Los argumentos del lenguaje privado: notas para la reconstrucción de una controversia

Abstract

En este trabajo intentaremos reconstruir la controversia acerca de la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado desatada a partir de la publicación de las Investigaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein en 1953. Nuestro trabajo se propone una reconstrucción histórico-sistemática más que una reconstrucción histórica exhaustiva. Es decir, intentamos conciliar el desarrollo temporal con el desarrollo lógico que en nuestra hipótesis está dado por la progresiva articulación y cuestionamiento de algunos supuestos. El resultado será un esquema de la controversia y de sus posibles salidas, lo que con Wittgenstein querríamos llamar una “visión sinóptica” de la controversia.

This paper tries to reconstruct the controversy on the possibility of private language. First, we analyse “epistemological” trends in the argument (Malcolm, Fogelin) showing their failures. Then, we analyse “semantic” versions (Kenny, Tugendhat) finding they are also failed. Barry Stroud’s criticism of transcendental arguments as refutations of scepticism allows us to discern the common presupposition that weakens the versions of the argument considered. Moreover, this reconstruction allows us to see how Kripke’s deals with the problem of the previous discussion in order to avoid committing himself with this presupposition. We consider Kripke’s version to be the only consistent version of the argument. Such a statement obliges us to consider two of the most important criticisms directed against Kripke’s Wittgenstein: The problem of objectivity of the rule: Can a single individual be right in contradicting communal assent?; and the problem of internal relationships between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. We claim that our reconstruction of the controversy provides good reasons to show that the above-mentioned objections don’t apply to Kripke’s Wittgenstein version.