# A Critical Taxonomy of the Theories About the Paths into the Reduction

**Patricio A. Perkins**

ONLINE FIRST

Springer

Springer

CrossMark

# A Critical Taxonomy of the Theories About the Paths into the Reduction

**Patricio A. Perkins**[1]

**Abstract** The paths or ways to the transcendental reduction are a pivotal phenomenological notion in Husserl's philosophy. The metaphor of *path*, in fact, alludes to the demonstrative proofs of transcendental phenomenology. Nonetheless, Husserlian scholarship has not yet been able to end the disputes surrounding this topic, and as a result, competing interpretations continue to prevail. Since existing theories about the paths have not yet been cataloged or analyzed in their global context, I intend to classify the main existing theories about the paths and evaluate the trend established by Iso Kern. Thus, this paper answers the following questions: how many kinds of theories about the paths are there? And, how plausible is the trend and approach initiated by Kern? In order to evaluate each theory, I will compare the interpretation with its exemplary cases. The key contribution of this investigation is therefore twofold: to distinguish with unequivocal concepts the two main trends of hermeneutical theories in play and to evaluate the plausibility of the aforementioned Kernian one. The paper also attempts to show that the hermeneutical approach initiated by Kern has no contextual examples for its conceptual scheme and should consequently be abandoned in favor of an alternative solution.

## 1 Introduction

It is well known that Husserl calls his philosophical method the *transcendental reduction* and that he uses the metaphor of *path* or *way* to indicate the arguments leading to it. Although these two concepts—i.e., transcendental reduction and paths into the reduction (henceforth: "the paths")—form the theoretical foundations of

✉ Patricio A. Perkins
  pperkins@humanidadesucsf.edu.ar

[1] Faculty of Philosophy, Universidad Católica de Santa Fe/CONICET, Santa Fe, Santa Fe, Argentina

⩗ Springer

Husserl's thought, incompatible theories about the paths have proliferated for over fifty years in Husserlian scholarship, turning this topic into a crucial and quite complex debate. Surprisingly, no systematic classification and evaluation of the available theories exists. I intend to address this issue here by laying out such a taxonomy and additionally evaluating the most well-known trend, namely, the one initiated by Kern (1962). The classification is intended to sort out and organize the tacit disagreements among these interpretations, differences among scholars about: (i) what a path into the reduction is, (ii) how many there are, and (iii) what notion of transcendental being is attained in each case. For reasons of space, after categorizing each theory in its defining traits I will only analyze the paradigmatic examples provided by each theory. Since these theories claim to be literal interpretations of Husserl's thought, the validity of each interpretation will be assessed according to the degree to which the paradigmatic case actually embodies the theory in an unambiguous and complete manner.

Now, two issues arise from this approach to the matter at hand. First, if the taxonomy will categorize *various* trends, why focus the critical analyses only on the trend initiated by Iso Kern? I have two reasons for this choice. The first is based on the factual complexity of the topic, the full investigation of which requires an in-depth examination and careful reading of each position and a significant amount of textual evidence in order to corroborate or refute the existing interpretations. Within Kern's trend alone, there are at least five incompatible theories from authoritative Husserlian scholars such as Drummond, Bernet, Depraz, Luft, and Welton. And Kern himself, as I will show below, has presented two different and contradictory interpretations about the subject without acknowledging it. As a result, to provide a full critique of all existing trends far exceeds the scope for a single paper. The second reason is that Kern's line of thought is, as I will show, currently the most influential interpretation of the topic. Since the notion of *path* is actually at the center of a hermeneutical issue, it should be initially approached from this standpoint.

Second, why is this paper about how the notion of paths is understood in Husserlian scholarship rather than in Husserl himself? To be sure, my eventual goal is to provide a correct interpretation of the notion of *path into the reduction,* and for this I will certainly discuss Husserl's own idea of *path*. However, the problematic hermeneutical situation requires a detour from this objective. In order to explain the notion of *path*, we need first a *prolegomenon,* including a taxonomy and a critique of the existing theories. Based on the foregoing, in this paper, I will confront four issues. First, I will prove that, though it has gone unacknowledged, there does in fact exist a conflict in the theories about the paths into the reduction. Second, I will classify the *genera* and *differentiae* of the possible theories about the paths. Third, I will evaluate the mainstream theories. Finally, I will briefly discuss Husserl's own understanding of the general idea of *path*. The key contribution of this paper lies in the identification and appraisal of pre-existing theories about the paths. I also offer a clarification of some conflations and confusions, which is needed in order to have a rational ground when choosing a theory on the matter. While a classification of the theories about the paths is clearly necessary for the comprehension of this phenomenological notion, the question concerning what a path into the reduction

actually is will not be addressed thoroughly in the present paper. Although I will briefly touch on this issue at the end, it seems that this question requires that we first sort through and organize the important scholarly literature surrounding this enigmatic topic in Husserl.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section expounds the two main categories used to analyze the hermeneutical theories about the paths: one based on a property that I call *performative conditioning* and the other based on what I refer to as *attributive conditioning*. The attributive conditioning trend is divided into two sub-groups: *critical* or *conciliatory* species. The second section illustrates the former species with Kern's theory and the latter with Drummond's interpretation. The third section exemplifies two further conciliatory variants of attributive conditioning: the views of Depraz and Luft. The fourth section evaluates two further cases of the critical trend: a second interpretation from Kern and a theory from Welton. All these technical categories will be explained in what follows. Finally, the fifth section lays out Husserl's general idea of *path*.

## 2 *Genera* and *Differentiae*: Attributive and Performative Conditioning

I use *performative* and *attributive conditioning* to refer to the two fundamental properties distinguishing the higher genera in the theories about the paths. To assert that a path to the reduction involves performative conditioning means that such an argument conditions the execution of the transcendental reduction. As a result, only arguments capable of coercing the enactment of transcendental phenomenology merit being cataloged as a path into the reduction. Performative conditioning does not a priori rule out the possibility of multiple paths into transcendental being, since a hypothetical multiplicity of paths may be compatible with a single idea of transcendentality. Several scholars have tacitly supported the notion of performative conditioning by agreeing that Husserl puts forth an identical idea of transcendental being in the diverse paths to the reduction (Geniusas 2012; San Martín 2005; Staiti 2012a, b; Zahavi 2003). This general position opposes the different variants of a *Two Husserl* theory, especially that of Landgrebe (1963, pp. 163–206; cf. Perkins 2014a). Husserl himself explicitly supports the category of *performative conditioning* and the unity of his thought when he states, "In the reflections to which I have devoted myself in these many years, I have pursued various ways, all equally possible, aimed at exploring, in an absolutely transparent and compelling fashion, such a motivation as presses beyond the natural positivity of life and science and forces upon us, by displaying the necessity of the phenomenological reduction, a conversion to the transcendental attitude." (Husserl 1989, pp. 415–416; Hua V, pp. 148–149).

Attributive conditioning constitutes the second genus in the theories about the paths into the reduction. In virtue of attributive conditioning, the paths to the reduction not only force the *performance* of the reduction, but also control its defining concepts. Each path thereby represents an argument built upon an exclusive set of concepts that generate an independent attribute of transcendental being. Since this property of attributive conditioning holds that the paths determine both the

enactment and the attributes of transcendental being, it assumes that (a) the number of paths accepted, (b) the respective premises assigned to each path, and (c) the content and validity of the conclusion have a patent interdependence. Interestingly, the conclusion of a path represents the valid or invalid idea of the transcendental being aimed at by each path. Based on the validity of the conclusion as a criterion, attributive conditioning branches into three sub-species:

1. *Conciliatory species*, where all the paths listed arrive at an exclusive and valid attribute of transcendental being.
2. *Critical species*, where only some of the paths listed arrive at a valid attribute of transcendental being.
3. *Aporetic species*, where none of the paths listed make a valid case for transcendental being.

