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Crafting public security: demilitarisation, penal state reform and security policy-making in post-authoritarian Chile

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ABSTRACT

Here I dissect the institutionalisation of 'citizen security' as a category and sector of public policy in post-authoritarian Chile. Deploying a Bourdieusian field theory approach and questioning narratives of security policies as responses to criminality or adaptations to democratic values, I argue that the construction of a new security policy sector – with a new consensus (distinct from that of National Security), with reformed police and courts in its core, leaving aside the military and extending beyond traditional agencies – derives from (i) struggles over policing and criminal justice reforms, (ii) tensions between the military and democratic authorities in democracy and (iii) performative integrations of the new policy components. These mechanisms explain the evolution of the security problem and the progressive aggregation of bureaucratic agencies and methods to the 'public security policy' – policing, judiciary, urban design, prisons and prevention plans. I close discussing alternative accounts of institutional variations in security governance in the region.

1. Introduction

Crime and violence have been at the core of Latin American governments' agendas for the last two decades.[1] As common and organised crime as well as fear of crime has been deemed as a threat to democratic governance in the region, both at the level of principles and of regime endurance, a number of studies concerned with the crime problem in those democratic contexts 'examined reform measures, and the conditions under which some have succeeded and others failed'.[2] Police and criminal courts reform have also been discussed in relation to the paradigm change in security policy from 'National Security to Citizen security'.[3] Here, instead of discussing the 'difficulties of achieving lasting police and criminal justice reforms, security *and* an integration of democratic principles and the rule of law on an institutional level',[4] I analyse how the transition to political democracy, and the struggles around police and criminal justice reforms resulted in the building of new 'security policy' rationales and state institutions that claim to embody those 'democratic principles and the rule of law', and that legitimate democratic authorities production of order and the governance of certain agents and organisations over 'public security' policies in democratic times. That is, I

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analyse the public governance of crime issues in a case of recent democratisation as derived from the struggles around reforming police forces and criminal justice systems. In doing so I twist the traditional question of how to achieve police and criminal courts changes that warrant a democratic security policy and address how has a conception of 'democratic public security policy' emerged out from struggles for police and criminal courts reform, leading to the institutionalisation of public or citizen security as a 'category of policy intervention'[5] in democratic Chile.

From a structural and constructivist analysis of public policies and security – tracing the objective determinants of policy options and security definitions from the structured context of practice and agent's preferences and strategies,[6] and developed below – I map the emergence and consolidation of the new category of 'citizen security', as well as the way in which specific police and criminal courts components were progressively classified as pertaining to such policy realm. From this perspective, I explain the crafting of a security policy in democracy, resulting in what has been called a 'public' or 'citizen security' policy as opposed to a 'National Security' policy in Chile. But, instead of taking for granted that 'public security' refers 'to physical and psychological safety of persons [...]' where 'the sources of threat…are principally crime, violence, terrorism *and* domestic institutions characterized by incompetence, corruption and impunity, [indeed] corrupt and inefficient law enforcement and judicial institutions',[7] I explain how the lack of institutional reforms towards accountability and efficiency in police and criminal courts were converted into a legitimate threat and considered part of the public problem itself.

The resulting centrality of policing and criminal justice reforms within this policy arena is not merely a reaction to an increase in crime rates or to the problematisation of crime within the political arena. In Chile, since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s and most importantly, since crime control became a central political problem in the first half of the 1990s, security concerns shifted from counterterrorism to citizens security, and citizens' security 'solutions' evolved from attempting policing reforms to criminal procedure reform as well as penitentiary issues, encompassing later on crime data gathering, and then data production and community participation programmes, known as "social prevention programmes, as well as victims crime assistance and urban design.[8] Each of these elements and components, have been elaborated as distinct policy programmes, struggled upon by different agents in relatively independent processes and time periods during the first decade of democracy in the 1990s, and only later on, identified as pertaining to the 'citizen's security policy' by the first 'Diagnosis of Citizen´s Security in Chile' of 2003. Emerging 'security experts', along with, politicians and bureaucrats that participated in the elaboration of the different police, criminal courts, penitentiary, community mobilisation, victimisation and violence policies the decade before, authored the diagnosis.[9] These same components finally became part of the National Citizen's Security Policy of late 2004 and the National Citizen's Security Strategy in place since 2005.

As we can see, the crafting of the new 'public security' or 'citizen security' policy is not a fatality and its components vary in time and across cases. In studying the emergence and configuration of security policies across Latin America or even within its Southern cone countries one observes a great variety of categories and components, even within the same country and at different moments in the same national or subnational jurisdiction. The centrality of police, judicial, carceral, informational, communitarian or

educational components also varies across cases and moments.[10] In other words, the crafting of a 'citizen's security policy' is a highly contingent process.

In what follows I provide an in-depth study of the Chilean case showing how certain mechanisms shaped the institutionalisation of the new category of public intervention with its specific components. Before engaging in the socio-historical analysis I present the theoretical framework that draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Vincent Dubois to highlight the operation of bureaucratic field´s struggles as core mechanisms of change, in particular struggles taking place in what I call the policing field, the criminal courts field and more generally the security policy field.

2. Security policy making: between penal state making, democratisation and the institutionalisation of categories of public intervention

To deal with the security policy making in democratic Chile I follow the Bourdieusian approach proposed by Vincent Dubois and his concepts of 'categories of public intervention' and 'fields of public policies'[11] combined with the sociology of securitisation advanced by Didier Bigo[12] With these concepts I analyse how 'Citizen's security' became a new public policy category that emerged after the transition to democracy and 'gave coherence and meaning to a set of necessarily different acts, discourses, expenditures and administrative practices'[13] and integrated different elements that were hierarchically ordered. This category does not merely 'reflect the objective reality of the problems tackled by authorities'. Instead 'it classified and shaped objects, practices and social problems…belonging to [security] that, thanks to this category achieved a "specific integration and ordering of these multiple interventions as a whole". As the emergence and the components of this policy category varies across countries, I trace the "specific historical condition of its emergence"[14] and the multiplicity of activities and "rationalisations regarding objectives, priorities, hierarchies, and assessment of results". I am interested here in particular in the mutations in terms of "principles of legitimisation",[15] as well as of state agents and agencies involved, of the means deployed, of the actions or practices involved, in the degree of integration and subordination to the same principles of legitimisation'. In the case the security policy, as it occurs to other 'social problems', following its emergence, security also evolved towards a stable field of public policy. It could have disappeared as such, or its components integrated under another category.

