ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIPHERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH-PERFORMING ASIAN ECONOMIES AND LATIN AMERICA (1950-2019)

Juan E. SANTARCANGELO[1]
Noelia ABBATE[2]

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to compare the long-term economic performance of the core countries of High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) and Latin America in order to analyze their strategies, the role of the state in this process, and the evolution of their productive specialization profile under the new international division of labor. This study presents two peculiarities that are rarely found in the literature. First, it offers a long-term perspective from the 1950s until the present day. Second, it covers a broad range of countries, allowing us to obtain more general and representative conclusions.
Keywords: Economic development, Latin America, High-Performing Asian Economies, Political Economy
JEL: O11, O20, O57
El desarrollo económico e industrial de la periferia: una comparación entre las "Economías Asiáticas de Alto Rendimiento" y América Latina (1950-2019)
Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es comparar el desempeño económico de largo plazo de los países centrales de las Economías Asiáticas de Alto Rendimiento (EAAR) y América Latina para analizar sus estrategias, el papel del Estado en este proceso y la evolución de su perfil de especialización productiva bajo la nueva división internacional del trabajo. Este estudio presenta dos peculiaridades poco frecuentes en la literatura. En primer lugar, ofrece una perspectiva de largo plazo, desde la década de 1950 hasta la actualidad. En segundo lugar, abarca un amplio abanico de países, lo que permite obtener conclusiones más generales y representativas.
Palabras clave: Desarrollo económico, Estado, América Latina, Economías Asiáticas de Alto Rendimiento, Economía política.

1. Introduction

Since the 1950s, a group of High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) has managed to set a long-run development model that combines high economic growth rates, industrial transformation, and significant social improvements throughout these years. When analyzing the development path followed by Latin American countries, which until the beginning of the 1970s showed similar performances (and even sometimes better than

[1] Juan E. Santancárgelo, PhD in economics (New School University), Professor and Full-time researcher at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ) and National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) (Argentina), Chair of the graduate program in Economic Development and Director of the Center for Development, Innovation and Political Economy Studies (CEDIEP) at the UNQ, jsantar@gmail.com.
[2] Noelia Abbate, PhD candidate in economics and Researcher at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (Argentina).

countries of HPAE), it becomes apparent that there were, in the last fifty years, recurrent economic, political, and social crises.

To contribute to regional comparative development studies, the aim of this paper is to compare the long-term economic performance of the core countries of High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) and Latin America to analyze their strategies, the role of the state in this process, and the evolution of their productive specialization profile under the new international division of labor.

To this end, we selected the countries of South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia of the High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAE), which exhibited the highest annual growth rates from 1950 to the present, and the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile in Latin America (LAC), which also account for the most industrialized countries and the largest in terms of GDP. This study presents two peculiarities that are rarely found in the literature. First, it offers a long-term perspective from the 1950s until the present day. Second, it covers a broad range of countries, allowing us to obtain more general and representative conclusions.

This paper is organized into four sections. Section two highlights the main characteristics of economic performance in terms of GDP growth, development regime, the role of the manufacturing sector, the evolution of labor productivity, and the country's ability to increase its capital formation. Section three reviews the role of the state in this process through the main development strategies, level of planning, aim of industrial policies, relevance of public resources, and the degree of autonomy. On that basis, in section four we study the relationship of the countries with the rest of the world by analyzing their orientation towards the global economy, the degree of productive knowledge intensity of the economies, and their regional integration. Section five concludes the study.

2. Economic development in the long run

HPAEs and LACs are two regions that have concentrated the most successful cases of economic development in the periphery in the last seventy years, and several studies have tried to underline their particularities and differences. To compare the development paths followed by the main countries of both regions, we divide the period under analysis into four stages: 1950-1975; 1976-2002; 2003-2015; and 2015-2019[3]. On the one hand, the Asian region exhibits a development model mainly based on export-oriented industrialization throughout the period, while Latin American countries present very defined sub-stages: Chile and Mexico abandoned their ISI strategy and then pursued neoliberal regimes, while Argentina and Brazil alternate several phases of industrialization through import substitution and neoliberal schemes.

The first comparison among the countries is presented in Table 1 and Table 2 where some of the main features of the development path are presented for LAC and HPAE countries.

[3] The stages were selected using the case of Argentina as benchmark since it was the most developed and industrialized Latin American country.