Note that if there is more than one accepted path and each is valid, then each should entail an independent, but valid, attribute of transcendental being. The concept of transcendental being in this case should therefore be divided into several properties, each one correlating to a separate path. In contrast, if some of the accepted paths are invalid, they should conclude in an incorrect notion of transcendental being. Finally, if all the paths are invalid, then there is no valid argument which would entail transcendental being. In this paper, I am only interested in the critical and conciliatory species of attributive conditioning, so sub-groups in performative conditioning or aporetic attributive conditioning are not discussed in detail. As a result of these definitions, the following distinctions are made:

1. *Performative conditioning (PC)*: the property by virtue of which an argument is intended to condition the execution of the transcendental reduction.
2. *Attributive conditioning (AC)*: the property by virtue of which an argument is intended to condition the execution of the reduction and the resulting attributes—valid or not—of transcendental being.

   a. *Critical approach (ACCr)*: a theory endorsing AC, which only accepts some existing paths as valid
   b. *Conciliatory approach (ACCo)*: a theory endorsing AC, which holds that all the paths are valid
   c. *Aporetic approach*: a theory endorsing AC, which asserts that none of the paths are valid

## 3 Foundational ACCr and ACCo: Kern and Drummond

In his groundbreaking paper on the paths, Kern (1962) produced the first and single most influential framework built upon AC. The paper has been translated into several languages (Kern 1977/1997/2003b) and has been endorsed in different degrees by various scholars (De Palma 2012; De Warren 2009; Depraz 1995; Koortoms 1994; Simón Lorda 2001a, b, 2005; Overgaard 2002; Perreau 2013;

Rinofner-Kreidl 2000; Welton 2000). Despite the fact that his introduction to phenomenology (Bernet et al. 1989) presents a radically different theory about the paths (which I will cover in the fourth section of this paper), Kern (2003a, p. 169) does not seem to acknowledge a modification of his original opinion. The source most referred to regarding this original opinion is the aforementioned journal article (1962), although this argument in reality belongs to his book about the Kantian influences in Husserl's thought (1964). The latter has the significant advantage of showing how a *Two Husserl* theory akin to that of Landgrebe (1963) motivates this interpretation about the paths. In fact, Kern (1964, pp. 108–112) postulates two independent moments in Husserl's philosophy—Cartesian and Kantian—and claims additionally that Husserl finally departed from the former in the *Krisis*. That book thus documents the original motivation of Kern's theory about the paths: i.e., it offers a theoretical annex for a *Two Husserl* framework, where the Cartesian and ontological paths embody two antagonistic philosophies.

According to Kern (1962, p. 304), Husserl set forth three paths into the reduction—the Cartesian, the psychological, and the ontological paths—but only one of these is valid. The Cartesian path, for Kern (pp. 304–322), requires that true transcendental being be adequate evidence serving as apodictic foundation for the system of sciences. Since worldly being does not comply with this requirement, Husserl turns to the egological experience of the *cogito* by bracketing worldly being. Some exclusive concepts of this path, in Kern's view, are the argument of the world's non-existence, the solipsistic reduction, apodicticity, and absolute science. Since adequate evidence based on experience is unattainable, Kern concludes that this argument is a complete failure. In Kern's opinion, the Cartesian path only allows for a mere actual and solipsistic ego: an I without a We, a past, or a future. This means that this path not only falls short of transcendentality, but also fails to provide a complete notion of ego.

The psychological path, on Kern's view (1962, pp. 322–327), attempts to disclose transcendental being through an exclusive interest in subjectivity in contrast to mere bodies. This interest is able to gain access to lived-experiences and intentionality thanks to the universal inhibition of worldly validity, but it finally grounds transcendental phenomenology in intentional psychology. Because of this, Kern claims that here Husserl attains a full-fledged but abstract ego, due to the fact that phenomenological psychology is an abstract science. Kern assigns a vaguer set of exclusive concepts to this path that includes notions such as human sciences, psychology, and intentionality. Given that, for Kern, the psychological path obtains a complete, though still not transcendental, ego, this path represents a weaker failure than the Cartesian one.

The ontological path, according to Kern (1962, pp. 327–344), is the only perfect argument for transcendental being. This path, Kern argues, is interested in the ultimate sense of objectivity and thereby begins its proof of transcendentality from one of the three types of ontology: formal, material, or life-worldly. On this view, the clarification of an ontological a priori leads forcefully to the transcendental ego, since this is the only manner of superseding a unilateral ontology. As a result, this path understands transcendentality as the being in which all objectivity is constituted. For Kern, this is the only path that attains a concrete and full-fledged

transcendental being made up of the absolute correlation between ego and world. Typical concepts assigned by Kern to this argument include genetic phenomenology, objectivity, temporality, intersubjectivity, transcendental correlation, etc. Since Kern holds that each path into the reduction leads to a different case of transcendental being and that two of these paths attain invalid ideas of transcendentality, his theory naturally represents ACCr. I note that, from a historical point of view, Kern is the author of both AC and the first case of ACCr.

Granted that each path to the reduction is meant to be a particular interpretation of transcendentality made up of a different group of exclusive concepts and thereby radically distinguished from the other paths, it seems at the outset as though each path ought to be explicitly represented in Husserl's writings. Kern (1962, p. 304), however, openly rejects this conclusion, pointing out that the Husserlian corpus vaguely mirrors his picture of the paths. The reason for this, Kern argues, is that Husserl normally conflates the different paths. Now, if Kern's theory is vaguely mirrored in Husserl's works—meaning by this that there are few organic examples of this interpretation—what kind of methodology is used to abstract the ideal structure of each path burdened with AC? Kern resolves this issue by attributing a questionable priority to his ideal design for each path over Husserl's actual arguments. In Kern's opinion, the lack of a textual context should not prevent us from identifying the existence of a certain path. Hence, the actual existence of a path is justified by the mere presence of any of its basic elements: if idea $x$ belongs to the ideal Cartesian path, then wherever it occurs the Cartesian path also occurs, even when the adjacent elements of $x$ belong to another type of path. The case of *Ideen I* illustrates this hermeneutical methodology. Kern (1962, p. 335) identifies here both the Cartesian and ontological paths, given that Husserl discusses *adequate evidence*, a concept from the Cartesian path, and *transcendental correlation*, a concept from the ontological path. Because of the high impact of this hermeneutical methodology in other cases of AC, in what follows I will refer to it as the *textual discontinuity* (TD) of the paths. Under TD, the ideal concepts constituting each path represent discrete units of meaning identifiable as part of a path independent of their context.

Now, since literal interpretations require a justification in organic contexts, TD seems a problematic methodological principle. If contextual examples are ruled out, how are we to decide whether Husserl, or the interpretation, conflates the paths? In fact, a universal assumption of TD would inevitably turn any AC into an arbitrary construal. Because of this pitfall, Kern partially assumes TD and adduces some pure examples of the paths for his model. Organic examples, thereby, are responsible for compensating for the tacit arbitrariness of TD. Interestingly, TD could be envisaged as analogous to the *unconsciousness* postulate in Landgrebe's *Two Husserl* theory (1963, p. 165; cf. Perkins 2014a, p. 211), inasmuch as both are *ad hoc* hypotheses which attempt to temper the lack of organic examples in their respective interpretations. One salient difference between the two scholars is that Landgrebe (1963, p. 189) willingly admits the potential arbitrariness of his postulate, while Kern only tries to moderate it offering perfect examples.

