



## 'It is not fair that he is treated as a commoner': lower-level native lords in the repartimiento of Macha (Charcas) under colonial rule, 1540–1619

María Carolina Jurado

To cite this article: María Carolina Jurado (2016) 'It is not fair that he is treated as a commoner': lower-level native lords in the repartimiento of Macha (Charcas) under colonial rule, 1540–1619, Colonial Latin American Review, 25:3, 300–324, DOI: [10.1080/10609164.2016.1237709](https://doi.org/10.1080/10609164.2016.1237709)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10609164.2016.1237709>



Published online: 16 Feb 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

## 'It is not fair that he is treated as a commoner': lower-level native lords in the *repartimiento* of Macha (Charcas) under colonial rule, 1540–1619

María Carolina Jurado

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET)/Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

... because when these kingdoms were conquered many leaders of caste and blood were lost. And in replacement lowly tribute-paying commoners were chosen. These facts damage the land and the poor Indians are lost.<sup>1</sup>

Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala [1615]

In the early seventeenth century, indigenous chronicler Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala harshly criticized native Andean rulers who had come to power in various polities during the first century of colonial rule in Peru, replacing the dying native lords of 'caste' and 'noble lineage'. Overly friendly with colonial authorities and often drunkards and *coqueros*—according to Guamán Poma—these 'fake paramount lords (*caciques principales*) were originally tribute-paying commoners (*indios bajos*)' (Guamán Poma 1987 [1615], 818–19).<sup>2</sup> Crown officials, along with many Spanish and native witnesses, were similarly attentive to the shifting status of Andean lords, stressing the difference between lesser-ranking headmen and tribute-paying commoners (*indios del común*). As early as 1565, Governor Lope García de Castro, the highest-ranking local authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru between 1564 and 1569, focused attention on subordinate lords, calling them '*caciques menores*' and assigning them a different status than that of paramount leaders.<sup>3</sup> Almost a decade later, Lic. Polo Ondegardo underlined the social difference between the lesser-ranking lords and the mass of *indios del común* (Ondegardo 1990 [1571], 156).

In order to understand the dynamics of Andean polities under colonial rule, scholars have focused their attention primarily on paramount lords—*caciques principales*/governors, *capitanes de mita*, *alcaldes*, or *alguaciles mayores de naturales*<sup>4</sup>—along with the formation of indigenous ruling lineages (Abercrombie 1998; 2006; Choque Canqui 1978; 1983; 1997; 2003; Río 1995; Dueñas 2009; Espinoza Soriano 1960; 1981; Garrett 2005; Graña 2000; Morrone 2010; 2014; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris 2006; Ramírez 1987; 1996; 2006; Rivera 1978; Rivera and Platt 1978; Salomon 1975; Saignes 1992; Spalding 1974; 1984; Stern 1982; Rasnake 1989; Wachtel 1976; among others). By contrast, research on lower-level native lords remains scarce (Chocano 2003; Puente Luna 2007; Noack 2001; Rostworowski 1977; Zuloaga Rada 2011; 2012). This is especially true of the Charcas region, where indigenous hierarchies of power were made up of leading lords or *caciques principales*/governors, lesser-ranking lords, officials of the indigenous town council (*cabildo de indios*) or of the local church (*doctrina*), and finally other

native Andeans generally called *indios principales* (Espinoza Soriano 1987; Jurado 2008; 2011; 2012).

This article studies the impact of colonial rule on Andean hierarchies of power by underlining the role of its lower-level members. Although generally relegated to the background in surviving documentation, it was these lower-ranking leaders who enabled paramount lords to organize labor services, levy tribute, and otherwise govern Andean polities. This article examines the impact of colonial authorities' shifting demands and rules with regard to native leadership against new tensions emerging within segmented Andean polities. As colonial rule strengthened, lesser-ranking native leaders found new roles, raising the stakes in the subordinate lords' fight for status. The article focuses on the regional Aymara society encompassed by the colonial *repartimiento* of Macha, an administrative and fiscal jurisdiction subject to the *Real Audiencia* of Charcas. When possible, I offer comparisons between Macha and other Andean polities.

The *repartimiento* of Macha, located about ninety miles north of Potosí, is well documented. Archival sources include proofs of merit and service (*probanzas de méritos y servicios*), lawsuits (*pleitos*) over lordships, and genealogical disputes by different lesser-ranking lords, all which reveal the demands, duties, and nobility claims of subordinate lords. In Macha, such lords were known as *segundas personas*, *jilakatas*, and *indios principales*. This essay argues that evolving colonial institutions along with Crown fiscal and labor demands on the *repartimiento* of Macha, along with its own segmented and stratified dynamics, reshaped native hierarchies of power. These hierarchies were impacted in such a way that lower-level leaders gained visibility and capacity to act at least until the early seventeenth century. The discussion also calls for a reconceptualization of Andean colonial categories such as *indio principal*, but also of the colonial fiscal category of tribute-paying commoner (*indio tributario*). In this sense, the evidence suggests that while the colonial definition of a commoner describes a fiscal category that is useful for quantitative and demographic purposes, it also hides the social diversity and the multiplicity of ranks typical of early colonial indigenous polities in the southern Andes.

This article starts by exploring the first interrelations between lesser-ranking lords and colonial authorities under the *encomienda* system, dominant until the late 1560s. Next, it examines the impact of Viceroy don Francisco de Toledo's reforms in the early 1570s, which simplified and standardized native hierarchies of power within each *repartimiento*, also splitting local Andean elites between tribute-paying lords and those exempted from it. Finally, the article emphasizes the reactions of lower-level native leaders when faced with the loss of exemption from tributary obligations in the early seventeenth century. I use the illustrative case of *indio principal* don Diego Chambi, from the *repartimiento* of Macha. Chambi's fight for status and his legal arguments to defend his tributary exemptions reveal the central place of *indios principales* in native hierarchies of power as well as their dynamic role in early colonial society.

### **Under the *encomienda*: the rise of Macha segment and the reassignment of native hierarchies, 1540–1569**

During the first three decades of colonial rule, the corporate and self-governing Andean kinship group that would later form the *repartimiento* of Macha was under the *encomienda* system, a royal grant that allowed the beneficiary or *encomendero* to obtain

indigenous tributes. Rights to Macha's tributes were granted to one important Spanish captain and then another, after which the *encomienda* reverted to the king (*en cabeza de Su Majestad*). This last transition connected Macha's native leaders directly to royal treasury officials in the mining center of Potosí. The period from conquest to the 1560s marked deep internal rearrangements. As explained below, the kinship and jurisdictional polity known to scholars as the Qaraqara Federation, which encompassed the later *repartimiento* of Macha in a complex quadripartite structure, experienced internal changes in its ruling lineage status that led to the reassignment of its segmented hierarchies. Also by 1560s, the once quadripartite structure of the Qaraqara Federation was split between two Spanish administrative jurisdictions or *corregimientos*. Crown-appointed *corregidores* oversaw the Crown's substantial fiscal and labor demands within these new districts.

According to early colonial documents, upon the Spanish invasion in the 1530s, the Aymara-speaking kinship group that would later form the *repartimiento* of Macha belonged to a larger socio-political entity headed by a paramount lord called Moroco whose domain was described as the 'Province of the Charcas and Caracara'.<sup>5</sup>

Some ethnohistorians have argued that the Aymara kinship group encompassed by the late sixteenth-century *repartimiento* of Macha be included in the pre-Hispanic Qaraqara Federation. This jurisdictional polity symbolically organized its members according to the Andean principle of dualism (*hanan/hurin* or *ala/maa*) that also ordered smaller political units called by the Spanish *parcialidades*. Several Andean socio-political groups were typically subdivided into these units. According to scholars, Macha was probably the most prestigious segment or *parcialidad* within the Qaraqara Federation, with its higher moiety or *alasya* presiding. This *parcialidad* encompassed the sites or units of Aymaya and Pocoata as well.<sup>6</sup> The same scholars have also argued that the settlement or *pueblo* of Macha constituted the 'capital' of the Qaraqara Federation and home to its paramount lords (Río 1995; Platt 1987; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris 2006; Saignes 1986). I offer a new perspective by proposing a more fluid social dynamic in which native leaders' preeminence within the different segments of the Qaraqara Federation—especially the status of the native lords bound to Macha—underwent considerable reassignment and adjustment. These shifts allowed some native Andean leaders to change and expand their real and discursive places both in the pre-Hispanic past and in their colonial present.

The Spanish Crown imposed a host of fiscal demands on Andean polities that had only recently experienced other tribute and territorial reorganization. Within *Tawantinsuyu*, these groups' members and their ruling native lineages were also reorganized. The Incas had engaged certain factions of Andean lords politically and economically through family ties, material benefits, and symbolic re-significations. For the Qaraqara Federation, and bearing in mind the methodological precautions characteristic of colonial documentation when used to fathom earlier structures, a seventeenth-century indigenous *probanza de méritos* affirms the existence of a parental union that linked some local native lords to the lineage of the Inca Huayna Capac (Jurado 2014; Platt, Bouysse Cassagne, and Harris 2006, 724).

The information provided by Inca record keepers or *kipucamayocs* in the first decades of colonial rule, along with that obtained from local knotted-string records, facilitated the early distribution of Indians in *encomienda*, numbered in detail with their leaders' names and settlements (Pärssinen 2003, 260). After the Spanish occupation of the Charcas region, the socio-political integrity of the Qaraqara Federation was preserved through an

*encomienda* granted to Gonzalo Pizarro on 7 March 1540. The initial *encomienda* was based on a more or less forced alliance with native lords (Puente Brunke 1992; Presta 2000; Stern 1982; Trelles 1991). A close analysis of Gonzalo Pizarro's *encomienda* grant or *cédula de encomienda* reveals intricate hierarchies of native authorities. They were spread out geographically to be in charge of at least four or five tributary units. In addition, this early document confirms a paramount leadership role for the native lord called Moroco.

Pizarro's 1540 *cédula de encomienda* suggests a quadripartite organization for the Qaraqara Federation since only four 'heads' (*cabeceras*)<sup>7</sup> of the 'Caracara Province' are mentioned: Chaqui, residence of Moroco, the paramount leader; Chacondi, with its lord, Gualca; and finally, the Caracara and Moromoro settlements, each with its own native lord (Jurado 2012). Linked to these four demographically large settlements (called by Spanish scribes and officials *cabeceras* and also *pueblos*) was a network of more than fifty lower-level native leaders called *principales*, each of them tied directly or indirectly to lord Moroco. These numerous *principales* controlled a variable number of commoners in one or several *pueblos*. With an ethnically diverse settlement pattern that was physically diffuse, demographically unequal, and politically intertwined, the Qaraqara Federation relied heavily on intermediate and lower-level native lords. They articulated the larger socio-political entity to such a degree that Spanish authorities listed their names and places of residence in order to map and make sense of the polity.