In the case of 'public' or 'citizen' security policies in democratic Chile, in fact, this category emerged at the same time that it eclipsed the category of 'national security'.[16] Each category, as expected from Bigo's perspective, prioritised politically and administratively specific threats and involved different agents with authority over those policies who engaged in an agonistic process of 'securitisation' or 're-securitiation' where, within the 'field of (in)security professionals' 'agents and institutions concur[red] over the legitimate knowledge about specific dangers, risks and vulnerabilities'.[17]

Highlighting the structural an strategic component of field theory, Dubois[18] proposes studying public policies in terms of the contents of its problematisation and components, by establishing, at the structural moment, the 'relations between options and orientations and the definition of a policy to the positions and interests of those who advocate them' and (2) the 'correspondence between the content of policies and the structure of the space of agents involved in its production'.[19] These analytic and

explanatory operations require to determine the type of definitions of the policy that emerged, and to connect such definitions, at the more constructivist moment, with the interests, dispositions, resources – including international connections–and trajectory of agents promoting them, and to determine the space of agents advancing or opposing such new definitions, and their trajectories in relation to authority over security priorities. These agents include from ascending lawyers and investigative police officers to retreating military officers. At the same time, it is relevant to analyse which practices and interventions were classified or created as related to the legitimate definitions of the problems, and the ways in which they were integrated and ordered. This integration in itself may imply exclusion of specific institutional components or practices from a previous category (i.e. excluding protests control from national security), the autonomisation of the category and a possible integration of other elements, as well as changes in the boundaries of the policy field 'that reconfigures formerly autonomous social universes and shifts the borders of those realms to include them partially or totally in the new [security] field'[20] In the process, different public and private agents may lose or gain power and authority within their subfield of struggles and as a result over the security policy realm. Dealing with changes in boundaries, power struggles, internal subfield and symbolic differentiation, as well as on the causal efficacy of the social trajectory of agents this Bourdieusian field-theoretical perspective covers a number of explanatory voids left by alternative approaches to security policy change in the region; namely 'institutionalist' and 'neoliberal state', perspectives I discuss in the concluding section.

A complete study of these process should analyse not only the study of struggles within the bureaucratic field (more precisely, within the policing and criminal courts fields) as I do here, but also the dynamics in the general political field as well as processes within the journalistic field paying also attention to the different or coinciding temporalities or the processes in each arena. Here I concentrate in the police and criminal courts subfields, but the media and political arenas are also mentioned. Each of these arenas produces representations of the public problem of security and gives varying attention to it at different moments, evolving from periphery to central space (and vice versa) in each arena, according to the 'carrying' capacity of each arena.[21] The attention to the dynamics and temporalities in each arena (political, journalistic and bureaucratic), is relevant, both because processes in each of them, with different temporalities and cycles, preserve the centrality of security as a public problem at different moments.

Taking into account the processes in these different fields what we observe is not a linear process of (a) initial problematisation; (b) solution proposal and design, and (c) implementation (i.e. increase in crime, public decision, implementation) of a security policy where reforms are more or less successfully implemented to deal with the problem, as most analysis do. Instead, we observe a process of accretion of 'solutions' that appear before the 'problem' itself, that arise from long term struggles in bureaucratic sub-fields, and that latter on get attached to the 'security' problem as it is 'carried on' by agents of the political and journalistic fields. In what can be described as a progressive clustering of policies and measures around the security problem, policing policies remained central since the transition to democracy. Other policies, such as judicial reform, neighbourhood courts, or urban city design become integrated latter on or even excluded (i.e. Neighbourhood Courts for example was advanced as a solution

by Allende years experts right after transition but was later on displaced by criminal procedure reform). Each of these elements appear and emerged independently from each other. For example, criminal procedure reform results not from struggles around police powers but from dynamics in the juridical field. Political agents, ministries, and experts, according to their own strategies latter on attempted to integrate the different institutional components into the 'security' policy category.

Here I concentrate in the police and in the judicial component and the struggles in the policing and criminal courts fields, where different agents deployed different types of capital to change the policing and criminal courts field, and by doing that, altered the symbolic order of the security field that pivoted around both military, policing and criminal courts policies. These tensions and investments led both to the development of a new field doxa and a new policy 'categorical imperative'.[22] In turn, on the one hand, it laid the bases for the addition of a plurality of institutional practices and interventions related to the 'security' problematic. In this work I refer mainly to the integration of police and criminal procedure reforms within the security policy, A more complete analysis should also reconstruct the genealogy of community crime prevention plans, crime statistics and crime surveys, urban design, something I do in other works.

Tackling the formation of security policy from struggles within sub-sectors of the bureaucratic field, I advance an empirical approach to penal state transformation that connects political processes with bureaucratic struggles. These dimensions are systematically overlooked in works that deal with recent changes in the penal sector of the state or in changes in penal policies. With the concept of the policing and criminal courts field I analyse the transformations of the system of police bureaucracies attributing changes not to macro-societal changes or general political currents such as neoliberalism [23] or the incorporation of new foucaultian rationalities but to the struggles within the fields where specific agents and interests carry those rationalities. In doing so I address both structural issues of autonomy of bureaucratic agencies from political actors and other state agencies, as proposed by Garland,[24] but go beyond an analysis of ideal types of bureaucrats and politicians and take into account specific positions and trajectories of bureaucratic agents and experts.

To substantiate my argument I draw on the comparative field analysis used to explain the transformation of police forces, criminal justice and prisons in post-authoritarian Chile and Argentina[25] putting in relation the agents and dynamics of the policing and criminal justice fields with what I call the security policy field in democratic Chile. I use documentary and interview data collected in Santiago de Chile between 2009 and 2011 and between 2016 and 2017. I also resort to secondary bibliography and official documents. Most official documents were obtained in the library of the Carabineros High Police Academy and of the Ministry of Justice of Chile, as well as in online government repositories. I use documents and data from 46 in-depth interviews with present and former: (i) high-ranking police officials directing training, general planning, and urban security under-directorates; (ii) members of intervening NGOs and think tanks; (iii) experts in public and private universities, and (iv) advisors and former incumbents of the Departments of State and Justice in each Chile. In open-ended interviews, that lasted from one to four hours, obtained though snow-ball sampling. In the interviews I inquired about their social and professional trajectories, assets, relations, roles and views in the police, justice and security reform process. Combing interviews with document data I

analysed the agents' reconversion strategies, their alliances and position-takings within the struggles around police or court reform. The analysis reconstructed the evolving composition of agents in the police and criminal courts sub-fields, describing their dominant or dominated positions in the process of policy formation and institutional change and their different views on the appropriate policies. Having reconstructed those struggles in much more detail elsewhere,[26] in this work I proceeded to relate the causal process of struggles in the police and criminal courts fields with the strategies within the more general and emerging security policy field, working with Dubois hypothesis of correspondence between the content of policies and the structure of the space of agents involved in its production, tracing back the authority of those agent as derived from their previous participation in sub-field struggles.

The analysis that follows is organised in four moments. I start tackling the 'public order' issues that the Chilean transition brought analysing the emergence of security as a political problem, and how the public order problems of transition lead to government investments that produced a new police doxa within what I call the 'policing field'. I then turn to the changes in the two national police forces, Carabineros de Chile and the Investigative Police forces. Then I trace how criminal courts reform processes, taking place within the criminal courts field, emerged as a public issue and then became incorporated to security policies. I then briefly refer to the incorporation to security as a municipal policy and the reactions of the central government. Finally, I analyse how both elements, police and judicial, as well as local municipal components, were incorporated in the first overall formulation of a citizens' security policy in the mid-2000s. I close discussing the relation between this approach to alternative perspective on security policy making in the region.

3. Policing the transition, security as a political problem, and the change in the policing field doxa

The political transition to democracy in Chile in 1990 implied a devaluation of bureaucratic capital held by the former military junta a re-valuation of electoral capital in the political field. Still, elected authorities found important obstacles to convert their political capital into governmental authority over the Carabineros, the national militarised police of Chile, and more generally, implied an enormous weakness regarding the production of internal order and the fight against political opponents form the right and the left.

