Policy Issues

The Organization of the Executive Branch in Latin America: What We Know and What We Need to Know

Alejandro Bonvecchi
Carlos Scartascini

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a research agenda for the organization of the executive branch in Latin America by reviewing the literature on the U.S. and Latin American presidencies and outlining the research gap between them. The study finds that while strong, regionwide patterns have been established about cabinets in Latin America, research is lagging behind on the presidential center, presidential advisory networks, and their effects in policymaking. The article sets forth a series of research questions and suggests a combination of quantitative, social network, and case study strategies to address them.

Presidents and presidential systems have long been under scrutiny in the political science and political economy literature. Presidents are often singled out and blamed or rewarded for affecting the state of the economy (Moe 1993; Alesina et al. 1997), and for governing by concentrating power and the way they manage power—which may include turning democracy into a "delegative" regime (O'Donnell 1994). The presidential system of government has been singled out as the culprit behind the democratic instability experienced by Latin America throughout the twentieth century (Linz and Valenzuela 1994), an indictment disputed more recently by Zelaznik (2001), Cheibub (2002, 2007), Amorim Neto (2006), and Chasquetti (2008) and praised (but sometimes loathed) for the outcomes it generates (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Still, an analysis of the organization of the presidency and its influence on public policy, as well as presidential and regime survival, is still pending.

Despite the importance and recurrence of debates about presidents and presidential systems, and regardless of presidents' centrality to the policymaking process,

Alejandro Bonvecchi is an assistant professor in the Departament of Political Science and International Studies, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and an adjunct researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). abonvecchi@utdt.edu. Carlos Scartascini is principal economist in the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank. carlossc@iadb.org

the progress of research has been uneven in Latin America. The literature on presidential politics has typically dealt with four topics: the organization of the executive branch of government, the resources of the presidency, presidential coalitions, and the specifics of decisionmaking in particular administrations. Students of the U.S. presidency have generated a wealth of work on all these topics, but the development of research and knowledge on them for Latin America and other developing countries has not kept the same pace across some of the topics.[1] While significant pieces have been produced on coalition building and management, as well as on economic and political decisionmaking in particular administrations, little progress has been made on the organization of the executive branch and the resources of the presidency.

Research on coalition politics in Latin America has established that coalition governments are frequent (Deheza 1997; Amorim Neto 1998, 2006; Altman 2001; Zelaznik 2001; Martínez-Gallardo 2010a; Chasquetti 2008), more unstable than single-party governments but less unstable than minority single-party governments (Zelaznik 2001; Amorim Neto 2006), and structured by presidents in order to maximize the survival chances of their legislative coalitions (Amorim Neto 1998, 2006; Zelaznik 2001; Martínez-Gallardo 2010b). Studies have also shown that the office of the president is typically endowed with resources to help build and maintain cabinet and legislative coalitions, and that presidents generally use these resources effectively (Pereira and Mueller 2002; Pereira et al. 2005; Amorim Neto 2006; Mejía Acosta 2006). These works have demonstrated that Latin America has mostly proactive presidents whose constitutional and partisan powers enable them to impose themselves on institutionally weaker, mostly reactive assemblies (Shugart and Carey 1992; Carey and Shugart 1998; Cox and Morgenstern 2002).

Research on economic and political decisionmaking has established the existence of common trends in policy orientation and decisionmaking sequences in economic adjustment (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, 1995; Torre 1998, Schamis 1999, 2002; Llanos 2002), pension reform (Mesa-Lago and Muller 2002; Weyland 2005, 2007), and left-wing social and political turns (Levitsky and Roberts 2008; Weyland et al. 2010). Numerous studies have also shown the effects of diverse political variables on presidential decisionmaking, such as president–government party relations (Corrales 2000, 2002), the socioeconomic nature of reform coalitions (Schamis 1999; Etchemendy 2001), legislative career patterns (Ames 2001; Samuels 2003), constitutional powers (Negretto 2006), public opinion ratings (Stokes 2001), and presidential leadership (Novaro and Palermo 1996; Whitehead 2010). These works have demonstrated that while presidential administrations in Latin America differ in their outcomes, stability, and survival (Pérez-Liñán 2007; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010), these differences are underpinned by common variables and processes.

However, no equivalent knowledge exists about the organization of the executive branch. This gap rests on two main shortcomings: the absence of a theoretical and methodological agenda and the lack of information with which to feed the development of empirical research. These shortcomings are probably due to both historical and organizational factors. Latin America's long experience with political and economic instability has hitherto placed other topics at the center of academic

research, such as authoritarianism, corporatism, civil-military relations, regime transitions, and structural reforms. Also, in contrast to the United States, Latin America's frequent experiences with coalition governments have called attention to congress and executive-legislative relations rather than the presidency and its resources. In addition, information on the working of the congress is typically more readily available than on that of the executive; Latin American congresses regularly record most of their activities—via committee reports, floor deliberations, and legislative databases, many available online or in public archives—while the presidency and the ministries generally publish only the final outcomes of their work—decrees, bills— and withhold the rest.

This article addresses the shortcomings of presidential studies in Latin America by developing an agenda for research on the organization of the executive branch and its effects on policymaking, using the literature on the U.S. presidency as a benchmark. This benchmark has limitations, insofar as the U.S. case differs from Latin America in aspects that may impact organization: the U.S. executive has weaker veto, decree, and appointment powers (García Montero 2009), and faces a stronger supreme court, more powerful congress and oversight agencies, politically more subordinated armed forces (Pion-Berlin 2009), and a more stable and less complex party system than its Latin American counterparts (Whitehead 2011). However, the common separation-of-powers features, the fairly continuous experience of Latin America with democracy in recent decades, and the shared centrality of presidents to political systems make presidencies more comparable, and the organizational findings of the U.S. literature a useful starting point. This literature has established that the executive branch is a complex, differentiated organization typically made up of three components: the presidential center, the cabinet, and a series of advisory networks in which cabinet members and presidential advisers interact alongside bureaucratic officials and nongovernmental counselors.

