Artículo
The effect of social norms on bribe offers
Fecha de publicación:
20/07/2018
Editorial:
Oxford University Press
Revista:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
ISSN:
8756-6222
e-ISSN:
1465-7341
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.
Palabras clave:
Experiment
,
Social norms
,
Sanctions
,
Corruption
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Articulos(IIESS)
Articulos de INST. DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DEL SUR
Articulos de INST. DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DEL SUR
Citación
Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474
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