The governing *Concertación* de *Partidos por* La *democracia* – an Alliance of centre-left parties within which the Christian Democratic party (DC), the Socialist Party and the Partido por la Democracia were the main partners, and hereinafter Concertacion – had very little room to manoeuvre in the political and military fronts right after the transition. The authoritarian regime imposed a protected democracy allowing the former military and police elites to reconvert their power within the democratic political arena. The 1980 Constitution had created a 'National Security Council' composed by members of the military and Carabineros and a minority of civilians, gave pre-eminence of the executive over the congress, established that former chiefs of the Army and the police would become 'appointed senators' and put in place a voting system that meant an overrepresentation of right-wing parties in Congress. Exploiting its political power, four

days before President Alwyn got into office, Carabineros obtained a new General police ordinance securing its bureaucratic integrity and independence: it put police chief Rodolfo Stange in power for eight more years, gave him the monopoly over designations of high officers, deployment; incorporation, careers, and social benefits, and prohibited reducing police personnel and budget.

Within the centralised political system of Chile Carabineros shared policing functions with the historically small Investigative Police (IP), in charge of criminal investigations. Struggles within the political and bureaucratic spaces between 1927 and 1990 resulted in Carabineros becoming a highly coherent and professionalised force, with recognised authority over policing policies, progressively independent from the military and from both local politics and national political parties. The smaller Investigations Police after separating from Carabineros in 1932 was historically subordinated the executive branch, involved in both political and crime policing. The bureaucratic capacity and its autonomous authority allowed *Carabineros* to reject the attempts of democratic authorities after 1990 to take control of the force and to self-reform to preserve its bureaucratic power, and most importantly to preserve its authority over policing policies.

Authority over policing policies is the core stake within what I call the policing, field-the historically specific bounded structure of hierarchical relations where relatively autonomous public police organisations, competing bureaucracies (i.e. the military, intelligence bodies, or other specialised police forces), the central government, and agents of the political system as well as experts, sharing an interest in policing matters, invest in it and vie to accumulate and deploy policing capital, the authority to determine public policing policies and priorities. Within the field, police organisations may themselves be sub-fields of struggles – not merely a rigid obedient apparatus, acquire different levels of bureaucratically based authority over policing policies, and develop field-like properties[27] with its boundaries, hierarchies, orthodoxy and competing internal factions.

In the case of *Carabineros*, within the organisation, two factions competed for supremacy at the return of democracy in the early 1990s. One faction was what I call the 'Counterinsurgents', specialised in political policing, and counterinsurgency since the 1950s, and another one was a more dispersed groups I call the 'managers', specialised in police administration.[28] The Police Chief Rodolfo Stange Oelckers designated by Pinochet during dictatorship in 1985, was both a counterinsurgency and a police management specialist. Under the leadership of General Director Stange and spearheaded by Pinochet's threats of dissolving Carabineros, the managers had began a long-term process of institutional strengthening and professional re-arming. While sharing power with counterinsurgency experts, the 'managers' reinforced the managerial and planning capacities of Carabineros. Cost-analysis and planning was generalised as a new professional skill applied even at the precinct level[29] By 1988, when Pinochet lost the plebiscite opening the transition to democracy, Carabineros had rearmed itself with a new doctrine that combined management and counterinsurgency applied to combating urban crime and social disorder.[30] Counterinsurgency has been incorporated in the organisation, training and mission definition since the coup, while police management was an older specialisation.[31] At the inauguration of democracy in 1990s Carabineros was a highly professional bureaucracy with a coherent definition of its mission, oriented to state security and normal crime, with a cohesive command dominating a disciplined force and highly sensitive to intromissions of political authorities over the force or to

attacks to bureaucratic power or jurisdiction. In these conditions, the government invested all its political capacities to increase its control over the police, developing administrative bodies and sponsoring alternative visions of police work. This investment took place primarily after the democratic government had to face left wing terrorism.

The security problem emerged in Chile around the issue of left-wing terrorism. Progressively, however, crime insecurity became a central political problem. The government policies regarding terrorism in democracy allowed the proliferation of new agents in the policing field. These new agents deployed state, academic, and journalistic capitals putting forward an heterodoxic and critical view of the police mission and laying the symbolic and administrative platform of the consolidation of security as a public policy category

To address terrorism elected president Aylwin invested in administrative and expertise capacities to face the retreating but menacing military, to counter Carabineros and to get control over the Investigative Police. In 1990 and 1991, the government had to deal with a number of politically oriented bank robberies, prison escapes of radical left-wing leaders and the killing of the main ideologist of dictatorship, Jaime Guzman. The government´s legitimacy suddenly depended on the control and repression of the radicalised left. According to Interior Ministry Belisario Belasco, left-wing terrorism was 'the people's main problem'. But, as Acevedo Arriaza argue, more than a people's problem, it was a government's problem, as the democratic government found itself in the need to respond to the Armed Forces' and Carabineros' requests to 'intervene to avoid a guerrilla situation'.[32] In that scenario, the government, lacking an 'intelligence organisation of its own', initially invested in reinforcing and backing the Investigations Police. The government put anti-terrorism in the Investigative Police´s hands, and supported its killing of terrorists and suspects at point black and the use of torture, during 1991–1992.[33] To coordinate anti-terrorism policies, the government also created in 1990 a special office, called 'La oficina' [the office], which in 1991 became the 'General Directorate for Public Security and Information' (DISPI). The government used 'La oficina' and DISPI to disarm the radical leftist groups that continued operating after the transition. Between 1991 and 1992, the government disarmed, through imprisonment and repression two radical communist organisations, the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez, and the Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria – Lautaro.[34]

Besides reinforcing the heteronomous Investigations Police (Fruhling 1998) Secretary General Minister Edgardo Boeninger – former director of the Center for Development Studies (CED) – 'the most active and broadly effective institution working on the topic of [democratic] transition'(Puryear 1994:94) – began to reorient the think tank to democratic-era government concerns. Central among them was counterterrorism. Working at DISPI and CED Hugo Frughling – a Harvard Law school graduate, former Ford Foundation fellow, and academic advisor to the human rights organisation Vicaria de la Solidaridad during dictatorship – rapidly became a specialist, first on counterterrorism,[35] working on what at that time was the core 'security problem' right after transition. The discussion about terrorism in the first years of democracy, opposed two camps, the army and the militarised police and the right wing politicians and media on the one hand, and the government experts and liberal law scholars, on the other. Frughling participated very early in the debate around the existence of guerrilla. Distinguishing between types of political violence ('state terrorism', 'political

demonstrations', 'terrorism' and 'guerrilla'), he proposed as counterterrorism policies 'preserving the rule of law, public opinion campaigns, political and social integration of possible members and information gathering'. In particular, he suggested 'not concentrating information gathering in only one security organism', meaning not to give Carabineros a monopoly over political intelligence, and not to 'involve the armed forces' in counterterrorism.[36]

After the terrorist groups were practically disarmed in 1992, experts at DISPI and CED started producing new know-how in the policing field. Hugo Frughling turned into a specialist in policing matters, in particular in democratic policing (interview Fruhling, 30 May 2009). He got funding from the Ford Foundation to study civilian control over the police and introduced in Chile 'community policing', a model that was an integral part of the US foreign police policy US launched in the early 1990s.[37] In 1998, he would eventually get state funds to create the 'Center for the Study of Citizens' Security', at the prestigious Universidad de Chile. Also at DISPI, social anthropologist Patricio Tudela, educated in Germany, former political analyst working at the DC party think-tank during transition, turned himself into a police expert working in the state. Paradoxically enough, it was government and experts attention to terrorist violence that gave rise to the notion of 'citizen's security' in Chile. In his discussion of Terrorism in 1992, Fruhling himself recognised 'that terrorism is a threat to state security…but of course it also affects citizens´ security' (1992: 46). In late 1993–1994, Tudela introduced the notion of 'Security in Democracy' from the German Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution, where he was trained in the early 1990s (Interview Tudela August 2009). As he became director of the Division of Police Coordination in charge of relations with Carabineros and an advisor to the interior ministry Figueroa he applied it to refer to policing policies more generally (Interview Tudela, August 2009).[38] Government and CED experts also started working more heavily on common crime issues after 1992. Democratic authorities were concerned in the media representation of common crime in the first years of democracy,[39] but after 1992 crime insecurity became central within the public debate.