In light of these hermeneutical circumstances, the validity of Kern's ACCr rests chiefly on the cases unaffected by TD. Therefore, I will analyze two instances of the perfect path—i.e. the ontological one—in order to assess whether or not they

comply with this requirement. The first is *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Hua XIII, pp. 111–195), a lecture course preceding *Ideen I*, which Kern (Hua XIII, p. xxxii; 1962, p. 308) claims exhibits an ontological path free of any Cartesian element whatsoever. In his introduction to *Husserliana*, Kern (Hua XIII, pp. xxxiii, xxxvi) reassesses this claim and adds two further hypotheses: (i) that Husserl uses this lecture in 1921 to replace the philosophical program of *Ideen I,* and (ii) that Husserl extends the reduction to intersubjectivity thanks to the *natural concept of the world* from Avenarius and the key notion of *double reduction*. I believe (cf. Perkins 2014b, p. 41) that *Grundprobleme* is not able to do without TD in this ACCr for two main reasons. First, *Grundprobleme* includes the kind of concepts that Kern assigns exclusively to the Cartesian path, such as the ontological priority of pure lived-experiences, absolute evidence, and the subsequent annihilation of the world thought-experiment (Hua XIII, pp. 143–144, 147). Husserl (Hua XIII, p. 150) even lauds Descartes as the inspiration for the transcendental reduction, while stating that philosophy is an interest directed toward absolute knowledge. Second, it seems dubious to postulate a philosophical antagonism between this lecture and *Ideen I*, given that *Grundprobleme* inspired notions of *Ideen I*, especially those chosen by Kern to distinguish them. As Schuhmann notes (Hua III, p. xxiii), a significant part of what this lecture says about the transcendental reduction (Hua XIII, pp. 141–152) was used by Husserl in *Ideen I*. Furthermore, Husserl not only explicitly recognizes the key role of the *natural concept of the world* in *Ideen I* (Hua XXIX, p. 425), but also expounds the basic notion of the *double reduction* (Hua III, pp. 235–237).

The *Krisis* represents the second archetypical example of the ontological path for Kern. Naturally, the text as a whole challenges this construal, since the third section presents the ontological and psychological paths. Nonetheless, in Kern's view (1962, pp. 311, 341–343), section 3.B is not only a perfect example of the ontological path, but also testimony to Husserl's conscious rejection of the Cartesian path. I think that three major objections can be raised regarding this interpretation. First, the claim that Husserl rejects the Cartesian path in the *Krisis* has not received general acceptance in Husserlian scholarship (Gadamer 1987, pp. 129, 162; Geniusas 2012, p. 133; Staiti 2012a, p. 51; Zahavi 2003, p. 50). In fact, the imperfections of the Cartesian path acknowledged by Husserl in the *Krisis* appear more as a statement of pedagogical drawbacks than as the rejection of a false notion of transcendentality dependent on the Cartesian path. Second, the late Husserl (Hua XXIX, p. 425) supports this reading, when he confirms *Ideen I* as a valid exposition of his philosophical system. Third, even accepting Kern's view about Husserl's criticisms of the Cartesian path, the ontological path in the *Krisis* is inevitably burdened with TD, given the fact that it includes Cartesian concepts, such as the absolute evidence of the ego (Hua VI, p. 192) or the epoché as disconnection from the world (Hua VI, pp. 81, 182).

This ACCr also entails difficulties in cases where Kern openly recognizes TD. Kortooms (1994) accurately notes that *Ideen I* works with the psychological reduction, and consequently, a strict application of Kern's ACCr turns *Ideen I* into a case which imperfectly includes exclusive concepts of all three paths. As a result, under this ACCr, one single book confuses three antagonistic philosophical programs. Furthermore, from a conceptual point of view, the models for the

psychological and ontological paths show a major inconsistency. Under this ACCr, phenomenological psychology and life-world ontology constitute two different paths into transcendentality. Husserl (1930, pp. 16–21; Hua VI, p. 215; Hua XLI, pp. 342–359, 485–486), however, defines phenomenological psychology as the branch of life-world ontology which studies the soul. Hence, the psychological path designed by Kern should be subsumed under the model of the ontological path, thus turning the latter into a partly invalid argument about transcendental being and anulling the former as an independent path.

In short, the evaluation of the first case of ACCr reveals two basic shortcomings. Empirically, the theory is not only incapable of providing organic examples, thus requiring a universal application of TD, but also fails to offer testimony of Husserl's consent to AC. Theoretically, its ideal design of the paths entails a significant conflict between the psychological and ontological paths.

In line with a notion of transcendental being borrowed from Sokolowski (1970, p. 131), Drummond (1975, 1990, pp. 46–59) challenges Kern's ACCr with the first case of ACCo. His interpretation lists only two paths—the Cartesian and ontological—and he judges both as valid and essentially necessary. The psychological path, for its part, is excluded *qua* path and limited to a mere pedagogical role. Each path, postulates Drummond, is an autonomous proof of a single property of transcendental being: the Cartesian path proves the apodictic evidence of the ego, the ontological its "absolutely prior" (1975, p. 50) being. Transcendentality, in Drummond's view, is the apodictic and prior ego and each path constitutes the respective proof of one of these two necessary properties. In his analysis, the Cartesian path is embodied in *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (Hua II), *Ideen I* (Hua III), *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII) and *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hua I), while the ontological path is represented in *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Hua XIII), *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (HuaMat IX), *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* (Hua XVII) and *Krisis* (Hua VI). Surprisingly, despite the theoretical difference between Kern's ACCr and this ACCo, both suffer similar difficulties when it comes to the documentation of their theories. Drummond, in fact, is forced to acknowledge that some Cartesian elements are present in ontological paths and vice versa. But Drummond, instead of postulating TD, considers that discrete elements of a path lose their status *qua* path when they are held in the improper path. So, for instance, if Husserl affirms the ontological priority of the ego in a Cartesian path, he is merely asserting it, since "the way through ontology is incapable of establishing this apodicticity, just as the Cartesian way is incapable of establishing its precedence." (Drummond 1975, p. 62)

I believe that this ACCo, despite the modifications of AC and TD, is not able to sufficiently ground its interpretation in unambiguous examples. I would like to present three brief cases. The first case concerns *Ideen I*. For Drummond (p. 50), this Cartesian path entails apodicticity and merely asserts the prior being of the ego. Nonetheless, Husserl (Hua V, p. 149) states that *Ideen I* proves both properties: the apodicticity and priority of the transcendental ego. Certainly, it is an open question whether Husserl correctly proves these two properties of transcendentality, but it seems that he does not intend a mere assertion of the priority of the ego in *Ideen I*. The second case, taken from *Cartesianische Meditationen,* supports this point. In

Drummond's opinion, this Cartesian path should only prove apodicticity. Nevertheless, in the first Meditation Husserl actually proves apodictic evidence that is *first in itself*; prior being and apodictic evidence are two properties clearly mirrored in Husserl's argument. First, he proves the first being in itself (Hua I, pp. 57–61), and then he argues for the respective kind of evidence of that being (Hua I, pp. 61–63). The third case, *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (HuaMat IX), concerns the ontological path. Drummond (1975, p. 55), misled by indirect testimonies (Hua VIII, p. 219), believes that this lecture represents the ontological path. Careful reading, however, reveals two important issues. First, Husserl (HuaMat IX, p. 357) claims that this lecture provides a path through a history of the idea of philosophy, not through an ontological path. Second, Husserl (HuaMat IX, pp. 255–256) here uses Descartes' method of doubt in order to discover "das *cogito* als absolut zweifellose Urquelle" (HuaMat IX, p. 359). Consequently, Husserl not only offers a new category of path—i.e. the historical path—omitted in this ACCo, but also establishes the apodicticity of the ego, a proof that should only be possible in the Cartesian path.

In brief, Drummond's theory about the paths is the first case of ACCo openly contesting ACCr. This ACCo, however, suffers from hermeneutical issues analogous to Kern's ACCr, since it is not able to provide unequivocal documentation attesting to the limited number of paths listed, nor their particular nature. The main shortcoming in this ACCo, therefore, is that Husserl does not seem to postulate this kind of modified TD or openly endorse the essential inter-dependence of the Cartesian and ontological paths. In the next section I will reveal how Drummond's ACCo is not the only version of this trend of AC.

