Rights-based management in Latin American fisheries

Abstract

This study reports on a diversity of cases of rights-based benthic and finfish fisheries from Latin America. For benthic fisheries, Part I of this technical paper documents managementexperiences including: (i) limited entry or moratoria combined with a total allowable catch(TAC) in the Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery, and in the sea urchin and Juliana clam fisheries of Chile; (ii) catch shares in the diving fisheries for scallops from San José Gulf (Argentina) and for the loco snail in Chile (a system now defunct), and the Patagonian scallop industrial fishery (Argentina); (iii) Territorial use privileges based on sea bed tracts in Chilean territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs, 'AMERBs'), concessions from central Baja California (Mexico), 'predios' of sustainable use in Mexico, and concessions for seaweed extraction in Argentine Patagonia; (iv) individual use privileges over fishing 'campos' in spiny lobster concessions of Punta Allen (Mexico), 'marcas' in the Juan Fernández lobster fishery, and 'parcelas' in Chilean algal harvests; and (v) territorial communal rights (traditional and indigenous users) in the Seri Indian fishery of Mexico, Brazilian Reserva Extrativistas, and the piangua fishery of Colombia's Afro-American communities. For finfish fisheries, Part II presents rights-based management study cases for: (i) individual vessel quota (IVQ) management of the anchovy (Engraulis ringens) fishery of Peru; (ii) individual stakeholder quota management of the hake (Merluccius gayi gayi) fishery of Chile; (iii) community territorial use rights in the Gulf weakfish (Cynoscion othonopterus) fishery of the Gulf of California, Mexico; and (iv) individual effort quotas (IEQs) for artisanal communities in the multispecies fishery at Coiba National Park, Panama. Each case specifies the main attributes of the access rights (in a broad sense, including privileges), whether formal or informal: (i) how the rights are conferred and upheld; (ii) exclusivity of participation in the fishery; (iii) duration of the rights conferred; (iv) security or quality of the title conferred by the rights; (v) transferability, divisibility and flexibility in the use of the rights; and (vi) actual rights enforceability and corresponding compliance with use rights limitations. The study also reports on aspects of the harvest strategies in place, including: (i) fishing methods and gear; (ii) when fishing is authorized to take place; (iii) harvest controls; and (iv) monitoring.For fisheries targeting benthic organisms, main findings for the major categories ofprivileges or rights were:- Limited entry. A moratorium on the number of participants (boats and/or fishers),possibly combined with a TAC, often has been the first reaction to symptoms ofoverfishing. Moratoria are, in principle, a short-term instrument that should evolve intoformal limited-entry systems with specified entry/exit rules, a form of 'non-quantitativeaccess rights'. In practice, closed registries tend to become frozen, which results in aninformal market for the privileges of registered but inactive fishers and a distortion offishing effort statistics.- Catch shares. Catch shares have fared better in situations where there are fewparticipants, whether the shares are granted to individual coastal gatherers, small-scaleboat-owners or industrial vessels. In limited-entry systems (with or without catch shares)where the fishing units are small boats (typical of commercial diving), whether accessprivileges are vested on individual fishers or boats has significant implications formanagement. The dynamics (entry, mobility, ageing, attrition and exit) of fishers and boatsare very different. Fishers are generally more transient than boats, and often move acrossjurisdictional boundaries. Systems based on catch shares granted to individual fishers havefailed when the number of participants is large, mostly because inflated or outdatedregistries and poor enforcement have frustrated effective implementation.- Territorial use privileges typically consist of concessions to fishers organizations,such as Mexican cooperatives and Chilean 'sindicatos', for the use of specific resources intracts of seabed (TURFs). Differences in design have significant management implications.In the case of Chilean AMERBs, the tracts are relatively small, leaving variable extensionsof background areas where fishing for key target species is nominally banned, butregulations are unenforceable. The result has been severe depletion of valuable resources(e.g. loco snails) in background areas and an illegal market for small, sublegal shellfish.Mexican cooperatives from central Baja California, instead, have concessions overextended tracts contiguous with each other, so that there is no unclaimed backgroundterritory. This system has been very successful on most accounts. Overall, TURFs havefared better in cases with a long history of collective territorial appropriation, informal in itsbeginnings, than in systems introduced de novo by design. Moreover, they have been moreeffective in cases where the tracts are close to fishing communities, particularly in ruralareas, which facilitates vigilance and deterrence of intruders.