Introduction

A feminist critique of PPPs rooted in the global South

Corina Rodríguez Enríquez and
Masaya Llavaneras Blanco

This book deals with some recurring development issues. On the one hand, it talks about the need for countries, mainly – but not only – across the global South, to expand the provision of social services to their populations in order to guarantee the most basic human rights such as health, education and decent standards of living. It also emphasises the need for countries to improve and expand their infrastructure, in part to achieve the above goals and in part to improve opportunities for economic development, which would better equip them to guarantee people's rights.

On the other hand, the book deals with the structural challenges that states face in order to finance public policies aimed at expanding and strengthening economic and social infrastructure and the provision of social services. The scope of the book thus lies squarely within debates and discussions on 'financing for development'.

The volume also addresses inequalities which are at the heart of development. It deals with inequalities between countries that turn a community's needs and development aspirations into business opportunities for an elite minority in the global North and, in some cases, in the global South. The corporate capture of development also deepens inequalities within countries by reproducing the marketisation of the public sphere and transforming citizens and denizens into consumers. In particular, the book explores the ways in which some dimensions of inequality, such as those based on gender, are exacerbated by the very solutions that propose to tackle them.

To this end, the book presents a series of case studies on public-private partnerships (PPPs) in countries across Africa, Asia, the Pacific and Latin America. It uses a feminist framework to analyse these cases, seeking to contribute to the debate on the benefits and challenges of the PPP model in addressing development needs.

Role of the private sector in the discourse and making of development

In the current phase of concentration and financialisation of global capital, private corporations have increasingly gained a position of power over other actors. In many regions of the global North and South, they are able to impose their own agendas, driven by the constant search for ever-greater profits. Private actors have increasingly come to subordinate public and collective interests, diminishing the capacity of the state to regulate them, threatening human rights, and challenging labour, environmental and other laws and regulations.

Indeed, powerful private interest groups and their partners have gained excessive influence over policy making, thereby eroding both human rights and democratic processes. This corporate capture of the state has systemic and long-standing influence, and is backed by narratives arguing that (1) states, through processes of 'rent-seeking', are inherently economically inefficient; and (2) policy issues are of such technical complexity that ordinary people cannot understand, and therefore should not (or need not) engage with them. The disingenuous inference often drawn from these assertions is that private corporations operate in public interest; what is good for corporations is claimed to be self-evidently good for the state and those that live in its territory, including citizens.

The current avatar of the corporate capture of the state is the PPP model. The relentless pressure on states, in both the global North and South, to implement fiscal compression policies underpins the emergence of PPPs as the vehicle of choice for development programmes and the circulation of investment finance. PPPs, as defined by the Global Campaign Manifesto, 'are essentially long-term contracts, underwritten by government guarantees, under which the private sector builds (and sometimes runs) major infrastructure projects or services traditionally provided by the State, such as hospitals, schools, roads, railways, water, sanitation and energy'.[1] PPPs have a long history in the global North and a relatively shorter one in the South. More recently, they have been promoted by regional development banks and international financial institutions as a way to secure financing, first for the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and currently for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Governments and funders frame the PPP model as a silver bullet that facilitates the building of large infrastructure projects and the provision of public services; solves the problems of inadequate public financing, technology and skilled human resources; and improves efficiency and effectiveness. These partnerships are also seen as a great model for the private sector. Since most PPP projects are backed by sovereign guarantees from the state, they present institutional investors, including Northern pension funds, with high-return, low-risk investment opportunities. For this reason, a growing critique of PPPs revolves around their role in reinforcing the corporate capture of the state. This critique also challenges their lack of effectiveness, and poor transparency and accountability. It understands PPPs as an extension of the corporate capture of multilateral governance systems in regional, national and local policy spaces. The role of states in multilateralism has been gradually diluted since the inclusion of business interests in processes such as Rio 92 in the early 1990s. The insertion of corporate interests in the UN system, for example, became clearer in the early 2000s and was reinforced in the post-2015 development agenda and the expansion of multistakeholderism. PPPs are a concrete manifestation of how corporate powers have permeated governance processes at the global, national and local levels, undermining long-term and universal approaches (Adams and Martens, 2015; People's Working Group on Multistakeholderism, 2021; Pingeot, 2016).

