

# Cold War in Latin America: the Camelot Project (1964-1965) and the political and academic reactions of the Chilean Left wing<sup>1</sup>.

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The Camelot Project emerged as a social research project with the purpose of measuring, predicting and controlling internal conflicts within peripheral countries. This project was just one example of the type of research in the Cold War context which aimed to contribute to the struggle against social *insurrection*. Possibly the most ambitious as well as the crudest example of the relationship between politics and social science, it was an intervention which could have resulted in a massive loss of autonomy in the scientific realm. The Camelot Project was created within the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) in the American University, and the United States Defense Department requested that it be applied in Chile within four years.

Hugo Nutini, a Chilean-American anthropologist, tried several times to recruit Chilean social scientists to the project, but time and again they refused to participate. Camelot practically fell into oblivion but when the project almost seemed to be a closed episode, it was denounced by the communist newspaper *El Siglo* as a form of American espionage and so the scandal blew up. So much so, that the Chilean political parties had to take action and created the Special Investigative Commission to clarify the matter and report to the Chamber of Deputies.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper, based on **El impacto del Proyecto Camelot en el período de consolidación de las Ciencias Sociales latinoamericana** (co-written with Fernando Quesada, Serie Cuadernos de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO Costa Rica, in press), explores the reactions of the Chilean left wing. The sources used were the minutes of the Special Investigative Commission on the Camelot Project and the left press, including official organs of the political parties.

<sup>2</sup> I would like to thank specially the contribution of Prof. Howard Davis to the English version of the present article.

In this paper we intend to show that from the first appearance of the project in the public sphere in June 1965, a *myth* was constructed around Camelot which connected espionage with sociological research. This myth was based on the idea that all external financing implied not only spying and conspiracy but the subordination and dependency of science strategy in peripheral countries.

The Camelot Project arose from complex interactions within a set of academic, scientific and political conditions. Bearing in mind the political conditions in which this project was born, it is necessary to analyse both the American situation and the context in which the project was developed, including the US academy and politics, Chilean journalism and the political field, and the Latin American academic system.

Let us review briefly the various social spaces involved in the scandal.

Regarding the American political field, disputes between the departments of Defense and of State were evident in the management of foreign affairs. The State Department had lost influence in significant areas of American foreign policy, which complicated the functioning of the embassies, especially in some jurisdictions. But the Defense Department budget for social research was much lower than the corresponding budget at the Department of State (approximately 125,000 dollars and 20 million dollars respectively).

In terms of the scientific field, the social sciences were considered to be less prestigious than the natural sciences. In the 1950's, however, the social sciences grew closer to the military sector. This generated a debate about the autonomy or dependency of the social sciences in relation to politics and government.

Meanwhile, the Chilean political field was undergoing an increasing radicalization during the period of Christian Democrat government under Frei Montalva as President (1964-1970). This process would culminate in Salvador Allende's socialist project. The Chilean left wing experienced increasing support in successive elections after 1946. In the presidential elections of 1958, Salvador Allende (candidate of the Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular, FRAP) obtained 28.9 % of the votes

compared with the 31.6% of Jorge Alessandri (from the coalition which including the Conservative and Liberal parties). Thus, for the first time, the Chilean left came just 33,500 votes short of achieving power by democratic means; undoubtedly, the United States was worried by this prospect within its sphere of influence, which is how it saw Latin America in the bipolar world. Support for Leftism also grew in the union sector; in 1932 the total number of unionized workers was just 54,800, in 1964 the number had grown to 270,600, and five years later it would reach 533,800<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the condition of the social sciences in Chile and Latin America. Two group of periodizations of the Latin American social sciences development can be distinguished: the first<sup>4</sup> was characterised by the flurry of works about the history of social sciences in Latin America published in a short span of time during the early 1970's. The authors sought to establish the founding story of these disciplines in the region in terms of their rapid expansion and institutionalization, centred on the opposition between *sociology of chair* and *scientific sociology*. Outputs from the second group began to appear in the late 1980s<sup>5</sup>.