Taking stock of the approaches and knowledge produced in that literature, this article identifies a set of relevant questions on Latin American presidencies and outlines research strategies for their investigation. The argument is presented as follows. The next three sections deal with the literature on the presidential center, the cabinet, and presidential advisory networks, respectively. Each section begins by reviewing the U.S. literature, subsequently assesses the works about Latin America, and finally proposes a set of research questions for the study of Latin American presidencies. Our study shows that while the extant literature on Latin America has produced significant knowledge of cabinet composition, there is a wide research gap on the nature, composition, and workings of the presidential center and the presidential advisory networks, as well as their effects on policymaking processes. The concluding section sums up these research questions and suggests strategies and techniques to address them.[2]

THE PRESIDENTIAL CENTER

In presidential systems, constitutions or special legislation typically outlines the executive branch of government as headed by a president assisted by cabinet departments, or ministries, functionally differentiated by policy area. But presidents are also assisted by a closer group of advisers with no necessary departmental responsibilities who work under their most direct supervision. These advisers constitute the office of the president, or presidential center.

The presidential center, institutionalized in the United States with the creation in 1939 of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), was established to strengthen the president's ability to coordinate the work of cabinet departments and other executive agencies that, due to their own organizational interests, such as budgetary or power maximization and service delivery to constituents and interest groups, typically had "little incentive to subjugate their departmental needs to the president's broader bargaining interests" (Dickinson 1997, 46). This rationale has suggested two explanations of the emergence and function of the presidential center.

The informational explanation stems from the bargaining paradigm of presidential politics espoused by Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power* (1990). In this paradigm, in a political system of separated institutions sharing power, presidents are forced to bargain with other actors—Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups, the media—in order to influence the outcomes of government. To bargain effectively, presidents' primary need is information—not just any information, but information that enables them to retain or augment their influence over those other actors with which they have to bargain; contrasting information, from multiple sources, so that presidents can weigh the biases and interests of those sources and come up with their own assessment and decisions (Neustadt 1990; Rudalevige 2002).

The presidential center allows presidents to do exactly that: multiply information sources by charging close advisers with duplicating, supervising, or monitoring the tasks of cabinet ministers (Ponder 2000); and contrast policy ideas and political assessments by inciting dissent between ministers and advisers (Neustadt 1990; Dickinson 1997). The presidential center helps presidents retain bargaining power by enabling them to escape the informational asymmetries to which they are subjected: those of ministries concerned primarily with their own turf, those of bureaucrats concerned primarily with technical criteria and interest group satisfaction, those of political advisers concerned primarily with the electoral consequences or public opinion payoffs of decisions.

The leadership explanation of the presidential center stems from the unilateral paradigm of presidential politics espoused by rational choice scholars such as Terry Moe. In this paradigm, presidents have strong incentives to enhance the autonomy of their office: they are elected by a national constituency that "leads them to think in grander terms about social problems and the public interest"; they are held responsible for "virtually every aspect of national performance"; and they are beset by powerful players—namely Congress and the bureaucracy—with opposing incentives and enough institutional resources to impose them. To assert their leadership

over these players, presidents seek to design and run "a unified, coordinated, centrally directed bureaucratic system" (Moe and Wilson 1994, 11) through which they can develop their own policy ideas and use their own unilateral institutional powers to implement them.

The presidential center allows presidents to do exactly that: centralize decisionmaking by placing trusted advisers to supervise or lead cabinet ministries from above and control the bureaucracy by imposing a hierarchical decisionmaking process, through which not only policy alternatives but also information diffusion and political messages are decided at the top (Moe 1993; Moe and Howell 1999). The presidential center helps presidents lead the government and the policy process by enabling them to escape the institutional constraints to which they are subjected in a separation-of-powers system, and to attune their decisions to public opinion moods over the particularistic interests of legislators, ministers, and bureaucrats.

Regardless of the weight each explanation may have, the emergence of the presidential center has been linked to the centralization of the policymaking process by the executive branch in general, and particularly to its hierarchization under the presidency. The political and administrative relevance of the presidential center has consequently induced scholars to focus on its composition, its relation to presidents, the stability of its membership and functions, and its participation in decisionmaking.

Composition and Characteristics

The composition of the presidential center has been investigated with particular emphasis on the types of staff constituting it and the size of that staff. The premise of this research has been that the kinds of persons recruited to the presidential staff and its operating procedures are the critical conduits through which presidents can influence the performance and outcomes of their government (Burke 2000, 25). Presidents may surround themselves only with cronies and clerks, or with political and policy advisers with independent standing; advisers may be pundits or seasoned political operatives, learned students of policy or experienced policymakers, political system insiders or novice outsiders (Burke 2000). Presidents may organize their staff in a hierarchical, competitive, or collegial way (Johnson 1974); they may develop staff structures congruent to the challenges of their decision settings (Walcott and Hult 1995); or they may suspend centralization altogether, contingent to critical variables in their political and bureaucratic environment (Rudalevige 2002).

The types of staff recruited to the presidential center in the United States have evolved from an exclusively organizational capacity to a complex network of personal assistants, policy advisers, political strategists, communication personnel, and legal counselors (Arnold 1998; Lewis 2008). The expanded scope of direct presidential jurisdiction has been explained as the joint outcome of environmental pressures for increasing government activity, congressional action in response to those pressures, and particular presidential initiatives to seize control over specific policymaking areas (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). But such increasing complexity in the presidential center also appears to have pressured presidents into concentrating the

control of decisionmaking in their own office, to the detriment of the very agencies established in the EOP. This dynamic has generated what has been labeled the paradox of politicization: the recruitment of politically loyal but administratively inexperienced aides into the EOP has increased presidential control over decisions but diminished the technical ability of EOP agencies to advise the president on policy matters (Dickinson 2005).

The staff in the U.S. presidential center does not seem to enjoy much stability. Four not necessarily exclusive explanations have been advanced for this pattern. One is partisan turnover: when the governing party is ousted, most of the presidential staff also changes. Another is the duration of organizational units within the presidency—which, though increasing since the 1950s, has varied considerably from one year to another, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1970s (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). A third explanation is administrative overhaul, which was frequent in the twentieth century (Arnold 1998). A fourth explanation is the changing nature of presidential campaigns, which has forced prospective presidents to invest more in specialized campaign staff than in policy or administrative experts, and has thereby led to increased turnover rates after the campaign-turned-governing staff proves inadequate for their new function (Dickinson and Tenpas 2002). High turnover rates help foster centralization of decisionmaking in the president but, at the same time, increase the leverage of career bureaucrats over the policymaking process.

