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dc.contributor.author
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto
dc.contributor.other
Rasmussen, Jesper Lundsfryd
dc.contributor.other
Asmuth, Christoph
dc.date.available
2023-04-13T15:26:53Z
dc.date.issued
2023
dc.identifier.citation
Ferreiro, Hector Alberto; Fact-constructivism and the Science Wars: Is the Pre-existence of the World a Valid Objection against Idealism?; Königshausen & Neumann; 2023; 317-337
dc.identifier.isbn
978-3-8260-7577-3
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/193744
dc.description.abstract
Metaphysics relies on the presupposition of the non-being or nothingness of the world: since the world has once not existed it is necessary to postulate a cause for its existence, i.e. an extrinsic principle to explain the absolute beginning of the causal series of all things that constitute the world. After the critique of theologizing metaphysics by authors like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, the notion of an absolute beginning still persists though in a field in which it often goes as such unnoticed while it factually enjoys wide acceptance, namely in epistemology. It sounds as a truism that knowledge begins: personal inexistence (birth-death cycle) and the phenomenon of unconsciousness (sleep-wake cycle) seem to endorse the obviousness of that statement. Now, to link the beginning of the phenomenal series of subjective acts of knowledge with the existence of an external world that causes the specific content of the transient cognitive acts relies, however, on two presuppositions, namely on the thesis of a complete non-being or nothingness of knowledge and, intrinsically related to this first presupposition, on the thesis of an absolute beginning of cognitive activity. If knowledge begins from its own nothingness, there must be a cause that is extrinsic to the totality of acts of knowledge, a cause that it doesn´t belong to the series of cognitive acts and, therefore, that it is not caused by any of them: this uncaused cause of contentful knowledge is supposed to be the real world external to the knowing subject. In my paper I make explicit the relation between realist-empiricist approachs to epistemology and the double presupposition of the nothingness and the absolute beginning of knowledge, I will explain the difficulties implied by these two presuppositions and, finally, I propose as plausible solution to those difficulties some theoretical claims of absolute idealism.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Königshausen & Neumann
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
German Idealism
dc.subject
Absolute Idealism
dc.subject
Beginning
dc.subject
Mario Bunge
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia y la Tecnología
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
dc.title
Fact-constructivism and the Science Wars: Is the Pre-existence of the World a Valid Objection against Idealism?
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/parte de libro
dc.date.updated
2023-03-16T13:47:47Z
dc.journal.pagination
317-337
dc.journal.pais
Alemania
dc.journal.ciudad
Würzburg
dc.description.fil
Fil: Ferreiro, Hector Alberto. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://verlag.koenigshausen-neumann.de/product/9783826075773-philosophisches-anfangen/
dc.conicet.paginas
420
dc.source.titulo
Philosophisches Anfangen: Reflexionen des Anfangs als Charakteristikum des neuzeitlichen und modernen Denkens Kultur
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