The 1540s proved turbulent in the Andes, and after the defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro in 1548, the Qaraqara Federation faced re-allotment and division. A portion of Gonzalo Pizarro's *encomienda* was granted to General Pedro de Hinojosa on 29 August 1548. Although less informative than Pizarro's grant, Hinojosa's *cédula de encomienda* reveals changes brought about by early colonial rule. In particular, the document outlines the gradual administrative separation of previously united socio-political segments and marks the disruption of native hierarchies of power. The evidence suggests that other Andean communities went through similar reassignment of their lords' status, or 'rank inflation', as described by Susan Ramírez for the North Coast of Peru (1996). According to Ramírez, the granting of *encomiendas* caused pre-Columbian native hierarchies of rank to collapse while subordinated lords seized the opportunity to become paramount lords, adopting the titles, insignia, and privileges originally reserved for paramount lords alone (Ramírez 1996, 29–30, 156–57). In the Charcas region, by 1548 Macha obtained a privileged position in the new *cédula*, being distinguished as the 'the first Moroco settlement', although the paramount lord Moroco was dead. This is surprising since eight years before, in the Pizarro grant, the *pueblo* of Macha was not considered particularly relevant. In the earlier *cédula*, thirteen settlements 'subject to Macha' or whose subjects 'serve in Macha' were listed, but without further explanation. Instead, by 1548, 133 tribute-paying commoners inhabited the *pueblo* of Macha, led by lord Gualca, 'subject to Moroco'. Curiously, the exact same native lords, settlements, and number of commoners that had been previously mentioned in 1540 related to the settlement of Chacondi, which, eight years later, was not mentioned at all. To sum up, we should underline the fact that in General Hinojosa's *cédula de encomienda* the Macha segment or *parcialidad* clearly gained status. Although the Chaqui settlement continued to function, as in 1540, as the 'head settlement' or *cabecera* of Moroco, it must have shared its preeminence with the *pueblo* of Macha (Jurado 2012).

This information suggests a notable rearrangement of the Pizarro *encomienda's* native lords, whose deaths, loss of power, or rise within the native hierarchies of power also implied a shuffling of the status of each lord's subjects and settlements. The death of Moroco, which coincided with the execution of his *encomendero*, Gonzalo Pizarro, plus the rise of Gualca as paramount leader, must have led to considerable internal rearrangements within the larger unit. In several seventeenth-century indigenous *probanzas de méritos*, Gualca was recalled as the paramount lord of the *hanan* segment or moiety of the *repartimiento* of Macha, whereas Moroco was recalled as the *hurin* one (Jurado 2011). This dual power structure in which a pair of native leaders co-ruled a socio-political entity neatly split into two moieties is hard to recognize in the original 1540 *cédula*. When both lords were alive the Spanish seemed only to recognize Moroco as paramount leader. And after Moroco's death in 1548, the dual structure remained hidden behind the European notion of linear succession among sole rulers, Gualca succeeding Moroco. If dual authority was exercised, other changes in the hierarchy of native leaders must have still been important given that those headmen recognized as belonging to the *hurinsaya* moiety found their status and dialogue with the Spanish altered with the loss of Moroco. Meanwhile, the *hanansayas*, represented by Gualca, gained in status and visibility. The fact that a man listed as 'Gualca's brother' attended the second *encomienda* acquisition ceremony in Potosí, in early November 1548, may show the importance that Gualca and the *hanansayas* acquired during the eight-year interim.

Finally, upon the death of General Pedro de Hinojosa, in March 1553, the Macha *encomienda* was placed under the direct administration of Crown officials as part of the royal patrimony. After 1555, the *cajas reales* of Potosí registered tribute payment by the subjects of the former *encomienda* of Hinojosa, identified as 'Charcas Indians of Hinojosa', bound to unified fiscal demands until 1567.<sup>8</sup> A thorough analysis of the tributary registers reveals shifts and tensions in the relationships between the native lords and their *parcialidades* or segments. In 1558, for the first time, the documentation listed the leaders delivering tribute, distinguishing the names of lords from Chaqui from those of Macha.<sup>9</sup> This probably means that not only did Crown officials' knowledge grow as colonial rule tightened, but also that intermediate and lower-level native leaders started to acquire an active role in meeting or challenging colonial demands. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that when delivering cash tribute (*pesos ensayados*), Macha and Chaqui were differentiated in the register as different *parcialidades*, their native lords still maintained a strong idea of unity, coordinating deliveries of money to Potosí and co-producing maize tribute.<sup>10</sup>

The following decade was marked by constant disputes before the *Audiencia* of Charcas launched by the different socio-political segments that made up the former *encomienda* of Gonzalo Pizarro. These legal disputes accentuated internal divisions described in the *encomienda* grants. In 1566, the two segments broke apart. The number of native lords connected to Crown officials rose, a process that clearly influenced Governor Lope García de Castro's view of the subordinate lords' status, as described above. Also, representatives of Chaqui and Macha ceased to go to Potosí together to deliver their *pesos ensayados* and started to do so on separate dates. Divisions also occurred in maize production, as the *parcialidad* of Tontola (located near Toropalca) started delivering the cereal only in the name of Chaqui, whereas the *parcialidad* of Guaycoma did so for Macha and Chaqui.<sup>11</sup> The following year (1567) the Macha and Chaqui *repartimientos* were assigned to two newly created colonial *corregimientos*, Chayanta and Porco, with the Macha segment assigned

to Chayanta and most of the former Chaqui segment falling within Porco Province. This split was part of a larger institutional restructuring of the Viceroyalty of Peru put in place under Lic. Lope García de Castro. *Corregimientos* were headed by a local administrative and judicial official (*corregidor y justicia mayor*), whereas rural *corregidores* were known as *corregidores de indios*. They were introduced to improve administration of the various *repartimientos* and were obliged to periodically inspect indigenous communities (Stern 1982, 127–28). According to Thierry Saignes, implementation of the *corregimiento* system had a greater impact on the territorial and political cohesion of pre-Hispanic Andean entities than any colonial act to date (Saignes 1992, 111). In fact, the intervention of a colonial authority outside the group, the *corregidor de indios*, would gain gradual importance in the internal affairs of the *repartimiento*, eventually leading to the ouster of local native lords from many of their traditional roles. Furthermore, the creation of the provinces or *corregimientos* of Chayanta and Porco confirmed the legal and administrative division of the socio-political segments that had been united in the initial *encomienda* of Gonzalo Pizarro.

### **'... the poor natives have many lords above them':<sup>12</sup> Viceroy Toledo and the simplification of native power hierarchies**

In the southern Andes, the reforms enacted by Viceroy don Francisco de Toledo in the early 1570s caused, among other things, the homogenization and legal simplification of native power hierarchies within *repartimientos*. Yet Toledo also introduced a new level of local complexity: the indigenous town council (*cabildo de indios*). In the Charcas region, a native hierarchy of leadership was promoted and implemented within most *repartimientos*, which included legal recognition of three levels of native lords. These included the paramount leader, called the *cacique principal* and/or governor, and some subordinated lords, including the so-called *segunda persona*. Below him were the *caciques of ayllus* who headed of the smallest political units of the *repartimiento*, the *ayllu*. Finally, Viceroy Toledo divided the very same local Indian elite of each *repartimiento* between native lords subject to tribute payment and those exempted of from it.

There were still other reforms, each with its own effect. The shuffling of Andean socio-political hierarchies caused by the *encomienda* system was exacerbated in Charcas in the 1570s by the forced resettlement of the native population into Iberian-style towns (*pueblos de indios*). Much has been written about Viceroy Toledo and his larger political and economic project in the Viceroyalty of Peru (Assadourian 1979; 1983; 1989; Bakewell 1984; Cole 1985; Gade 1991; Spalding 1974, 61–87; Stern 1982, 133–84; Zavala 1978, 1:63–146). Here I focus solely on the restructuring of native power hierarchies within the *repartimiento* of Macha resulting from Toledo's *visita general*, comparing Macha with other Andean *repartimientos*, especially in greater Charcas.

The forced resettlement of Andeans and the official recognition of their native lords did not occur uniformly across the Viceroyalty of Peru, nor were these processes entirely the fault of Viceroy Toledo. In fact, in the north resettlement began informally in the 1540s. Yet it was only in the 1560s that the first systematic, Spanish-directed efforts at concentration took place—ordered by a Lima *oidor*, Dr. Gregorio González de Cuenca (Ramírez 1996, 30). These and other changes were under way before Toledo's arrival in 1569, and they gave the viceroy several models to consider. Aware of the complex and

intricate structures typical of Andean polities and of their scaled levels of leadership, Viceroy Toledo warned his general inspectors (*visitadores generales*) to take care when selecting sites for Spanish-style *pueblos de indios*, ‘especially where there are two or three *caciques* of *parcialidades*, for each of them wants the other subjects to come to their settlement given that their home is established there’.<sup>13</sup> Toledo was clearly aware that several decades of colonial rule had altered Andean social hierarchies.<sup>14</sup> In short, site selection was certain to affect the socio-political dynamics of each Andean *repartimiento*.

The Toledan forced resettlement of Andean population altered the late 1560s *repartimiento* of Macha’s territoriality. Resettlement patterns from the Toledan era have been treated in detail elsewhere (Jurado 2006), so here I offer only a sketch of the process. According to Viceroy Toledo’s accounts, the inspector Galaor de Loayza regrouped his 10,451 inhabitants into four *pueblos de indios*: Santa Fe de Chayrapacta in the previous settlement (*asiento*) of Macha; Magdalena de Aymaya; Alcázar de Pocoata; and San Marcos de Miraflores de Yaure. The first three pueblos were located in cold and barren highlands and the fourth in the warmer, greener lowlands (Figure 1).<sup>15</sup> Chayrapacta, not mentioned in the *cédulas de encomienda*, was described in documents from the 1570s as a likely name for the former pueblo of Macha. By contrast, Chacondi, which had been a demographically relevant settlement only thirty years before, was not mentioned at all.



**Figure 1.** The repartimiento of Macha at the end of sixteenth century.



The forced resettlement of the *repartimiento* of Macha's inhabitants by Toledo also provided an opportunity to change its paramount native ruling lineage. According to Spanish law, the right to become a *cacique principal* was based on birthright. Nevertheless, it was the Crown that designated indigenous headmen, thus differentiating the *cacique*, or native lord, from the governor or native administrator of a *repartimiento*. Even so, in most cases the *cacique principal* and governor were the same person, given that not only was he sometimes the recognized heir but also had the capacity to exercise power (Díaz Rementería 1977, 40–41). As in the rest of the Andes, these native lords were placed at the top of regional power hierarchies in virtually all *repartimientos* (Puente Luna 2007, 112). According to a seventeenth-century *probanza de méritos*, it was around 1575 that the *repartimiento* of Macha underwent a significant internal political change. The descendants of Gualca, a native lord included in both of Macha's *cédulas de encomienda*, were deprived of their right to rule because they had not reached majority. In their place, according to one of the testimonies, a certain don Pedro Soto was appointed *cacique principal* and governor of the *repartimiento*, 'without having the right to it'.<sup>16</sup> The life story of this *hanan* lord is unknown, but despite being accused of usurpation he apparently enjoyed enough of his subjects' support to rule the *repartimiento* until at least 1619.