Both groups agree in their account of the first stage, namely the *stage of thinkers* or *prehistory* that extends from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century almost up to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the social science disciplines were making an impact in the region by means of institutionalization, professionalization and internationalization. This represents the so-called the "*foundational phase*" (Garretón, 2005), the stage of "*elaboration and affirmation*", according to Cardoso and the constitution of "*scientific sociology*" (Franco, Gonzalez Casanova). The main intellectual projects are those of Gino Germani, Jose Medina Echavarría and Florestán Fernandez.

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<sup>3</sup> See Alan Angell (1974): **Partidos políticos y movimiento obrero en Chile** (Ediciones Era, México) and Jaime Antonio Etchepare Jensen (1999): **Ciento cincuenta años de candidaturas presidenciales, Chile 1850-2000** (*Cuadernos de Historia* N°19, Santiago de Chile).

<sup>4</sup> In this group see the periodizations made by Delich (1970), Graciarena (1972), Franco (1974), including Germani (1964) and Galtung (1965).

<sup>5</sup> This group includes texts by González Casanova (1985), Brunner (1986), Vasconi (1991), Cardoso (1995), Garretón (2005) and Garretón *et al* (2005).

These sociologists were engaged in a common search to overcome current obstacles such as the scarcity of scientists, lack of institutional centres, insufficient financial resources and the prevailing essayist style. It was thought that sociology was merely reproducing lectures with virtually no research into concrete cases. Their goal was to achieve legitimacy for sociology as science through methodological renewal based on empirical research and to promote a new attitude and new status for scientists orientated towards value neutrality or objectivity. In other words, the desire to modernize Latin American societies also embraced the academic field, and the pursuit of “modern intellectual systems that should count with institutions, personnel and intellectual and material means “(Brunner, 1986:6)

Between 1958 and 1973, the social sciences in Latin America experienced comprehensive professionalization. An academic regional circuit without precedent began to be constituted with Santiago de Chile as its main centre. It was made possible by the coexistence of several elements including the presence of international bodies such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), the external public and private help, and the support of the Chilean state in the development of higher education and scientific research (Beigel, 2008). The process of expansion and consolidation of Latin American social sciences was therefore strongly influenced by external funding from private foundations as well as from international cooperation agencies.

This is the general context in which the scandal of the Camelot Project developed in Chile in 1965: the Cold War, political radicalization in Chile and the consolidation of the social sciences in Latin America. In what follows, avoiding digressions into adjacent areas, we will refer to the characteristics of the Camelot Project, to the timing of its arrival in Chile and to the reactions that it evoked from Latin American scholars and from political actors in Chile, especially the Socialist and Communist parties.

## Description of the scientific project

Before presenting the Camelot Project it is necessary to point out that very few copies of the project were in circulation in Chile. They were available to selected social scientists, sometimes in censored form with parts blocked out. Since most scientists refused to participate in the research, Hugo Nutini deliberately withdrew the document. However, the Special Investigative Commission of the National Chamber of Deputies worked on the project document as their primary source. The following is a description of the contents taken from the Commission minutes.

Designed to take three and a half years and involve the equivalent of 140 person years, Camelot had three main objectives, namely:

1. To identify and measure indicators and assess the reasons for potential internal conflict
2. To estimate the effect of different governmental actions that might influence this potential
3. To obtain, preserve and gather the information needed for the system previously mentioned.  
(Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress, Session 33, 16/10/1965: 3291)

The Camelot Project was postulated in the framework of social research development deriving from the Second World War, which had an emphasis on reversing the "imperfect, not systematic, scattered, not cumulative" state of scientific understanding of internal war (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Acts of Congress. 1965: 3295). It admits that it builds on previous studies (particularly the works of Charles Tilly and Gilbert Shapiro on the French Revolution).

The organizational structure of the Camelot Project was presented as follows:

Director of the Project: Rex Hopper

Social Systems Studies: Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa.

Simulation Techniques: Dr. James S. Coleman

Analytical Case Studies: Ralph Swischer (still under processing)

Operations Research: Dr. Robert Boguslaw.

