Artículo
An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Fecha de publicación:
03/2007
Editorial:
Elsevier
Revista:
Mathematical Social Sciences
ISSN:
0165-4896
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
Palabras clave:
VOTING
,
COMMITTEES
,
UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
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Identificadores
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Articulos(IMASL)
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Articulos de INST. DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS
Citación
Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Jordi, Massó Carreras; Neme, Alejandro José; An undominated nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit; Elsevier; Mathematical Social Sciences; 54; 2; 3-2007; 152-175
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