A brief introduction to PPPs

As defined in the Global Campaign Manifesto, PPPs are 'essentially long-term contracts, underwritten by government guarantees ….' They are arrangements that involve some form of risk sharing between the public and private sectors (Romero, 2015). What differentiates PPPs from public procurement is that, in a PPP, a private company is responsible for raising the upfront costs of investment which are then paid back by the taxpayer, either directly or through the state, over the course of the contract by which the private company builds, maintains and operates (or delivers some agreed variant of) the service. In return, the private company expects a guaranteed profit on its investment.[2] A PPP is different from 'informal or loose collaborations between different actors, including multi-stakeholder partnerships and short-term outsourcing arrangements for the delivery of goods and the provision of services, for instance, in health or education. It also excludes privatisation schemes, by which previously publicly-owned services and facilities are fully transferred (by sale) to the private sector' (Romero, 2015: 11).

The analysis of PPPs in health and education needs a more flexible and broader definition since, in many cases, such projects involve not only corporations but also funders and philanthropic organisations (although the latter are sometimes linked to corporations). Nonetheless, the core issue remains the role of the private sector in the functioning of the state.

The varied definitions of PPPs that countries currently include in their regulatory frameworks share some common characteristics:

1. These are medium- or long-term but finite contracts between the public sector (at the national or local level) and a private sector company or consortium.
2. There is a private finance component, sometimes through a complex network of diverse participants, which must be repaid by the public sector or the users.
3. Private actors often have a relevant role in different stages of the project (design, implementation and financing).
4. The public partner's main tasks include setting the objectives to be achieved in public interest, overseeing the quality of the proposed services and the price policy, and ensuring the achievement of the stated objectives.
5. In the event that the contract is not renewed, the ownership of the asset is transferred to the public sector upon its completion (Romero, 2015; Unión Europea, 2004). Contracts, however, can be extended for long periods, in which case, service provision remains in private hands (Hall et al, 2013).

Risks that are meant to be shared under PPPs include those associated with construction, such as design problems, building cost overruns and project delays; performance risks, such as the availability of an asset, and the continuity and quality of the service provision; and demand risks, such as the ongoing and future need for the service/asset which can impact project value and revenues. There are also macroeconomic risks related to factors which affect financing costs, such as inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. Finally, there are political and regulatory risks that include changes in regulations and political decisions, such as tax policy changes or new environmental rules, which affect the project (Romero, 2015).

Private sector partners may recover their investment in one of two ways:

1. PPPs in which users pay. The private partner is allowed to charge the public for using the facility, generally by levying a fee, which can be supplemented by subsidies paid by the government; or
2. PPPs in which the government pays. The private sector company provides and administers the infrastructure or services for the public

authority and receives regular payments from the public partner based on the level of service provided (Eurodad et al., 2019).

The cases presented in this book illustrate a combination of the different features of PPPs. They point to the commonalities among them, but also the specific complexities that arise in different sectors and jurisdictions.

Role of IFIs in the promotion of PPPs in the SDG era

The current promotion of PPPs has been framed within the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action on Financing for Development. Under these frameworks, it was agreed that the mechanisms used to generate the capital required to deliver the 2030 Agenda would need to go beyond international aid[3] to include finances available to governments directly as well as through private sector investments. At the same time, the World Bank (WB) announced a new strategy called Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD), which the bank claimed would 'leverage solutions' and connect and coordinate the public and private sectors: 'The MFD approach insists that nothing should be publicly financed if it can be commercially financed in a sustainable way. If commercial financing is not forthcoming for a project, a country must promote a more investment-friendly environment and/or provide private sector guarantees, risk insurance and other inducements' (Alexander, 2018: 7).

