Artículo
The pyrrhonian argument from possible disagreement
Fecha de publicación:
04/2011
Editorial:
De Gruyter
Revista:
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
ISSN:
0003-9101
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
In his Pyrrhonian Outlines, Sextus Empiricus employs an argument based upon the possibility of disagreement in order to show that one should not assent to a Dogmatic claim to which at present one cannot oppose a rival claim. The use of this argument seems to be at variance with the Pyrrhonian stance, both because it does not seem to accord with the definition of Skepticism and because the argument appears to entail that the search for truth is doomed to failure. In the present paper, I examine the passages in which Sextus utilizes the argument from possible disagreement and offer an interpretation that makes the use of this argument compatible with the Pyrrhonian outlook.
Palabras clave:
PYRRHONISM
,
SKEPTICISM
,
DISAGREEMENT
,
OPPOSITION
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Articulos(SEDE CENTRAL)
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Citación
Machuca, Diego Emanuel; The pyrrhonian argument from possible disagreement; De Gruyter; Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; 93; 2; 4-2011; 148-161
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