## 4 Additional ACCo: Depraz and Luft

Tacitly contesting Kern's ACCr and Drummond's ACCo, Depraz and Luft present two radically different variations of ACCo. As with the other theories, I will focus on their main structure and then evaluate some paradigmatic examples.

Depraz (1995, p. 302) lists three paths—Cartesian, psychological, and ontological—and correlates them with levels of intentional analysis. It is well known that Husserl distinguishes between two interrelated standpoints in intentional analyses: static and genetic, solipsistic and intersubjective (Walton 2012). Depraz (2012, p. 263) claims that the Cartesian path introduces static phenomenology; the psychological path, a solipsistic genetic phenomenology; and the ontological, the intersubjective level of genetic analyses.[1] Leaving aside a strict analysis of Depraz's selection of concepts for each level of intentionality, it is clear that this interpretation of the paths turns them into complementary approaches to phenomenology, given the fact that the levels of intentionality are all valid and necessary for a full-fledged ego. Now, if each path conditions the enactment of a certain level of intentional analysis, and all levels are valid, then this theory necessarily is committed to ACCo.

---

[1] Depraz is inconsistent with this conceptual division. She (Husserl 2001, p. 7), for instance, also affirms that the psychological path includes the intersubjective reduction.

Ignoring the potential accusation of hermeneutical arbitrariness, Depraz (1995, pp. 215–216) argues that the paths are mere regulatory ideas in Husserl's thought, never to be found purely in one text or argument. Naturally, this thesis exempts this ACCo from a direct evaluation through paradigmatic examples, while simultaneously annulling the concreteness of the paths. I believe that there are two main arguments against such a claim. Firstly, Husserl does not consent to such a description of the nature of the paths. On his view, a path is a concrete demonstration of transcendentality. Secondly, the universal extension of TD makes this theory untestable, since it invalidates the main method for proving a hermeneutical hypothesis true or false. This is the reason why other ACs try—futilely, I believe—to avoid TD with pure examples. I deem that this ACCo, based on the levels of intentionality, fully assumes TD because it seems incapable of being grounded in a systematic empirical basis.

Before moving to the next theory, I would like to note a particular confusion in Depraz's ACCo, solved by means of the distinction between ACCr and ACCo. Depraz (2012, p. 448) believes that her ACCo is built upon Kern's framework. Although undeniably true with respect to AC, this assertion is incorrect with regards to the species of AC that is endorsed, the exclusive concepts assigned to each path, and the role of TD. Kern, in fact, not only endorses a competing theory such as ACCr and tries to avoid a universal application of TD, but also (Bernet et al. 1989, pp. 183–189) completely omits the topic of the paths when explaining the levels of intentionality.

Luft (2004, 2011) offers another variant of ACCo combined, however, with some elements referable to ACCr. Luft understands the paths as different *agendas* in Husserl's philosophy and lists three possible paths. The Cartesian path represents, in Luft's view, an agenda guided by apodictic foundationalism, which is incapable of attaining more than a non-worldly ego deprived of intentional objects, temporality, and intersubjectivity. Based on phenomenological psychology and transcendental reflection, the psychological path instead represents a philosophical project capable of gaining access to the full-fledged absolute ego at which the Cartesian path failed to arrive. The diverse motivation and method, argues Luft (2004, pp. 210–11), makes it possible to include concepts such as constitution and temporality. The ontological path (p. 217), in turn, begins from the life-world ontology and ultimately accedes to the *correlatum* for the absolute ego: the life-world as product of the ego's constitution. For Luft, this kind of approach involves topics such as intersubjectivity, genetic analysis, and passivity. From this brief description, it becomes clear that this interpretation construes the paths by reference to the a priori intentional correlation, since the psychological path leads to an absolute intentional consciousness, whereas the ontological path reveals the life-world as *cogitatum*.

Assuredly, the unsuccessful Cartesian path should categorize this theory as ACCr, but two elements tip the scales in favor of ACCo. First, Luft (2011, p. 80) recurs explicitly to the idea of incompatible *agendas* in order to elude the notion of *contradiction* or *exclusion* while maintaining a sense of tension between them. Luft (2004, p. 227) simply accepts the opposition between Cartesian foundationalism and life-world as a necessary element in Husserl's thought, calling it the *Janus head* of transcendental reduction. Second, Luft (2002, p. 9; 2015, p. 18) acknowledges that

Husserl never gives up his alleged Cartesianism, a claim which is supported by overwhelming textual evidence. Moreover, in his view, the Cartesian and psychological path share the same core-concept: the absolute ego.

Luft's ACCo is difficult to evaluate because it presents vague proofs for his design of the paths. The Cartesian path seems to be represented in *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (Hua II) and *Ideen I* (Hua III), because they "move from transcendence to pure immanence" (Luft 2004, p. 208). I would point out that, on this interpretation, *pure inmanence* means a mere noetic ego. Now, do *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* and *Ideen I* actually entail a non-intentional absolute ego? This claim is hard to sustain, since both texts endorse an absolute ego composed of noetic and noematic parts. It should be noted that Husserl (Hua XXXV, pp. 80, 180) does not exclude the noematic part of consciousness even when he thoroughly carries out the apodictic reduction. The psychological contents of *Ideen I*, acknowledged by Husserl himself (HuaDok III/6, pp. 180–181), represent a further issue. If *Ideen I* seeks apodicticity, includes noematic elements, and argues by way of phenomeno-logical psychology, it cannot illustrate a pure example for this interpretation of the Cartesian path. Because of these kinds of documents, Luft (2004, p. 230) states that Husserl only excludes intentional objects in early periods. It is not clear, however, to which documents he is referring, apart from the two mentioned above. On a conceptual basis, Luft's psychological and ontological paths share the same kind of issue as Kern's. Given the fact that phenomenological psychology is a branch of the life-world ontology, if we wholly take up this ACCo, the psychological path would not be distinguished from the ontological one, but subsumed in it.

In brief, Luft postulates an ACCo based on the transcendental correlation and holds that the Cartesian path in early periods acceded to a mere noetic ego. Phenomenology here is thus the synthesis of two different philosophical projects beginning with different points of departure but concluding with an intertwined dual entity. Given the fact that TD implicitly affects the examples provided, the main drawback in this ACCo is the deficient empirical basis for the theory.

As a result of the analysis so far, there have been at least three variants of ACCo based on incompatible notions: apodictic and prior being, levels of intentionality, and the transcendental correlation. All the cases require TD, explicitly or implicitly, due to the absence of a systematic empirical basis for their theories.

## 5 Additional ACCr: Kern and Welton

Bernet et al. (1989/1999) present a new kind of ACCr tacitly competing with Kern's original ACCr, even though the latter theory is referenced as a valid thesis on the matter. Given that Kern openly accepts all the opinions argued in this book as his own, the present ACCr could be envisaged as correction of his previous theory. The authors (1999, p. 59) distinguish between, on the one hand, the sense of transcendentality as a basic accomplishment of the reduction, and on the other, the motivation for its performance. They hold the latter to be burdened with AC. As regards the sense of transcendental being, its true nature (p. 62) is consciousness in itself, namely a non-psychological or non-natural entity examined in its own

essence. With respect to the paths, they are distinguished by the confrontation among three modern philosophers and their different debates: the Cartesian path with Descartes, the ontological with Kant, and the psychological with empiricism. In this ACCr, the only valid argument is the psychological, whereas the Cartesian and ontological fail in different degrees.

On this view, in the Cartesian path Husserl attempts to attain transcendentality by coming to terms with Descartes. As with other ACCr's, the Cartesian path in both its earlier and later appearances (1999, p. 69) is considered a complete failure. Motivated by radical skepticism, the Cartesian path falls prey to a skeptical epoché that suspends the world's existence and thus excludes transcendental constitution, time, and intersubjectivity. The ego in this path is therefore considered solipsistic, timeless, and non-intentional. Other concepts attributed exclusively to this path—apart from the skeptical motivation and the epoché as disengagement, bracketing, or suspension of the world—are subjectivity as a residue, the idea of world-annihilation, and foundationalism understood as the search for an absolutely given foundation (pp. 66–67). I would like to note that this design of the Cartesian path (p. 76) distinguishes *foundationalism* and *absolute science*: the former is considered a necessary concept of the Cartesian path, while the latter is a universal characteristic of Husserl's thought. This path is documented with the following works, although the degree of applicability is undetermined by the authors: *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* (Hua XXIV), *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (Hua II), *Ideen I* (Hua III), *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII), and *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hua I).