In 2017, this approach was also adopted by the G20 via the Hamburg Principles[4] which apply to various multilateral development banks (MDBs). The approach is based on the belief that traditional methods of financing are not sufficient to achieve the SDGs. Accordingly, it emphasises the importance of 'attracting private solutions' (The Equality Trust, 2019).

As Alexander (2016) has argued, these infrastructure plans involve a new paradigm described in a 2015 report entitled 'From Billions to Trillions', and is built on the following three pillars:

1. The use of public money (i.e. taxes, user fees, guarantees, etc.) to leverage or catalyse private sector investment, particularly long-term institutional investment (i.e. pension and insurance funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds, etc.);
2. A commitment to create 'pipelines' of 'bankable' projects, with an emphasis on megaprojects[5] (initially in four sectors: transportation,

energy, water and sanitation, and information and communications technology (ICT)); and
3. Mechanisms to replicate PPPs rapidly through standardised clauses in PPP contracts, information disclosure requirements, procurement, risk mitigation, etc., as well as by updating the legal and financial regulations of countries (i.e. land acquisition, investor protections, etc.) to attract private investment.

From the private sector perspective, the profitability (or 'bankability') of projects is crucial for these plans to make sense. Depending on the sector and location, PPPs represent an attractive business opportunity for companies, especially those in construction and engineering; service providers, such as those in healthcare; and financial institutions, such as banks and institutional investors. They present an opportunity for those investors who hold trillions of dollars and are looking for attractive returns and seeking to diversify their portfolios in order to reduce the risks to their investments (Romero, 2015).

More recently, the G20 Eminent Persons Group (EPG) proposed that securitising on a large scale across the MDB system would, in effect, create new asset classes and attract a wider range of investors. In this way, the EPG seeks to engage the private financial sector not only for financing investment projects, but also for securitising future revenue streams from existing project pipelines and bundling them into tradeable assets in the financial markets (Alexander, 2018).

The Draft Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions, formulated by the WB and published in February 2019, open for public consultation to capture inputs and recommendations by all relevant stakeholders, is one way to facilitate the replication of PPP projects.[6] However, civil society organisations (CSOs) have stressed the need to review this Draft Guidance in order to avoid imbalances in the way risks and rewards and rights and responsibilities are allocated between private sector partners and the public sector contracting authority. In April 2019, a large number of CSOs supported a joint submission by Foley Hoag LLP, legal experts from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Observatory for Sustainable Infrastructure, who made a number of critical observations.[7] In their view, the Draft Guidance, for the most part, is fixated on getting the PPP agreement signed by motivating the private partner at the expense of the host country and its people. The latter are urged to accept the negative consequences that may befall them as a result of these contractual provisions as the cost of attracting infrastructure investment. This approach maximises the profit margin of the private partner while potentially creating large contingent liabilities for the host country.

An updated version of the Draft Guidance seems to have responded to this critique by adding three new chapters that can potentially assist in the negotiation of balanced contractual provisions, and recognise the local law as the appropriate tool to govern PPP contracts. The rest of the document, however, retains earlier biases in favour of the private sector, leaving the Draft Guidance without a broader sustainable development perspective. Among other things, the Guidance emphasises the principle of value for money, according to which a public service should be provided by a private entity that can offer higher quality results at a certain cost or the same quality at a lower cost. The private sector bias notwithstanding, the value for money principle recognises that the efficient use of public resources and the management of fiscal and financial risks are paramount. Yet, the management of the non-financial risks of PPPs arising from environmental, social and governance factors find little or no mention in the WB's document.

PPPs in practice

The organisations that promote PPPs have made all possible efforts to demonstrate their positive impact, but have not been able to avoid acknowledging the pitfalls entirely. A study from the WB's own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) confirms that there is little evidence of the positive impact of PPPs (IEG-WB, 2012). Critical empirical analysis[8] shows that PPPs are controversial, at least when taking into account cost, efficiency, equity, community access to services, environmental justice, transparency and accountability. More crucially, a feminist analysis of PPPs, which is central to this volume, sheds light on some lesser discussed aspects, namely, their negative implications for gender equality and women's human rights.