Besides the DISPI and CED experts, allied to the government, three other new agents emerged within the policing field in the early 1990s. From the academic field, criminal law scholars and criminologists at the Diego Portales Law School, fighting for human rights in the 1980s, introduced the notion of 'citizen security' developed during the Spanish transition to democracy.[40] Reintroducing in Chile the perspective of critical criminology along human rights analysis, they adopted the category of 'citizens' security' to distinguish it from 'public order', associated with authoritarian regimes. At the same time, criminologists and legal scholar, were the first ones to distinguish between 'objective insecurity' and 'subjective insecurity' or fear or crime.

While security was discussed both in relation to terrorism and common crime, progressively it became focused on common crime. This translation was also related to the increased attention that the dominant media set on common crime, after the son of the media tycoon Agustin Edwards was kidnapped by a radical leftist group and them liberated from captivity in 1992, the media conglomerate *El Mercurio* put common crime in centre stage. Common crime became editorialised, while the *El Mercurio* group launched *Fundación Paz Ciudadana* (FPC), a think-tank that specialised in crime and criminal justice reform issues. FPC was directed by University of Chicago trained

economists and propaganda experts and financially backed by the main economic conglomerates of Chile.[41] FPC put crime at the centre of the political agenda right after transition and promoted the municipalisation of the police.[42] Very soon it also began to get involved in criminal procedure reform, as we will see in the next section. The other main new actor was the think-tank *Libertad y Desarrollo* (LyD), which was created in 1989 to advise the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (UDI) party and fed the crime control policies of Joaquin Lavin, himself a Chicago trained economist and mayor of wealthy municipality of Las Condes since 1992 (Lavín's interest in security as mayor will lead the central government to promote municipality based crime prevention programmes as we will see later)

These new agents (rising security experts, academics, and think-tanks) put forward an heterodox vision of the state coercion and particularly of police practices, that questioned the field doxa inherited from dictatorship centred on state security, highly repressive and distant from the community. They proposed instead a police in the service of citizen security, efficiently provided by a plurality of police agencies, more accountable to the public and respectful of detainees' rights. The struggles between the central government and Carabineros triggered Carabineros to turn this new orthodoxy into a new bureaucratic reality very soon.

4. The modernisation of the police forces and the problem of security in the mid-1990s

It was in the second democratic administration, under President E. Frei, that the autonomous Carabineros engaged in self-transformation as a result of a long confrontation with the central government over the direction and control of the police. The confrontation began in 1994 when, after a military prosecutor indicted General Stange in a dictatorship-era case of assassination of communist activists, president Eduardo Frei (also from the Christian Democratic party, as Aylwin), asked Stange to resign. As he refused, Frei demanded him to 'at least modernise the force' (Interview Patricio Tudela, July 2009). To compel the police to modernise the government froze designations of new personnel and promotions – just as Pinochet had done between 1977–1982 and 1985–1987. This changed the internal power relations, producing the displacement of the counterinsurgency experts, and the rise to the top of the managers. Stange immediately reorganised high Command and the planning division. By mid-1994 a renovated High Command, now filled with managers, elaborated a first 'Modernisation Plan'[43] based on renovated 'professional education, respect for human dignity, efficiency in production of security and incorporation of technology'.[44]

But the government found the modernisation plan 'insufficient', (Tudela himself discussed the plan) and in late 1994, escalated the symbolic attack criticising Carabineros' approach with an international conference in Santiago on 'Security, Democracy and Participation.[45] DISPI director and Hugo Frughling from CED were keynote speakers. Interior Minister Carlos Figueroa, declared in his speech, written by Tudela on 'Citizen security as a state task', that 'the old paradigm of public order, whose instrumental character allowed it to serve the interest of authorities gives place to that of citizens' security, […] centred in protecting citizens'.[46] DISPI Director, emphasised the need to balance the rule of law and repression, to aim towards greater

efficiency and efficacy, to incorporate the community and municipalities in the production of security, as well as focalisation of their efforts. Hugo Frughling, from CED and DISPI, added to all this the need for more administrative and judicial control, programme evaluations and greater community participation.[47]

It is worth noticing that it was in this conference that the idea of 'citizens' security' or security as mainly referred to crime control and crime prevention was homogeneously espoused among the participants. This conference certainly marked the generalisation of this new orthodoxy in the policing field, and in the feebly emergence of the security policy field more generally. According to the conference proceedings "citizens´ security was 'based on the rule of law and a democratic order', but it exceeded policing powers. The heavy volume concluded with a programme for a security policy that encompassed: the police, criminal procedure reform, municipal governments, and the design of public security policies. When proposing policies Fruhling mentioned: 'Diagnosis', encompassing crime reports, victimisation surveys and crime prevention, including local crime prevention programmes, neighbourhood prevention policy, focus on certain sectors, drugs and alcohol, and policing policies, which included collaboration and indicators of police work, community relations and accountability.[48]

While the new category of security encompassed a variety of elements, the struggle with the police continued and remained central. The symbolic and budgetary attrition produced the removal of Chief Stange, and propelled the police force to react with a counterplan. Stange retired in 1995 after the headquarters decided that 'the continuation of Stange in front of the institution started to become to heavy a burden for the whole force' (Interview Retired General Sandoval Quappe, June 2009). Deputy-chief Cordero Rusque, also from the managers group, took his place. With a strong corporative outlook and a keen managerial profile he produced a new 'Strategic Plan', which proposed 'four modernizations[:]... human resources, logistics, communications and public relations, and operations' (Interview, General Gonzalez Theodor, Planning and Development Director, May 2009). In 1997, Deputy-Chief Manuel Ugarte Soto, also an expert in administration, became chief.

In 1997, the Planning Directorate developed studies, with the aid of the Economics Department at the Universidad Catolica, that would allow them to justify budget increases, as well as redefine their function and operations. With studies 'based and originated in the economic and administrative sciences'[49] the Planning Directorate created methodologies and formulas to determine the 'local and aggregated national demand of police services'. With the 'Methodology to determine the critical surveillance level of a police beat'[50] they advanced 'a scientific way to establish the need of additional resources that the institution required to efficiently perform its labour'.[51] To determine the most efficient way to satisfy such demand they resuscitated 1981 studies on a 'Methodology to determine the equivalence among means of police surveillance' and developed a 'Methodology for the optimisation of the operative deployment of Carabineros'.[52] With these studies the managers provided themselves with symbolic means to counter the budgetary attrition in the hands of the Finance Minister and put themselves in a stronger position to discuss with the right-wing think-tanks, majors and senators. As Tudela put it: 'the Finance Minister suddenly found out that it was facing a technically capable institution' (Interview July 6th. 2009).