Conferences and Review: Dr. Jessie Bernard

(Report of Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress, Session 33, 16/10/1965: 3200)

The Project was organized into two types of studies. The first, directly related to the internal war theme, intended to analyze comparatively twenty-one case studies, from which five were initially selected: Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Canada and Cuba. Canada and Cuba would be the first to be analyzed. At this stage, Chile was not included in the group of twenty one. The second type of study aimed at a higher level of abstraction and it was focused on the analysis of social systems, to measure their propensity for imminent internal war. The intention in both types of research, apart from "being as scientific and quantitative as possible", was to generate categories to enable the comparative study of cases and social systems (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress. 1965:: 3294).

Parallel to this, it was proposed to keep the project under permanent theoretical review in order to achieve major refinements through, for example, a series of conferences on *Social Conflict, Control and Social Change* and *Modelling of a Social System* (planned for June 1965), and a meeting of Camelot personnel with external experts who had confirmed their participation in the review of the research (planned for August 1965 at the SORO headquarters). This group of scientists included George Blanksten, Harry Eckstein, Frederick Frey, William Kernhauser, Charles Tilly and Gino Germani.

The text of the project emphasizes two major issues to be addressed: practical problems in data collection and the specific schemas for analyzing this information. Thus, "the first three technical appendices detail, respectively, the research plan for studies of social systems, the studies of analytical cases and the issue of manual and mechanized research", while the fourth appendix presents a particular model of internal conflict (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress. 1965:3201).

In Appendix A, written by Jiri Nehnevajsa and dedicated to research on the social systems model, three principal aims for Camelot were established:

- To observe and analyze the types of tension produced inside and on every system submitted for analysis
- To observe and analyze the sources of tension in relation to all possible types of tension
- To observe and analyze the distribution of circumstances conducive to tension across the systems  
(Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress 1965: 3202)

According to the document, the study of social systems should give an account of the ideal functioning of social institutions (including family, religious, economic, judicial, military, political, diplomatic, educational, scientific, communications, health and charitable institutions) relative to their actual activity in their specific setting, that is, the production of "symbols, persons, goods or combinations of them" (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress. 1965: 3205). Secondly, Project Camelot should focus on the process of formation of these products (values, subjects or practices) beginning with a description of what really happens in order to identify and explain discrepancies in procedure and activities. To establish the causes of internal conflicts, the first step would be the study of the social system along the following axes:

<b>Levels</b>	<b>Focus</b>	<b>Epochs</b>
Institutions	Normative	Past
Organizations	On process	Present
Individual	On perceptions	Future

Based mainly on an empirical approach, Camelot set out firstly to describe the system (with an inventory of the organizations involved such as political parties, trade

unions, churches, youth and rural organizations). The second stage was to create a normative design for the system. Thirdly, Camelot aimed to build models of social activity by means of surveys, measuring perceptions and attitudes to authority, since the project's central hypothesis was the existence of a "direct relationship between the level and scope of the frustrating of expectations and the possibility of internal conflict" (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Acts of Congress. 1965: 3225)

Appendix B, framed as the study of the social system, was prepared under the direction of Ralph Swisher and was dedicated to the design of case study investigations. The analysis started from the assumption that "insurgency is the result of a state or process of disintegration in some aspect of the social system" (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Acts of Congress. 1965: 3224). In consequence, Camelot focussed data collection on seven aspects:

1. Political development of the case
2. Analysis of political disturbances (violent incidents)
3. Analysis of the Government
4. Analysis of insurgent organizations
5. Institutional models
6. Occupational groups
7. Data on social antecedents

(Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress 3225)

It is worth noting that the case analysis was focused on two components: on the one hand, the frustrated expectations of population that allow the emergence of *insurgent* organizations; and on the other, the features and organization of the government, with its potential for action through reforms able to counteract the social movements of the opposition, and through control of social institutions such as the family, communications, health, economy, religion, education, public administration and security forces.