The first possible downside of PPPs stems from their financial cost. In many cases, these projects have proven costlier for governments in the long run than traditional public investments. This is because the conditions outlined in PPP contracts usually imply heavier financial costs than those arising from direct government borrowing. The cost is even greater in developing countries where investors expect higher returns to compensate for the presumed higher risks.

The biggest potential financial cost stems from the possibility of contingent liabilities due to poor project design, whereby obligations that had not been calculated before are imposed on the state. This is worsened by few pre-existing transparency mechanisms within states, the lack of government guarantees in tax accounting registries and limited capacity to manage the initial contracts or renegotiations (Alarco Tosoni, 2015;

Pessino, 2016). The fiscal implications of PPPs result either from (1) direct liabilities, which are payment terms set in the contract (e.g. capital contributions to ensure that a project that is economically desirable, but not commercially viable, can proceed); or (2) from contingent liabilities, which are payments required from governments if a particular event occurs (e.g. if the exchange rate of the domestic currency falls or the demand plummets below a specified level).[9]

The second controversial aspect of PPPs has to do with efficiency, understood in terms of its classic definition of achieving a goal in the least costly way. According to the IEG-WB (2012), an in-depth, though not statistically representative, evaluation of twenty-two PPPs indicated that the results were mixed when it comes to improvements in efficiency. The most positive outcomes were observed in countries that have consolidated frameworks to manage PPPs, that is, where the state already has strong institutions and well-developed capacities, thus undermining the argument that the private sector necessarily improves efficiency.

Third, PPPs have the potential to restrict people's access to services and lower their quality, thereby threatening and weakening people's rights. This is usually the case when the financing of PPPs includes user fees, making access to services costlier or unaffordable for large sections of the population (Romero, 2014). Besides, as profit-led ventures, PPPs are rarely developed in sectors that are unprofitable for the private partner, even when there are social inequities and gaps that need to be addressed.

Fourth, poor regulation of PPPs has caused serious social and environmental damage. Poor planning, lack of ex-ante impact assessments, flawed normative frameworks as well as weak state capacity to monitor the process serve to increase the risk of negative impacts on natural resources and people's livelihoods.

Fifth, PPPs are highly controversial when it comes to transparency and accountability. Often, these projects do not go through the normal procedures of procurement, and contract details remain unpublished. There are few or no mechanisms for conducting proper consultations with communities at the project development stage. Thus, PPPs restrict democratic accountability and increase the scope for corruption as negotiations remain mired in commercial confidentiality.

More recently, feminist critiques have begun to raise serious concerns as PPPs expand into areas that are central to women's lives and livelihoods: exploitation of natural resources, energy, infrastructure and social services. Existing analyses have highlighted the impact of corporate power on women and historically marginalised communities, as well as the risks posed by PPPs to gender equality. These risks arise from:

1. Fiscal constraints, as PPPs are expensive and transfer risks to the state and society, thereby limiting the resources available to deliver gender-transformative infrastructure and social provisions;
2. A 'race to the bottom' in terms of working conditions, as PPP projects often fail to meet labour standards or provide social protections;
3. Restricted access to social services, due to rising costs associated with PPPs;
4. The lack of participation in project selection, design and monitoring of PPPs, and the absence of transparency or accountability mechanisms;
5. The loss of access to land, water, and other private and common resources, which are taken over in the name of PPPs with the full support of governments, thus reducing women's ability to provide for their own and their families' subsistence and even resulting in destitution; and
6. The perpetration of greater violence, including the sexual violence, when women resist or demand justice.[10]

Organisation of this book

Existing gender analyses of PPPs have, however, largely drawn on studies that were not specifically meant to evaluate the gender dimension. In other cases, insufficient information has meant that the conclusions are reasonable but hypothetical. The initial findings thus point to the need to deepen the analysis of PPPs from an intersectional feminist perspective embedded in the global South.