The tradeoffs between centralization and isolation and between politicization of the administration and technical expertise suggest that the staff in the presidential center must perform several functions in decisionmaking processes. Research has defined these functions according to the specialization of staff types (Walcott and Hult 1995) or forms of staff involvement in the policy process (Ponder 2000). The staff specialization perspective, stemming from organization theory, argues that the president's staff participates in decisionmaking in any of three capacities: outreach, policy processing, and coordination and supervision. Outreach tasks include liaison with Congress, press relations and publicity, contacts with interest groups, executive branch staffing operations, and presidency–executive branch relations management. Policy processing, in turn, encompasses information gathering, analysis, and proposals in domestic, economic, and national security policy, as well as in specific interbranch policy structures, such as task forces or commissions. Coordination and supervision include speechwriting, managing the president's schedule, and governing the presidential center itself (Walcott and Hult 1995).

The staff involvement perspective, privy to information theory, argues that the president's staff participates in decisionmaking as director, facilitator, or monitor (Ponder 2000). As director, it centralizes policymaking tasks and reports only to the president. As facilitator, it brokers agreements among policy jurisdictions under the president's supervision. As monitor, it delegates policy to other agents in the executive branch but "keeps a watchful eye on the progress and substance of policy development" (Ponder 2000, 14). These forms of involvement in the policy process need not be exclusive of any particular staff member or structure; in fact, according to Ponder, U.S. presidents (such as Jimmy Carter) practice "staff shift"—the move-

ment of staff members and structures from one function to another—in tune with the issue at hand and the availability of technical expertise and political capacity to control the substance of policy outcomes (Rudalevige 2002).

Relationship

To work within this complex organization, presidents have developed different managerial styles. Johnson (1974) identifies three: competitive, in which the president stands at the center of decisions by overlapping jurisdictions, duplicating assignments, and developing rivalries; formalistic or hierarchical, in which the president delegates authority to top advisers, who run a hierarchical organization with clearly specified, differentiated functions and who filter the information and policy alternatives that reach the presidential desk; and collegial, in which the president operates as the hub of a wheel, the spokes of which are a group of advisers who collectively discuss and propose alternatives. For instance, Franklin Roosevelt's style has been described as competitive (Dickinson 1997), Richard Nixon's as hierarchical, Carter's as collegial (Link 2002).

As Johnson argues, each style has its own strengths and weaknesses. The competitive style maximizes presidential control, bureaucratic feasibility, and political viability in decisionmaking, but demands an enormous investment of time from the president to manage and solve staff tensions. The formalistic style maximizes diversity in information gathering and advice, but may generate upward distortions and slowness in crisis situations. The collegial style maximizes technical optimality and bureaucratic feasibility but requires skilled presidential management to maintain a working group dynamic (Burke 2009).

Inspired by organizational theory, Walcott and Hult (1995, 20) argue that managerial styles are a function of staff structures, and that presidents develop staff structures that are "roughly congruent with the prevailing decision setting." Thus, if presidents are confronted with uncertainty, they should build competitive or collegial arrangements that foster the search for alternative sources of information and advice. If presidents face controversy, they should use adversarial multiparty advocacy or adjudicative arrangements in which they decide after thorough debate. If presidents encounter certainty, they should develop hierarchical or collegial-consensual arrangements to enhance control over decisionmaking (Walcott and Hult 1995, 21–23).

Combining these perspectives with transaction cost theory, Rudalevige (2002) contends that presidential centralization of the policy process is contingent on the costs of acquiring information and that those costs, in turn, depend on a number of political variables, such as divided government, size of presidential legislative contingent, presidential public opinion approval rates, ideological distance between the president and the legislature, policy area, issue complexity, crisis situation, and length of the presidential term. Presidents will centralize decisionmaking in their office only when they can acquire information to do so at the least possible cost; that is, when policy proposals cross-cut jurisdictions, the presidential center has stronger

policymaking resources, policy approaches are new, and speed is of the essence (Rudalevige 2002, 39). Consequently, managerial styles should change according to the conditions that determine information costs, and staff structures in the presidential center should be prepared to deal with all possible contingencies.

Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

Research on presidential centers in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is practically nonexistent. O'Donnell (1994) characterizes concentration of power and policymaking drive in the presidential center as typical of delegative democracy, but provides only theoretical and broad comparative strokes of evidence. Bonvecchi and Palermo (2000) compare staff types in the presidential inner circles of Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina, as does Siavelis (2010) for the Concertación governments in Chile, but their evidence is more impressionistic than systematic. Aninat and Rivera (2009) describe the functions of the presidential center in the latter administrations, but with a normative orientation toward proposing a reorganization of the executive branch. Whitehead (2011) specifies the conditions under which Mexican presidents historically under the PRI regime could govern alone with their entourage, but provides scarce comparative evidence.

A significant field of research is therefore open. What countries have and do not have a presidential center? What are the conditions for the emergence of presidential centers in Latin America? How are presidential centers structured? What types of staff are presidential centers made of? How is that staff managed by the president: competitively, hierarchically, or collegially? How stable are staff structures, staff types, and presidential managerial styles in presidential centers? What accounts for (potential) variations?

To answer these questions, at least two types of information must be collected. On the one hand, legal and administrative information about the structure of presidential centers, its evolution through time, formal powers attached to each component of the presidential center, and the types of staff recruited. On the other hand, qualitative and quantitative information on the relationship between presidents and their presidential center: frequency and nature of interaction between presidents and the different types of staff, forms of staff involvement in decisionmaking processes, staff turnover rates, and so on.

THE CABINET

The role of the cabinet in the executive branch in presidential systems of government has experienced a paradoxical development: while the number, size, and policy responsibilities of cabinet ministries have grown over the past decades, their participation in decisionmaking processes has been increasingly contested by both the presidential center and presidents themselves. These tendencies, empirically substantiated reliably for the United States but scarcely for Latin America, have been explained by the combination of governmental responses to environmental

demands and the informational and political incentives of presidents to enhance control over decisionmaking. U.S. presidents seem to have risen to these challenges despite lacking what their Latin American counterparts possess—the power to create and eliminate departments, and appoint their ministers and secretaries, without congressional approval.