Appendix C *Simulation Techniques* developed by James S. Coleman, established models of internal conflict based on mathematical modelling and *game theory* which



"will reflect the main features of revolt in a society in development" (Report of the Special Investigative Commission, Acts of Congress. 1965: 3269). From this perspective, two possibilities are set out: the *Model of asymmetrical internal conflict* and the *Model of the social system as a basis for internal conflict theory*. In both cases, the empirical data from the case studies is used as a benchmark for elaborating the model. At all stages of Project Camelot the underlying logic is to describe in order to generate a norm. The procedure is to define and measure the perceptions of the population regarding their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the actions of government, in order to assess the possible mechanisms that could be used to neutralize internal conflict.

### **Chronology of the arrival of Camelot in Chile**

The relationship between Chilean social scientists and those responsible for the Camelot Project began in 1964. Hugo Nutini first contacted by letter and subsequently met the General Secretary of the Universidad de Chile, Álvaro Bunster, and the Director of the School of Sociology at the Universidad Católica, Raúl Urzúa, during his journey to Chile in December, 1964. On these occasions, Nutini reported on a proposed research programme prepared by the National Science Foundation (NSF) on a South American country. During a second contact in March 1965 Nutini requested a list of the main Chilean social researchers who might participate.

However, Urzúa rejected the proposed project for three reasons: firstly, he could not agree to support the enterprise because the details of the project were so vaguely presented. Secondly, Nutini should have identified the institutions which would provide a formal framework for the project. Finally, the project quoted a budget of approximately five million dollars, an amount which Urzúa considered to be excessive and dangerous because it could distort the Chilean scientific field (Urzúa, interview, 2006).

On April 9th, Rex Hopper, Director of the Camelot Project, arrived in Chile to stay for three days before returning to the United States. During his visit he met Eduardo Hamuy, Director of the Economic Studies Centre (CESO) at the Universidad de Chile. At

the meeting Hopper described briefly and without much detail a "project of political sociology" to be carried out. On April 15th Hugo Nutini returned to Chile and began a series of meetings with social scientists at the Universidad de Chile to convince them to take part in the project, without explaining its characteristics or funding.

Meanwhile, it is worth examining the itinerary of Johan Galtung, Professor at the University of Oslo and at the FLACSO, since he played an important role in the process leading to the rejection of the project. Before his trip to Chile, Galtung spent a few days in New Jersey at Princeton University. On 26 March 1965 Galtung learned about the Camelot Project from Harry Ekstein, a recognized German social scientist. Ekstein informed Galtung about a research project to be developed in Chile without mentioning either its financing or its link with the American military sector.

On April 4 1965 Johan Galtung arrived in Chile to teach as a guest professor at FLACSO. Four days later, on April 8, Galtung received a letter from Rex Hopper from the United States, inviting him to participate as a member of the Project. Hopper also attached some documents and a memorandum detailing the content of the research. In the days following, Galtung consulted several Chilean scientists about the project: Edmundo Fuenzalida (FLACSO), the Uruguayan professor Aldo Solari on April 10, Andrés Bianchi (CIENES) and Juan Planas (FLACSO) on April 14. Galtung had two meetings with Ricardo Lagos (Universidad de Chile and ex-president of Chile 2000-2006). In the first meeting they were with other scientists, but in the second the two were alone. Galtung succeeded in getting all of them to emphatically reject the project. On April 22, Galtung wrote to Rex Hopper rejecting the invitation to participate in the Camelot Project.

On April 29 Galtung met Raúl Urzúa, Eduardo Hamuy and others to comment on the features of the Camelot Project and he delivered a copy of the memorandum to Hamuy. In spite of Nutini's insistence, all Chilean and foreign social scientists working in Santiago de Chile massively rejected the offer.

