Artículo
Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience
Fecha de publicación:
01/2020
Editorial:
Routledge
Revista:
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
ISSN:
0967-2559
e-ISSN:
1466-4542
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in character; second, he does not believe now that the content of an experience needs to include everything the experience enables us to know non-inferentially. In this article, I take issue with both retractions. My thesis is that McDowell’s first version of perceptual content is preferable to the latest one.
Palabras clave:
CONCEPTUALISM
,
INTUITIONAL CONTENT
,
MCDOWELL
,
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT
,
REASON
Archivos asociados
Licencia
Identificadores
Colecciones
Articulos(IDH)
Articulos de INSTITUTO DE HUMANIDADES
Articulos de INSTITUTO DE HUMANIDADES
Citación
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience; Routledge; International Journal of Philosophical Studies; 28; 1; 1-2020; 36-55
Compartir
Altmétricas