The composition of the U.S. cabinet has gained complexity at the levels of structure and staff types. In terms of structure, the cabinet evolved from 3 departments in 1789 to 9 by 1903 and 15 by 2002 (Campbell 2005, 254). The structure of the cabinet has been taken to reflect both environmental pressures and ideological preferences for increased governmental activity (Ragsdale and Theis 1997, 1292–95). On the basis of the recent assignment of some policymaking responsibilities to the vice presidency, some authors also include this office as part of the cabinet structure (Baumgartner and Evans 2009), although the actual participation of vice presidents in decisionmaking has experienced significant variations across and even during each presidency.

The increase in the cabinet's organizational complexity has led to the distinction between inner and outer departments (Cronin 1975; Cohen 1988). The former—i.e., state, treasury, defense, and justice—tend to have broad and expanding missions and to work closer to presidents, and their performance is generally considered critical to the assessment of any presidency. The latter—i.e., the remaining departments, such as labor, environment, or health—usually have more specialized missions and work closer to interest groups and constituencies than to presidents, and their performance is assessed as relevant only contingent to the weight each president's program gives each policy area. This distinction has apparently also shaped the types of staff. Inner and outer cabinet members have been found to possess different profiles: while the former tend to be specialists or personal confidants of presidents, the latter are usually either party activists or individuals with backgrounds in related interest groups (Cohen 1988). In addition, the politicization of cabinet departments has reached beyond the chief executive officer level to the policy and support layers—to the point that "one has to bore down four levels below the secretary before reaching strata populated almost entirely by career officials" (Campbell 2005, 258).

These patterns have been explained as outcomes of presidential attempts to cope with information asymmetries and enhance control over policymaking. Information asymmetries arise from the inevitable fact of functional differentiation between the presidency and the cabinet departments and from the position of departments as agents with multiple principals; namely, the president, Congress, and interest groups (Weingast 2005, 313). Presidents cannot ignore the perils of departmental capture by the particularistic interests of bureaucrats and socioeconomic constituencies, nor can they risk letting cabinet secretaries freely propose legislation to Congress—where they can collude with specialized committees also potentially captured by particularistic interests (Light 1999, 223). The appointment of political allies and confidants to cabinet positions and the politicization of increasingly deeper layers of departmental ranks help presidents reduce these risks.

Presidential concerns with information asymmetries and control over policy-making also seem to have affected the stability of cabinet members and the role of departments in decisionmaking. While only a little over 50 percent of cabinet secretaries in the United States completed a full presidential term or more between 1789 and 1989 (Nicholls 1991), this percentage rose significantly in the 1990s (81.3 percent and 66.7 percent in each term for Bill Clinton) and 2000s (87.5 percent and 65.2 percent in George W. Bush's two terms), which would reflect the upside of politicizing the cabinet and controlling policymaking from the presidency (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2010). However, the increasing use, since the 1960s, of interdepartmental bodies as forums to develop and discuss policy alternatives has, in effect, limited the ability of cabinet secretaries to influence decisionmaking (Hult 1993). Councils, task forces, and presidential commissions have effectively undermined the authority of cabinet secretaries by carving out departmental subunits for specific purposes, pitting them against presidential center and extragovernmental advisers, and shifting their staff from one function to another within policymaking processes (Hult 1993; Ponder 2000). Therefore, as scholars have consensually concluded, there is no such thing as cabinet government in the United States.

Evidence in LAC

Research on presidential cabinets in Latin America has grown considerably in recent years, but this growth has been uneven, and accumulated knowledge is still incipient. Studies have focused mostly on the composition and stability of cabinets. In contrast, little investigation exists of the relation between presidents and cabinets or cabinet ministers' participation in decisionmaking processes.

The composition of presidential cabinets has been studied in three dimensions: their partisan makeup, the staff types, and their structure. Scholars have established that coalitions are the most frequent form of cabinet composition in Latin America. In comparative work on Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, Amorim Neto (2006) showed that 76 percent of cabinets between 1978 and 2004 were either majority or minority coalition cabinets. Working on practically the same list (merely replacing Panama with Paraguay), Martínez-Gallardo (2010a) showed that coalition cabinets were in place 52 percent of the time between 1982 and 2003, while Chasquetti (2008) found coalition cabinets in 41 percent of all governments in the sample between 1978 and 2006.

All cabinets in the present democratic periods of Brazil and Chile have been coalition cabinets; in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, this has been the case between 80 percent and 91 percent of the time (Chasquetti 2008). Majority coalition cabinets have been more frequent in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay (Amorim Neto 2006), while single-party majority cabinets are the least frequent form, prevalent only in Mexico (Amorim Neto 2006). These patterns have been explained as the joint outcome of the size of presidents' legislative contingents, the number of parties in the legislature, and the executive's lawmaking powers: coalition

cabinets appear to be more frequent when presidents have minority status, face a large number of legislative parties, and have weak lawmaking powers (Zelaznik 2001; Amorim Neto 2006; Martínez-Gallardo 2010a).

The types of staff recruited for cabinet positions have been studied in three dimensions: their partisanship, their background, and their gender. Amorim Neto's data show an average of 78.2 percent of partisan ministers, with peaks over 92 percent in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay and lows below 60 percent in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (2006). The share of partisan ministers appears to be correlated to the cabinet's coalescence rate; that is, the extent to which the partisan makeup of the cabinet is consistent with the distribution of seats in the legislature. Average coalescence rates—which vary from 0 (no coalescence) to 1 (perfect coalescence)—have been above 0.85 in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico and below 0.60 in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. These patterns have been explained as outcomes of the "presidential calculus" (Amorim Neto 2006): the partisan makeup of cabinets is contingent on the strength of executive lawmaking powers, the size of the president's legislative party, its discipline, the president's ideological position in regard to legislators, the elapsed length of the term, and the country's economic condition. The share of partisan ministers and the cabinet coalescence rate should be higher when presidents' parties control the legislative majority, are only beginning their terms in office, and have weak lawmaking powers.