Why then in the period following the meeting of 22 April did the sociologists and social researchers that knew of the project not denounce it or give publicity to the documents? Because a public complaint, or advertising of this research, could have triggered some of the following outcomes:

1. Directly or indirectly, the social sciences could be discredited by public opinion, with disastrous consequences for a field that was rapidly becoming recognized and institutionalized.
2. Denunciation would provoke political intervention and consequently the loss of the autonomy of the social sciences.
3. External funding of the social sciences could be affected, or even withdrawn, at a time when foreign agencies were particularly important for the development of the sciences in Chile.

On May 27<sup>th</sup>, at the *Escuela de Economía* (Economy College) in Santiago de Chile, the Camelot Project was presented publicly for the first time in the context of a lecture given by Eduardo Hamuy. Later, on June 9<sup>th</sup> in the CESO, Hamuy delivered a second lecture and distributed among his colleagues copies of the memorandum sent to Galtung by Rex Hopper. "Approximately 140 university students "(*Última Hora*, 18/06/65) attended these lectures but the Camelot Project came to be more widely known when Jorge Inzunza Becker, director of the official communist newspaper *El Siglo*, accessed the complete manuscript of the project and, using three news photographers, "photographed the whole document in three hours"<sup>6</sup>. The following morning, on June 12<sup>th</sup> 1965, the front page of *El Siglo* contained such headlines as "*Yankees study invasion of Chile*". The news produced such an impact on the media that the rest of the left wing press focused almost exclusively on the Camelot Project. Despite the press being completely dominated by three main groups<sup>7</sup>, the small Chilean left wing publications like *El Siglo*, *Última Hora* and

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with Jorge Inzunza Becker, Santiago de Chile, November 2008.

<sup>7</sup> The first group, belonging to Agustín Edwards, included the largest circulation newspaper *El Mercurio* with 100,000 copies, and seven local papers with combined circulation of 237,000 copies; the second was the SOPESUR Group with a circulation of 40,000 and, thirdly, the Consorcio Periodístico de Chile (Group

*Clarín* (also linked with Christian Democracy) ensured that the Camelot Project became a leading topic in public opinion and successfully maintained interest in the subject during the period from June to December 1965.

However, the traditional newspapers' treatment of the Camelot affair was discreet since they omitted any reference to *American imperialism* or *international espionage*. The most important journal of the right, *El Mercurio*, only mentioned Government concern (19/06/65 page 25), the letter of Álvaro Bunster's dismissal (*With reference to the Plan Camelot*, 02/07/65) and the creation of the Special Investigative Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.

Public condemnation of the Camelot Project originated in the press of *ideas*, the left wing press. It was fuelled by the interests of the oppositional media in high impact information and political denunciation. From the outset, media reporting of the scientific project turned into an issue of North American espionage; conspiracy theories grew as the word *Plan* replaced the word *Project*. Denunciations came thick and fast: *Chile included in sinister Yankee invasion project* (*El Siglo*, 12/06/65), *Yankee Violation to National Sovereignty* (*Ultima Hora*, 24/06/65), *In defence of its interests, the USA breaches self-determination* (*Ultima Hora*, 17/12/65) or *Yankees spy within our Army trying to gain its favour* (*El Siglo*, 16/06/65). Meanwhile *Clarín* focused its vilification on the specific case of one of the participants involved in the scandal ("*Bunster, secretary of the "U", presented a spy*" or "*Bunster, University Secretary, gave entrance to Nutini, the Plan Camelot spy* (*Clarín*, 28/06/65).

The political authorities reacted on several fronts. Radomiro Tomic, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, after extensive consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs<sup>8</sup>, submitted to the State Department "the reasons adduced by our

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COPESA) owner of *La Tercera*, with 75,000. According to Chilean Socialist Party estimates, the total circulation related to the Chilean right or to the governing Social Democrats was approaching 531,300 copies, compared with the 55,000 belonging to the Chilean left (30,000 copies of *Ultima Hora* and 25,000 of *El Siglo*).