As stated above, under the initial 1540 *encomienda* charter the polity of Macha had been united with several segments, all subject to the paramount lord Moroco. However, during the first three decades of colonial rule, relationships between the member polities of the pre-Hispanic Qaraqara Federation started to change as their native lords fought to improve their status. The pattern recurred. During the 1570s, amid the resettlement of rural Andeans into nucleated villages and the substitution of native ruling lineages, two political segments up to this time included in the *repartimiento* of Macha—the *parcialidades* of Aymaya and Pocoata—demanded that Viceroy Toledo change their status.

This request was the culmination of a longer process. These units had been called upon to provide a greater proportion of the *repartimiento* of Macha's fiscal requirements. For example, in 1566, Pocoata had contributed 20% of the *repartimiento* of Macha's cash tribute in *pesos ensayados*. By 1567, the Pocoata portion was 30%, and by 1568, 37% (Jurado 2011). Even though Viceroy Toledo had set both the tribute and labor quotas for the *repartimiento* of Macha, the subordinate lords of Pocoata and Aymaya—with the assent of don Pedro Soto, the new paramount lord of the *repartimiento*—managed to transform their native subjects' jurisdictional status from *parcialidades* into *repartimientos*. This in turn rendered the two headmen *caciques principales* and governors. Thus, it was in Potosí on 23 February 1575 that 'the *caciques* asked that Toledo divide and reassign what belonged to each *parcialidad* of the *repartimiento* of Macha'. Accordingly, the viceroy assessed the tribute quota of each segment separately. This case demonstrates how the restructuring of Andean polities under colonial rule was not simply caused by external and alien intervention. Each polity had its own internal dynamics and some native leaders took the initiative to substantially reconfigure hierarchies of power.

The arrival of Viceroy Toledo further strengthened royal officials' hostile attitude towards native lords, first expressed clearly in the 1560s (Alaperrine-Bouyer 2005; Assadourian 1983, 11). A key critic was Charcas *audiencia* judge Juan de Matienzo, who offered recommendations on native lordship (*cacicazgo*) in his treatise *Gobierno del Perú* ([1567] 1967). But also other Spanish writings pushed the Crown to eliminate the privileges of Andean lords. This attack had an impact not only on the placement and

jurisdiction assigned to *corregidores de indios* (Assadourian 1983, 11–16). It also affected the creation of local community councils and on the restriction of roles and prerogatives of native leaders and their access to their commoners' labor quotas, among other things. Viceroy Toledo's reforms likewise aimed for homogenization and legal simplification of native hierarchies of power throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru (Río 2005, 115; Poloni-Simard 2006, 101–2). In the north, the move to restrict the power of indigenous lords began earlier, in the 1560s, when *oidor* González de Cuenca eliminated the work and other forms of direct support that native lords expected from their subjects. The native lords claimed that Cuenca's greatly reduced subsidy was so low that 'the *cacique[s] principal[es]* are like commoners' (Ramírez 1996, 33). In a similar way, Cuenca's ordinances for Jayanca abolished many lords' offices and replaced them with Spanish-style officials, leading to the loss of many native words related to native power hierarchies (Rostworowski 1983, 118).

Claiming to defend native commoners, Viceroy Toledo issued a decree exempting the legitimate sons and brothers of *caciques principales*, plus those of some subordinated lords, from the onerous *mita* labor draft. Subaltern lords exempted included native leaders of moieties (*parcialidades*) and of the smallest political units or *ayllus*. But to be exempted (*reservados*) from forced labor duties, these native lords' relatives had to have been in power before the General Inspection of 1570s. Nevertheless, except for the legitimate eldest son to succeed the paramount native lord or *cacique principal*, the subordinated lords were all obliged to comply with the payment of cash tribute (the *pesos ensayados*) assessed for commoners.<sup>17</sup>

It has been said that these formalized Crown fiscal and labor obligations became the distinctive mark and characteristic of Andean commoner status after Viceroy Toledo (Poloni-Simard 2006, 56; Stern 1982, 133–34). Acknowledging greater complexity, Toledo's decree sought to break up every Andean *repartimiento*—not only dividing *indios del común* (forced to participate in rotational labor drafts) from the privileged local native elite (*repartimiento* headmen exempt from *mita*)—but also by fracturing the very same local native elite, which was divided between those lords subject to payment of money tribute and those exempted from it. Viceroy Toledo thus built upon a precedent established by Lima's *audiencia* president, Lope García de Castro. In 1565, García de Castro declared exemption for paramount leaders of *repartimientos* along with their sons, and also the subordinated lords called *segundas personas*, from any kind of colonial impositions. In addition, leaders of *huarangas* and *pachacas* (rounded-off units of thousands and hundreds, respectively) were exempt, for 'it was fair that they were honored due to their duties and because such has been and is the custom'<sup>18</sup> (Levillier 1921–1926, 3:126).

Viceroy Toledo provided general inspectors with instructions based on a native decimal division scheme, probably borrowed from the Andean polities of north-central Peru. This system was not always reproduced by native polities in Charcas.<sup>19</sup> Whereas in many areas of the Viceroyalty of Peru one could still find Andean political units organized according to the decimal division scheme during the seventeenth century, in the Charcas region Inca decimal division was limited to the ranking vocabulary of native lords (Pärssinen 2003, 333). Despite this fact, Toledo's dispositions used a decimal native power hierarchy for guiding the action of his Charcas general inspectors. Finally, even though this decimal division of rank or hierarchy was ultimately not used in establishing the tribute and *mita*

population quotas for Charcas's *repartimientos*, the viceroy managed to further homogenize or flatten the densely tiered native power structures that had already been transformed by forty years of colonial rule.

One of Viceroy Toledo's tribute assessments (*tasaciones*) for the Charcas region is housed in the Archivo Histórico de la Casa de la Moneda de Potosí.<sup>20</sup> Close analysis of this document confirms a double process of legal simplification and standardization of the *repartimiento*'s native power hierarchies. This simplification was announced in the instructions for the General Inspection, which established that:

you will make certain that only the *caciques principales* of the *repartimiento* and the *segundas personas* are left in them, as well as the *caciques* of *huaranga* [1,000] and *pisca-pachaca* [500] and *pachaca* [100], and you will remove all the other subordinated leaders (*mandones* and *principales*). (Romero 1924, 171)<sup>21</sup>

In addition, Toledo restricted the number of lowest-level native lords. In the viceroy's own words: 'there must be only one *cacique* in each *ayllo*'.<sup>22</sup> This regulation must have forced radical change if we consider the complaint of several Aymara lords in 1582, who asked the king 'for the *ayllus*' lords to be four and exempt from tribute and provided a salary and arable land'<sup>23</sup> (Espinoza Soriano 1969, 133).

Viceroy Toledo simultaneously promoted native power gradients or meaningful rankings that became standard in most Charcas *repartimientos*, even though the historical processes that shaped native polities inside each *repartimiento* were diverse. The Charcas *tasación* or tribute assessment housed in Potosí demonstrates official recognition of three levels of native lords within the *repartimiento*: (1) the paramount leader (*cacique principal* and governor), (2) the *segunda persona*, and (3) the '*caciques* of *ayllos* of *pachacas*', each heading the smallest units of the *repartimiento*. This number rises to four if we bear in mind the native leader whom Toledo called the *cacique* of *mitimaes* (a social category related to settlement enclaves), only recognized in the *repartimiento* of Chaqui.<sup>24</sup> Future research will determine the extent to which native power hierarchies in post-Toledan Charcas were similar to other indigenous communities of Viceroyalty of Peru. Notably, Puente Luna has identified a similar three-level power structure in the central Peruvian *repartimientos* of Atunjauja, Luringuanca, and Ananguanca (Jauja Province) for the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In spite of their previous decimal system of organization, the hierarchy of native leaders included the *caciques principales*, the *segundas personas* (or *caciques de pueblos*), and, below these, the *caciques de tasa de ayllu*. Finally, Puente Luna adds another level within the hierarchy of native leaders: the lords of *mitimaes*, who had an 'intermediate place between the *caciques principales* of *repartimiento* and the *caciques principales* of a town' (Puente Luna 2007, 115–19).

Other archival sources, including inspections (*visitas* and *revisitas*) and lawsuits, reveal how official native hierarchies exercised power within the *repartimiento* of Macha. Macha was among the majority (c.70%) of Charcas *repartimientos* in which the native power hierarchies promoted by Toledo succeeded.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, the paramount lord or *cacique principal* was assimilated to the native lords of the two moieties (*hanan* and *hurin*) which comprised the *repartimiento*, along with two subordinated leaders called *segundas personas*, one for each of the 'two *caciques principales*'. Finally, the hierarchy included one subordinated lord, called *principal*, for each of the ten *ayllus*, the smallest segments of the *repartimiento*. However, in spite of the Toledan strategy to standardize the native ruling

hierarchy, some thirty percent of *repartimientos* in Charcas did not include a *segunda persona*. Such was true of the recent *repartimientos* of Pocoata and Aymaya among others.<sup>26</sup> In these cases, imperial politics adjusted to local diversity. This is an important piece of evidence considering the generalized presence of *segundas personas* throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru (Rostworowski 1983, 117–29). These exceptions also reveal the limits of homogenization of native power hierarchies within the Charcas *repartimientos*. This may have been due to demographic change and/or pre-existing complex socio-political segmentations, but as we have seen, demands by native lords must also be considered.