But the managers did not limit themselves to window dressing their use of more resources. They extended the management logic from the administrative to the operative realm. In 1998 the High Command launched a pilot version of a new deployment plan, the 'Plan Cuadrante', (Police Quadrant Plan) where the new mathematical formulas and indexes were turned into criteria for deciding on territorial deployment throughout the country. In 2000, they extended Plan Cuadrante to the whole Santiago Metropolitan region, and after that they nationalised it all the way down to the preccint level.[53]

Besides reacting to the central government, the police also changed reacting to new experts' demands of greater accountability. The Plan Cuadrante incorporated 'police community relations' to 'adequately address security demands, better identify community problems, and create more trust on Carabineros[54]'. By doing that they satisfied the new standard of legitimacy based on getting closer to citizens and communities, while avoiding appearing following experts at the University and DISPI. At the same time, they were able to present a plan where Carabineros got collaboration and funding from municipalities while preventing the development of stronger municipal guards.[55]

Finally, Carabineros developed, since the mid-1990s, new criminal investigation capacities responding to the government-sponsored expansion of the Investigative Police and later on, to the Criminal Procedure Reform that began in 2000.[56] This criminal procedure reform, which put the formal direction of investigations in the hands of prosecutors, lead a group of officers to invest in criminal law and criminal investigations capacities since the early 1990s, and aided the force to keep a shared jurisdiction over criminal investigations with the Investigations Police.

The same system of tensions first around counterterrorism and then around common crime propelled the changes in the Investigations Police. The IP, however, instead of struggling with the government, allied to it, and very early on adopted the managerial logic imposed by government. The IP added to it a professionalising strategy based on a human rights perspective.[57]

5. Criminal procedure reform: from transitional justice concern to security policy component

While the tension in policing fields shaped the type of policing that was going to be introduced and incorporated as the policing components of the security policy, the struggles taking place in the judicial arena, in particular around criminal courts, shaped the judicial components of this policy. The criminal procedure reform, resulted from a struggle within the criminal courts field. This is the space in which reformers arose and reform proposals where struggled upon, a delimited space of relations located at the intersection of the juridical field, the penal sector of the bureaucratic field and the political field, where agents possessing mainly juridical, bureaucratic and/or political capitals vie for the authority to determine national criminal courts' roles, policies, and priorities.[58] The struggles within these spaces propel both court reform and the deployment of judicial governing expertise, among other capitals. These capitals, include, not just cultural-juridical capital, more or less internationalised, and progressively economic cultural capital, in the form of degrees and managerial know-how, but also social capital of networks, in particular with foreign agents and national political agents. From this perspective demands for judicial reform are *strategies* of national professional expert-

entrepreneurs that challenged the existing criminal procedure codes and the workings of the justice administration in order to make a new position for themselves in the local juridical fields. These strategies constitute *reconversion strategies of legal scholars or other professionals, like economists, from the academic or expert sector of the national juridical fields* deploying their social and (varied) cultural capitals in the political sector of the national criminal courts field. The actual implementation of their reforms has always depended on the convergence of their strategies with those of political agents (the central government and legislature) interested in court change.

In the 1980s, during dictatorship, and continuing a long series of reform attempts in Chile, criminal procedure reforms plans added, besides given power to prosecutors and increasing oral hearings, a concern with the organisational efficiency of the justice administration. This was the work of newcomers to the criminal courts field, economists working at the *National Planning Office* (ODEPLAN) and the *Finance Ministry*, the 'fortresses of the Chicago Boys'.[59] In 1978, a special commission led by economists, began studying the 'judicial carceral system'[60] and among its 'course of action' proposed a criminal procedure reform that would rationalise and computerise courts work.[61] In the late 1980 and early 1990s, another group, located and the newly created Universidad Diego Portales Law School, and leaded by Jorge Correa Sutil (who had a Yale University LLM), began working on transitional justice issues. Among them were Juan Enrique Vargas and Christian Riego, assistants to Correa Sutil and Juan Bustos Ramirez at Diego Portales and introduced the criminal procedure issue within the transitional justice agenda in the early 1990s.[62]

Right after transition to democracy in 1990s groups at the Diego Portales Law School and in the rights-wing think-tanks were again working on justice reform projects. The reform programme initially was centred on judicial training and career, and was a very limited attempt of the government to control a Judicial power that was beyond its control and a historical ally to Pinochet. From within this reformist pole, the most dominated of the dominated progressive legal scholars, Juan Enrique Vargas and Cristian Riego, from the Diego Portales Law School invested their meagre academic and political capitals, to become leaders within local reform scholars by proposing to concentrate on criminal procedure reform. They combined experience in work in human rights activism and in the *Rettig Truth Commission*, empirical studies framed in critical criminology introduced by Juan Bustos, and USAID and Ford Foundation funding. Through Ramirez they also contacted and brought Argentina reformers Julio Maier and Alberto Binder to Chile in 1992.[63]

The Portales group allied with economist-reformers experts at Fundación Paz Ciudadana leaded by Carlos Valdivieso (with a degree in International Economy from San Diego State University and former manager of foreign investments funds in a Chilean bank).[64] The economists also had an empirical perspective based on organisational efficiency studies and project evaluation. These two groups, counting with consensus-making strategies and organisational analysis provided by Binder´s team, designed a reform-package for criminal courts that replaced judicial training and career aspects within the justice reform of the democratic government. With the backing of the second democratic president, E. Frei (1994–2000) and Justice Ministry Soledad Alvear, as well as both right-wing and the centre-left parties, they saw the new code discussed in Congress between 1995 and 1999.

The initial discussions of criminal procedure reform associated the democratising of justice with transition topics.[65] As 'security' became a central media and political problem in the mid-1990s, the criminal procedure reform became one of the central components of this policy, and presented as such. In 1995, the President of FPC, María Pía Guzman, associate the criminal procedure as a moment within the 'flux of the criminal procedure' that starts with the crime, continues with the report, investigation, detention, sanction, prison and rehabilitation.[66] The main agents of the field, the reformers at Diego Portales, Juan Enrique Vargas; the Ministry and Secretary of Justice; a Supreme Courts Justice, all argued and took for the granted that criminal procedure reform was a matter of 'citizens security'. In 2000, Chile adopted a completely new criminal procedure, with a new division of labour between judges, prosecutors and public defence, operating in a managerially rationalised system that increased processing capacities.[67] Judges became secondary, controlling legality and the protection of defendant´s rights and the Prosecutors' Office would direct a gigantic and powerful unified prosecuting policy executed by regional and district prosecutors directing criminal investigation, that included also the centrality of victims.

