Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem
dc.contributor.author
Danon, Laura
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.date.available
2021-10-25T16:01:36Z
dc.date.issued
2020-02
dc.identifier.citation
Danon, Laura; The content of aliefs; Springer; Synthese (Dordrecht); 2-2020; 1-18
dc.identifier.issn
0039-7857
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/144949
dc.description.abstract
In “Against alief”, Mandelbaum (Philos Stud 165(1):197–211, 2013) argues that if aliefs—a sui generis kind of mental states originally posited by Gendler (J Philos 105(10):634–663, 2008a; Mind Lang 23(5):552–585, 2008b; Analysis 72(4):799–811, 2012)—are to play the explanatory role that is usually ascribed to them, their contents must be propositionally structured. However, he contends, if aliefs have propositional contents, it is unclear what distinguishes them from beliefs. I find Mandelbaum’s arguments in favour of the idea that aliefs must have propositional contents to be compelling. However, I think aliefs should only be credited with a deflated kind of propositional content that I will baptize as “semi-structured propositional contents”, since they are composed by representational units that are neither fully un-detachable nor fully re-combinable. As I will argue, this way of understanding the content of aliefs not only allows us to accommodate all the worries raised by Mandelbaum regarding the nature of their contents, but it also it helps explain why aliefs have some of the peculiar features that Gendler ascribes to them. Consequently, it gives to the advocates of aliefs new tools to defend, against Mandelbaum, that these are sui generis mental states with their distinctive functional role in our cognitive lives.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
ALIEFS
dc.subject
ASSOCIATIVE CONTENTS
dc.subject
BELIEFS
dc.subject
CONCEPTUAL RECOMBINATION
dc.subject
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENTS
dc.subject.classification
Otras Filosofía, Étnica y Religión
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.title
The content of aliefs
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2021-09-06T16:05:06Z
dc.journal.pagination
1-18
dc.journal.pais
Alemania
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.description.fil
Fil: Danon, Laura. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Synthese (Dordrecht)
![Se ha confirmado la validez de este valor de autoridad por un usuario](/themes/CONICETDigital/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-020-02583-6
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02583-6
Archivos asociados