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dc.contributor.author
Fioravanti, Federico

dc.contributor.author
Tohmé, Fernando Abel

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Delbianco, Fernando Andrés

dc.contributor.author
Neme, Alejandro José

dc.date.available
2021-07-07T12:54:53Z
dc.date.issued
2021-03-08
dc.identifier.citation
Fioravanti, Federico; Tohmé, Fernando Abel; Delbianco, Fernando Andrés; Neme, Alejandro José; Effort of rugby teams according to the bonus point system: a theoretical and empirical analysis; Springer; International Journal Of Game Theory; 50; 8-3-2021; 447–474
dc.identifier.issn
0020-7276
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/135626
dc.description.abstract
Using a simple game-theoretical model of contests, we compare the effort exerted by rugby teams under three different point systems used in tournaments around the world. We consider a point system that awards four points to the winning team, no points to the losing team, and two points to each team in a case of a draw. The other two point systems award bonus points depending on the final score. They both award a bonus point for losing by only one try. One of these two systems gives an extra point to the team that scores four or more tries while the other gives it for scoring three more tries than the other team. We develop two models. One is a static one, intended to compare the joint efforts equilibria as to find which point system maximizes the effort exerted by the teams. The other is a dynamical model, providing a framework for the analysis of equilibrium payoffs and find the one in which teams exert more joint effort. In both models, the point system that maximizes the amount of effort in rugby is the one that awards a bonus point for scoring three more tries than the opponent. To evaluate the real-world validity of this claim we run empirical analyses using data from matches under the three point systems being evaluated. The empirical results confirm our theoretical conclusions.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Springer
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
BONUS POINT
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RUGBY
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EFFORT
dc.subject.classification
Matemática Aplicada

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Matemáticas

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CIENCIAS NATURALES Y EXACTAS

dc.title
Effort of rugby teams according to the bonus point system: a theoretical and empirical analysis
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2021-06-10T19:25:05Z
dc.journal.volume
50
dc.journal.pagination
447–474
dc.journal.pais
Suiza

dc.description.fil
Fil: Fioravanti, Federico. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Matemática. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Tohmé, Fernando Abel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Matemática. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Delbianco, Fernando Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Matemática. Instituto de Matemática Bahía Blanca; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
dc.journal.title
International Journal Of Game Theory

dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-021-00756-2
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00756-2
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