Viceroy Toledo also established a hierarchy of salaries and access to native subjects' rotational labor. Labor allotments varied according to each lord's office, and further variations were found according to each *repartimiento*. The exception was the lowest-level *ayllu* leader, who only had access to the labor of his *ayllu* members. Thus, Toledo legally sanctioned and strengthened power hierarchies in some *repartimientos* and in others he imposed a novel imbalance of power. The *cacique principal*/governor was responsible for organizing labor services and levying tribute upon his *repartimiento*, and in exchange he received a salary and allotments of rotational labor from his own subjects (Díaz Rementería 1977, 40–41). The evidence suggests that in the *repartimiento* of Macha, the higher status of the *caciques principales* of each moiety was guaranteed by their differential access to money (Figure 2).<sup>27</sup>

We lack information regarding the *hanan cacique principal* don Pedro Soto, who, as we have seen, was also governor of the whole *repartimiento* at least through 1619. However, the *hurinsayas* living in the settlement of San Pedro de Macha were ruled by a native lineage that claimed descent from lord Moroco, mentioned in the first *cédula de encomienda*. These descendants of the old paramount lord in turn ruled some of their *ayllus*. Also, the *hurin* moiety had the peculiar tendency to divide the role of native leadership by having a different lord for *hurinsayas* living in the lowland settlement of Miraflores. The *hanan* native lord and his counterparts from *hurin* dealt separately, and

	Annual Wage (in <i>pesos</i> <i>ensayados</i> )	Products (in <i>fanegas</i> )		Labor force		
		Maize*	Papas	Old men	Old women	Young men
<i>Parcialidad</i> Leader	100	2	8	6	3	2
<i>Segunda persona</i>	--	1	6	2	2	2
<i>Ayllu</i> Leader	--	0,5	4	--	--	--

**Figure 2.** The native hierarchy of power and its remuneration. *Repartimiento* of Macha, 1575. [Source: Archivo Histórico de la Casa de la Moneda de Potosí, Caja Real, 18.] \*A maize *fanega* equals, approximately, 255 pounds in this region (Río 1989).

without overlapping, with the *corregidor* of Chayanta Province. The legal and juridical defence of their *repartimiento* territory and the distribution of land parcels were duties carried out essentially by the moiety *caciques principales*. In fact, it was they, together with their subordinated lords called *segundas personas*, who developed a central role in the defence of the larger, shared territory. Record of their land allotments may have been kept in their respective knotted-stringed records or *kipus*, given that the territory was controlled by each moiety through a system that guaranteed the intertwining of moieties and *ayllus* in a collectively known area (Jurado 2013).

Ethnohistorians have characterized *segundas personas* or Andean subordinate lords in different ways (Espinoza Soriano 1987; Jurado 2008; Platt 1987). Within the native power hierarchies in post-Toledan Charcas *repartimientos*, the *segundas personas*' role was seen as an important one given their range of duties. Viceroy Toledo assigned them various fiscal responsibilities, along with control of 'contingency' surplus funds (*bienes de comunidad*) and management of the *repartimiento*'s legal affairs and reports when the *cacique principal*/governor was absent.<sup>28</sup> According to the Toledan documentation, *segundas personas* were linked (by means of the possessive 'de') to the *repartimiento*—and also to the *cacique principal*, whose name identified and guaranteed his access to a subject labor quota. Thus, by indicating the privileges of *segundas personas*, the same notarial phrasing was repeated, assigning the *segundas personas* 'half the farming lands and half the labor service that are to be provided to the *caciques principales*'.<sup>29</sup>

The *segundas personas* of the *repartimiento* of Macha were always present when litigating matters related to tribute or the boundaries of a specific political segment such as an *ayllu* or moiety or to the whole *repartimiento*. We have only fragmentary information on the *segundas personas* of the *hanan* moiety, but luckily we have substantially more on their counterparts in *hurinsaya*. Between 1575 and 1619, the *hurinsaya segundas personas* were not blood related, which means that access to this office did not depend on the male inheritance required by colonial legislation. According to Macha's power hierarchy, the *segunda persona* office (at least as exercised in the *repartimiento* towards the end of the sixteenth century) was closely connected to accounting abilities (e.g. his accounting skills in 'his *kipu*'). Such skills were central to the management of draft-eligible commoners, tribute, and, according to other documentation, computing the land plots of each *repartimiento*'s moiety (Jurado 2008).

It is not my intention to suggest linear continuities with the pre-Hispanic past or to postulate the existence of complementary structural positions between the paramount native lords of each moiety and their *segundas personas*. The dynamism of Andean polities and their hierarchies of power in the face of substantial colonial demands after four or more decades of colonial rule challenges any claim of persistence. The native power hierarchies in the *repartimiento* of Macha at the end of the sixteenth century did, however, assign *segundas personas* roles connected to accounting and computing human and material resources. They were not alone. Evidence suggests that other indigenous communities or Andean *repartimientos* around Lake Titicaca readapted the roles of their native authorities, assigning *segundas personas* quantitative duties, such as despatching the *repartimiento*'s temporary workers (*mitayos*) to Potosí (as detailed in 1665 documents for the settlements of Chucuito, Acora, and Hilave), or being responsible for the *mitayo* allotment of their own moieties.<sup>30</sup> This is what the indigenous chronicler Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala in fact recommended towards the end of 1615; he promoted the participation of

*segundas personas* in delivering and enrolling *mitayos*, also encouraging their Western literacy.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, transformations within the *ayllu* leadership are less known since this minor segment of the *repartimiento* did not usually attract significant Spanish attention. Only one person per *ayllu*, its lord or *jilakata*, to use the native term (Spaniards preferred *mandón* or *principal*), legally maintained his leading role after the Toledan mandates—including rights to agricultural products grown by his people. As was true at higher levels in the hierarchy, the rotational labor force provided to *jilakatas* according to Toledo's reforms followed the pre-Hispanic *mit'a* pattern (Murra 1978, 135–75; Stern 1982, 23–57). In return, the *jilakata* was to provide seeds, food, and an *abasca*-cloth outfit yearly to each agricultural worker who labored for him. As to his domestic service, he was to allow old men and women and young men who served in his house to rotate every six months.<sup>32</sup> Although usually it was *segundas personas* who served as the referent for calculating the privileges of *jilakatas*—with the formula ‘to all the other *caciques* of *ayllos* of *pachacas* [ ... ] the commoners of their moieties will prepare a separate farm as the one for each of the *segundas personas* of this *repartimiento*’<sup>33</sup>—this was not the case of the *repartimiento* of Macha. In Macha, Viceroy Toledo guaranteed the *jilakatas* a quota of a half *fanega* of maize and two-thirds *fanega* of potato received by each *segunda persona*, thus removing access to rotational labor (Figure 1). This rule may have exacerbated segmentary competition and conflict inherent to each *repartimiento*'s hierarchy of leadership; Toledan standardization and legal simplification did not manage to reduce such frictions. Evidence of this comes from declarations of two Macha *repartimiento* subjects who in the name of their *ayllus* requested that the *corregidor* of *Chayanta* suppress the *segunda persona* office altogether. This was only nine years after Toledo recognized its status (Jurado 2008).

The *jilakatas* held a key position in the *repartimiento*'s native power hierarchy. By 1582, the Aymara lords of the Charcas region signed a legal petition claiming that ‘without them [the *jilakatas*] we could do nothing, and they know the people of their *ayllu*’<sup>34</sup> (Espinoza Soriano 1969, 133). According to the information obtained for the *repartimiento* of Macha, the *jilakatas* combined several roles related to levying tribute, selecting and assisting their *ayllu*'s *mitayos* in Potosí, and maintaining the daily balance between domestic units and their demand for farm plots. This central position turned them into crucial participants in lawsuits for lordship or *cacicazgo* rights at all levels of the *repartimiento* (Jurado 2011).

As we have seen, besides the *jilakatas* and other lords was another powerful unit: the indigenous town council or *cabildo de indios*. The native power hierarchy within the *repartimiento* institutionalized by Toledo had to share civil and criminal jurisdiction with the town councils. In part the legal simplification imposed upon the native hierarchy of lords was a necessary step to introduce the *cabildo*. According to Toledan legislation, the *cabildo* had an indigenous municipal judge (*alcalde*) who was to supervise—alongside the *cacique principal*/governor—land distribution and tribute collection within his *repartimiento*. In addition, *cabildo* authorities included an indigenous notary (*escribano*) appointed for life and one or two native village councilmen (*regidores*), plus a constable (*alguacil mayor*) chosen once a year by former members (Assadourian 1983, 14; Spalding 1974, 72–75). The indigenous town council in the *repartimiento* of Macha was an established institution whose members took pride in their positions when they acted as witnesses

or dealt with questions related to Crown fiscal and labor demands. We have little evidence of these town council members' actions, as only the 1614 appointment of the native notary of the *repartimiento* of Macha has been found. The appointment described the notary's responsibility:

... you are to deal with any disagreements and causes both civil and criminal that take place here, in absence of the Province notary, as well as with all the testimonies of native men and women written in this town (*pueblo*).<sup>35</sup>

However, an analysis of the *repartimiento* of Macha indicates that Toledan regulations did not manage to simplify completely its heterogeneous native hierarchies of power. In this sense, the documentary record depicts a network of natives called *indios principales* as distinguished native people who helped *jilakatas* and other lesser native lords in duties connected to the agrarian cycle, tribute collection, and the care of *mitayos*. Based on evidence for the *repartimiento* of Macha, I see a distinction between the term *principal* (as the Spanish sometimes called *jilakatas*) and *indio principal*, a social category that referred to the local native elite of *repartimiento* whose status differed from that of commoners (*indios del común*). The *indio principal* represented the collective unit in cases of conflict, making certain to be present in any relevant event in the *repartimiento*. Thus, the legal simplification and standardization imposed upon local and regional power hierarchies during the 1570s still left ambiguous gaps. It was here in the gaps that diverse native lords—essential for internal *repartimiento* rule but not officially recognized in the colonial legislation—sought to reproduce their differential status and take up active roles within the *repartimiento*.

### **'It is not fair that he is treated as a commoner'<sup>36</sup>: lower-level native lords and Crown fiscal pressure in the seventeenth century**

Colonial administrators continued to challenge native power hierarchies in the *repartimiento* of Macha throughout the seventeenth century and in manifold ways. For reasons of space, this section focuses on the erosion of privileges such as tribute exemption from the perspective of an individual *indio principal*, don Diego Chambi. Chambi's legal struggle to distinguish himself from tribute-paying commoners and *mitayos* illuminates how status and native Andean notions of nobility functioned at the *repartimiento*'s lowest-level. The Chambi case also helps to re-conceptualize the colonial category of *indio principal* as a social grouping or status that, through legal discourse put forth by advocates and attorneys, defended and made visible its leadership position within the *repartimiento*. The rank mattered, and it stood well above that of commoners (*indios del común*). Also, don Diego Chambi's life raises some questions about the social and status homogeneity of the fiscal colonial category of commoners.

Don Diego Chambi's struggle was hardly unique. Throughout the Hispanic world, the quest for tribute exemption and status recognition was part of a long legal tradition. Subjects regularly did battle in court to claim or emphasize aristocratic status. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, local Castilian *hidalgos* or petty noblemen strove and negotiated for exemption from tributary duties, legally and through family and political relationships. Increasing Crown fiscal demands led to a complex process of conflict and negotiation between the Crown, *pecheros* (ordinary tributaries), and *hidalgos*. *Hidalgos* developed

elaborate legal documents to prove their (sometimes doubtful) nobility (Bennassar 2003; Burgos Esteban 1989; Díaz de la Guardia 2005; 2008).<sup>37</sup> These late-medieval written letters-patent (*executorias de hidalguía*) served as models for colonial legal arguments made by Spanish notaries and advocates in proving native nobility in local or peninsular courts (Cunill 2014; Jurado 2014).