<sup>8</sup> In the cablegrams 272 (28/06/65), 276 (29/06/65), 318 (21/07/65) and official letters 261 and 264 (ambos del 30/06/65), the Chilean Ambassador Tomic solicits instructions to the Chilean Chancellor Gabriel Valdéz, regarding the Chilean Government position on the Camelot Project, in the light of the news

government for rejecting explicitly and categorically the Project Camelot<sup>9</sup>. The government also acceded to the request made by the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies for the creation of a Special Investigative Commission "in order to study the projections of the Plan known as Camelot in Chile, as well as any other foreign organisation activity" (Report of Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress. Session 17<sup>a</sup>, 07/07/65:1916)<sup>10</sup>.

Both in the left wing press and in the general debate surrounding the Investigative Commission's final report in December 1965, the Camelot Project was associated with more than one phenomenon. It served both as a pretext for a generalized critique of North American imperialism and as grounds for questioning a number of social research projects which were being developed when the scandal burst on the scene.

As for the first type of response, Camelot was interpreted as part of the Johnson Doctrine of US military interventionism illustrated by the invasion of the Dominican Republic by North American troops in April 1965. The Final Report of the Commission established that the Camelot Project existed "under the patronage and control of the Pentagon, in order to determine the degree of insurgency in Chile, in order to be able to intervene militarily in our country, whenever, in the opinion of this foreign power, the condition of insurgency should make it necessary" (Report of Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress. Session 33<sup>a</sup>, 16/12/65: 3353). It interpreted this as a violation of the Inter-American Treaty established by the Organization of the American States (OAS), articles 5 ° and 15 ° concerning the member states' sovereignty and independence.

The reaction of the Chilean Communist party was consistent with its main party program commitments (approved at the X Congress of April 1956) which established its

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published by the *Sunday Star* (27/06) and *Washington Post* (28/06) and approaches from North American journalists and politicians.

<sup>9</sup> Radomiro Tomic, in Confidential Official Paper N°704/35, Chilean Embassy in Washington D-C., July 30th, 1965.

<sup>10</sup> Eventually, the Commission was made up of deputies Andrés Alwyn (Chairman), Osvaldo Basso, Sergio Fernández, Osvaldo Giannini, Patricio Hurtado, Alberto Jerez, Mará Maluenda Campos, Juan Martínez, Jorge Montes, Eduardo Osorio, Julio Silva, Vicente Sota y Hugo Zepeda Coll (Minutes of the Chamber of Deputies. Session 33, 16/12/65:3129).

opposition to "the complete and multifaceted North American domination" (Riquelme and Daire, 1986:30) – Camelot being a clear example. At the same time, the party took the opportunity to re-launch criticisms against US interference in Chile seen in its influence on key sectors such as public utilities or copper exploitation and the pressures put on the government to ban certain political party activity<sup>11</sup>.

By the same token, in the XXI Ordinary General Congress held in June 1965, the Socialist party openly condemned "the United States new interventionist policy in our continent, known as the Johnson doctrine", while repudiating the OAS for being an "instrument serving imperialist interests" (Jobet, 1965:121)

In both cases, the arguments focused on US imperialism and its military expression: the fight against Castroism and the invasion of the Bahia de Cochinos in April 1961; increasing interventionism shown for example in the case of the invasion of the Dominican Republic; the North American support for the Brazil coup d'état in April 1964 that deposed the democratic government of Joao Goulart and installed a 21-year military dictatorship; the development of a Washington-backed *gorilista* coup strategy in the rest of South America, notably in Argentina involving General Onganía; the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) in 1947 and the Pact for Military Assistance (PAM) in 1952; the intensification of "counterinsurgency military training (...) and carabineers' training in urban counterinsurgency" (Muñoz and Portals, 1987:63) thanks to assistance funds that reached their peak during Johnson's presidential term, which were allocated according to the priorities of the so-called National Security Doctrine.

