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dc.contributor.author
Galiani, Sebastián
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dc.contributor.author
Jaitman, Laura
dc.contributor.author
Weinschelbaum, Federico
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dc.date.available
2022-09-14T17:59:17Z
dc.date.issued
2020-05
dc.identifier.citation
Galiani, Sebastián; Jaitman, Laura; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Crime and durable goods; Elsevier; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; 173; 5-2020; 146-163
dc.identifier.issn
0167-2681
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/168742
dc.description.abstract
We develop a theoretical model to study how changes in the durability of the goods affect prices of stolen goods, the incentives to steal and the equilibrium crime rate. When studying the production of durable goods, we find that the presence of crime affects consumer and producer surplus and thus their behaviour, market equilibrium, and, in turn, the social optimum. Lower durability of goods reduces the incentive to steal those goods, thus reducing crime. When crime is included in the standard framework of durable goods, the socially optimal durability level is lower. When considering different stealing technologies, perfect competition either over-produces durability or produces zero (minimum) durability. The monopolist under-produces durability. The model has a clear policy implication: the durability of goods, and the market structure for those goods, can be an effective instrument to reduce crime. In particular, making the durability of a good contingent upon that good being stolen is likely to increase welfare. We also study the incentives to develop and use this optimal technology.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
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dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
CRIME
dc.subject
DURABILITY
dc.subject
EXTERNALITY
dc.subject
MONOPOLY
dc.subject
PERFECT COMPETITION
dc.subject
SOCIAL OPTIMUM
dc.subject
THEFT
dc.subject.classification
Economía, Econometría
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dc.subject.classification
Economía y Negocios
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dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
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dc.title
Crime and durable goods
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2022-09-14T14:18:30Z
dc.journal.volume
173
dc.journal.pagination
146-163
dc.journal.pais
Países Bajos
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dc.journal.ciudad
Amsterdam
dc.description.fil
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. University of Maryland; Estados Unidos. National Bureau of Economic Research; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Jaitman, Laura. The London School of Economics and Political Science; Reino Unido
dc.description.fil
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268120300433
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.005
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