This book aims to fill this gap by building on existing analyses through a series of case studies that explore PPP projects in sectors such as health, energy, local market infrastructure, transportation and other large infrastructure.

The case studies undertake a multidimensional analysis of PPPs:

1. They examine the context in which the projects are developed, envisaging how they fit into global financing for development strategies, how they account for geopolitical and economic interests, and how they align (or not) with national discourses on development strategies for the improvement of living conditions.
2. They pay attention to the power relations between the main actors involved in the projects, including multilateral organisations, corporations, national governments, and social and women's organisations.

3. They review existing legal and regulatory frameworks for PPPs.
4. They examine specific projects by locating them in the national path dependency, ongoing processes of privatisation, and governmental and private sector strategies.
5. They analyse the gender and human rights' impact of the implementation and functioning of PPPs.
6. They review the transparency and accountability mechanisms (or the lack thereof) for monitoring PPPs.
7. Finally, they provide an overview of the existing forms of resistance to these processes and to concrete PPP projects.

The book is organised into an introduction chapter, four parts and a concluding chapter. The first part focuses on the narrative, political and economic environment of PPPs in the global South. It includes a chapter on **Kenya** in which Crystal Simeoni and Wangari Kinoti analyse the country's specialised medical equipment leasing scheme to explore broader questions of the neocolonial imposition of private financing models by international finance institutions and other players in the global financial architecture, and the extent to which these impact the social contract between the state and its citizens. The authors examine the central question of priority setting through a series of related inquiries: what informs the decision to spend on one healthcare need *versus* another, what does 'making it' look like, and which stakeholders are involved and consulted in decision-making processes? The chapter argues for greater Pan-African and feminist resistance against prevailing orthodox macroeconomic policies increasingly centred on private finance and calls for an intensification of the connected struggles against neoliberal and neocolonial systemic oppression across the continent.

The second chapter in the first part puts forth the case of **Ethiopia**. Netsanet Gebremichael describes and analyses Ethiopia's engagement with a PPP model of development financing in the context of a political transition from the ideological orientation of a developmental state to market-led liberalisation. The chapter shows how the political understanding of what constitutes the public itself underwent a substantive change as the country transitioned from a public enterprises model, in which the state had a hegemonic role in the economy, to public-private ownership of public assets in the form of PPPs. It focuses on PPPs in Ethiopia's energy sector and examines the shifting political dynamics by looking into the politics of such partnerships, drawing from media narratives, expert opinions and historical analysis.

The second part of the book talks about the normative and institutional labyrinths that accompany PPPs. It includes a case study of **Senegal** in which

Marème Ndoye explores the construction of a toll motorway outside Dakar against the backdrop of the Plan Sénégal Émergent (Emerging Senegal Plan) or PSE which made it possible to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects across the country. As the chapter illustrates, even as Senegal relied on an attractive regulatory and institutional framework to make PPPs a privileged means of financing, the system could not counter the inefficiencies of private actions, respect women's human rights or safeguard the environment. The chapter demonstrates the limits of the PPP model by highlighting the relatively high cost of infrastructure, the loss of human lives and the displacement of people, especially women. It also points to the additional efforts required to reduce the risks and negative impacts associated with PPPs.

The second chapter in this part presents the case of **Peru**, written by Bethsabé Andía Pérez. It analyses the PPP for the Alberto Barton-Callao Hospital and the primary care centre of the healthcare network La Red Asistencial Sabogal de EsSalud (the National Healthcare Insurance). It locates the case within the privatisation processes underway in Peru since the 1990s and looks at the institutional system developed with the advice of international organisations to promote PPPs as the solution to the country's infrastructure deficit. The author argues that this complex project was not adequately negotiated, resulting in vaguely defined services, follow-up mechanisms and modifications. The case thus ably illustrates the lack of transparency, avoidance of social monitoring and the growing risk of corruption associated with PPPs. In particular, it demonstrates how this specific project affected women's access to health and infringed on their labour rights. Finally, it elaborates on trade union and social movements that continue to resist the implementation of PPPs and the privatisation of public services in Peru.

