Artículo
Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
Fecha de publicación:
06/04/2006
Editorial:
Springer-Verlag
Revista:
Social Choice And Welfare
ISSN:
0176-1714
e-ISSN:
1432-217X
Idioma:
Inglés
Tipo de recurso:
Artículo publicado
Clasificación temática:
Resumen
This paper studies the strategic foundation of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein in: Pub Choice 72:193-212, 1991), also called the "second version" of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of single-crossing preferences. The main result shows that single-crossing constitutes a domain restriction over the real line that allows not only majority voting equilibria, but also non-manipulable choice rules. In particular, this is true for the median rule, which is found to be group strategic-proof over the full set of alternatives and over every nonempty subset. In addition, the paper also examines the relation between single-crossing and order-restriction. And it uses this relation together with the strategy-proofness of the median rule to prove that the outcome predicted by the Representative Voter Theorem can be implemented in dominant strategies through a simple mechanism. This mechanism is a two-stage voting procedure in which, first, individuals select a representative among themselves, and then the winner chooses a policy to be implemented by the planner.
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Articulos(IIESS)
Articulos de INST. DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DEL SUR
Articulos de INST. DE INVESTIGACIONES ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALES DEL SUR
Citación
Saporiti, Alejandro Daniel; Tohmé, Fernando Abel; Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule; Springer-Verlag; Social Choice And Welfare; 26; 2; 6-4-2006; 363-383
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