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dc.contributor.author
Albornoz, Facundo
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dc.contributor.author
Galiani, Sebastián
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dc.contributor.author
Heymann, Carlos Daniel
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dc.date.available
2023-04-25T15:13:22Z
dc.date.issued
2012-03
dc.identifier.citation
Albornoz, Facundo; Galiani, Sebastián; Heymann, Carlos Daniel; Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Economics and Politics; 24; 1; 3-2012; 24-46
dc.identifier.issn
0954-1985
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/195284
dc.description.abstract
We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
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dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Expropiation
dc.subject
Political Regimes
dc.subject
Democracy
dc.subject
Oligarchy
dc.subject.classification
Economía, Econometría
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dc.subject.classification
Economía y Negocios
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dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
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dc.title
Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2023-04-19T15:11:24Z
dc.journal.volume
24
dc.journal.number
1
dc.journal.pagination
24-46
dc.journal.pais
Reino Unido
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dc.journal.ciudad
Londres
dc.description.fil
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Birmingham; Reino Unido
dc.description.fil
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Heymann, Carlos Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Economics and Politics
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.x
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.x
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