The third and fourth parts of the book focus on the impact of PPPs on women's human rights as well as on the ongoing resistance to them at the regional, state and provincial levels, and at the local and micro levels, respectively.

In the chapter on **Mexico**, Isabel Clavijo Flórez and Julieta Lamberti analyse the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, a megaproject of the Mexican government aimed at the construction of infrastructure and energy projects, including the rehabilitation of the Isthmus Railway, and the construction, maintenance and operation of the Jáltipan Salina Cruz gas pipeline. While the project is supposedly based on a development model that meets social needs, it reproduces relations of domination over the territories in question by prioritising economic growth linked to extractive production. As the chapter illustrates, this type of growth not only generates negative environmental and social impacts, but also accentuates the discrimination, marginalisation and invisibility experienced by women in the region. The author shines a light on the women defenders of the Isthmus who not only resist these projects, but also simultaneously develop their own notion of well-being and propose an agenda that centres their right to health, education, food, water and environmental protection.

The chapter on **India,** authored by Sulakshana Nandi, presents the case of Ayushman Bharat-Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY). Considered the largest PPP initiated by any Indian government to date, the AB-PMJAY was meant to expand (in terms of population and annual amount coverage) an earlier publicly funded health insurance (PFHI) scheme known as the National Health Insurance Scheme. The study assesses the impact of PFHI schemes in general, and the PMJAY in particular, on women in India, with special reference to the state of Chhattisgarh. It reveals the serious implications of such schemes for women's health and access to healthcare, especially those belonging to socio-economically vulnerable sections. Women are forced to incur additional (illegal) out-of-pocket payments when utilising PFHI schemes, especially in the for-profit private sector. Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, the PMJAY failed to provide the requisite financial protections. On the contrary, the scheme has meant that funds that could have been used to improve the public sector, which provides more equitable health services and caters to more women, are diverted to the private sector, which is concentrated in urban centres and engages in unethical practices. Whilst women are most affected by these schemes, they have no formal role in their functioning. However, as in the other case studies, people's health movements and women's collectives have put up resistance against the PMJAY.

In the chapter on **Sierra Leone**, Hussainatu J. Abdullah analyses the case of Addax Bioenergy Sierra Leone Limited (ABSL) to argue that PPPs have failed to promote social development, including women's rights and gender equality. Premised on generating profits from the provision of social services, the PPP model is at odds with the long-term change that social activists advocate, the author suggests. The chapter details how IFIs, led by the WB, shaped Sierra Leone's PPP process, providing technical assistance for the development of a PPP framework. Despite the backing of these development finance institutions, ABSL's operations failed woefully, evident in the casualisation of labour; the suspension of social programmes; violation of the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), and social and environmental standards; inadequate compensation to land leasers and involuntary resettlement of residents. In particular, ABSL reinforced gender-based discrimination at its operational site by refusing to employ women in adequate numbers in its factories and to adopt an employment quota that would guarantee work to women. Other gender-specific losses included the displacement of people, and the loss of access to fertile land, food security and clean water, which collectively increased women's workload.

The chapter on **Ghana**, written by Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey and Sylvia Ohene Marfo, focuses on the construction of lockable shops and open sheds, under a PPP framework, at the Dome Market in the Ga East Municipality in the Greater Accra Region. Their research shows that the projects, which were arbitrarily conceived and implemented by the financiers and the Ga East Municipal Assembly, dispossessed traders and failed to allocate alternate trading spaces. The design and implementation of the PPP exacerbated existing class differences among the traders and reproduced structural inequalities between men and women. The PPP also deepened power struggles in the market leadership structure by weakening the position of the women traders and their collective bargaining platforms. In response, women traders put up strong resistance, employing various strategies such as demonstrations, political threats and complaints. Their protests convinced the state to suspend the PPP and take over the remaining construction work in the market.

