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dc.contributor.author
Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro
dc.contributor.author
Pailos, Federico Matias
dc.contributor.author
Toranzo Calderón, Joaquín Santiago
dc.date.available
2022-10-05T16:30:22Z
dc.date.issued
2021-08-09
dc.identifier.citation
Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro; Pailos, Federico Matias; Toranzo Calderón, Joaquín Santiago; Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 199; 9-8-2021; 12561–12586
dc.identifier.issn
0039-7857
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/172009
dc.description.abstract
Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemo- logical status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti- exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which LP and ST themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP, ST and the logics of the ST-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains (just like classical logic)? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST-metainferential logics in general—and STTω in particular— are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
MIXED CONSEQUENCES
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METAINFERENCES
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TRUTH
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SUBSTRUCTURAL LOGICS
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Filosofía, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia y la Tecnología
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Filosofía, Ética y Religión
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HUMANIDADES
dc.title
Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2022-09-20T12:00:18Z
dc.journal.volume
199
dc.journal.pagination
12561–12586
dc.journal.pais
Alemania
dc.description.fil
Fil: Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Pailos, Federico Matias. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Toranzo Calderón, Joaquín Santiago. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Synthese (Dordrecht)
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-021-03343-w
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03343-w
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