Artículo
Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies
Fecha de publicación:
05/2022
Editorial:
John Wiley & Sons
Revista:
Legislative Studies Quarterly
ISSN:
1939-9162
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? The literature on the US Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross-cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. This article argues that unlike in the US two-party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. Additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll-call votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two-party presidential system.
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Articulos(SEDE CENTRAL)
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Citación
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Clerici, Paula Andrea; Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies; John Wiley & Sons; Legislative Studies Quarterly; 47; 2; 5-2022; 397-426
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