By the late 1990s police 'modernisation' and criminal procedure reform occupied the core of the public security policy in terms of personnel and budget allocation. Still other components where progressively added to the policy when it was designed and formalised in 2004–2005, under government of Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006). In 2004, the government ordered a diagnosis and in 2005 published the National Public Security Policy. The 'Diagnosis' included within the political category organs from the ministries of Interior, Justice, Education, Housing and Urbanism, the Public Prosecutor´s Office, Carabineros and the Investigations Police, the National Women Service, National Institute of Sports, the National Institute of Youth and the National Drugs Council (CONASE). Central among the components were the community and municipality based crime prevention plans 'Safe Municipality' (Comuna Segura) and 'Safe Neighborhood' (Barrio Seguro). The central government designed these programmes reacting to municipal guards organised by majors, mostly from right-wing municipalities in the 1990s (Jorge Araya, Directorate of Citizen Security, Interview, November 2009). Tudela, since 1998 from DISPI, developed an 'Integral Plan of Citizens Security'. After 2000, at the Under-Secretary of Interior, under Jorge Burgos, he directed a special unit in charge of the plan and became part in mid-2001 of the Directorate of Citizen Security. He developed those programmes, along with Jorge Araya and Enrique Oviedo and received input from Franz Vanderscheuren, from the Alberto Hurtado Jesuit University. Vanderscheuren had studied Neighborhood Courts during the Allende years, and had returned to collaborate in Chile since 2002, after working at the UN Habitat for Humanity office in Africa, where he developed the 'Safer cities' approach in close collaboration with the International Center for the Prevention of Crime, of Montreal (Interview Franz Vanderscheuren, October 2009).[68] As we can see, to understand the content of each components one should analyse the genealogy of each policy and programme, something beyond the space available here.[69] More important to discuss is how the diagnosis reflected both the distribution of power over security policy making, the categories that structure it and the hierarchical ordering of the different components it produced.

6. Codifying citizens' security policy via 'diagnosing' the security problem

The 'Diagnosis of the Citizen's Security Experts Forum'[70] resulted from the work of especially selected 'experts' that discussed and drafted it in 2003 and decided to publish it the early 2004. The diagnosis was convened by Undersecretary of Interior, Jorge Correa Sutil and requested by the 'Citizen's Security Division' Director. The directorate was created in mid-2001, after the arrival to power of the Party for Democracy under President Ricardo Lagos. The 'Division' was originally put in place to design and implement crime prevention plans and organise crime records in the hands of the government (where both police forces would report), something that started in 1999 after a pilot programme designed by Fundacion Paz Ciudadana.[71] However, after two years, the Division turned from mere data gathering and preventing plan developers to initiating a State Policy that makes 'explicit the orienting principles of the different government initiatives as well as the mid-term and long term agenda'.[72] The convened Forum replicated a consensus making practice across parties, that mixed academic exchange rules with political party confrontations, leading to agreements and working consensus.[73]

Under the format of a 'Diagnosis' the report organised and put together a number of different practices that had previously existed in a disperse way and oriented to specific objectives. To assemble them the experts adopted the format of a market study, distinguishing between a 'Security demand' and a 'Security offer'. The section on 'demand' constructed such demand recounting statistics on 'crime reports, detentions, prison statistics, victimisation surveys, fear of crime and the relation between victimisation and fear'. The 'Security offer' section, presented a 'synthetic description that identifies the public and private offer in citizen security' and a detailed description of that offer 'based on the professional expertise of some of the forum members'.[74]

Presenting the state intervention in citizens' security as a '*distinguishable and systematic object of public policy*' involved at the same time to construct it as a '*multidimensional*' problem, attaching to the object 'citizen´s security' a number of programmes and practices that allowed a number of government agents to participate in its governance. The Interior Ministry was involved through the 'Citizen´s Security Division' and the 'Safe Municipality' Programs – involving community participation and funds – and through the 'Safe Neighborhoods' Plan – a special plan for highly 'problematic' zones. The National Drug Control Council participated with the PREVENT programme oriented to community participation. From the Justice Ministry, the National Minority Service, the Legal Aid Corporation, and the Prison System were also involved. From the Ministry of Education, the security policy components consisted in conflict resolution, drug prevention and healthy behaviours promotions within the school curricula. The Housing Ministry participated with its 'Preventive Space Design ordinances'. The Public Prosecutors´ office did it with the victims and witness Units. Carabineros and the Investigation Police also provided their own policing services offer. The National Women Service and Sport and Youth National Institute also attached some of their programmes to the policy programmes. After this synthesis, however, the diagnosis focused in a detailed analysis of what 'in the view of the forum are the most relevant ones [of the components]'.[75] The resulting policy, following Dubois hypothesis, reflected very well the "correspondence between the content of [the policy] and the structure of the space of agents involved in its production.[76]

Ordering in a hierarchy, not surprisingly, the diagnosis started explaining the criminal procedure reform and provided a whole section elaborating on 'criminal procedure reform and security', in particular discussing 'CPR and delinquency' and the varying relations with crime reports, crime, and fear of crime. Then extensive attention is given to the Preventive Security Police Quadrant Plan of Carabineros. This is followed by a detailed description of the two government programmes 'Safe Municipality' – (started in 2000) and the 'Safe Neighborhood Program' (started 2001). They continue with the 'National Council for Drugs Control', created in 1990, suddenly converted form a health to a crime prevention programme, and Prisons, including prison privatisation. The diagnosis refers then to the National Minority Council, and the actions of governors, in charge of provinces.

Finally the document closes with a 'Glossary' giving the appearance of a dictionary of terms of accepted use, at the same time that it establishes distinctions and classifications that organise the different components. A most important distinction established was the definition of 'citizen security' itself, codifying for all policy actors the meaning of their intervention. But just as important was the distinction between 'prevention' and 'control' policies. These categories allowed the formal coexistence of the prevention programmes produced by the government (social prevention, situational prevention) with 'control' encompassing 'detention, processing and sanction of people that committed crime', arguing in a circular manner that 'policies regarding police forces, the judicial system and the imposition of sections are generally classified within this category [of control], even if these institutions also engage in prevention'[77]. The classification and interest in producing an organic whole includes the oxymoron of 'judicial prevention'.

The specific classification of the different programmes in the policy reflect the composition of the 'experts' participating in the forum. Their participation was in turn determined by the recognised authority in security policies, following university and think-tank membership related to political party lines. First, the experts Andres Baytelman, Rafael Blanco from the Diego Portales School, and core participants in the criminal procedure reform and the legislative steering committee. Then, two members from the government sponsored think-tank on security policy, the Center for the Study of Citizen´s Security, from University de Chile, Hugo Fruhgling and Lucia Dammert, directly involved in both policing policies, and the evaluation of community programmes. These groups were generally identified with left wing and centre parties. Besides them we found the representatives of the FPC, Catalina Mertz and Gonzalo Vargas, who also participated in policing policies and in the criminal procedure reform, and associated with right parties all of them accompanied by the Sur Professionales think-tank member Enrique Oviedo. Finally, the undersecretary of Interior, Jorge Correa Sutil was there and who had close ties with the Diego Portales School and justice transition issues. All of them, have participated in the struggles around police issues or around the criminal procedure reform. Of a more academic profile we found M. Krause, psychologist, E. Valenzuela, Sociologist, both from the Catholic University, and F. Vanerschueren, from the Jesuit Universidad Alberto Hurtado, sociologist, but also officer at the UN Habitat for Humanity since the 1990s. Finally, Claudia Serrano Tapia, who was a government specialist in citizenship participation. While the Forum aligned experts along right- and left-wing party lines, the exchanges also allowed creating working

alliances, as well as transcending party lines. As Franz Vanderscheuren very clearly posits it, 'The forum was very important to get into agreements with (right-wing) CPF…and the people, the intelligent people at CPF, like Gonzalo Vargas, they understood how important it was to invest in prevention and participation' (Interview, October 2009).

However, and most importantly, as Bourdieu has argued regarding housing policies commissions in the 1970s in France, this report by a commission of experts, an experts forum, must be treated not as a presentation, but as a performance, where the agents, using the public authority invested in them, in this case by the Under-secretary of Interior and the Directorate of Citizen Security, produced a universalisation of their own particular stances and preferences, allowing each of them to appear as both disinterested and neutral. The format and language produced a 'de-particularisation' where the commission of experts 'appears beyond contingencies, interests and conflicts', contributing not to solve the political problem, but to make it exist as such at the general and collective level. Second, the composition of the commission also determined what elements of the policy were incorporated and classified as such, as well as the type of categories that were considered pertinent. To be part of the commission, the agents had to count on important amounts of either political capital (undersecretary of interior), properly 'security policy' expertise, either as specialists in policing policies (Fruhling, Dammert, Mertz, Oviedo) or on criminal procedure reform (Vargas, Baytelman, Blanco). Other draw mainly on their academic credentials (Valenzuela, Krause), combined with international organisations background (Vanderscheuren), noting, however, that the group or pure academics was a minority, compared to those with specific and concrete national and international trajectories in the new policy realm.

From those apparently neutral and impersonal positions, the members of the 'experts' forum, delineated and organised a new category of political policy that both reflected the priorities they have been advancing for almost a decade, either personally or institutionally. At the same time they become recognised experts in the specific public realm, becoming their expertise a state sanctioned expertise.

The report of the experts' forum became the bases for the document 'National Citizens Security Policy' issued on October 2004.[78] These document shares the same diagnosis, and the same offer of security, with the same categories of 'prevention', 'control' and 'institutional designs' that were established in the 2003 documents written by the experts. The 'National Public Security Strategy' launched in 2005, and its continuation, the 'Public Security National Plan', launched in 2010,[79] comprise the same categories and core components.

7. Theoretical alternatives and conclusion

As we could observe in this work, the formation of a security policy in democratic times in Chile is both directly related to policing and criminal courts policies, but at the same it is much more than that. The emergence of the problem of security was initially related to the problem of terrorism by leftist groups at the transition to democracy. It was that context that led to the problematisation of the government control over police forces, and eventually it led to police reforms programmes in Carabineros and the Investigations Police. The 'terrorism problem' produced an intense debate over repression in democratic times allowing for the elaboration of a new doxa within the policing

field, and for the progressive emergence of the security problem as a political problem and eventually a category of public intervention.

The category of citizen security then explicitly opposed to that of National Security, and aimed at leaving aside the Armed forces–eager to intervene, arguing that there was a guerrilla situation in Chile – and produced a legitimation of police and justice coercion in democratic times. Progressively the terrorism threat was displaced and common crime, what has been labelled 'crimes of greater social connotation' were prioritised as the main threats. While there was consensus about the threat, there was also a variety of agents proposing legitimate means to deal with it.

Regarding the relations between different agents, there was not a harsh competition between them, but instead a progressive adjustment of police, criminal courts, prisons, the traditional core of the penal state, with new agents and agencies. If compared with the agents involved in security prior to dictatorship the greatest novelty is the displacement of the military and the association of criminal investigation and adjudication with security, as well as the community reinforcement programmes. The police, which was central before remained central under the new policy category.

Now, in explaining both the categories and components, the concrete police or criminal courts components, as well as those of community participation, each and all of them result from concrete struggles in sub-sectors of the bureaucratic field, over police or criminal courts policies, over municipal crime prevention programmes, or over drugs or over minors policies. In each of these policy realms, it was the dominated agents: the police reformers from the government, the criminal procedure reformers and community-based prevention programmes from the think-tanks and universities, and in general the central government vis-à-vis Carabineros and the Supreme courts and the Army, or the Investigations Police vis-à-vis Carabineros, that systematically espoused and advanced a new doctrine and a new doxa in each subfield while at the same time advancing new techniques to satisfy the new demands. The new security policy, then, resulted from the convergence of a number of different struggles, and of the ascendant trajectory of agent in each of those sub-field, in the police, courts – and other sub-bureaucratic fields – with those of the political field, that produced and objectively determined and alliance between the agents of different subfields.

It is exactly these series of sub-fields struggles, strategies and convergences that are sidelined in those approaches that attribute security policy development to all powerful external forces of 'neoliberalism' or in those works that, paying closer attention to national conditions, adopt an 'institutionalist perspective'. A case in point is the sophisticated work advanced by Arthur Trindade and Renato Sergio de Lima on 'public security' policies in Brazil.[80] In their perspective they refer to the 'organisational field' formed by 'many organisations that act directly or indirectly to find solutions to the problems related to the maintenance of public order, criminality control and the prevention of violence'.[81] They share with the Bourdieusian field-theory analysis advanced in this work a dynamic view of 'public security' and their concept of organisational field encompasses both symbolic and power relations. Their concept of 'organisational field', just as the concept of security policy field, also has the capacity to put together organisations that the common sense divides and has the capacity to produce grand vistas. While this concept allow us to capture the multiplicity of organisations involved, including centrally the police, courts, and also the military, the problem arises when we want to explain the changes in norms and practices

(institutions) and in the organisations of the security organisational field. Even if the Institutionalist perspective refers to the basic mechanisms of mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism the concept of organisational field of security appears too large and vague to explain changes in the symbolic and, most decisively in power relations of the organisations and agents involved in the field. And even if they argue that the entrance of new organisations to the field reconfigure the 'security field' creating new conflict and strategies, it is difficult to determine what moves these agents, individual or collective, without a reference to the sub-field dynamics and structures, to the interests of organisations, and most importantly, to the trajectories and dispositions of agents. It is also difficult to explain the variety of competing definitions of (in)security within the field.

The analysis in terms of a field of public security policy with its subfields involved I advanced here pays greater attention to the agents and agencies that introduce the institutions that are presented as 'legitimate' to copy in each moment, and give more attention to the different types of power operating, in terms of capitals. At the same time by working at different levels, in terms of fields and subfields, I introduced causal factors different from those advanced by the institutionalist perspective. In paying attention to structural aspects of a middle level, the approach is closer to the work of de Lima, Sinhoreto and Buenos,[82] as it also pays attention to the politicisation of the judiciary and policing arenas, the changes in the type of activists (from civil rights activists to academics) in the political arena and the overall outcomes of the field centred on managing economic interests over the right to life, a matter left in the hands of the police as a result of processes of judicial reform. The field theory approach advanced emphasises the effects of the social trajectories and interests of different agents, and allows for the analysis of subfields in a more systematic manner.

Despite their differences, the concept of organisational field and of fields of public policy, both have the merit of highlighting concrete logics and orientations of agents as well as specific path-dependency structural determinations. These dimensions are lost in the attractive but simplifying narratives of Late modern evolutions in the periphery or neoliberal penal state transformation in Latin America,[83] oriented more to determine commonalties than specific differences across cases. Theoretically informed comparative studies, which are always comparisons across cases studies, appear as necessary as ever to keep on mapping the specific configurations of penal states and the specific security governance categories and structures in the region. The analysis advanced here aims both the denaturalise the notion of public, citizen or democratic security as well as to provide means to explain its genealogy and ongoing re-configurations in those different cases

Notes

1. Bergman and Whitehead, "Introduction. Criminality and Citizens Security," 5–8.
2. Ibid., 8; Bailey and Dammert, *Public Security and Police Reform*; Uildriks, *Policing Insecurity*; and Ungar, "Crime and City in Latin America."
3. Neild, "From National Security to Citizen"; Bailey "Introduction: New Security Challenges"; and Estevez, "Public and Citizen Security in South."
4. Uildriks, *Public Insecurity*, 2.
5. Dubois, "The fields of public policy."
6. Ibid; Bigo, "International Political Sociology." For a basic introduction to Bourdieu´s 'structural constructivism' se Wacquant, "Towards a Social Praxeology" 7–12.

7. Bailey, "Introduction: New Security Challenges," 12.
8. See Dammert, "From National Security to Citizen"; and Oviedo, "Democracia y seguridad ciudadana en Chile."
9. Foro de Expertos, *Diagnóstico de la Seguridad Ciudadana*.
10. See Bailey and Dammert, *Public Security and Police Reform*; and Kessler, *Cuestiones de Sociología*.
11. Dubois, *Cultural Policy in France* and "Fields of public policy."
12. 'International Political Sociology.'
13. Dubois, *Cultural policy in France*, 3.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. For a sketch of national security see Bailey, "Introduction: New Security Challenges."
17. C.A.S.E. Collective, "Critical approaches to security," 458; and Bigo, "International Political Sociology," 126.
18. Dubois, "Fields of public policy."
19. Ibid., 203.
20. C.A.S.E. Collective "Critical approaches to security in Europe," 458.
21. Hilgartner and Bosk, "Rise and Fall of Social Problems."
22. Dubois, "Fields of public policy," 3.
23. Iturralde Sanchez "Ooverno neoliberal da insegurança social na América Latina."
24. Garland, "The penal state."
25. Hathazy, *Democratizing Leviathan*.
26. Ibid, chapters 2 and 3.
27. Emirbayer and Jhonson, "Bourdieu and organizational analysis."
28. For a genealogical reconstruction of these groups since the 1960s, see author, pp.
29. Revista de Carabineros, May 1986, 42.
30. Gonzales Errazuriz, "Carabineros de Chile y Misión."
31. Ibid.
32. Boeninger, *Democracia en Chile*, 427, also Acevedo Arriaza, "Continuity in Post-Dictatorhip Period," 90.
33. Acevedo Arriaza, "Continuity in Post-Dictatorship Period."
34. Ibid; Fruhling, "Terrorismo en coyuntura actual."
35. See Fruhling "Terrorismo en coyuntura actual."
36. Ibid., 45.
37. National Institute of Justice, *Policing in Emerging Democracies*.
38. See Tudela, "Prevencion del delito y seguridad ciudadana," Figueroa Serrano "Seguridad ciudadana: Tarea de Estado."
39. Sunkel, "*Medios de Comunicación y violencia*."
40. Dominguez-Berrueta, et al., "Reforma policial y constitución"; Mera Figueroa, "Seguridad ciudadana, violencia y delincuencia."
41. Ramos and Guzman de Luigi, *La guerra y La paz ciudadana*.
42. Ibid., 71, 74.
43. Carabineros de Chile, *El camino de La modernización*.
44. Stange Oelckers, "Exposición del Sr. Director General."
45. Dirección de Seguridad Publica e Informaciones (DISPI), *Seguridad Ciudadana, Democracia y Participación*, 1995.
46. Ibid., 8.
47. Fruhling, "Propuestas diseño de políticas," 225.
48. Ibid., 226–7.
49. Carabineros, *Camino de La Modernización*, 9.
50. Ibid., 29–44.
51. Ibid., 9.
52. Ibid., 53,123.
53. Ministerio de Hacienda, *Programa Plan Cuadrante de Seguridad Preventiva*.

54. Carabineros, *Desarrollo Institucional*, 105.
55. With these technical developments Carabineros was also able to prevent the importation of Zero-tolerance to Chile by the local right-wing municipal governments and to the creation of municipal forces. In 1996 Lavin, mayor of Las Condes contacted the New York based Manhattan Institute about William Bratton's Zero-tolerance policing model – which, just as the Plan Cuadrante, is based on intense policing following management schemes. When in 1998 Lavin created a municipal police following Zero-tolerance, Carabineros legally detained the urban guards, and objected the creation of the force arguing 'it would mean an unequal provision of security to the poorer municipalities.' They argued with studies determining the 'security demand' of each municipality and the 'available supply' (Interview General Inspector Vera, April, 2009). The government-backed Carabineros and Zero Tolerance programmes' importation were defeated.
56. CEJA, *Justice report of the Americas*.
57. See Lunecke and Candina, "Formación en Derechos Humanos."
58. Within the criminal courts field we find agents primarily located within the juridical field, that is 'site of a competition for the monopoly over the right to determine the law' (Bourdieu 1987:817) based on the 'recognized capacity to *interpret* a corpus of texts sanctifying a correct or legitimate vision of the social world' (1987:818). We find also judges, prosecutors, and pubic defence lawyers that are part of the juridical field, but they deploy their juridical capitals as they are part of the penal sector of the bureaucratic field monopolising the public authority to investigate and adjudicate penal cases. We find, finally, the central government and political agents, academics, and the professions and the journalistic fields.
59. Cavallo, Salazar, and Sepulveda, *Historia oculta régimen militar*, 559.
60. Ministerio de Justicia de Chile, *Informe Final de la Comisión*.
61. During the 1980s, they developed tools to 'rationalize the administration of justice' (Chile, 1980:106) and converted investment project-evaluation techniques into standards for judicial policies. They produced 'a project evaluation analysis' for computerising justice in 1986 (ODEPLAN-CIAPEP 1986), and another for the adoption of public legal defence services in 1988 (ODEPLAN-CIAPEP 1988)'Social project evaluation analysis' was developed by former development economist Ernesto Fontaine, adapting foreign investment analysis to evaluate the 'social' i.e. economic benefits of public expenses (See Fontaine, "Applied Economics in Action").
62. Palacios Muñoz, "La reforma procesal penal."
63. Author, [2013]: 144–5.
64. Valdivieso, "La experiencia chilena."
65. Correa Sutil, *Cuadernos de Análisis Jurídico*; Riego, "Prisión durante el proceso."
66. Guzman, "Justicia y Seguridad," 89.
67. See note 56 above.
68. o develop these plans, and put them into action, the Government of Chile obtained loans from the Interamerican Development Bank, first in 2001, with the "Vulnerable Suburbs Support Program, (TC0206002) of U$S 910, 000 and then with the U$S 10,000,000 (CH-0178)" A Safer Chile Program Innovation Loan.
69. For a narrative description of these programmes see Dammert, "From National Security to Citizen."
70. Foro de Expertos, *Diagnóstico de La Seguridad* .
71. Dávila, *Seguridad ciudadana: Actores y discusión*,45.
72. Dammert, "*de La seguridad nacional*," 136.
73. See Puryer, "Thinking politics," 8.
74. Foro de Expertos, *Diagnóstico de la Seguridad*, 7.
75. Ibid., 84.
76. Dubois, "Field of public policy," 203.
77. Foro de Expertos, *Diagnóstico de La seguridad*, 135.
78. Ministerio del Interior, *Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana*.

79. Ministerio del Interior, *Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana* and *Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública.*
80. de Lima and Trindade, "Seguranca Pública."
81. Ibid., 1.
82. de Lima, Sinhoretto and Buenos, "Gestao da vida e da seguranca."
83. Iturralde Sanchez, "O governo neoliberal da insegurança."

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Notes on contributor

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