Table 1. LAC Development path in the long run, 1950-2019

Country	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Argentina	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	3,7%	1,2%	4,6%	-0,7%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=170	1976=167 -2002=223	2003=243 -2015=394	2016=386 - 2019=378
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=135	1976=130 -2002=121	2003=131 -2015=187	2016=181 - 2019=172
	Growth regime	wage-led	debt-led	wage-led	debt-led
	Development strategy	ISI	Neoliberal	Re-Industrialization and improve std. living	Neoliberal
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	46,43	35,42	26,51	22,30
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	22,51	19,73	16,80	14,58
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1950=100 - 1975=165	1976=165 - 2002=176	2003=176- 2015=231	2016=231- 2019=234
Brazil	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	7,6%	3,0%	3,0%	1,2%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=296	1976=325 -2002=652	2003=659 -2015=948	2016=917 - 2019=951
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=199	1976=214 -2002=262	2003=262 -2015=335	2016=321 - 2019=325
	Growth regime	wage-led	debt-led	wage-led shifting to investment-led	debt-led
	Development strategy	ISI	Neoliberal	Re-Industrialization and improve std. living	Neoliberal
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	32,33	33,18	22,52	18,22
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	21,26	20,25	18,86	15,11
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1950=100 - 1975=289	1976=306- 2002=446	2003=437- 2015=676	2016=671- 2019=677
Chile	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	2,4%	5,1%	4,3%	2,1%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=139	1976=144 -2002=524	2003=545 -2015=901	2016=916 - 2019=975
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=107	1976=109 -2002=272	2003=280 -2015=408	2016=409 - 2019=418
	Growth regime	wage-led	external-led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI	Neoliberal	Neoliberal	Neoliberal
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	39,84	36,07	34,69	29,49
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	15,48	20,44	22,63	21,71
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1950=100 - 1975=153	1976=157- 2002=235	2003=236- 2015=398	2016=404- 2019=401
Mexico	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	6,6%	3,3%	2,3%	1,3%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=261	1976=273 -2002=617	2003=626 -2015=829	2016=853 - 2019=887
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=165	1976=168 -2002=229	2003=229 -2015=257	2016=261 - 2019=263
	Growth regime	wage-led	external-led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI	Neoliberal	Neoliberal	Neoliberal
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	28,66	30,29	32,66	30,41
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	18,20	19,84	21,63	22,38
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1950=100 - 1975=227	1976=229-2002=201	2003=200- 2015=244	2016=245- 2019=247

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC, IMF, and Trading Economics.

Table 2. HPAE Development path in the long run, 1950-2019

Country	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Malaysia	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	7,0%	6,7%	5,2%	5,1%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=275	1976=307 -2002=1.559	2003=1.649 -2015=2.991	2016=3.124 - 2019=3.630
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=185	1976=201 -2002=525	2003=545 -2015=806	2016=830 - 2019=922
	Growth regime	profit-led	profit-led shifting to external led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI	ISI shifting to export oriented	Export oriented industrialization	Export oriented industrialization
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	30,02	41,25	42,88	38,04
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	18,43	30,98	23,14	24,93
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1955=100- 1975=226	1976=244- 2002=462	2003=478- 2015=708	2016=725- 2019=753
South Korea	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	9,7%	8,3%	3,6%	2,6%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=398	1976=450 -2002=3.376	2003=3.475 -2015=5.372	2016=5.529 - 2019=5.968
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=283	1976=315 -2002=1.843	2003=1.891 -2015=2.796	2016=2.867 - 2019=3069
	Growth regime	profit-led	profit-led shifting to external led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI (sine 1970s shifting to export promotion)	Export oriented industrialization	Export oriented industrialization	Export oriented industrialization
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	22,41	33,43	34,01	35,37
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	20,12	32,73	30,41	30,29
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1953=100- 1975=365	1976=377- 2002=1547	2003=1608- 2015=2044	2016=2084- 2019=2123
Indonesia	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	4,9%	5,3%	5,5%	5,1%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=205	1976=219 -2002=811	2003=849 -2015=1.631	2016=1.713 - 2019=1.988
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=137	1976=143 -2002=327	2003=338 -2015=554	2016=575 - 2019=645
	Growth regime	profit-led	external-led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI	ISI shifting to export oriented	Export oriented industrialization	Export oriented industrialization
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	-	40,95	44,56	39,48
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	17,00	24,38	28,14	32,34
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1960=100- 1975=121	1976=123- 2002=206	2003=206- 2015=532	2016=546- 2019=565
Thailand	GDP (annual growth rate average in %)	7,4%	6,4%	4,0%	3,5%
	GDP (constant 2010 million USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=290	1976=317 -2002=1.529	2003=1.638 -2015=2.522	2016=2.607 - 2019=2.892
	GDP per cap (constant USD, 1960=100)	1960=100 - 1975=188	1976=200 -2002=654	2003=695 -2015=1.006	2016=1.036 - 2019=1.139
	Growth regime	profit-led	profit-led shifting to external led	external-led	external-led
	Development strategy	ISI	ISI until 1985 and then export promotion	Export oriented industrialization	Export oriented industrialization
	Industry Value added (in % of GDP, average)	23,77	34,07	38,26	35,33
	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP, average)	19,65	30,06	25,30	23,26
	Labor productivity (1950=100)	1950=100- 1975=262	1976=273- 2002=584	2003=623- 2015=1088	2016=1121- 2019=1193

