Artículo
The Experience Not Well Lost
Fecha de publicación:
12/2014
Editorial:
Brill Academic Publishers
Revista:
Contemporary Pragmatism
ISSN:
1572-3429
e-ISSN:
1875-8185
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
According to Rorty, we can avoid the typical problems of traditional epistemology if we do not posit epistemological intermediaries between mind and world in order to explain empirical knowledge. In particular, one can do that if one considers perceptual experiences, not as mental states with representational content, but as causes of empirical beliefs. Accordingly, Rorty rejects any justificatory relation between experience and belief. Only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Experience has only a causal role in the acquisition of an empirical belief. In this article, I show how Rorty's resistance to attribute representational content to perceptual experience conspires against his attempt to overcome Cartesian epistemology.
Palabras clave:
Rorty
,
Perceptual Experience
,
Epistemology
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Articulos(IDH)
Articulos de INSTITUTO DE HUMANIDADES
Articulos de INSTITUTO DE HUMANIDADES
Citación
The Experience Not Well Lost; Brill Academic Publishers; Contemporary Pragmatism; 11; 1; 12-2014; 43-56
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