On the background of cabinet ministers, comparative work on Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the United States (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009, 2010) has shown that relevant education or work experience, political insider experience, and known links to ministry clients are the most important traits for ministerial recruitment. Relevant education or work experience oscillates between 89.6 percent of ministers in the United States and 75.3 percent in Colombia; political insider experience weighs the most in Argentina (63.1 percent) and Costa Rica (58.1 percent) and the least in Chile (48.9 percent) and Colombia (42 percent); while links to ministry clients are most important in the United States (48.1 percent) and Argentina (45.9 percent) and least in Chile (36.2 percent) (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2010, 31). Most ministers have primary careers in government in Argentina (67.5 percent), Chile (68.1 percent), and the United States (59.7 percent), while primary careers in business are more relevant in Costa Rica (43.7 percent), and friendship with the president is more relevant in Argentina (40 percent) than anywhere else (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2010). On gender, the same authors found the highest shares of female ministers in Chile (35.1 percent) and Costa Rica (24.7 percent), and the lowest in the United States (18.2 percent).

The structure of the cabinet is the least researched dimension of cabinet composition. The little comparative data available (Martínez-Gallardo 2010a) show significant variation in the number of portfolios across countries, from 9 in Paraguay to 27 in Venezuela in 2008. Within-country variation has also been established as large for Bolivia (IDB 2006), less so for Brazil (Inácio 2006), but not for Argentina

(Molinelli and Palanza 1998). Twelve Latin American countries have a ministerial position with cabinet coordination responsibility. It is defined constitutionally (Argentina, Peru) or legally (Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Venezuela), located within the presidential center (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico) or assigned to the vice president (Guatemala, Nicaragua). Complete data collection and explanation of these stylized facts are still pending.

Cabinet stability has been investigated considering the duration of both cabinets and ministers. For duration, Amorim Neto's 2006 data show an average of 2.6 years for Latin American cabinets, compared to 4 years for U.S. cabinets. Cabinets survive longer than the average in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and less in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru (Amorim Neto 2006). These patterns have been explained as outcomes of the presidential party's legislative status, the share of partisan ministers, and the cabinet's partisan makeup: cabinets last longer if the president holds a legislative majority and the cabinet has a high share of partisan ministers and a single-party makeup (Amorim Neto 2006).

Ministerial duration varies considerably across Latin America. Measured in months by Martínez-Gallardo (2010b), ministers last an average 19.8 months, with Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay above average and Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela below average. Measured in years by Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2010), ministers serve longer in the United States (3.6 years) than in Latin America (2.2 years). Ministers have been found to serve longer if inflation and political conflict are low; economic growth, presidential popularity, and elections proximity are high; and institutional powers strong (Martínez-Gallardo 2010b), and if they are linked to ministry clients, whereas political, education, or work experience does not increase tenure (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2010).

There is practically no research on the relationship between presidents and cabinet ministers in Latin America. There are some case studies of presidential administrations that contain accounts of conflicts between presidents and finance ministers or between finance ministers and the rest of the cabinet (Palermo and Novaro 1996; Corrales 2000, 2002; Altman 2000; Mayorga 2001; Novaro 2001; Lanzaro 2001b), as well as Pion-Berlin's thorough review of organization and dynamics of defense policy (2009), but no systematic dataset or account of presidential-ministerial interaction exists so far.

The role of the cabinet in decisionmaking processes is also understudied. Martínez-Gallardo (2010a, 121–22) claims that ministers have "a near-monopoly" on policy design, are charged with steering presidential bills through Congress, and enjoy a central position in the implementation stage. However, no empirical evidence has been hitherto provided on any of these claims.

Consequently, important research questions remain unanswered. What is the nature of the portfolios included in Latin American cabinets? Under what conditions has each portfolio emerged or disappeared? How is the cabinet organized: in functionally differentiated portfolios, in interdepartmental councils, or both? How is

authority distributed within cabinets: is it institutionally wielded by a coordination portfolio, concentrated by the president, or informally assigned by the president to one or more ministries? What are the formal and effective powers of ministers? In what ways are cabinet departments involved in policymaking? How do ministers relate to the presidential center and its staff? How do presidents manage relations between the presidential center and cabinet departments? What is the structure of decisionmaking in the cabinet and in the ministries? In what ways do presidents intervene in cabinet deliberations and internal ministerial decision processes?

To answer these questions, as in the case of the presidential center, two types of information would be required and two different research strategies would be adequate for treating that information. On the information side, first, legal and administrative instruments depicting the organization of cabinets and ministries and its evolution through time, the formal powers of ministries and their subordinates, the formal powers of presidents in relation to ministers, and the scope of policy responsibilities of presidents, cabinet departments, and the presidential center; and second, quantitative and qualitative information on the frequency and nature of interactions among presidents, ministers, and presidential center staff, forms of involvement of ministries in decisionmaking processes, turnover rates, and so on.

ADVISORY NETWORKS

Presidential advisory networks are groups of individuals, organizational units, and subunits linked to presidents through the provision of advice for their decisions (Hult 1993, 113). Studies of advisory networks contend that interaction among network members may affect "the nature and timing of the advice a president receives, the president's views on the credibility and importance of that advice, and the impact of the advice on presidential decisions and decision outcomes" (Hult 1993). Research on these networks in the United States has focused on their composition, operation, and effects on presidential decisionmaking.

Studies of the composition of advisory networks have focused on the nature and stability of their membership. Organizational approaches have concentrated on the specific organizational units and subunits involved in particular networks, stressing how their mandates, information, working routines, and linkages to other actors, such as Congress and interest groups, shape the advice they produce and their clout in presidential decisions. Stemming from Allison's classic work on the Cuban missile crisis (1972), this approach has used primarily to investigate foreign policy decisionmaking, particularly under crisis situations (Janis 1972, 1982; Kozak and Keagle 1988; Burke and Greenstein 1989; Hart 1994, 1997; Preston 2001).

The main finding of these studies is that the composition of networks involves crucial tradeoffs for presidents to maintain control of decisionmaking. If networks are staffed solely with policy area specialists, presidents will probably receive biased information designed to protect policy turfs and hide previous bad choices or least-preferred alternatives of departments and bureaucrats. If networks are staffed with units from various areas and different mandates, information and advice will be

more diverse, but two opposing dynamics may complicate decision processes: either the pressure to produce decisions by consensus may lead to "groupthink" and its pathologies of information filtering, misrepresentation, and denial of alternatives and potentially bad consequences or outcomes (such as in the Bay of Pigs invasion); or the competition between units for dominance over outcomes may force the president to invest excessive time and energy in the process—as in decisionmaking on Vietnam under Lyndon B. Johnson (Rudalevige 2005, 340).