The chapter on **Zimbabwe** focuses on the case of the Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals as author Nyasha Masuka argues that the PPPs being implemented in the country's health sector do not actively mainstream gender equality. These PPPs have not been consistently guided by any regulatory framework. When such a framework did exist, the PPP implementation processes did not necessarily abide by it or take into account human rights and/or gender equality. For example, while Zimbabwe exempts pregnant and lactating women from paying user fees when accessing health services, there is no legislation in place to enforce this policy. There have been instances where women have either been denied such care or detained in maternity wards for failure to pay user fees. Women cannot access care in the private wings of public hospitals or buy medicines from the private pharmacies in public hospitals because of prohibitive costs. In line with the other case studies, the lack of transparency and accountability resulted in acts of resistance from healthcare professionals, legislators and denizens in Zimbabwe, ultimately leading to the cancellation of all PPPs in public hospitals.

Finally, in the chapter on **Fiji**, Lice Cokanasiga analyses the first PPP in the country that involved private financing of two public hospitals, undertaken with guidance from an MDB. The contract was for the redevelopment of one public hospital and the construction of a new wing at another. The author depicts this PPP as a controversial venture, so much so that the Fiji Nursing Association (FNA) challenged the government over it. Australian medical firm Aspen Medical, the private entity involved in the PPP, partnered with the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) in order to bid for the contract. The FNPF, a statutory body that manages a compulsory savings scheme for all Fijian employees and offers members the option of lifetime superannuation or pensions upon retirement, risked the pension funds of members to invest in this PPP. No consultations took place either with FNPF members or the people from the city of Lautoka, the town of Ba as well as the rest of the western division who would access health services at the two public hospitals involved in the PPP. No feasibility studies or impact assessments on health, environment or gender are available to recommend the proposed PPP, and Fiji's economy is too small to absorb the associated risks.

The analysis put forth in these chapters is firmly rooted in a Southern intersectional feminist perspective. Each of the ten case studies present strong evidence of the negative consequences of PPPs for women's livelihoods and human rights as well as their impact on other forms of inequality. In documenting these cases, we hope the book will enrich ongoing debates on the role of public and private sectors in financing development. It is also our endeavour, through this book, to contribute to the improvement of regulatory and transparency frameworks and, most crucially, to strengthen the struggle for democratic development and the feminist resistance against global corporate capture.

Notes

1 See 'Public-Private Partnerships: Global Campaign Manifesto', 13 October 2017. Available at: https://www.eurodad.org/ppps-manifesto.

2 'Public-private partnerships are also referred to as private finance initiatives (PFI) in the UK, and as "blended finance" or "blending" by the UN and multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when they also raise financing for the project and add the financing costs to the contractual payments to governments.' (The Equality Trust, 2019: 7).

3 However, the UN insists that '[o]fficial development assistance is still necessary to help the countries most in need, including the least developed countries, to achieve sustainable development'. Available at: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda.

4 The Principles of MDBs' Strategy for Crowding-in Private Sector Finance for Growth and Sustainable Development (henceforth the Hamburg Principles) provide a common framework for multilateral development banks to increase levels of private investment in support of development. The principles include: (1) recognising the primacy of country ownership; (2) creating

an investment-friendly environment; (3) expanding and standardising credit enhancement; (4) prioritising commercial financing; (5) blending concessional resources and private capital; (6) reviewing incentives for crowding-in private sector resources. (World Bank – IMF, 2017, Annex 1).

5 Since 2010, the G20 has worked with development banks in Africa and Asia, in particular, to strengthen existing infrastructure project preparation facilities (PPFs) to fill the 'pipelines' with megaprojects.

6 Similarly, other frameworks are being discussed and accepted, such as the UNECE Guiding Principles for People First PPPs as well as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on PPPs.

7 'Joint Submission to the World Bank on the Draft 2019 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions', 30 April 2019. Available at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/eurodad/pages/614/attachments/original/1594042848/Joint_submission_World_Bank_PPP_guidance.pdf?1594042848.

