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dc.contributor.author
Orlando, Eleonora Eva
dc.contributor.other
Orlando, Eleonora Eva
dc.contributor.other
Saab, Andrés Leandro
dc.date.available
2022-10-05T12:29:39Z
dc.date.issued
2021
dc.identifier.citation
Orlando, Eleonora Eva; On the Moral Import of Using Slurs; Lexington Books; 2021; 159-186
dc.identifier.isbn
978-1-7936-1436-0
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/171892
dc.description.abstract
In this chapter I examine the thesis that there is a theoretically interesting relation between the semantic account of slurs, namely, expressions such as "spic", "nigger", "faggot", "dyke", "kike", "whore", etc. and the adoption of a morally correct stance on issues such as racism, sexism and homophobia. As is well-known, those expressions are prima facie associated with the speaker's conveyance of contemptuous feelings for the members of a certain group of people identified in terms of their origin ("spic"), race ("nigger"), sexual orientation ("faggot", "dyke"), religion ("kike"), gender ("whore"), etc. Recently, Hom and May (2013) have claimed that adopting a morally correct stance on such crucial issues requires supporting a certain account of the meaning of slurs, namely, one that has been classified in the Introduction to this book as Lexical Monism, on which they are conceived of as general terms expressing empty concepts. From their perspective, only by depriving slurs from extensions is it possible to come up with a semantic view that accords with the commonsensical moral belief that nobody should be despised because of qualities concerning her origin, race, sexual orientation, religion, gender, and similar aspects. Moreover, this implies a position on the moral import of slur use: those uses denying the ascription of the corresponding property to an individual, like "Victor is not a kike", or those interpreted as manifesting the empty character of slur-words, such as "There are no spics" and "No lesbians are dykes", are to be considered morally correct ones. So, Hom and May's position encompasses both a proposal about what it takes for a semantic account of slurs to be morally correct, and a thesis, following the proposed account, about what kinds of slur uses are morally correct.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Lexington Books
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
SLUR
dc.subject
MORAL INNOCENCE
dc.subject
MONISM
dc.subject
DUALISM
dc.subject.classification
Otras Filosofía, Étnica y Religión
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
dc.title
On the Moral Import of Using Slurs
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/parte de libro
dc.date.updated
2022-09-20T12:00:45Z
dc.journal.pagination
159-186
dc.journal.pais
Estados Unidos
dc.journal.ciudad
Lanham
dc.description.fil
Fil: Orlando, Eleonora Eva. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793614360/Slurs-and-Expressivity-Semantics-and-Beyond
dc.conicet.paginas
256
dc.source.titulo
Slurs and Expressivity: Semantics and Beyond
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