Interactional approaches have defined individual advisers, rather than organizations, as their units of analysis, and have categorized them according to their level of access to the president. Based on presidential schedules and diaries, scholars (Best 1988a, b; Thompson 1992; Link 2002) have established the volume of interactions between presidents and advisers and determined the existence of different adviser types according to the distance between their formal positions in government and their effective positions in advisory networks. Link's study of the Nixon and Carter administrations found three types of network members: inner core advisers, with extraordinary (i.e., one standard deviation greater than the mean) access to the president's time; outer core advisers, with above-average but less than standard deviation access levels; and peripheral advisers, with below-average levels of access (Link 2002, 251–52). This categorization of advisers makes it possible to pinpoint the influence of particular individuals and organizations—as represented by individuals—on presidential decisions by weighing their frequency of interactions with the president, the length of their paths to the president's attention, and the precise timing of their presence before the president.

The stability of network membership has also been studied from the organizational and interactional perspectives. Organizational studies have concentrated on the survival of units and on variations in presidents' use of those units in decision-making processes (Porter 1980; Burke and Greenstein 1989; Ragsdale and Theis 1997), whereas interactional analyses have stressed the turnover of each adviser type (Link 2002). Network stability has been explained from the organizational perspective as the outcome of presidents' managerial styles: turnover would be higher under competitive styles (Dickinson 1997) than collegial styles—though staff shifting to different functions in the policy process may also yield high turnover (Ponder 2000). From the interactional perspective, turnover rates seem to be determined by overload: since presidents have to deal with an increasing number of problems, their engagement in parallel processing of issues forces them to limit the number of advisers they contact and to seek only those who can quickly provide information and solutions that are easy to understand and implement (Link 2002, 253). High turnover rates of network members may therefore be construed as indications of presidents' greater adaptability to changing decision settings, or as signals of presidential difficulties in handling complex environments and simultaneous challenges.

The operation of presidential advisory networks has been studied in three dimensions: decision procedures, conflict among network members, and the effects of both on presidential decisionmaking. Decision procedures have been found to change according to context and issue. Routine decision contexts typically involve

deliberation and decisionmaking by cabinet members and top-level bureaucrats, which presidents subsequently sanction, whereas extraordinary contexts, such as crises or unexpected events, typically lead to direct presidential involvement, either through hierarchical arrangements with heavy reliance on the presidential center or adjudicative rules by which advisers provide competing counsel and presidents decide (Hult 1993; Walcott and Hult 1995).

Foreign policy issues are typically settled through competitive and collegial decisionmaking, in which presidents encourage adversarial deliberation among the specialized agencies, whereas domestic policy issues, particularly social policy, are generally discussed by interdepartmental councils and subjected to multiple advocacy procedures (George 1972) whereby all concerned agencies, and even outside parties, such as interest groups, voice their position—typically with some cabinet secretary or top presidential aide acting as an "honest broker" charged with laying down all the information and choices.

These variations have been explained as outcomes of the diverse incentives of network members. To govern effectively and secure their place in history (Moe 1993), presidents should maximize the chances to push their agenda through; and since campaigning consumes most of their time and energies, they typically have little in the way of ideas and resources to develop policy agendas on inauguration, so they must eventually rely on the institutional sources available: cabinet departments, Congress, interest groups, think tanks (Light 1999, 83). This opens a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurship by career bureaucrats and cabinet secretaries, as well as influential congressional leaders—all of whom compete for agenda setting and program jockeying on their preferred issues (Light 1999, 158).

Conflict within advisory networks has been studied as a consequence of members' incentives, problem overload, presidential inattention, and decision cycles. Presidential incentives to maximize control over decisionmaking clash with bureaucratic turf protection, Congressional interest in credit claiming for politically promising issues, and departmental policy entrepreneurship (Volden 2002; Epstein et al. 2008). Problem overload may lead to inefficient information processing and biased deliberation (Light 1999), high network turnover rates (Link 2002), and ultimately inadequate choices. Presidential inattention, either to specific issues or to tensions among network members, may lead to domination of decision processes by powerful actors or agencies, decision gridlock, and "traffic jams" in policy processing due to "underdirected participants" (Helmer 1981, quoted in Hult 1993). Furthermore, conflicts within advisory networks tend to increase throughout the term as presidents focus on their re-election campaign or lose power as lame ducks (Light 1999).

Evidence in LAC

There is no comparable literature on presidential advisory networks in Latin America. A handful of studies have analyzed the role of economists in policymaking, particularly during the structural reforms of the 1990s (Markoff and Montecinos 1993; Centeno and Silva 1998; Montecinos and Markoff 2009), but mostly via case studies, without systematic datasets and unrelated to network analytic perspectives. An even smaller literature on the diffusion of policy ideas (Madrid 2003; Weyland 2007) has developed comparative analyses of the role of policy networks in the spread of pension reforms throughout Latin America using network concepts, but these works generally do not deal with the interaction between presidents and advisory networks.

There is therefore a considerable research agenda still pending. To what extent do presidents in Latin America employ advisory networks? For what policy issues or areas do they employ those networks? What is the composition of presidential advisory networks? How stable is this composition, and if unstable, how does it vary? What explains the emergence, duration, and demise of advisory networks? How are authority and power distributed among network members? How does decisionmaking operate in advisory networks? How do presidents manage conflict among advisory network members? To answer these questions, legal and administrative information is needed on the level of institutionalization, formal powers, and evolution of presidential advisory networks and their members, and quantitative information on the frequency and nature of interactions and conflicts among network members is also required.

To Conclude: Methodological Suggestions for a Research Agenda

This article's review of the literature on the organization of the executive branch in the United States and Latin America has shown that research on Latin American presidencies has produced strong, regionwide findings on the composition of cabinets, while in contrast, research on the presidential center and the presidential advisory networks is significantly lagging behind.

