Artículo

Relational Autonomy in Spinoza. Freedom and Joint Action

Aguilar, Claudia Maria de Los AngelesIcon
Fecha de publicación: 24/06/2022
Editorial: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Revista: Comparative and Continental Philosophy
ISSN: 1757-0638
e-ISSN: 1757-0646
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de recurso: Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:

Resumen

Over the last years, some of Spinoza studies have shifted to a consideration of the relational character of his ethics by focusing on the notion of autonomy. This concept is foreign to Spinoza’s vocabulary. Therefore, I will attempt to explain what Spinozan relational autonomy is and its connection with the most important ethical concept in his philosophy: freedom. Following considerations about Spinozan freedom, I claim that it entails a relational character and that, for this reason, it is equal to relational autonomy. We are free when our joint action is based on adequate ideas of what we have in common with others.
Palabras clave: AUTONOMY , FREEDOM , SPINOZA
 
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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/201872
URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17570638.2022.2091972?scroll=top&ne
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2022.2091972
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Citación
Aguilar, Claudia Maria de Los Angeles; Relational Autonomy in Spinoza. Freedom and Joint Action; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Comparative and Continental Philosophy; 14; 1; 24-6-2022; 1-9
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