In this ACCr, the ontological path engages with Kant and proves to have important advantages over the Cartesian, though it remains imperfect. Superseding the Cartesian path, thanks to its different point of departure, Husserl moves here from the world of experience to the transcendental correlation motivated by the necessity of explaining objectivity. This alternative path (1999, p. 70) avoids the exclusively Cartesian concepts such as the skeptical epoché, the bracketing of the world, and foundationalism, thereby disclosing an intentional, temporal, and intersubjective ego. The ontological path is explained with citations taken from *Krisis* (Hua VI), *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* (Hua XVII), *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII), and *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hua I). The main shortcoming of Kant and the ontological path, claim the authors (1999, p. 72), is the constructive approach to transcendentality derived from Kant's lack of an intentional psychology.

Husserl's confrontation with empiricism in the psychological path brings out the missing intuitivity in the ontological path. Just like the ontological path, the psychological does not suspend "the belief in the being of the world" (p. 74), but simply shifts from the ego as psychic entity to the ego as transcendental being. While intentional psychology treats the ego as part of the world, phenomenology reveals the world as an intentional correlate of the transcendental ego. The development from psychology to phenomenology propaedutically obtains what is intuitively needed. The documents used in this case are *Krisis* (Hua VI), *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII), *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hua I), *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Hua IX), and *Ideen III* (Hua V).

The main drawback of this ACCr is the confusing manner in which it grounds its construal of the paths. This theory not only documents different paths with identical works, but also fails to declare which works should perfectly embody each path. The ontological path (1999, p. 71), for instance, is characterized by referencing an appendix of *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII, p. 436). Now, *Erste Philosophie* seems unsuited to the ontological path, since the lecture illustrates the other two paths. In addition, this particular appendix repeatedly defines the epoché as bracketing the general thesis of the world, which is a concept attributed exclusively to the Cartesian path. Thus, a paragraph chosen to characterize the ontological path not only belongs to a lecture describing non-ontological paths, but also defends alleged Cartesian concepts. Similar problems arise in the Cartesian and psychological paths. For example, the attribution of a non-intentional, solipsistic and timeless ego to the Cartesian path seems inapplicable in a pure fashion in *Ideen I* (Hua III) or *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII), given the fact that Husserl speaks there of the noematic components of consciousness, intersubjectivity, and temporality. With regard to the psychological path, if *bracketing the world* and *intentional psychology* separate the Cartesian path from the psychological, why does *Ideen I* appeal to intentional psychology, as has already been shown, and why does *Erste Philosophie* reaffirm the epoché, as the appendix cited above does? In conclusion, despite being a new ACCr which is radically different from Kern's first position, this theory also relies implicitly on TD, since the examples offered fail to embody the paths in a systematic manner.

Welton (2000) offers an original theory about the paths into the reduction that explicitly conflates (p. 405) Landgrebe's *Two Husserl* framework (1963) and Kern's first ACCr. The resulting thesis from this fusion holds that the paths mirror two contradictory programs in Husserl's philosophy. A special trait of Welton's theory rests in his definition of transcendentality as *equiprimordiality*. I will briefly explain these two elements—the conflation of AC and a *Two Husserl* theory, and equiprimordiality—starting with the latter.

In order to understand *equiprimordiality*, we must begin with Welton's definition of "phenomenon." A phenomenon, according to Welton (pp. 22–23), is made up of four elements: as-, for-, in- and from- structures, although the latter plays no significant role in Husserl's phenomenology. Every phenomenon, continues Welton, shows itself *as* something *for* someone *in* a horizon. Welton (pp. 71–74) interprets the as- and for- structures as acts and objects belonging to "the totality of beings" (p. 337), while the in-structure constitutes the transcendental dimension, "the level of the to-be of all beings" (p. 337), since "it makes possible the determinate presence of beings but is itself never identifiable as a being" (p. 87). Focusing only on acts and objects thus defines the natural attitude (p. 87), whereas conditions of possibility form the transcendental realm in the phenomenological attitude. Now, the transcendental dimension or in-structure (p. 93) is not a single horizon, but the correlation between *two*: namely, ego and world. Transcendentality (p. 96), accordingly, is the correlation between ego and world, understood as the condition of possibility for any being whatsoever, especially for the correlation between acts and objects. Welton calls this thesis about transcendentality *equiprimordiality*, because it implies a perfect transcendental symmetry between ego and world. This

thesis therefore supports the essential interdependence of ego and world. With the concept of equiprimordiality, Welton sums up the core-concept of one of the two philosophical programs in Husserl's thought.

Cartesianism (pp. 95, 104) is the title for the philosophical program opposing equiprimordiality, since it represents an alternative definition of transcendentality. The ego is, under this framework, the absolute being and the world is seen as a relative being. In Cartesianism, continues Welton (p. 110), the transcendental reduction becomes an epoché that excludes the world from the phenomenological analysis, since the absolute ego represents a being existing with independence from the being of the world. Epoché as disconnection from the world thus becomes an exclusive concept of Cartesianism. In line with Langrebe (1963, pp. 198–199), Welton (2000, pp. 105, 405) holds that Cartesianism has a dual cause: first, the exclusive theoretical interest in subjectivity; second, the epistemological approach seeking an apodictic ground for the system of sciences. Equiprimordiality, for its part, is necessarily linked to the idea of horizons and a full-fledged ego. In short, the two main properties of Cartesianism are (a) a pseudo-transcendental approach to the intentional correlation, which amounts to an omission of conditions of possibility, and (b) the ontological priority of the ego over the world. In its place, equiprimordiality represents (a) a true transcendental perspective and (b) an equal transcendental status of world and ego. In addition, Cartesianism results in a flawed ego, while equiprimordiality attains the opposite. Cartesianism and equiprimordiality therefore form two radically different definitions of transcendentality: an absolute being, the ego, or the absolute, but transcendental, correlation between ego and world.

Having distinguished Cartesianism from equiprimordiality, it is now time to explain how these two notions underpin Welton's synthesis of Landgrebe's *Two Husserl* theory and Kern's ACCr. Landgrebe argues in favor of a substantial, but unconscious, evolution between an initial and a late philosophical position in Husserl (see Perkins 2014a; Geniusas 2012, p. 134; Staiti 2012a). Langrebe is forced to postulate that Husserl was unaware of this evolution in his thought, given that Husserl never explicitly consents to what Landgrebe sees as a clear substantial evolution. Thus, *Husserl's lack of awareness* represents a questionable *ad hoc* hypothesis used to explain the missing evidence for the theory. As is well known, Landgrebe, aware of this issue, tries unsuccesfully to offer examples of Husserl's partial awareness of his alleged internal contradictions.

It is essential to note that, even though ACCr and a *Two Husserl* theory share the common objective of dividing Husserl's thought into two contradictory programs, they apply different means for the division. While AC grounds the division in a conceptual criterion such as the paths into the reduction, a *Two Husserl* theory postulates a historical principle. Hence, AC ideally admits simultaneous contradictory programs, if and only if they belong to different paths into the reduction. TD is the outcome of the non-fullfillment of this requirement. A *Two Husserl* theory, instead, ideally admits contradictory programs, if and only if they belong to different historical phases of Husserl's thought. The *unconciousness* hypothesis is the outcome of not complying with the historical criterion of division. Accepting this kind of *Two Husserl* theory, Welton (p. 260) postulates that Husserl

unconsciously evolves from a Cartesian to a Kantian position, equiprimordiality being the result of the latter and Cartesianism that of the former. Interestingly, since Welton also integrates an ACCr framework, he assumes the double challenge of a notional and historical demonstration of Husserl's contradictory philosophical systems.