Research on the presidential center, the powers of cabinet departments, and the presidential advisory networks could profitably combine statistical analysis with social network analytic strategies. This combination would be most adequate to establish not only the determinants of different types of staff structures and arrangements but also the nature of staff involvement in policymaking and the frequency with which presidents mobilize each form of involvement. Quantitative analyses of the presidential center or the cabinet should use them as dependent variables and test the effect of the standard independent variables in studies of the institutionalization of the presidency: legislative strength of the president's party, formal powers of the president, presidential popularity, length of presidential term, economic context, government size, government structural complexity, and so on. Social network

analyses of the relationship between presidents and their staff should look into the frequency, nature, and volume of interactions among presidents, ministers, and advisers as indicators of the importance of each staff type in decisionmaking processes. The identification of network structures and relational contents would enable the reconstruction of presidential managerial styles and their application to specific policymaking processes or decisions.

Furthermore, research on the effects of executive organization and presidency resources on policymaking should combine statistical analysis with case studies in order to pinpoint the determinants of governing strategies, policy aims and ideas, policymaking structures, and policy outcomes, and to trace the mechanisms by which the former variables affect the latter. These studies could profitably treat policy ideas, forms and frequency of staff involvement, and outcomes as dependent variables, and staff types, presidency resources, organizational arrangements, and standard political and economic environmental factors as independent variables.

The questions and research strategies proposed on the basis of this literature review may, of course, be corrected and improved on. But the fact will remain that advancing this research may greatly help to improve the understanding of the workings of the presidency, the causes of its weaknesses in specific countries in the region, its effects on policymaking, and its outcomes. The academic payoff of this research agenda can be large, for at least two reasons. One: while the U.S.-based literature has advanced at a faster pace, it is still in its infancy, particularly regarding the use of strong quantitative and comparative analysis. The other: many theoretical propositions about presidentialism have not been connected or tested against the organizational specifics of the presidency. Researchers taking on the Latin American executives may then be able to make a contribution that resonates beyond the Latin Americanist research network of scholars.

NOTES

1. For example, the *Oxford Handbook* series includes a volume on the U.S. presidency but has no similar one for either presidential regimes in general or presidencies in developing countries.

2. We acknowledge that our present focus on organization far from exhausts cross-country variations in the types of resources—institutional, partisan, economic—available to Latin American presidents that may affect their governing and survival. For space reasons, we must defer addressing this broader picture to future research.

REFERENCES

Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald Cohen. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macro-economy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Allison, Graham T. 1972. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Altman, David. 2000. The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay, 1989–1999. *Party Politics* 6, 3: 259–83.

———. 2001. The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Regimes. Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame.

Ames, Barry. 2001. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Amorim Neto, Octavio. 1998. Of Presidents, Parties, and Ministers: Cabinet Formation and Legislative Decisionmaking Under Separation of Powers. Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego.

———. 2006. *Presidencialismo e governabilidade nas Americas*. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung/Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

Aninat, Cristóbal, and Eugenio Rivera. 2009. Coordinación estratégica en el estado de Chile. El centro de gobierno bajo la Concertación y propuestas a futuro. In *Un mejor estado para Chile. Propuestas de modernización y reforma*. Santiago: Consorcio para la Reforma del Estado. 81–127.

Arnold, Peri E. 1998. *Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905–1996*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Baumgartner, Jody C., and Rhonda Evans. 2009. Constitutional Design of the Executive: Vice Presidencies in Comparative Perspective. *Congress and the Presidency* 36: 148–63.

Best, James. 1988a. Who Talked to the President When? A Study of Lyndon B. Johnson. *Political Science Quarterly* 103, 3: 531–45.

———. 1988b. Presidential Learning: A Comparative Study of the Interactions of Carter and Reagan. *Congress and the Presidency* 15: 25–48.

Bonvecchi, Alejandro, and Vicente Palermo. 2000. En torno a los entornos: presidentes débiles y partidos parsimoniosos. *Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política* 6: 103–11.

Burke, John P. 2000. *The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton*. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 2009. Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency*, ed. George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 501–27.

Burke, John P., and Fred Greenstein. 1989. *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Campbell, Colin. 2005. The Complex Organization of the Executive Branch: The Legacies of Competing Approaches to Administration. In *The Executive Branch*, ed. Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 243–82.

Carey, John, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. 1998. *Executive Decree Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Centeno, Miguel Angel, and Patricio Silva. 1998. *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*. London: Macmillan.

Chasquetti, Daniel. 2008. Democracia, presidencialismo y partidos políticos en América Latina: evaluando la difícil combinación. Montevideo: Instituto de Ciencia Política/Universidad de la República.

Cheibub, José Antonio. 2002. Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 35, 3: 284–312.

———. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1988. *Politics of the U.S. Cabinet: Representation in the Executive Branch, 1789–1984*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Corrales, Javier. 2000. Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory on the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 32, 2: 127–49.

———. 2002. *Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern 2002. Epilogue: Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents. In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 446–68.

Cronin, Thomas E. 1975. *The State of the Presidency*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Deheza, Grace I. 1997. Gobiernos de coalición en el sistema presidencial: América del Sur. Ph.D. diss., European University Institute.

Dickinson, Matthew J. 1997. *Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2005. The Executive Office of the President: The Paradox of Politicization. In *The Executive Branch,* ed. Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 135–73.

Dickinson, Matthew J., and Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. 2002. Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates Among Presidential Advisers, 1929–1997. *Journal of Politics* 64, 2: 434–48.

Epstein, David, Ida P. Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2008. Conditional Presidential Leadership: Pivotal Players, Gridlock, and Delegation. In *Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power*, ed. Bert A. Rockman and Richard W. Waterman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 81–104.

Escobar-Lemmon, María, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. 2009. Do Cabinet Ministers in Presidential Systems have Experience in their Portfolio, or is On-the-Job Training the Norm? Paper prepared for delivery at the International Political Science Association Meeting, Santiago, July 11–16.

———. 2010. Coming or Going: How Background Affects Duration in 5 Presidential Systems. Paper prepared for American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 2–5.

Etchemendy, Sebastián. 2001. Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics of Compensations in Argentina's Economic Liberalization. *Latin American Politics and Society* 43, 3 (Fall): 1–35.