Also related to this policy for financing external activities, the US Senate produced a report concerning governmental operations abroad. The report *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, confirmed North American support for Eduardo Frei Montalva's reformist

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<sup>11</sup> After taking part in the Gonzalez Videla government (1946-1952) the Chilean Communist Party went underground following the Democracy Permanent Defense Act, promulgated in 1948. In the same year, the breakdown between communists and radicals received official recognition when the president "broke diplomatic relations with the USSR and the Eastern European countries and retired the communist ministers in the cabinet" (Correa Sutil, et al, 2001: 182). These were the origins of the Chilean communism proscription which came to an end in the 1958 elections.

regime, at the time of the Chilean left wing's possible success in the presidential elections of 1964. Support from the United States had two aspects. The first took the form of "direct financial support to the Christian Democratic campaign. The CIA underwrote slightly more than half of the total cost of that campaign". Secondly, "the CIA mounted a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign" (US Senate, *Covert action in Chile 1963-1973*, 1975:14)

The second kind of response in opposition to the Camelot Project involved placing under suspicion any foreign organization, whether religious, social or science-oriented. Thus, both the Religious Congregation Maryknoll and the *Peace Corps*, comprised mainly of North American citizens, were mentioned during the parliamentary debate.

However, the main objections were directed towards sociological research. The Chamber of Deputies condemned the surveys carried out by the North American sociologist Roy Hansen in the War Academy of Chile; the surveys carried out by Dale Johnson together with Eduardo Hamuy through CESO (Universidad de Chile); and the surveys of Chilean students' attitudes to the Cold War and relations between the USA and Chile conducted by Elliot Marcus.

The criticism and suspicions towards sociology and its techniques, particularly surveys, was a cause for concern among social scientists. Roger Vekemans, who was suspected of being involved in the Camelot affair due to his connections with American religious organizations, despite not actually having any part in the project, gave testimony at the Investigative Commission. He expressed his concern for "the mortgage that may be imposed on social sciences and, more specifically, in the case we are dealing with, on social research" (Report of Special Investigative Commission, Minutes of the Congress, Session 17<sup>a</sup>, 16/12/65:3153). Likewise, Clodomiro Almeyda, a sociologist and leading socialist, tried to protect sociological techniques claiming that the generalized rejection of the Camelot Plan "is creating an innocent victim: social research techniques and, in particular, surveys (*Última Hora*, 17/07/65: 2). In other words, although the academy mobilized in defence of sociology, Camelot did not leave Latin American scientific activities unharmed.

## Consequences for the Latin American academic field

Undoubtedly, the Latin American academic and scientific field suffered from the impact of the Camelot project. It was mainly because it coincided with a period of both institutionalization and consolidation, a process in which external funding played a fundamental role.

At that time, there were several projects under way in Latin America: the *Simpático Project* in Colombia, the *Colony Project* in Peru, the *Numismatic Project* applied to a number of countries and the *Reasentamiento (re-settling) Project*, among others. And other projects were being designed for application in countries or regions considered to be “vulnerable” by the United States, as in the case of the *Revolt Project* in Canada. In the landscape of scientific production in the Latin American countries the Camelot scandal was a disturbance of some magnitude which brought about a realignment of perspectives.

In order to understand the lines of debate during this time there is no better illustration than a set of texts published in social science journals devoted to an overall assessment of the model. One good example is an article written by Johan Galtung (1965) who, as noted above, was centrally involved in the dismantling of the Camelot Project. For the Norwegian scholar, *the sociology of sociology* should contribute the elements needed to develop this discipline as a science. In general, the article shows that external funding as such was not a crucial problem for scientific production; on the contrary, it helped to stimulate its development. In the part where the author refers to *intellectuals in their social context* he does not mention their financial dependency but concentrates instead on the internal problems of the field such as the permeability of theories and current models, the relationship between teachers and students and the position of intellectuals in the wider society. Although financial factors were a very important matter for sociologists and especially for those institutions where they were concentrated, social-cultural factors were much more relevant in the debate.



The article needs to be read in the light of Galtung's profile and record. His critical stance towards Camelot and his contribution to its dismantling were partly motivated by the likely negative consequences for his own place in the scientific community, not to mention the ideological position he made explicit in the letter of rejection sent to the Camelot Project manager, Rex Hopper. In this letter, the author defines the project as essentially a "proposal for a project which gives a clear impression of stemming from the upper class." (Report from de Special Investigating Commission, Minutes of the Congress, 1965:3279.)