Since the paths should represent one of two philosophies, and these philosophies belong to different historical phases of Husserl's thought, this ACCr distinguishes two phases in the paths: a Cartesian phase grounding the thesis of the absolute ego, and a Kantian one defending equiprimordiality. However, Welton (p. 118) is forced to acknowledge that this division is not perfectly accurate, since Cartesian concepts can be found in the Kantian phase and vice versa. The Cartesian phase includes a Cartesian and psychological path entailing the absolute ego in *Ideen I* (Hua III) and *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII) respectively, while *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Hua XIII; Welton 2000, p. 425 note 84) is an instance of a Kantian path in the improper historical phase. The Kantian phase (Welton 2000, p. 155) includes a Cartesian and a Kantian path entailing equiprimordiality, the former being the direct path in *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hua I), and the latter the indirect path of *Krisis* (Hua VI). In order to avoid ambiguities, I will refer to the first Cartesian path as *Cartesian–Cartesian path*, and the second, *Kantian-Cartesian path*.

In order to avoid the *unconsciousness* hypothesis inherited from Landgrebe, Welton (2000, pp. 111-117) contends that Husserl became increasingly aware of five specific shortcomings in the Cartesian–Cartesian path. These flaws, continues Welton, made him try to expand it from within until he finally desisted from the project, as the refusal to publish the German version of the *Cartesianische Meditationen* allegedly evinces. I would like to briefly consider the documentation grounding this conjecture before continuing to the description of the paths in the Kantian phase.

The first conscious shortcoming, suggests Welton (p. 112), is embodied in the famous §43 of *Krisis* (Hua VI, p. 157). For Welton, this paragraph recognizes that parenthesizing the world brings about an empty and worldless ego. As I have already noted, many scholars have contested this kind of extreme construal of the *Krisis*, arguing that Husserl is merely pointing out some pedagogical shortcomings of the Cartesian path. This opinion is based on the fact that Husserl repeatedly defends the validity of the Cartesian path, although he recognizes that, pedagogically speaking, it is inferior (Hua V, p. 148; Hua VIII, pp. 432–439; Hua XXIX, p. 425). I would like to add that Welton's specific claim is based on two questionable suppositions. First, he takes it for granted that the imperfection of the Cartesian path indicated in this text is caused by the epoché, but Husserl does not in fact link the former to the latter. Second, Welton, like other supporters of ACCr, assumes for the sake of his interpretation that *bracketing the world* is an exclusive concept of the Cartesian path. This concept of *epoché*, however, is positively present throughout the *Krisis* (Hua VI, pp. 81, 182).

For Welton (2000, p. 113), a page of *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Hua IX, p. 30) attests to a second instance of Husserl's awareness of the Cartesian shortcomings. Here, argues Welton, Husserl recognizes that the epoché restricts phenomenological reflection to a superficial level. I believe that this interpretation is

dubious for two reasons. First, this text does not attest to a conceptual relationship between *epoché* and *superficial reflection*. In fact, this particular lecture focuses exclusively on phenomenological psychology, purposely omitting topics such as the paths into the reduction and the transcendental reduction itself. Even *Ideen I* (Hua III, pp. 235-237), the allegedly exemplary case of the Cartesian–Cartesian path, challenges the idea that the depth levels of reflection are an exclusive upshot of the Kantian Husserl. Second, Welton seems to misinterpret the phrase "was man erst sehr spät bemerkte" (Hua IX, p. 30 line 13–14), thinking that it suggests a self-critique, while Husserl (Hua IX, p. 37; Hua V, p. 157) appears to be referring to other psychologists, such as Brentano.

For Welton (2000, pp. 113–114), the third conscious limit involves Husserl's rejection of idealism in a marginal note of *Ideen I* and in its *Nachwort*. Regrettably, Welton (p. 424 note 69) wrongly cites the marginal note of *Ideen I*. The text cited does not actually comment on the book's passage referred to by Welton, and the page numbers are wrongly assigned. Welton believes that the marginal note cited comes from page 484 and that it comments on page 58 of *Ideen I*, when it actually comes from page 485 (Hua III/2) and comments page 57 (Hua III/1). With regard to the *Nachwort*, Welton (p. 114) believes that Husserl (Hua V, p. 152) here rejects his idealistic Cartesianism because he realizes that it excludes the world from phenomenological inquiry. This kind of construal seems hard to accept, given that the *Nachwort* emphatically represents an apologia for *Ideen I*, especially for the absolute ego. Husserl, in fact, here identifies transcendental being with "das Ich als absolute in sich und für sich seiendes 'vor' allem weltlichen Sein" (Hua V, p. 146), describes the transcendental reduction as "das Außer-Vollzug-Setzen des Seins-glaubens hinsichtlich der Erfahrungs-welt" (Hua V, p. 145), and defines phenomenology as transcendental idealism (Hua V, p. 151). It seems implausible that a context including these topics should at the same time reject them. Furthermore, as I already noted above, the *Nachwort* (Hua V, p. 148) also represents a straightforward rejection of AC.

Appendix XX of *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII) and the *Nachwort* include, in Welton's opinion (2000, p. 114), a fourth sign of Husserl's awareness of his flawed Cartesianism. In this case, Husserl recognizes that Cartesianism leads forcefully to a solipsistic and worldless ego. With regards to *Erste Philosophie*, Welton argues that in it the transcendental reduction "clearly outstrips its Cartesian formulation and comes close to reversing the asymmetry between consciousness and world" (p. 116), given that it operates with Kantian notions such as *horizons*, *index*, and *intentional implications*. This reading is questionable from three points of view. First, Welton here exaggerates whatever self-critique Husserl may be making when the latter questions some ambiguous metaphors in *Erste Philosophie*, such as *Residuum* and *Ausschaltung der Welt*. Welton thus transforms Husserl's mild self-critique into an unjustified rejection of the Cartesian path and a shift between philosophical systems. Second, Welton attributes Husserl's critique of solipsism to *Erste Philosophie* and *Ideen I*, when it actually points to a lecture from 1907. Third, if operating with notions such as *horizons*, *index*, and *intentional implications* outstrips the Cartesian formulation of the transcendental reduction, then *Ideen I* should not be cataloged as a pure Cartesian–Cartesian path, since these notions are

openly assessed (Hua III, pp. 119, 159, 165, 191, 197, 235, 337, 350). The *Nachwort* (Hua V) affords an analogous analysis. Welton's argument could be summarized thus: *field of experience* and *intersubjectivity* are non-Cartesian notions; Husserl operates with them in the *Nachwort*; ergo, Husserl is putting Cartesianism into question. Two critical points about this syllogism should be mentioned. First, the argument presupposes the ACCr and *Two Husserl* frameworks in order to deduce the conclusion. If we suspend the belief in such frameworks, the conclusion is untenable. Second, if we do not parenthesize those presuppositions, the argument should interpret *Ideen I* in a manner similar to the *Nachwort*, since it includes concepts such as *intersubjectivity* (Hua III, pp. 102–103, 310–311, 352) and the ego as *field* of phenomenological facts (Hua III, p. 106). But that would leave this ACCr void of a systematic empirical basis for its concept of the Cartesian–Cartesian path. In brief, I find it far-fetched to think that these two texts bespeak a notional dependence between the Cartesian path and solipsism. But if they actually did, these same arguments would turn *Ideen I*, the alleged paradigmatic example of the Cartesian–Cartesian path, into an impure case.