García Montero, Mercedes. 2009. *Presidentes y parlamentos. ¿Quién controla la actividad legislativa en América Latina?* Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

George, Alexander. 1972. The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 66: 751–85.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. 1992. *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1995. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hart, Paul 't. 1994. *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 1997. Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics. In *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making*, ed. Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 3–34.

Helmer, John 1981. The Presidential Office: Velvet Fist in an Iron Glove? In *The Illusion of Presidential Government,* ed. Hugh Heclo and Lester Salamon. Boulder: Westview Press. 45–83.

Hult, Karen M. 1993. Advising the President. In *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, ed. George C. Edwards, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 111–60.

Inácio, Magna. 2006. Entre presidir e coordenar: presidência e gabinetes multipartidários no Brasil. Paper presented to the III Congreso Latino Americano de Ciência Política, Campinas, September 4–6.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2006. The Politics of Policies. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank/David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.

Janis, Irving L. 1972. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

———. 1982. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Johnson, Richard T. 1974. *Managing the White House*. New York: Harper & Row.

Kozak, David C., and James M. Keagle. 1988. *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Lanzaro, Jorge, ed. 2001a. *Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.

———. 2001b. Uruguay: las alternativas de un presidencialismo pluralista. In Lanzaro 2001a. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. 283–317.

Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. 2008. Latin America's "Left Turn": A Conceptual and Theoretical Overview. In *Latin America's Left Turn: Causes and Implications*, ed. Levitsky and Roberts. Unpublished mss., Harvard University.

Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Light, Paul C. 1999. *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Link, Michael W. 2002. The Presidential Kaleidoscope: Advisory Networks in Action. In *Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. New York, Columbia University Press. 235–61.

Linz, Juan, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1994. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Llanos, Mariana. 2002. *Privatization and Democracy in Argentina: An Analysis of President-Congress Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Llanos, Mariana, and Leiv Marsteintredet. 2010. *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Madrid, Raúl. 2003. *Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Markoff, John, and Verónica Montecinos. 1993. The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists. *Journal of Public Policy* 13, 1: 37–38.

Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia. 2010a. Inside the Cabinet: The Influence of Ministers in the Policymaking Process. In *How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking*, ed. Carlos Scartascini, Ernesto Stein, and Mariano Tommasi. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. 119–46.

———. 2010b. Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections from the Government in Presidential Systems? Paper prepared for American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 2–5.

Mayorga, René A. 2001. Presidencialismo, parlamentarizado y gobiernos de coalición en Bolivia. In Lanzaro 2001a. 101–35.

Mejía Acosta, Andrés. 2006. Crafting Legislative Ghost Coalitions in Ecuador: Informal Institutions and Economic Reform in an Unlikely Case. In *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*, ed. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 69–84.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and Katrina Muller. 2002. The Politics of Pension Reform in Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34: 687–71.

Moe, Terry M. 1993. Presidents, Institutions, and Theory. In *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, ed. George C. Edwards, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 337–86.

Moe, Terry M., and Scott A. Wilson. 1994. Presidents and the Politics of Structure. *Law and Contemporary Problems* 57: 1–44.

Moe, Terry M., and William Howell. 1999. Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, 4: 850–72.

Molinelli, Guillermo, and Valeria Palanza. 1998. *Congreso, presidencia y justicia en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Temas.

Montecinos, Verónica, and John Markoff. 2009. *Economists in the Americas*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Negretto, Gabriel. 2006. Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, 3 (Fall): 63–92.

Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. New York: Free Press.

Nicholls, Keith. 1991. The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members. *Western Political Quarterly* 44, 1: 149–72.

Novaro, Marcos. 2001. Presidentes, equilibrios institucionales y coaliciones de gobierno en Argentina (1989–2000). In Lanzaro 2001a. 51–100.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 5, 1: 55–69.

Palermo, Vicente, and Marcos Novaro. 1996. *Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem*. Buenos Aires: Norma.

Pereira, Carlos, and Bernardo Mueller. 2002. Comportamento estratégico em presidencialismo de coalizão: as relações entre executivo e legislativo na elaboração do orçamento brasileiro. *Dados* 45, 2: 265–301.

Pereira, Carlos, Timothy J. Power, and Lucio Rennó. 2005. Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case. *Journal of Politics* 67, 1: 178–200.

Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal. 2007. *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Pion-Berlin, David. 2009. Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. *Armed Forces and Society* 35, 3: 562–86.

Ponder, Daniel E. 2000. *Good Advice: Information and Policy Making in the White House*. College Station, Texas: A&M University Press.

Porter, Roger B. 1980. *Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Preston, Thomas. 2001. *The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ragsdale, Lyn, and John Theis. 1997. The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924–92. *American Journal of Political Science* 41, 4: 1280–318.

Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2005. The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, 2: 333–60.

Samuels, David. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schamis, Hector. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics* 51, 2: 236–68.

———. 2002. *Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Latin America and Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Shugart, Matthew, and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siavelis, Peter. 2010. Formal and Informal Organization of the Executive Branch in Chile. Paper presented at the V Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, Buenos Aires, July 28–30.

Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Public Support for Economic Reforms in New Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, Robert J. 1992. Contrasting Models of White House Staff Organization: The Eisenhower, Ford, and Carter Experiences. *Congress and the Presidency* 19: 101–24.

Torre, Juan Carlos. 1998. *El proceso político de las reformas económicas en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Paidos.

Volden, Craig. 2002. A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System. *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 1: 111–33.

Walcott, Charles E., and Karen M. Hult. 1995. *Governing the White House: From Hoover Through LBJ*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Weingast, Barry R. 2005. Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the Political-Bureaucratic System. In *The Executive Branch*, ed. Joel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 312–43.

Weyland, Kurt. 2005. Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform. *World Politics* 57, 2: 262–95.

———. 2007. *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weyland, Kurt, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter. 2010. *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Whitehead, Laurence. 2010. Fernando Henrique Cardoso: The Astuzia Fortunata of Brazil's Sociologist-President. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1, 3: 111–29.

———. 2011. El sistema presidencial mexicano en perspectiva comparada. *Revista de Política Comparada* 5: 11–28.

Zelaznik, Javier. 2001. The Building of Coalitions in the Presidential Systems of Latin America. Ph.D. diss., University of Essex.