8 Eurodad (2018) presents a summary of these analyses from various countries across continents.

9 Contingent liabilities can be explicit, which are the most common public guarantees, such as those related to the risk of inflation, exchange rate instability, etc., or implicit, which depend on the expectations by the public or pressure by interest groups and are triggered by cases of underperformance where the public sector ends up bailing out the project (or even worse, bailing out the private sector company) (Romero, 2015).

10 Some of these findings are analysed in Eurodad, FEMNET, G&DN (2019) and DAWN (2015).

References

Adams, B., and J. Martens (2015), *Fit for Whose Purpose? Private Funding and Corporate Influence in the United Nations*, New York: Global Policy Forum.

Alarco Tosoni, G. (2015), *¿Negocio Público o Privado? Ventajas y desventajas de las APPs en América Latina*, Lima: Latindadd. Available at: http://www.latindadd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NEGOCIO-PUBLICO-PRIVADO-VENTAJAS-Y-DESVENTAJAS-DE-LAS-APP-EN-AMERICA-LATINA.pdf (accessed 1 February 2021).

Alexander, N. (2016), *Infrastructure Investment and Public Private Partnerships*, Washington DC: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

Alexander, N. (2018), *The Hijacking of Global Financial Governance?*, Washington DC: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

DAWN (2015), 'Public-Private Partnerships and Gender Justice in the Context of the 3rd UN Conference of Financing for Development'. Available at: https://dawnnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ffd3_Public-Private-Partnerships-and-Gender-Justice.pdf (accessed 1 February 2021).

The Equality Trust (2019), 'Finance Development not Dividends. Challenging the Rise of PPPs'. Available at: https://equalitytrust.org.uk/sites/default/files/finance-development-not-dividends-2019-03-v4.pdf (accessed 1 February 2021).

Eurodad (2018), *History Repeated. The Failures of PPPs*, Brussels: Eurodad.

Eurodad, FEMNET, G&DN (2019), *Can Public-Private Partnerships Deliver Gender Equality?*, Brussels: Eurodad.

Hall, D., Lobina, E., and Terhorst, P. (2013), 'Re-municipalisation in the Early Twenty-first Century: Water in France and Energy in Germany, International', *Review of Applied Economics*, 27 (2): 193–214. Available at: 10.1080/02692171.2012.754844 (accessed 1 February 2021).

IEG-WB (2012), *World Bank Group Support to Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Experience in Client Countries*, Washington DC: World Bank.

People's Working Group on Multistakeholderism (2021), *The Great Takeover: Mapping of Multistakeholderism in Global Governance*, Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute.

Pessino, C. (2016), 'Tratamiento de pasivos contingentes', Presentación en el Seminario *Espacio Fiscal y Proyectos de Inversión. El Rol de las APP*, Lima: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Pingeot, L. (2016), 'In Whose Interest? The UN's Strategic Rapprochement with Business in the Sustainable Development Agenda', *Globalizations*, 15 September. Available at: 10.1080/14747731.2015.1085211 (accessed 1 February 2021).

Romero, M. J. (2014), 'Where Is the Public in PPPs? Analysing the World Bank's Support for Public-Private Partnerships', 29 September. Available at: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2014/09/public-ppps-analysing-world-banks-support-public-private-partnerships (accessed 1 February 2021).

Romero, M. J. (2015), 'What Lies Beneath? A Critical Assessment of PPPs and Their Impact on Sustainable Development', 9 July. Available at: https://www.eurodad.org/what_lies_beneath (accessed 1 February 2021).

Unión Europea (2004), 'Libro verde sobre la colaboración público-privada y el derecho comunitario en materia de contratación pública y concesiones', 30 April. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/94a3f02f-ab6a-47ed-b6b2-7de60830625e/language-es (accessed 1 February 2021).

World Bank – International Monetary Fund (2017), 'Maximizing Finance for Development: Leveraging the Private Sector for Growth and Sustainable Development', 19 September. Available at: https://www.devcommittee.org/sites/dc/files/download/Documentation/DC2017-0009_Maximizing_8-19.pdf (accessed 1 February 2021).