For Welton (2000, p. 117), the fifth example of Husserl's consciousness is embodied in the following question: "Wie soll man, wenn man in der epoché verbleibt, je über Welt-vorstellungen hinaus kommen?" (Hua VIII, p. 480) I consider that this construal poses two problems. First, Welton wrongly assumes that Husserl is commenting on the Cartesian path, when in reality the appendix discusses the psychological one. Second, the question, read in its context, is not putting into question the epoché, but refuting a possible objection to phenomenology. In order to force his particular reading, Welton's translation of the question cited above includes the following concepts between brackets: "If we remain in the [Cartesian] epoché how are we ever to move beyond [our] representations of the world?" (2000, p. 117) But this is a biased manner of translating this passage. In fact, Husserl himself (Hua VIII, p. 585) indicates explicitly that this question is an "*Einwand*" to his theory and immediately thereafter rejects it as a misinterpretation, something that Welton reluctantly admits but discards by claiming that "[w]hat little he [Husserl] did say is irrelevant because he did not respond from within the Cartesian framework" (2000, p. 117). This case evinces how an AC relies on TD in order to validate its interpretation: first, a proposition is isolated from its context; second, it is interpreted following the respective AC; and third, it is reinserted as an atomic element gainsaying its original context. In conclusion, the texts offered do not seem to provide unequivocal and systematic evidence of Welton's conjecture about Husserl's conscious departure from Cartesianism. Thus, in my opinion, this ACCr is not able to avoid the *ad hoc* hypothesis inherited from Landgrebe's *Two Husserl* theory.

The Kantian phase of Husserl's thought includes two different paths proving equiprimordiality. According to Welton (2000, pp. 156–158), in this phase Husserl downgrades the ontological priority of the ego in the Cartesian path to a mere epistemological priority. The Kantian-Cartesian path has two distinctive traits: it is a direct path, because it immediately presents the transcendental dimension, and it depends on the Kantian–Kantian paths. These second types of path (2000, p. 157) forge an indirect path into equiprimordiality by questioning the conditions of

possibility of diverse disciplines. Now, if the path questions subjective disciplines, such as intentional psychology, it is a path through intentional psychology (2000, p. 160); if it questions instead an objective field, such as logic, science, or the life-world, then it represents a path through ontology (2000, pp. 160–163). A trademark of the paths in the Kantian phase, claims Welton (2000, p. 161), is that they do not operate with the suspension of the world's existence, thanks to their particular way of questioning back from a being to subjectivity.

*Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie* (Hua VII, pp. 230–287) represents, in Welton's opinion (2000, p. 161), the best example of a Kantian path. Now, does this lecture effectively ground Welton's theory? I believe that three facts challenge this evidence. First, Husserl (Hua VII, pp. 234, 240, 278, 284) repeatedly praises Descartes' contribution to transcendental phenomenology and goes so far as to accuse Kant (Hua VII, p. 237) of having overlooked the Cartesian findings that lead to an absolute, concrete, and intuitive ego. Second, Husserl (Hua VII, pp. 230, 233, 234, 238) here not only reaffirms the validity of *Ideen I* as the first published piece of transcendental philosophy, but also rejects the objections directed to it as absurd misunderstandings. Third, transcendental phenomenology, declares Husserl (Hua VII, pp. 262, 272), exclusively thematizes transcendental subjectivity through the method of transcendental reflection.

Now, the definition of transcendental reflection in this lecture strongly challenges the notion of equiprimordiality. For Husserl (Hua VII, p. 266), reflection is the act in which subjectivity is given in its manifold manners, i.e. an oblique perception of the self. *Transcendental* reflection, claims Husserl (Hua VII, p. 267), attains consciousness purely in itself, disconnecting all worldly being thanks to the transcendental epoché. Inversely, natural reflection (Hua VII, p. 267) attains human consciousness, namely, subjectivity as a being in the world. In line with this notion of transcendental reflection, Husserl (Hua VII, pp. 256, 268, 270) describes transcendental subjectivity as a closed and absolute realm of being, separated from worldly being, and glosses the transcendental attitude (Hua VII, p. 283) as a stance that supersedes the interpretation of the world as an absolute being by grasping the absolute being of the spirit. Husserl (Hua VII, p. 268) even holds that the world is not a phenomenological topic as actual being, but only as being constituted in consciousness. For these reasons, I believe that the exemplary case of equiprimordiality is unable to unambiguously affirm the thesis of equiprimordiality or comprehensively validate this complex ACCr.

In conclusion, I deem that the analysis of the empirical basis for Welton's ACCr reveals that this hermeneutical theory is actually incapable of surmounting the universal application of TD and the *unconsciousness* hypothesis, due to the absence of unequivocal and systematic evidence for its design of the paths.

## 6 Husserl's General Idea of a Path into the Reduction

The metaphor of *path* (*Weg*) normally alludes to the means by which one is led towards an end or objective. Husserl acknowledges this literal sense of *path* in a lecture course about ethics: "Der Wille zum Ziel ist notwendig Wille zum Ziel

durch den Weg." (Hua XXVIII, p. 52) Some synonyms for the paths into the reduction are the expressions *Eingangswege* (Hua III/2, p. 650), *Gang* (HuaDok III/3, p. 218), *Weggedanken* (Hua VIII, p. 127), *Gedankengang* (Hua VIII, p. 127), *Aufstieg* (Hua XXXV, p. 51) or *Einleitung* (Hua VI, p. xiv footnote 6).

Now, toward which end do the paths into the reduction lead? All the paths, Husserl believes, lead to the one and only radically grounded scientific philosophy (Hua III/2, p. 650). Interestingly enough, Husserl considers that scientific philosophy is essentially possible, though it may have been factually absent until the appearance of transcendental phenomenology (Hua XXV, pp. 5, 62), which is the real basis for the true philosophy and for a correct metaphysics (Hua III/1, p. 8). Thus, all the paths lead to the same end: the eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity (Hua VIII, p. 251). Given that transcendental phenomenology is the appropriate beginning for scientific philosophy, Husserl calls it *prima philosophia*, i.e. *First Philosophy* (HuaDok III/3, p. 218).

Now, what is the general nature of the means to transcendental phenomenology? First, Husserl claims that they are argumentative steps that compel one to carry out the transcendental turn (Hua V, p. 148; Hua VI, p. xiv footnote 6; HuaDok II/1, p. 41). Granted that this is correct, as I believe it is, it does not seem inaccurate at this point to interpret the Husserlian metaphor of *paths* as *proofs* of phenomenology, just as *mutatis mutandi*, Aquinas uses the term "via" as a metaphor for proof in the proofs of God's existence (I q. 2, art. 3). Second, Husserl repeatedly reminds us that there are various possible and independent paths into phenomenology (Hua III/2, p. 650; Hua V, p. 148; Hua VI, p. xiv footnote 6; Hua VIII, p. 251; Hua XVII, p. 21; Hua XXIX, p. 425). Despite Husserl's belief in the validity of all the paths and their common end, it is also true that, from a historical perspective, he admits an evolution in his appraisal of them: he began preferring the Cartesian path (Hua V, p. 149; Hua XXXV, pp. 51, 313), but ended up favoring the historical one (Hua VI, pp. 157-58; Hua XXIX, p. 425). Thus, it is incorrect to assume that Husserl rejects the Cartesian path or *Ideas I* in the *Krisis* period, as late texts clearly attest (HuaDok III/3, p. 215; Hua XXIX, p. 425).

If there are various independent paths into the one and only transcendental phenomenology, how many are there and what are the differences between them? This is the most fascinating, albeit challenging, question regarding the matter at hand: "ein Desiderat der transzendentales Methodenlehre" (HuaDok II/1, p. 34). All of my argument presents a *path* that ends in the need to answer this question. Naturally, it is not an inquiry that I can pursue further in this context. In fact, I hope to have shown that a thorough study of just one single path, such as for instance the Cartesian one, demands a dedicated investigation free from prejudices such as AC.

