Artículo

Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience

Kalpokas, Daniel EnriqueIcon
Fecha de publicación: 01/2020
Editorial: Routledge
Revista: International Journal of Philosophical Studies
ISSN: 0967-2559
e-ISSN: 1466-4542
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de recurso: Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:

Resumen

In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in character; second, he does not believe now that the content of an experience needs to include everything the experience enables us to know non-inferentially. In this article, I take issue with both retractions. My thesis is that McDowell’s first version of perceptual content is preferable to the latest one.
Palabras clave: CONCEPTUALISM , INTUITIONAL CONTENT , MCDOWELL , PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT , REASON
 
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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente descripción: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.5 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/125600
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1690542
URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09672559.2019.1690542
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Citación
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience; Routledge; International Journal of Philosophical Studies; 28; 1; 1-2020; 36-55
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