Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan

Abstract

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemo- logical status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti- exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which LP and ST themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP, ST and the logics of the ST-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains (just like classical logic)? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST-metainferential logics in general—and STTω in particular— are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth.