The irrelevance of poverty for the morality of the lending system

Abstract

In this article, I examine the claim that the morality of the international lending system should be assessed by looking at its effects on poverty. The claim I would like to defend is that it is not a necessary truth that aggravation of poverty under the current lending system is what makes this system unjust. Instead, I argue that, regardless on its efects of poverty, what makes the lending system unjust is that it allows wrongful loans. It is of course often the case that there is something wrong with lending, and that this flaw leads to poverty. However, in my view, the effects on poverty and the morality of loans can be conceptually independent from each other. Thus, it is misguided to measure poverty as a way of testing whether the lending system is just. I proceed as follows. First, I explain in some detail Pogge’s view about lending and justice, as he is the main defender of the outcome-view that I am trying to refute. Second, I will show two possible concerns about Pogge’s view. I will call the first one the ‘agnosticism objection,’ and the second one the ‘normative limitation objection.’ Third, I will briefly describe my own account of the conditions under which lending would count as wrongful (and non-binding). This account is an improvement over Pogge’s account.