In the Viceroyalty of Peru, Inca nobles, native lords, and other indigenous petitioners appeared before *audiencia* judges as early as the 1540s to demand *encomiendas*, coats of arms, official positions, and other rewards and emoluments. Scholars have lately attempted to re-conceptualize active Andean litigation in ecclesiastical and secular courts, including the *audiencias* of Lima and Charcas, highlighting indigenous participation in lawsuits over land, town boundaries, lordship rights, and communal assets. Scholars have also noted that *repartimiento*-level indigenous demands for reduced tribute and *mita* quotas were soon joined by private lawsuits (*pleitos particulares*) filed by native individuals who claimed to be exempted (*reservados*) from their tributary duties due to their noble status, age, or illness (Charles 2007; Puente Luna 2015; Graña 2000; Honores 2003; Medinaceli and Arze 1998; Mumford 2008; Poloni Simard 2005; Stern 1982, 185–218; among others). A significant number of Andean lords also traveled to Spain to plead their own and/or their communities' claims before the Habsburg court (Puente Luna 2014; Dueñas 2009; Glave 2008). To Crown officials in both Peru and New Spain, indigenous subjects quickly won the ill fame of being expert litigators or '*indios pleitistas*'. It was assumed that Spanish advocates had unwittingly taught them how to use the court system against colonial authorities. To gain a sense of how this dynamic developed in the *repartimiento* of Macha in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, we turn to the case of *indio principal* don Diego Chambi. Among other things, his plight shows how Crown fiscal pressure shaped the sociopolitical trajectory of the lowest-level native lords.

Upon the departure of Toledo, Viceroy García Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Cañete (1589–1596), expressed his concern over the decline of both native populations and tribute income. As a remedy, he proposed declaring the native lords of each *repartimiento* tribute-paying commoners. In a letter from 27 May 1592, the viceroy proposed that

The *caciques principales* and the *segundas personas* that Your Majesty reserves [from tributary duties] are the most rested and wealthy [ ... ] which is why it would be desirable that they pay this service to Your Majesty too, and even twice as much as commoners (*indios particulares*).<sup>38</sup>

This proposal went into effect on 3 December 1603, when the next viceroy, don Luis de Velasco y Castilla (1596–1604), Marquis of Salinas, abolished part of Toledo's *provisión* or decree that had ensured exemption down to the local level. The new legislation repeated the order that legitimate eldest sons of the paramount lords (*caciques principales*) were exempted from *mita* obligations and cash tribute payment (*tasa*), whereas younger legitimate sons were only exempted from rotational labor drafts. However, the law now stated that the descendants of subordinate lords, such as *segundas personas* and any other lower-level native headmen, were to comply with *mita* duties and pay tribute.<sup>39</sup>

This change in policy toward lower-level native lords had a profound impact on the individual and collective experiences of Andean *repartimientos*. One such individual was the *indio principal* don Diego Chambi. Documents he left behind allow us to



analyze the challenges, strategies, and legal and paralegal spaces encountered by a member of the *repartimiento* of Macha's native elite. How might he maintain his privileges and social preeminence when forced to act like a commoner? Well advised in legal matters and skillful in exploiting the interstices of colonial justice, don Diego Chambi appealed to the *corregidor* of Chayanta Province. It was the *corregidor*, don Fernando de Padilla, who, when taking the census of the *repartimiento* in 1616, was to apply the new regulations. There was a problem. *Corregidor* Padilla had arrived in San Pedro de Macha to check the number of tribute-paying commoners established by his predecessor, Miguel Ruiz de Bustillo, who was accused of exempting rich natives from colonial demands in exchange for money. After Padilla's investigation, the *repartimiento* of Macha registered eighty-six tribute-paying commoners more than before, mostly by denying exemptions to *indios principales* (Jurado 2011).

As one of those affected, don Diego Chambi appealed to the *Audiencia* of Charcas 'for this abuse to stop', claiming that *Corregidor* Padilla had registered him 'among the commoners without considering my exemptions and liberties'.<sup>40</sup> Disregarding the new model put in place by Viceroy Salinas, the Charcas magistrates heard Chambi's request and sent a letter to the *corregidor* prefaced by Viceroy Toledo's original order. He was told to execute its contents. Twenty days later, *Corregidor* Padilla and his notary questioned a string of witnesses willing to testify that don Diego Chambi indeed possessed the 'quality' of an indigenous exempted person (*reservado*).

Much like the *probanzas de méritos* filed by other native paramount lords in the Charcas region (Jurado 2014), the testimonies collected by *Corregidor* Padilla resorted to Western notions of legitimate birth as well as parental categories meant to link don Diego Chambi with a lineage of native lords listed on the first *encomienda* grant. Thus, Chambi was said to be a 'great grandson' of lord Moroco, 'grandson' of the salient *hurin-saya cacique principal*, and 'nephew' of his heir to this office, and also son of a *jilakata* from the Mahapicha *ayllu* (of the *hurin* moiety). The witnesses clearly were aware of the importance of Western hereditary succession and the concept of lineage when referring to colonial native lordship and tribute exemptions. They therefore adjusted their discourse to the petitioner's expectations.

Even though don Diego Chambi did not occupy a native office legally recognized by colonial rule, he had experienced different leadership roles—'honorable offices' in a *jilakata*'s words—serving as a *principal* with *mitayos* in Potosí and as a municipal judge (*alcalde*) in San Pedro de Macha's town council. Probably with the aid of Spanish advocates and attorneys, the witnesses—all of them described as *indios principales*—made use of a hierarchical discourse, appealing to the rank that differentiated the *indios principales* from the tribute-paying commoners, showing discomfort at the supposed injustice of treating an *indio principal* and an *indio del común* as equals. According to some statements, 'it is fair that he be treated justly [ ... ] and not as an *indio particular*', or 'it is not fair that such natives are treated as *indios particulares*, they deserve justice'.<sup>41</sup>

These colonial Andean notions of nobility that differentiated the local native lords from commoners show up in contemporary documents from other regions in the Viceroyalty of Peru. For example, Waldemar Espinoza Soriano states that in 1598 the paramount lords of the Charcas region opposed the idea that commoners could be indigenous judges (*alcaldes mayores de naturales*), arguing that the office was for first-rank (*de primer rango*) lords only (Espinoza Soriano 1969, 59). For the seventeenth century, Magdalena Chocano

notes the existence of an ideology of noble lordship in the Andean polities of the Province of Conchucos that differentiated the status (*calidad*) of the *principal* from that of the commoners, a notion that became stronger a hundred years later (Chocano 2003, 129). Also, this elite concept of nobility was present in Guaman Poma's denunciation quoted at the beginning of this article. Nevertheless, as seen in other regions of the Viceroyalty of Peru (Chocano 2003), evidence from the *repartimiento* of Macha suggests that his simplistic vision of native lords of noble lineage being replaced by former commoners (supported by colonial authorities) cannot be generalized across the viceroyalty. We need more local studies in order to test Guaman Poma's accusations of native power hierarchies, yet his writing still sheds light on a complex political space within colonial Andean polities that also helped consolidate colonial rule.

The Andean idea of nobility at the lowest level of the native leadership hierarchy that emerges in indigenous witness testimonies probably reflected legal advice given by Spanish advocates and attorneys. Even so, the witnesses' words show the existence of a group of *indios principales* with a different status that allowed them to rotate through lords' offices. Chambi's case suggests that the *indio principal* had a differential rank in colonial Aymara society. In addition, it highlights a typical practice within the *repartimiento* of Macha: a high degree of rotation among *indios principales* in diverse leadership roles. Don Diego Chambi constitutes only one example of the several individual experiences found in archival records. This suggests that leadership was not limited to those native lords occupying offices assigned by colonial law, but that it was shared among different members of the *repartimiento*, sometimes identified as commoners (Jurado 2011). Thus, if the colonial definition of tribute-paying commoners describes a fiscal category useful for quantitative and demographic purposes, it hides the diversity and multiplicity of status within Andean *repartimientos*. The dense network of *indios principales* from the *repartimiento* of Macha—many of whom were classified by colonial authorities as tribute-paying commoners—occupied central leadership roles in native power hierarchies, reducing the duties of paramount or subaltern native lords. As chess pieces, the *indios principales* moved about the existing ruling spaces in the *repartimiento* willing to show their ability and status, actions and postures that distinguished them from the *indios del común*.

In this case, the juridical strategy was successful since don Diego Chambi managed to win exemption from rotational labor drafts for three years 'exchanging the personal services he was to carry out in Villa de Potosí and Porco for *segunda persona* duties and not in any other way'. Such was the final sentence of *Corregidor* Padilla.

Nevertheless, in October 1619, the *indios principales* of the *repartimiento* of Macha who had petitioned in 1616 had to reiterate their strategies and testimonies in a new inspection. This *visita* was headed by *Corregidor* Antonio Salgado, who favored total rejection of all minor lords' tributary exemptions. The new *corregidor* applied, without exception, the order of Viceroy Luis de Velasco, declaring all *indios principales* claiming exemptions through blood ties to old native lords tribute-paying commoners. By the end of the second decade of the seventeenth century, colonial rule did not grant preeminent position to *indios principales* whose roles were not recognized by colonial law. Thus, don Diego Chambi's strategy became futile and, in 1619, he too would become a tribute-paying commoner and a temporary worker (*mitayo*).

The considerable fiscal and labor demands of the Spanish Crown gradually turned a large group of *indios principales* into tribute-paying commoners and temporary workers. Nevertheless, just as they had managed to enter the interstices of legislation in order to avoid being considered *mitayos*, it is possible that throughout the seventeenth century *indios principales* found new ways of protecting their rank and social differentiation within Andean polities. Were there loopholes in colonial rules or practices that allowed some minor lords to avoid the heavy demands of rotational labor drafts? Historian Silvio Zavala found among the documents of Viceroy Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marquis of Montesclaros (1607–1615), a *relación* titled *De la mita de Potosí y reducciones del reino*. In this work, the anonymous author hints at this question by mentioning that the *repartimientos* of Macha, Pocoata, and Aymaya freed half of their total quota of temporary workers by ‘paying the interested party so as to hire other native workers instead of them’ (Zavala 1979, 2:68).