Other articles published in the same year relate to the broader Latin American scene. One example is an article by Jorge Graciarena (1965) from the Department of Psychology of the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) on the topic of *Sociology in Latin America*. The analysis refers to international cooperation and the development of sociology. Firstly, the author distinguishes between two forms of cooperation: public and private (Graciarena 1965: 231). In broad outline, Graciarena refers to the criteria on which the financing of social sciences in Latin America should be based. Among them, he mentions the context of the disciplines that are financed and the theories used to frame studies but he also criticizes the direction taken by privately-financed investigations in the social sciences.

He reports that 1. comparative studies predominate; 2. there are inconsistencies between the priorities and objectives of external agencies and the national scientific fields; 3. there are theoretical and methodological conflicts between the core and the peripheral countries; 4. channels of communication between the directors of projects who reside in the core academic centers and the investigators and data collectors in the scientific periphery are poorly developed, and 5. national investigators are subordinate to those of the donor countries.

Should the scientific disciplines fail to neutralize these modes of operation which derive from the need of some countries for financial assistance to develop their academic systems, then the logic of the international division of labour would continue

and turn them into ordinary “exporters of sociological data industrialized out of the region”(abroad). (Graciarena, 1965: 238)

This text was written a short time prior to the Camelot scandal. What occurred led the author to add a footnote outlining the characteristics of the project, but it is obvious that the text was already drafted at the time when Graciarena received the information. It can be inferred that his criticisms of academic dependency were prescient although lacking in detail.

It is worth mentioning that the “Information” section of the same journal contains a letter from its Director, Eliseo Verón. In the letter, a group of intellectuals (including Darío Cantón, Oscar Cornblit, Torcuato Di Tella, Joge Graciarena, Silvia Sigal and others as well as Eliseo Verón) view Camelot in amazement as an “ interference in the internal affairs of the Latin American nations”.

In Argentina, where the University known as Reformist (1955-1966) had successfully integrated both the university authorities and the students in a single modernization project, external funding was a major issue that created tensions and divisions between the clusters. Although the Camelot Project raised suspicions about the relation between the funds and the American secret services, the origin of these debates about subsidies to the sciences can be traced back to 1959. It was the year when the USA signed a Technical Assistance agreement to create CAFADE, a national committee for the administration of the funds supporting economic development. These funds were intended to channel American support for higher education and research (Sigal 2002:82). Similarly, the 210,000 dollars in subsidies given by the Ford Foundation to the Department of Psychology at UBA in 1960 and the 35,000 given by the Rockefeller Foundation to the project of José Luis Romero and Gino Germani’s Institute of Social History both attracted strong criticism (Sigal, 2002:83).

The debate about the external financing of Latin American social sciences – mingled with the argument about academic and financial autonomy or dependency – was already present before the Camelot issue blew up. The effect of the scandal was to

create a **myth** of scientific dependency not only about external economic support for social science but also about its use as a tool for espionage or cultural imperialism (mainly by the United States). These negative representations of both aspects (funding and application) spread to all kinds of external support for scientific projects. An example is the stoppage or interruption of the *Proyecto Marginalidad* (Marginality Project) due to the American origins of the funds.

The apparent evidence of a direct relationship between Camelot and the withdrawal of external financial support from Latin American social sciences should not be taken at face value, even taking into account the fall of the *Proyecto Marginalidad*. The myth and the negative representations were not solely responsible for the stoppage of this project. Other factors played a part: the global economic situation which changed in the early 1970's and political conditions in the region which directly affected the social sciences as well as other fields. Finally, it must be remembered that there is no direct causal relationship between intellectual and academic autonomy or dependency. There is an active link between the two, an historical link, which over time allows greater or lesser intellectual independence or freedom.

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## **Interviews**

- Jorge Inzunza Becker, member of the Chilean Communist Party and ex-director of the newspaper *El Siglo* (1965), realized by Juan Jose Navarro in Santiago of Chile, November 2008.