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dc.contributor.author
Senci, Carlos Maximiliano
dc.contributor.author
Hasrun, Hipolito Manuel
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Moro, Rodrigo
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Freidin, Esteban
dc.date.available
2020-11-27T15:24:29Z
dc.date.issued
2019-08-01
dc.identifier.citation
Senci, Carlos Maximiliano; Hasrun, Hipolito Manuel; Moro, Rodrigo; Freidin, Esteban; The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab; SAGE Publications; Rationality and Society; 31; 3; 1-8-2019; 287-312
dc.identifier.issn
1043-4631
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/119227
dc.description.abstract
In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/ absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rights and duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and information about rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly, officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to do so (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribe offers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations from results without explicit normative information and the relevance of present findings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
eng
dc.publisher
SAGE Publications
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.subject
BRIBERY GAME
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CORRUPTION
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DUTIES
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MORALS
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RIGHTS
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SOCIAL NORMS
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Otras Sociología
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Sociología
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CIENCIAS SOCIALES
dc.title
The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.date.updated
2020-11-11T18:47:12Z
dc.identifier.eissn
1461-7358
dc.journal.volume
31
dc.journal.number
3
dc.journal.pagination
287-312
dc.journal.pais
Reino Unido
dc.journal.ciudad
London
dc.description.fil
Fil: Senci, Carlos Maximiliano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Hasrun, Hipolito Manuel. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Moro, Rodrigo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
dc.description.fil
Fil: Freidin, Esteban. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentina
dc.journal.title
Rationality and Society
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1043463119853893
dc.relation.alternativeid
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463119853893
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