### Final comments

Caught between the shifting demands of the colonial state and the equally fluid internal dynamics of Andean socio-political units, lower-level native lords did much to transform their own roles within native hierarchies of power. Tracing the course of the *repartimiento* of Macha from its initial *encomienda* grant up to the abrupt changes in tribute exemption categories in the early seventeenth century reveals a complex and changing Aymara-colonial power hierarchy sensitive to colonial political changes and to the internal demands of ruling lineages and social segments. The political reassignment of hierarchies in greater Macha at the beginning of the colonial period, the deepening of segmentary tensions, and the struggle to obtain the jurisdiction and control of the surplus of smaller political segments have been central to this diachronic analysis. Also, the lower-level native lords and the *indios principales* of the *repartimiento* of Macha struggled to obtain spaces or positions of power and also to defend their status in spite of colonial ordinances. In the early seventeenth-century *repartimiento* of Macha, not even the challenges to exemption from fiscal and labor demands introduced by viceregal decree could undermine the hierarchical discourse and restrict the actions of members of the Aymara-colonial elite.

### Notes

1. ‘... porque en la conquista destes rreynos se perdieron los señores principales de casta y sangre. Y por ellos se elixieron de yndios muy bajos. Estos dichos dañan la tierra y se pierde los dichos pobres’ (Guamán Poma 1987, 818).
2. ‘... falsos caciques principales se hazen de indios bajos’ (Guamán Poma 1987, 818–19).
3. Prevenções hechas por el Licenciado Castro para el buen gobierno del reino del Perú y especialmente la conservación e instrucción de los indios [1565] (in Levillier 1921–1926, 3:117).
4. The *cacique principal*/governor was the paramount native lord of a *repartimiento*, an administrative and fiscal jurisdiction in colonial Peru. The *capitán de mita* was a native lord responsible for the *repartimiento*’s temporary workers (*mitayos*). The *alcalde mayor de naturales* was, after the 1560s, a native judge in indigenous lawsuits.
5. Cédula de encomienda de Gonzalo Pizarro por Francisco Pizarro (Archivo General de Indias [hereafter, AGI], Charcas, 56, s.f.).

6. According to the principal views in Andean historiography, the Qaraqara Federation was divided into two moieties: (a) Macha, which included Aymaya, Macha, and Pocoata; and (b) Chaqui, which included Visisa, Chaqui, Colo, Caquina, Picachuri, Tacobamba, Moromoro, and Caracara (Río 1995, 3–47; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris 2006). Despite this, Thierry Saignes proposed another reading of the Qaraqara Federation, according to which the ‘*cabecera* Macha’ included the settlement of Pocoata, Caracara, and Arichica, whilst the ‘*cabecera* Chaqui’ included Visisa (Saignes 1986, 16). Zagalsky (2012) offers yet another reading.
7. *Cabecera* meant the main locality, residence of the authority under whose jurisdiction other settlements (*pueblos*) were included. *Pueblos* was a vague term meaning both ‘subjects’ and people governed by the *cabecera* (Gibson 2003, 105–6). The first *cédulas de encomienda* were the result of a combination of European and Andean logics of space, which is why methodological precautions must be taken when analyzing the Spanish denomination of certain native settlements as *cabeceras*. For a critique of the concept applied to Andean societies see Jurado 2012, 8; Presta 2013; Zagalsky 2012, 27.
8. Archivo Histórico de la Casa Nacional de Moneda de Potosí (hereafter, AHP), Caja Real, 1, 2, 6.
9. The native leader don Alonso Choquevilca represented the *parcialidad* of Chaqui whilst don Francisco Xarajuri and don Pedro Auca did so for that of Macha (AHP, Caja Real, 1, 2).
10. AHP, Caja Real, 1.
11. AHP, Caja Real, 5.
12. ‘... tanto genero de mandones como los pobres tenian sobre sí’. Libro de la visita general del Virrey Toledo (in Romero 1924, 190).
13. ‘... particularmente donde hay dos o tres caciques de parcialidades [por] querer cada uno que se pase a su pueblo por tener él ya hecho allí su asiento y casa’. Provisión para llevar a la práctica las reducciones. Don Francisco de Toledo, Quilaquila, 7 de noviembre de 1573 (in Sarabia Viejo 1986, 1:281).
14. The division of Andean polities—aimed at granting Spaniards *encomiendas*—was strongly criticized by the followers of Bartolomé de Las Casas in the Viceroyalty of Peru. Important personalities such as fray Domingo de Santo Tomás or Lima *audiencia* president Pedro de la Gasca, among others, protested against the impact that these new organizational schemes had both on the Andean socio-political segments and their native leaders (Assadourian 1983; Jurado 2012).
15. Libro de Retazas del Virrey don Francisco de Toledo (Archivo General de la Nación Argentina [hereafter, AGN-A], IX, 17-2-5, ff. 95v–96r).
16. ‘... sin que tuviese derecho a ello’. Probanza de méritos de don Joan de Castro y Paria [1613] (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 317r).
17. According to his *provisión*: ‘... I order and command that the sons and descendants of the *caciques* pay the tribute as established, but be exempted from personal service as sons and legitimate brothers of *caciques* of their *ayllus* and *parcialidades* holding power until the General inspection’ [... horden y mando que los dichos hijos y descendientes de los dichos caciques paguen todos su tasa como esta dicho y que sean reserbados de los dichos serbicios personales con tanto que sean hijos de los dichos caciques y de sus hermanos legitimos y que [h]ayan sido [h]asta la dicha Bisita General principales y mandones de los dichos ayllos y parcialidades]. Provisión inserta en la Información de Filiación de don Diego Chambi (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 519r).
18. ‘... justo que se les haga aquella honrra por el officio y porque assi ha sido y es costumbre’ (Levillier 1921–1926, 3:126).
19. Thus, for example, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo instructed the general inspectors to become informed about ‘which tributes the natives paid to their main *caciques*, to the *caciques* of *huarangas* and *principales* of *pachacas*, during the Inca period’ [‘qué tributos daban los indios en tiempo del Inga a sus caciques e principales, y a los caciques de huarangas, y a los principales de pachacas’]; or even ‘which are the sons of *caciques* and *principales* of *huarangas* and *principales* of *pachacas*’ [‘qué hijos hay de caciques y principales de huarangas y principales de pachacas’], transmitting the native decimal division scheme (Romero 1924, 143–44).

20. Given that the Libro de Retasas del Virrey don Francisco de Toledo kept in the AGN-A is a later copy of Viceroy Toledo's tribute assessment and that the information can also be obtained from the Caja Real 18 (AHP), for the purpose of this study both versions have been compared, privileging the contents of the latter.
21. '... proveeréis que solamente queden en ellos los caciques principales del repartimiento y las segundas personas, y los caciques de huaranga y de pisca-pachaca y de pachaca, y quitaréis todos los demas mandones y principales' (Romero 1924, 171).
22. '... a todos los demas caciques de ayillos de pachacas de cada uno de los dichos repartimientos solamente ha de haber uno en cada ayillo'. This formula is repeated throughout Toledo's tribute assessment in Caja Real 18. See, for example, AHP, Caja Real, 18, ff. 26r, 86r, 101v, 135v, among others.
23. '... que los principales de los ayillus sean cuatro principales y sean reservados de tasa y les den salarios y sementeras' (Espinoza Soriano 1969, 133).
24. AGN-A, IX, 17-2-5; AHP, Caja Real, 18.
25. This percentage was obtained from analysis of Caja Real 18 (AHP) and includes the following *repartimientos*: Macha, Visisa, Chaqui, Chayanta, Moromoro, Puna, Sipesipe, Paria, Sacaca, Yamparaes, Pocona, Colquemarca-Andamarca, Totorá, Chuquicota-Sabaya, and Aullagas-Uruquillas.
26. Several Charcas *repartimientos* shared the absence of this official in the native hierarchy of power. Those included some that were created by the General Inspection (such as Aymaya and Pocoata), other scarcely populated *repartimientos* (such as Caracara and Incas Gualparocas) and the *repartimientos* of Chichas, Aravate and, Churumatas and Moyos.
27. Libro de Retasas del Virrey don Francisco de Toledo, AGN-A, IX, 17-2-5; AHP, Caja Real, 18, ff. 222r, 226v-227r. Not all the paramount leaders of Charcas *repartimientos* received the same salary or labor services. Viceroy Toledo's tribute assessment reveals a heterogeneous situation set up according to unspecified regulations. Therefore, for example, the main *caciques* of the *repartimientos* of Aymaya, Caracara, and Colo-Caquina-Picachuri, from Porco and Chayanta Provinces, perceived half the salary of their counterparts from the *repartimiento* of Macha, whilst in the *repartimientos* of Visisa or Chayanta only one main leader was recognized with an annual salary higher than that of Macha. The importance that the general inspectors had in establishing the amounts perceived by each native lord—and in the negotiations where native leaders could have intervened—must be also borne in mind given the importance that Viceroy Toledo gave to his official recommendations or *pareceres* in this matter. In his instructions for the inspectors, Toledo advised that 'upon the end of the inspection to each *repartimiento* you can include your views as to the possibility of the labor service that should be given to *caciques* and *principales* so that a better justified tribute can be applied' ['Acabada la visita en cada repartimiento, pondréis al pie della vuestro parecer sobre la posibilidad de ( ... ) el servicio que se debe dar a los caciques y principales, para que visto el parecer, se haga la tasa con más fundamento y justificación'] (in Romero 1924, 169).
28. For instance, the usual formula in Charcas records stated: 'In the *repartimiento* of [ ... ] there is to be a chest with three keys and three compartments The smallest one should contain the community's books—which will be described later—and other documents belonging to the indigenous town council; the second compartment should keep the tribute; and the third compartment, the community's money. This chest should be kept in the main *cacique* dwellings, and he should be the keeper of one key. **If absent, the key should be kept with the segunda persona** or with one of the indigenous municipal judges. The second key should be kept by the town scribe or *quipocamayo* and the third key, with the *corregidor* of *naturales*' ['En el repartimiento de ( ... ) [h]aya una caja de tres llaves con tres apartamientos que en el uno de [e]llos que sea el mas el pequeño esten los libros de la comunidad que luego se diran y las demas escrituras pertenecientes al conçejo, y en el otro se recoja y guarde la tasa y en el otro la plata de comunidad la qual dicha caja este en casa del cacique principal del dicho pueblo el qual [h]a de tener la una llave, **en su ausencia la [h]a de dexar a la segunda persona**, o a uno de los alcaldes y la otra el escrivano de conçejo o quipocamayo, y la otra el corregidor de los naturales'] (AHP, Caja Real 18).

