Artículo
Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland
Fecha de publicación:
06/2015
Editorial:
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
Revista:
Analytic Philosophy
ISSN:
2153-9596
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes "to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one´s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)". My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland´s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
Palabras clave:
Skepticism
,
Suspension
,
Equipollence
,
Inquiry
Archivos asociados
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Identificadores
Colecciones
Articulos(SEDE CENTRAL)
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Articulos de SEDE CENTRAL
Citación
Machuca, Diego Emanuel; Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Analytic Philosophy; 56; 2; 6-2015; 177-187
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