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dc.contributor.author
De La O, Ana L.
dc.contributor.author
Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac
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dc.contributor.author
Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca
dc.date.available
2024-03-04T10:43:22Z
dc.date.issued
2023-02
dc.identifier.citation
De La O, Ana L.; Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac; Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca; Voluntary audits: Experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats; Pergamon; World Development; 162; 2-2023; 1-14
dc.identifier.issn
0305-750X
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/229159
dc.description.abstract
Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights from the social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation and effort. Partnering with a provincial auditing body in Argentina, we implement an encouragement design in which school principals are invited to receive a voluntary audit of a publicly funded school meal program. We employ a two-level randomization, in which regions are first randomly assigned to a higher or lower rate of invitations, and then schools within regions are randomly assigned to treatment or control. We find divergent effects of treatment based on the density of treatment; in the group of regions assigned to the lower rate of invitations, school principals assigned to treatment report increased motivation and a decrease in school closings. In contrast, in the group of regions assigned to the higher rate of invitations, we observe the opposite effect. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, we speculate that a higher rate of invitations may generate pressure to accept the invitation and thereby undermine any positive effects of volunteering. Our results suggest the promise of voluntary audits as well as the need for further research on the conditions under which voluntary oversight may have differing consequences for bureaucratic effort and motivation.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
Pergamon
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dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
ARGENTINA
dc.subject
AUDIT AGENCY
dc.subject
BUREAUCRATIC MOTIVATION
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BUREAUCRATIC OVERSIGHT
dc.subject
FIELD EXPERIMENT
dc.subject.classification
Ciencia Política
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dc.subject.classification
Ciencia Política
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dc.subject.classification
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
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dc.title
Voluntary audits: Experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2024-02-29T13:18:37Z
dc.journal.volume
162
dc.journal.pagination
1-14
dc.journal.pais
Reino Unido
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dc.description.fil
Fil: De La O, Ana L.. University of Yale; Estados Unidos
dc.description.fil
Fil: Gonzalez, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto de Investigaciones Políticas. - Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Instituto de Investigaciones Políticas; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca. University Brown; Estados Unidos
dc.journal.title
World Development
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dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106131
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