29. The quote relates to the *repartimiento* of Chayanta (AHP, Caja Real, 18, f. 101v). Similar formulas were found in other Charcas *repartimientos*, such as Paria, where Toledo's tribute assessment explains that '... Lucas Colla and Don Miguel Chuquicallo, *segundas personas*, will each be assigned half of the farming grounds of the main *cacique*, Don Pedro Llanqui, and every year they ought to give him half of their animals (*cameros*) and half of the service' [... a Lucas Colla e a don Myguel Chuquicallo segundas personas se les [h]a de haçer a cada uno la mitad de las chacaras e sementeras que se manda hazer al dicho don Pedro Llanqui [cacique principal] y en cada un año les [h]an de dar la mitad de los dichos carneros y mitad de servicio que al susodicho'] (AHP, Caja Real, 18, f. 26r).
30. AGN-A, XIII, 23-10-2, s.f.
31. According to Guamán Poma, 'the *segundas personas* from such Provinces ought to deliver the temporary workers of the *mita* to the mines and *plazas* of this kingdom. And any such *segunda persona* ought to be skillful and know how to read and write and enroll all the natives from the *mita* and submit his signed testimony to the captain' ['las segundas personas de las dichas provincias [h]an de alsar la vara de la rreal justicia de tiniente de corregidor en todo el rreyno sólo para yr al camino a entregar los yndios de la mita a las dichas minas y plazas deste rreyno. Y este dicho tiniente sea dilixente y sepa leer y escribir y enpadrone a todos los yndios de la mita y entregue con el testimonio y firma suya al dicho capitan'] (Guaman Poma 1987, 820).
32. Charcas documents repeat the notary phrasing: 'And they will be provided to serve them and their house and their cattle by exempted Indians and young men, not older than 17, and unsuspecting native women to serve their wives and house for those who are married; each will be provided food and clothing—one *abasca* cloth outfit per year—and will rotate out of the *mita* every six months unless they want to serve for a longer period of time or if the boys do not reach the tribute-paying age' ['Yten le [h]an de dar para servicio de su persona y casa y guarda de sus ganados ( ... ) indios de los reservados de tasa y ( ... ) muchachos de 17 años para abaxo y ( ... ) indias sin sospecha para el servicio de su muger y casa mientras fuere casado a los quales [h]a de dar de comer y a razon de un bestido de abasca a cada uno en cada un año y se [h]an de mudar por sus mitas de seis a seis meses si ellos de su voluntad no quisieren servir mas tiempo o si los dichos muchachos no llegaren a edad de poder tributar']. This quotation belongs to the *repartimiento* of Sacaca (AHP, Caja Real, 18, f. 74r). In relation to agricultural plots, the following is mentioned: '... giving the native workers seeds and food and drink, as it is customary' ['dandoles a los dichos yndios las semillas y de comer y beber como es costumbre'] (AHP, Caja Real, 18, f. 74r).
33. '... a todos los demas caçiques de ayillos de pachacas [ ... ] les [h]an de hazer los yndios de sus parcialidades otra tanta chacara como a cada una de las segundas personas de este dicho repartimiento'. The quote refers to the *repartimiento* of Chuquicota and Sabaya (AHP, Caja Real, 18, f. 203r).
34. '... sin ellos no se podria hacer ninguna cosa [ ... ] y ellos conocen a la gente de su ayllu' (Espinoza Soriano 1969, 133).
35. '... cualquier pleytos y causas y seviles y criminales que aquí subcedieren en ausencia del escrivano de la Provincia [ ... ] todas [h]an de pasar ante bos [ ... ] y [h]an de pasar y pasen ante bos todos los testamentos que se hicieren en este pueblo por los yndios e yndias'. Nombramiento de Sebastián Paria como escribano de cabildo, 1614 (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 329v).
36. '... que no sea tratado como a yndio particular'. Probanza de don Diego Chambi, indio del repartimiento de Macha, 1612 (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 521v).
37. My special gratitude to Dra. Florencia Mendizabal and Dra. Corina Luchía for sharing their knowledge and bibliography with me, and especially to Corina for her invaluable comments.
38. '... los caciques principales y segundas personas que Vuestra Magestad reserva son los que estan mas descansados y con caudal [ ... ] [por ello] tuviera por muy acertado que tambien ellos pagaran a Vuestra Magestad este servicio y aun doblado que los demas yndios particulares'. Carta a Su Magestad del virrey Marqués de Cañete, Callao, 27 de mayo de 1592 (in Levillier 1921–1926, 12:299).

39. The *Provisión* states: ‘that only the legitimate eldest son of *caciques principales* be exempted from *mita* and tribute, and the younger legitimate sons of such *caciques* be exempted from *mita* but not from tribute, and that no other native, even if they are sons of *segundas personas*, or of the *cacique* of *guarangas* and *picha pachaqa* and *pachaca* be exempted from *mita* or paying for their tribute’ [‘que solo el hijo mayor del cacique principal sea reservado de pagar tributo y de acudir a mitas y los demas hijos legitimos del tal cacique de solo las dichas mitas y no de tributo y que a ninguno otro yndio, aunque fuesen hijos de segundas personas y de cacique de guarangas y picha [sic] pachaca y pachaca, no fuesen reservados del dicho tributo y mitas’]. This *provisión* was included in the Probanza de méritos de don Joan de Castro y Paria [1613] (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 294r). This is also the *provisión* found by Silvio Zavala in the John Carter Brown Library (Zavala 1979, 9).
40. ‘... para que el agrabio çese’ and ‘me tiene enpadronado entre los yndios tributarios sin me guardar mis exençiones y libertades’. Probanza de don Diego Chambi (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, f. 520r).
41. ‘... es justo que le [h]aga merced [ ... ] y que no sea tratado como a yndio particular’ and ‘no es justo que los tales principales sean tratados como yndios particulares y son dignos se les haga merced’. Probanza de don Diego Chambi (AGN-A, XIII, 18-7-2, ff. 521v, 523r).

## Acknowledgements

This research was funded by CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina), by PICT FONCyT 2012-2661, by UBACyT 20020120300052 and by UBACyT 20020100100182 and states the main ideas included in my doctoral dissertation for the Universidad de Buenos Aires. An earlier draft of this work was presented at the IX Congreso Internacional de Etnohistoria (Arica, 2014). I would like to express my gratitude to Marina Zuloaga Rada for her invaluable suggestions. Gratitude is also extended to the reviewers of this article for *Colonial Latin American Review* and especially to CLAR General Editor Kris Lane.

## References

- Abercrombie, Thomas. 1998. Tributes to bad conscience: Charity, restitution, and inheritance in cacique and encomendero testaments of sixteenth-century Charcas. In *Dead giveaway: Indigenous testaments of colonial Mesoamerica and the Andes*, eds. Susan Kellogg and Mathew Restall, 249–81. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- . 2006. *Caminos de la memoria y del poder. Etnografía e historia de una comunidad andina*. La Paz: Sierpe.
- Alaperrine-Bouyer, Monique. 2005. Recurrencias y variaciones de la imagen del cacique. In *Máscaras, tretas y rodeos del discurso colonial en los Andes*, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 187–207. Lima: IFEA–Instituto Riva Agüero.
- Assadourian, Carlos S. 1979. La producción de la mercancía dinero en la formación del mercado interno colonial. El caso del espacio peruano, siglo XVI. In *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina*, ed. Enrique Florescano, 223–92. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- . 1983. Dominio colonial y señores étnicos en el espacio andino. *Hisla* 1: 7–20.
- . 1989. Acerca del cambio en la naturaleza del dominio sobre las Indias: la ‘mit’a’ minera del virrey Toledo: documentos de 1568–1571. *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 46: 3–70.
- Bakewell, Peter. 1984. *Mineros de la Montaña Roja. El trabajo de los indios en Potosí, 1545–1650*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Bennassar, Bartolomé. 2003. Los hidalgos en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: una categoría social clave. In *Vivir el siglo de oro. Poder, cultura e historia en la época moderna: estudios en homenaje al profesor Angel Rodríguez Sánchez*, ed. Bartolomé Bennassar, 49–60. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.

- Burgos Esteban, Francisco. 1989. Las bases sociales del poder de la elite del estamento hidalgo. El linaje de los Barrón (Logroño, siglos XVI y XVII). *Brocar. Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica* 15: 91–117.
- Charles, John. 2007. 'More Ladino than necessary': Indigenous litigants and the language policy debate in mid-colonial Peru. *Colonial Latin American Review* 16 (1): 23–47.
- Chocano, Magdalena. 2003. Contrastes y paralelismos provinciales. La autoridad indígena entre Lucanas y Conchucos. In *Élites indígenas en los Andes. Nobles, caciques y cabildantes bajo el yugo colonial*, eds. David Cahill and Blanca Tovías, 111–37. Quito: Abya Yala.
- Choque Canqui, Roberto. 1978. Pedro Chipana: cacique comerciante de Calamarca. *Avances* 1: 28–46.
- . 1983. El papel de los capitanes de indios de la provincia de Pacajes 'en el entero de la mita' de Potosí. *Revista Andina* 1 (1): 117–25.
- . 1997. Cacicazgo aymara de Pakaxa. *Estudios Bolivianos* 4. La Paz: Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos–FHCE-UMSA.
- . 2003. *Jesús de Machaqa: la marka rebelde*. La Paz: Plural.
- Cole, Jeffrey. 1985. *The Potosí mita 1573–1700. Compulsory Indian labor in the Andes*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Cunill, Caroline. 2014. El uso indígena de las probanzas de méritos y servicios: su dimensión política (Yucatán, siglo XVI). *Signos Históricos* 32: 14–47.
- Díaz de la Guardia y López, Luis. 2005. El poder feudal como origen de hidalguía en la Baja Edad Media castellana: un ejemplo del señorío de Villena. *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* 18: 129–68.
- . 2008. Los pleitos plenos de hidalguía en la Baja Edad Media: una posible evolución jurídica bajo los Trastámara desde la óptica de la Edad Moderna. *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* 21: 41–108.
- Díaz Rementería, Carlos. 1977. *El cacique en el Virreinato del Perú. Estudio histórico-jurídico*. Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla.
- Dueñas, Alcira. 2009. Ethnic power and identity formation in mid-colonial Andean writing. *Colonial Latin American Review* 18 (3): 407–33.
- Espinoza Soriano, Waldemar. 1960. El alcalde mayor indígena en el Virreinato del Perú. *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 32: 183–300.
- . 1969. El 'Memorial' de Charcas: crónica inédita de 1582. *Cantuta. Revista de la Universidad Nacional de Educación* : 117–52.
- . 1981. El reino aymara de Quillaca-Asanaque, siglos XV y XVI. *Revista del Museo Nacional de Lima* 45: 175–274.
- . 1987. El señorío de Ayanca en el reino Lupaca. Siglos XV–XVII. *Diálogo Andino* 6: 46–77.
- Gade, Daniel. 1991. Reflexiones sobre el asentamiento andino desde la época toledana hasta el presente. In *Reproducción y transformación de las sociedades andinas. Siglos XVI–XX*, eds. Segundo Moreno and Frank Salomon, 1:69–90. Quito: Abya Yala.
- Garrett, David. 2005. *Shadows of empire: The Indian nobility of Cusco, 1750–1825*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, Charles. 2003. Las sociedades indias bajo el dominio español. In *América Latina en la época colonial*, ed. Leslie Bethell, 99–130. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Glave, Luis Miguel. 2008. Gestiones transatlánticas. Los indios ante la trama del poder virreinal y las composiciones de tierras (1646). *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 34: 85–106.
- Graña, Mario. 2000. 'Bastardo, mañoso, sagaz y ladino'. Caciques, pleitos y agravios en el surandino. Don Fernando Ayavire y Velasco contra don Juan Colque Guarache. Charcas, siglo XVI. *Anuario del Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia* : 541–56.
- Guamán Poma de Ayala, Felipe. 1987. *Nueva crónica y buen gobierno* [1615]. Eds. John Murra, Rolena Adorno and Jorge Urioste. Madrid: Historia 16.
- Honores, Renzo. 2003. La asistencia jurídica privada a los señores indígenas ante la Real Audiencia de Lima, 1552–1570. Paper presented at the XXIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (Dallas).
- Jurado, M. Caroline. 2006. Las reducciones toledanas a pueblos de indios: aproximación a un conflicto. El repartimiento de Macha (Charcas), siglo XVI. *Cahiers des Amériques Latines* 47: 123–37.
- . 2008. Delineando a las 'segundas personas': autoridades étnicas desdibujadas en Charcas colonial. Un estudio de caso. *Revista Andina* 46: 193–210.