- Individual privileges for access to fishing spots, a particular form of TURF, are as arule regulated by some form of customary marine tenure. These systems are typicallyassociated with interception gear, such as traps or attraction devices. Informal individualprivileges are usually tradable under a variety of arrangements (monetary or else) and canbe inherited. The 'parcela' system of algal harvesting from Chile is based on resourceswith a high turnover rate, and privileges may be temporary and re-assigned through alottery. Informal customary marine tenure systems are the result of a protracted process ofadaptive adjustment. Formalization of customary systems poses significant risks because, inthe absence of effective feedback, formality can be a straightjacket for systems whoseresilience is conditioned on their adaptiveness.- Territorial communal rights granted to traditional and indigenous users aredifferent from all of the preceding because access rights to fishing are usually only part of abroader package. Restitution of rights is always accompanied by significant devolution ofmanagement authority. This results in two-tier governance systems, in which somedecisions are made at the national level (e.g. 'bounding' the community), while rules forthe access to resources or benefits by individual members are decided within thecommunity. Issues of legitimacy raised by the definition of 'community' can be verycomplex. Moreover, the granting of exclusive communal rights may be in conflict withnational legislation.The main attributes of the rights-based systems in place for the finfish fisheries reported inthis study are the following.For the IVQ system in the anchovy (Engraulis ringens) fishery of Peru, exclusive rights aregranted for ten years with a contract warrant to industrial vessels targeting anchovy for indirect human consumption outside the five-mile limit allocated to artisanal vessels. There is no transferability of rights independent of the vessel unit, and divisibility is allowed to substitute capacity of individual vessels removed from fishing. For the individual stakeholder fishing quota of the common hake (Merluccius gayi gayi) fishery in Chile, the current fishery law in operation allocates 5 miles from the coast for exclusive use of the artisanal fishing. In addition, the common hake fishery is declared in full operation and a limited-entry scheme is in place for both industrial and artisanal. A maximum catch limit per stakeholder MCLS is also in place. By law, a TAC must be defined annually to assign 35 percent for the artisanal sector and 65 percent for the industrial one. Rights are renewable on a yearly basis, and the State guarantees the right to a fraction of the total TAC, subject to biomass accessibility. Rights are non-transferable and non-divisible. With the community territorial use rights of the Gulf weakfish (Cynoscion othonopterus) of the Gulf of California, Mexico, exclusive territorial fishing rights with limited entry are granted for two years to a coastal community with limited entry. Security is provided by fishing title rights for the period covered by the fishing licence. In this Mexican fishery, rights are non-transferable and non-divisible. For the multispecies fishery at Coiba NationalPark, Panama, exclusive fishing rights are granted, through IEQs, to fishers of 47 small-scale boats. Rights are granted for one year with the possibility of renewability. These rights are secure rights as long as there is full compliance with regulations of the Coiba National Park. Transferability or divisibility of these rights is not allowed.The study also explores and discusses the following questions: How can the property rightssystems illustrated in the case studies improve the incentives for stewardship, conservation and sustained profitability? What sorts of distributional implications are there in each of the rights-based finfish fisheries reported? What sorts of operational requirements do the different types of property rights documented demand in terms of research, enforcement, administration and actual fishing operations?The diversity of rights-based management schemes reported for benthic and finfish fisheriesin Latin America seems to respond to: (i) local fishery contexts; (ii) institutional, resource and ecosystem dynamics; and (iii) governance capacities in place. At this stage of establishing rights-based schemes in Latin America, a commonality found in virtually all study cases is the non-transferability of formal privileges. It seems to reflect the concerns for potential concentration of fishing rights in a few hands were transferability introduced. In many of the cases discussed, non-divisibility of rights is also specified. In contrast, informal access privileges are effectively transferable and divisible in some customary tenure systems where sea bed resources are targeted. Enforcement and compliance continues to be a challenge for many of the cases reported, particularly in artisanal fisheries. Community self-policing in fisheries with a limited number of participants seems to facilitate compliance with regulations and granted rights. Because of the relatively short time span in which the reported formal right-based systems have been in place, the sustainability performance of most of them cannot yet be properly assessed. The main exceptions are spiny lobster fisheries from Mexico (Baja California and Quintana Roo) and Chile (Juan Fernández Islands), in which sustainability has been achieved through a long history of informal access arrangements preceding (or coexisting with) more recently established formal privileges.