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dc.contributor.author
Trakas, Marina
dc.date.available
2021-10-13T19:10:01Z
dc.date.issued
2020-08
dc.identifier.citation
Trakas, Marina; La notion de reconnaissance chez Bergson; Universidade Católica de Pernambuco; Ágora Filosófica; 20; 2; 8-2020; 194-222
dc.identifier.issn
1679-5385
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/143443
dc.description.abstract
Dans son dernier livre, Ricœur affirme que la notion de reconnaissance de soi à travers de la mémoire du passé est au cœur de l’œuvre de Bergson, particulièrement dans Matière et Mémoire (1896). Cet article propose une relecture de cette œuvre bergsonienne afin d’analyser la conceptualisation de la notion de reconnaissance proposée par son auteur. Comme cette étude le montre, loin de présenter l’idée d’une reconnaissance de soi à travers la mémoire et le passage du temps, Bergson introduit le concept de reconnaissance strictement en rapport avec la perception: la reconnaissance automatique, qui consiste à savoir se servir des objets, et la reconnaissance attentive, qui nous ramène aux objets afin de les connaître. Cette analyse limitée de la notion de reconnaissance s’explique par l’objectif principal qui guide cette œuvre: démontrer que dans la perception concrète il y a déjà un point de contact entre la matière et l’esprit à travers de la mémoire
dc.description.abstract
In his latest book, Ricœur states that the notion of selfrecognition through the memory of the past is at the heart of Bergson's work, particularly in Matière et Mémoire (1896). This article offers a rereading of this Bergsonian work in order to analyze the conceptualization of the notion of recognition proposed by this author. As this study shows, far from presenting the idea of self-recognition related to memory and the passage of time, Bergson introduced the concept of recognition strictly in relation to perception. He distinguished two kinds of recognition: automatic recognition, which consists in knowing how to use objects, and attentive recognition, which brings us back to objects in order to know them. This restricted analysis of the notion of recognition can in fact be explained by the main aim that guided his work: to demonstrate that in concrete perception there is already a point of contact between matter and mind through memory.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
fra
dc.publisher
Universidade Católica de Pernambuco
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
Henri Bergson
dc.subject
Reconnaissance
dc.subject
Mémoire
dc.subject
Perception
dc.subject
Matière
dc.subject
Attention
dc.subject
Esprit
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia y la Tecnología
dc.subject.classification
Filosofía, Ética y Religión
dc.subject.classification
HUMANIDADES
dc.title
La notion de reconnaissance chez Bergson
dc.title
Bergson's Notion of Recognition
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2021-04-28T21:33:33Z
dc.identifier.eissn
1982-999X
dc.journal.volume
20
dc.journal.number
2
dc.journal.pagination
194-222
dc.journal.pais
Brasil
dc.journal.ciudad
Recife
dc.description.fil
Fil: Trakas, Marina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Ágora Filosófica
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.unicap.br/ojs/index.php/agora/article/view/1728/1446
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/https://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2020.v20n2.p194-222
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