- . 2011. Autoridades étnicas menores y territorios. El impacto de la fragmentación colonial en las bases del poder. Macha (norte de Potosí), siglos XVI–XVII. PhD. dissertation. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- . 2012. Fraccionamiento de una encomienda: una mirada desde el liderazgo indígena. Qaraqara, 1540–1569. *Surandino Monográfico* 2 (2). Accessed [http://www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/investigacion/institutos/ravnani/prohal/surandino2/surandino2\\_dossier.html](http://www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/investigacion/institutos/ravnani/prohal/surandino2/surandino2_dossier.html)
- . 2013. Doble domicilio: relaciones sociales y complementariedad ecológica en el Norte de Potosí (Bolivia) del temprano siglo XVII. *Chungara. Revista de Antropología Chilena* 45 (3): 613–30.
- . 2014. ‘Descendientes de los primeros’. Las probanzas de méritos y servicios y la genealogía cacical. Audiencia de Charcas, 1574–1719. *Revista de Indias* 74 (261): 387–422.
- Veillier, Roberto. 1921–1926. *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*. Madrid: Publicaciones del Congreso Argentino.
- Matienco, Juan de. [1567] 1967. *Gobierno del Perú*. Paris–Lima: Institut Français d’Études Andines.
- Medinaceli, Ximena, and Silvia Arze. 1998. Prestigio y poder en élites indígenas en situación colonial: el norte de Potosí–Bolivia en el siglo XVII. *Latin American Literary Review* 52: 153–73.
- Morrone, Ariel. 2010. Legitimidad, genealogía y memoria en los Andes Meridionales: los Fernández Guarachi de Jesús de Machaca (Pacajes, siglos XVI–XVII). *Memoria Americana. Cuadernos de Etnohistoria* 18 (2): 211–37.
- . 2014. Reconfiguración de alianzas políticas en contextos críticos: los caciques de San Andrés de Machaca (Pacajes, Audiencia de Charcas, siglos XV–XVII). *Boletín Americanista* 64 (68): 187–210.
- Mumford, Jeremy. 2008. Litigation as ethnography in sixteenth-century Peru: Polo de Ondegardo and the Mitimaes. *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88 (1): 5–40.
- Murra, John. 1978. *La organización económica del Estado Inca*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI.
- Noack, Karoline. 2001. Los caciques ante el notario: transformaciones culturales en el siglo XVI. In *América bajo los Austrias. Economía, cultura y sociedad*, ed. Héctor Noejovich, 191–205. Lima: PUCP.
- Ondegardo, Polo. 1990. Notables daños de no guardar a los indios sus fueros [1571]. In *El mundo de los Incas*, eds. Laura González and Alicia Alonso, 35–171. Madrid: Historia 16.
- Pärssinen, Martti. 2003. *Tawantinsuyu. El estado inca y su organización política*. Lima: IFEA–Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Platt, Tristan. 1987. Entre *Ch’axwa* y *Muxsa*. Para una historia del pensamiento político aymara. In *Tres reflexiones sobre el pensamiento andino*, eds. Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, Olivia Harris, Tristan Platt, and Verónica Cereceda, 61–131. La Paz: HISBOL.
- Platt, Tristan, Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, and Olivia Harris. 2006. *Qaraqara-Charka. Mallku, Inka y Rey en la provincia de Charcas (siglos XV–XVII)*. *Historia antropológica de una confederación aymara*. La Paz: IFEA–Plural.
- Poloni-Simard, Jacques. 2005. El pleito como parte de la consolidación de la sociedad colonial. In *Máscaras, tretas y rodeos del discurso colonial en los Andes*, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 177–88. Lima: IFEA–Instituto Riva-Agüero.
- . 2006. *El mosaico indígena. Movilidad, estratificación social y mestizaje en el corregimiento de Cuenca (Ecuador) del siglo XVI al XVIII*. Quito: Abya Yala-IFEA.
- Presta, Ana. 2000. *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial (Bolivia). Los encomenderos de La Plata, 1550–1600*. Lima: IEP/BCRP.
- . 2013. Los valles mesotérmicos de Chuquisaca entre la fragmentación territorial yampara y la ocupación de los migrantes *qaraqara* y *charka* en la temprana colonia. In *Aportes multidisciplinarios al estudio de los colectivos étnicos Surandinos. Reflexiones sobre Qaraqara-Charka tres años después*, ed. Ana Presta, 27–59. La Paz–Lima: Plural Editores–IFEA.
- Puente Brunke, José de la. 1992. *Encomienda y encomenderos en el Perú. Estudio social y político de una institución colonial*. Seville: EEHA.
- Puente Luna, José Carlos de la. 2007. *Los curacas hechiceros de Jauja. Batallas mágicas y legales en el Perú colonial*. Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP.
- . 2014. The many tongues of the king: Indigenous language interpreters and the making of the Spanish Empire. *Colonial Latin American Review* 23 (2): 143–70.

- . 2015. That which belong to alls: Khipus, community, and indigenous legal activism in the early colonial Andes. *The Americas* 72 (1): 19–54.
- Ramírez, Susan. 1987. The ‘dueño de indios’: Thoughts on the consequences of the shifting bases of power of the ‘curaca de los viejos antiguos’ under the Spanish in sixteenth-century Peru. *Hispanic American Historical Review* 67 (4): 575–610.
- . 1996. *The world upside down. Cross cultural contact and conflict in sixteenth-century Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 2006. Historia y memoria: la construcción de las tradiciones dinásticas andinas. *Revista de Indias* 66 (236): 13–56.
- Rasnake, Roger. 1989. *Autoridad y poder en los Andes. Los kuraqkuna de Yura*. La Paz: HISBOL.
- Río, Mercedes del. 1989. Estrategias andinas de supervivencia. El control de recursos en Chaqui (siglos XVI–XVIII). *Anuario del IEHS* 4: 53–84.
- . 1995. Estructuración étnica qharaqhara y su desarticulación colonial. In *Espacio, etnia, frontera. Atenuaciones políticas en el sur del Tawantinsuyu, siglos XV–XVIII*, ed. Ana Presta, 3–47. Sucre: Asur.
- . 2005. *Etnicidad, territorialidad y colonialismo en los Andes. Tradición y cambio entre los soras de los siglos XVI y XVII*. La Paz: IEB/IFEA/ASDI.
- Rivera, Silvia. 1978. El mallku y la sociedad colonial en el siglo XVII: el caso de Jesús de Machaca. *Avances* 1: 7–19.
- Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia, and Tristan Platt. 1978. El impacto colonial sobre un pueblo Pakaxa: la crisis del cacicazgo en Caquingora (Urinsaya) durante el siglo XVI. *Avances* 1: 101–20.
- Romero, Carlos. 1924. Libro de la visita general del Virrey Toledo. *Revista Histórica* 7 (2): 115–216.
- Rostworowski, María. 1977. La estratificación social y el hatun curaca en el mundo andino. *Revista Histórica* 1 (2): 249–86.
- . 1983. *Estructuras andinas del poder. Ideología religiosa y política*. Lima: IEP.
- Saignes, Thierry. 1986. En busca del poblamiento étnico de los Andes bolivianos (siglos XVI y XVII). *Avances de Investigación* 3. La Paz: MUSEF.
- . 1992. Lobos y ovejas. Formación y desarrollo de los pueblos y comunidades en el Sur Andino (siglos XVI–XX). In *Reproducción y transformación de las sociedades andinas, siglos XVI–XX*, eds. Segundo Moreno and Frank Salomon, 91–136. Quito: Ediciones ABYA–YALA.
- Salomon, Frank. 1975. Don Pedro de Zambiza, un varayuj del siglo XVI. *Cuadernos de Historia y Arqueología* 42: 285–315.
- Sarabia Viejo, María Justina. 1986. *Francisco de Toledo. Disposiciones gubernativas para el Virreinato del Perú, 1569–1574*. Seville: EEHA.
- Spalding, Karen. 1974. *De indio a campesino. Cambios en la estructura social del Perú colonial*. Lima: IEP.
- . 1984. *Huarochiri: An Andean society under Inca and Spanish rule*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Stern, Steve. 1982. *Los pueblos indígenas del Perú y el desafío de la conquista española. Huamanga hasta 1640*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Trelles Arestegui, Efraín. 1991. *Lucas Martínez Vegazo: funcionamiento de una encomienda peruana inicial*. Lima: PUCP.
- Wachtel, Nathan. 1976. *Los vencidos. Los indios del Perú frente a la conquista española (1530–1570)*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Zagalsky, Paula. 2012. Nuevas preguntas sobre una antigua federación aymara. Algunos aportes en torno a la Federación Qharaqhara (Charcas, siglos XVI). *Surandino Monográfico* 2 (2). Accessed [http://www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/investigacion/institutos/ravignani/prohal/surandino2/surandino2\\_dossier.html](http://www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/investigacion/institutos/ravignani/prohal/surandino2/surandino2_dossier.html)
- Zavala, Silvio. 1978–1979. *El servicio personal de los indios en el Perú (extractos del siglo XVI)*. Mexico City: El Colegio de México.
- Zuloaga Rada, Marina. 2011. Las encomiendas y el poder local en Huaylas: las guarangas en la construcción del sistema colonial. *Diálogo Andino* 37: 67–86.
- . 2012. *La conquista negociada: guarangas, autoridades locales e imperio en Huaylas, Perú (1532–1610)*. Lima: IFEA–IEP.