## 7 Conclusion

The taxonomy of the theories about the paths reveals noteworthy hermeneutical implications. First, this taxonomy constitutes an essential instrument to navigate the morass of available positions. Just in considering the AC trend alone, I cataloged six radically different cases: three ACCr and three ACCo. In this manner, the

classification managed to schematically organize the wide variety of competing theories into two main trends. Hopefully, this taxonomy will be constructive in renewing a reflexive and systematic discussion in Husserlian scholarship about this key phenomenological notion. Second, focusing on the existing cases of AC, the analysis reveals substantial difficulties in the empirical basis of these kinds of interpretations. Surprisingly, six conflicting explanations about the same phenomenological notion are forced, openly or tacitly, to rely on TD, an *ad hoc* hypothesis introduced to save AC from the unfavorable evidence. Therefore, apart from the taxonomy, the other key finding in this investigation consists in revealing the pervasive need for such a protective hypothesis in the existing species of AC. This unfavorable circumstance in cases of AC encourages one to look in the direction of PC as a more plausible hermeneutical solution for this phenomenological notion. The most important limitations of this paper is precisely the absence of a critical taxonomy of PC. Consequently, future studies taking PC into account will need to be performed.

# References

Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1989). *Edmund husserl: Darstellung seines denkens*. Hamburg: Meiner. English edition: Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.

De Palma, V. (2012). Die Welt und die Evidenz. Zu Husserls Erledigung des Cartesianismus. *Husserl Studies, 28*(3), 201–224.

De Warren, N. (2009). *Husserl and the promise of time: subjectivity in transcendental phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Depraz, N. (1995). *Transcendance et incarnation: le statut de l'intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez Husserl*. Paris: Vrin.

Depraz, N. (2012). Empathy and second-person methodology. *Continental Philosophy Review, 45*(3), 447–459.

Drummond, J. J. (1975). Husserl on the ways to the performance of the reduction. *Man and World, 8*(1), 47–69.

Drummond, J. J. (1990). *Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism: Noema and object*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1987). *Neuere Philosophie I. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.

Geniusas, S. (2012). *The origins of the horizon in Husserl's phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hua I. Husserl, E. (1991). *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. S. Strasser (Ed.). Den Haag: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua II. Husserl, E. (1973). *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*. W. Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua III/1, 2. Husserl, E. (1976). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. K. Schuhmann (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua V. Husserl, E. (1971). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*. M. Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua VI. Husserl, E. (1976). *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. W. Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua VII. Husserl, E. (1956). *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*. R. Boehm (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua VIII. Husserl, E. (1959). *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. R. Boehm (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua IX. Husserl, E. (1968). *Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*. W. Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XIII. Husserl, E. (1973). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Erster Teil: 1905-1920*. I. Kern (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XV. Husserl, E. (1973). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*. I. Kern (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XVII. Husserl, E. (1974). *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten*. P. Janssen (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XXIV. Husserl, E. (1984). *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie Vorlesungen 1906/07*. U. Melle (Ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XXIX. Husserl, E. (1993). *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934-1937*. R. N. Smid (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua XXV. Husserl, E. (1987). *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911-1921)*. T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp (Eds.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XXVIII. Husserl, E. (1988). *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914)*. U. Melle (Ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua XXXV. Husserl, E. (2002). *Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23*. B. Goossens (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua XLI. Husserl, E. (2012). *Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1891–1935)*. D. Fonfara (Ed.). Dordrecht: Springer.

HuaDok II/1. Husserl, E. (1988). *VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre*. H. Ebeling, J. Holl, and G. Van Kerckhoven (Eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

HuaDok III/3. Husserl, E. (1993). *Briefwechsel. Teil 3: Die Göttinger Schule*. E. Schuhmann, and K. Schuhmann (Eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

HuaDok III/6. Husserl, E. (1993). *Briefwechsel. Teil 6: Philosophenbriefe*. E. Schuhmann, and K. Schuhmann (Eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

HuaMat IX. Husserl, E. (2012). *Einleitung in die Philosophie 1916-1920*. H. Jacobs (Ed.). Dordrecht: Springer.

Husserl, E. (1930). *Was ist das: psychologische Reduktion? Nachlass von Edmund Husserl (B I 9 I/III)*. Husserl-Archiv Köln: Universität zu Köln.

Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology an to a phenomenological philosophy. Second book: studies in the phenomenology of constitution*. R. Rojcewicz, and A. Schuwer (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. (2001). *Sur l'intersubjectivité I*. N. Depraz (Trans.). Paris: PUF.

Kern, I. (1962). Die drei Wege zur transzendental-phänomenologischen Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls. *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 24*(2), 303-349. English edition: Kern, I. The three ways to the transcendental phenomenological reduction in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In F. Elliston, and P. McCormick (Eds.), *Husserl. Expositions and appraisals* (pp. 126-149). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. Spanish edition: Kern, I. Tres caminos a la reducción fenomenológica trascendental en la fenomenología de Husserl. A. Simón Lorda (Trans.). In A. Serrano de Haro (Ed.), *La posibilidad de la Fenomenología* (pp. 259-294). Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1997. French version: Kern, I. Les trois voies de la réduction phénomenologique transcendantale dans la philosophie de Edmund Husserl. *Alter, 11*, 285-323, 2003b.

Kern, I. (1964). *Husserl und Kant*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Kern, I. (2003a). Edmund Husserl, natur und geist, vorlesungen sommersemester 1927. *Husserl Studies, 19*(2), 167–177.

Kortooms, T. (1994). Following Edmund Husserl on one of the paths leading to the transcendental reduction. *Husserl Studies, 10*, 163–180.

Landgrebe, L. (1963). *Der Weg der Phänomenologie. Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung*. Gerd Mohn: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.

Luft, S. (2002). *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Luft, S. (2004). Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between life-world and cartesianism. *Research in Phenomenology, 34*(1), 198–234.

Luft, S. (2011). *Subjectivity and lifeworld in transcendental phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Luft, S. (2015). Husserl y la filosofía trascendental. *Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia, 57*, 15–34.

Overgaard, S. (2002). Epoché and solipsistic reduction. *Husserl Studies, 18*(3), 209–222.

Perkins, P. A. (2014a). Acerca de la interpretación de Landgrebe sobre el cartesianismo de Husserl. *Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, 11*, 203–222.

Perkins, P. A. (2014b). La relación filosófica entre Husserl y Avenarius en Problemas fundamentales de la fenomenología. *Diánoia, 49*(72), 25–48.

Perreau, L. (2013). *Le monde social selon Husserl*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (2000). *Edmund Husserl. Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität*. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber.

San Martín, J. (1997). La despedida de Husserl del cartesianismo según Landgrebe. *Agora, 16*(2), 101–121.

San Martín, J. (2005). *La estructura del método fenomenológico*. Madrid: UNED.

Simón Lorda, A. (2001a). Intersubjetividad y experiencia del otro en *Ideas* de Husserl. *Agora, 20*(2), 55–81.

Simón Lorda, A. (2001b). *La experiencia de alteridad en la fenomenología trascendental*. Madrid: José Manuel Caparrós.

Simón Lorda, A. (2005). ¿Resuelve la doble reducción fenomenológica el problema de la intersubjetividad? In C. Moreno Márquez & A. M. De Mingo Rodríguez (Eds.), *Signo, intencionalidad, verdad. Estudios de fenomenología*. Sevilla: Sociedad Española de Fenomenología y Universidad de Sevilla.

Sokolowski, R. (1970). *The formation of Husserl's concept of constitution*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Spiegelberg, H. (1994). *The phenomenological movement. A historical introduction*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Staiti, A. (2012a). The pedagogic impulse of Husserl's ways into transcendental phenomenology. *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 33*(1), 39–56.

Staiti, A. (2012b). Human culture and the One structure: On Luft's reading of the late Husserl. *Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 4*(2), 317–330.

Walton, R. J. (2012). Levels and figures in phenomenological analysis. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50*(2), 285–294.

Welton, D. (2000). *The other Husserl: The horizons of transcendental phenomenology*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Zahavi, D. (2003). *Husserl's phenomenology*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.