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC, IMF, and Trading Economics

During the first period, characterized by industrialization by import substitution, Latin America experienced one of the largest expansions of its GDP. The four selected countries have a wage-led growth regime. This allowed them to experience a

considerable increase in their annual growth rate. For example, Argentina had an average increase of 3.7 percent in its GDP and a GDP per capita of 2.1 percent. Brazil's case is even more surprising, with values of 7.6 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively. Mexico's GDP grew by an average of 6.6 percent and its GDP per capita rose by 3.4 percent. In contrast, Chile's development was not as good due to the high polarization of society and politics reflected in the different alternations in power and the difficulties in designing a clear development path, in addition to the irruption of the military coup by the end of this period. This led to an average growth of 2.4 percent on average in Chile´s GDP, and only 0.6 percent in GDP per capita.

The industry value added of the region began to have significant participation in the GDP (Guisan, 2023). Argentina's case is the most noticeable, since the value added by the industrial sector was equivalent to 46.4 percent of its GDP. This was accompanied by an increase in gross fixed capital formation, which represented 22.5 percent of GDP, and a rise in labor productivity of 65 percent. Trade administration policies and tariff barriers were heavily used for the development of the manufacturing sector, which was complemented by the creation of the Industrial Bank at the beginning of the period. The second stage of import substitution was based on the introduction of foreign direct investments to expand the manufacturing sector, mainly in the automobile, metallurgical, chemical, and petrochemical industries.

Brazil experienced a rise in manufactured exports during the Second World War, which fell sharply once it was over. To turn this around, the country planned the development of light industry with protective measures, but the inflationary crisis led to one of the longest military coups in the region (–1964-1985). Between the 1950s and 1973, Chile's economic development path was based on industrialization through import substitution. It was a period of intense debate and ideological battle between parties from the Right, the Center, and the Left. All three alternatives used the hiatus of the personalist presidency of Carlos Ibanez (1952—8) to stake out new firm positions for future electoral combat, which would result in a victory for the right in 1958, for the center in 1964, and for the left in 1970, after which the military would brush aside all democratic competition. The arrival to the Government of the Left, led by Salvador Allende, set out to carry out an important transformation in the Chilean economy. Allende's program promised to nationalize the economy and to implement a massive program of income redistribution. Nonetheless, political tensions grew, as did violence, and the coup d' état that took place in Chile in 1973, led by Pinochet, imposed a dictatorial regime that settled down until 1990.

Finally, Mexico experienced a period of combined growth with low inflation from 1956 to 1970, also known as the golden age of Mexico's modern economic growth (Moreno Brid and Ros, 2009). Those years were signed by the acceleration of the real GDP growth rate, achieving values near 7 percent per year, accompanied by a considerable decrease in the inflation rate up to 3 percent per year. As in the rest of the countries in the region, the development policies during this period were centered on industrialization, and the state was a significant factor. During these years, manufacturing activities expanded at an average annual rate close to 9 percent, which was possible due to the rise in domestic market demand, while labor productivity rose by 127 percent. Moreover, a rapid increase in real wages was observed, followed by the development of the middle class and the

expansion of the formal sector of the economy, which was reflected in a more progressive functional distribution of income.

Despite the virtuous dynamics of the Mexican economy, the establishment of the maquiladora in 1964 had a significant impact on the economy. A maquiladora is a company that allows factories to be largely duty-free and tariff-free, and was established when the Mexican government introduced the *Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza* (Border Industrialization Program). Despite its consolidation can be found only around the first half of the 1970s, the maquila industry seriously affected the industrial development of this country and generated a great dependence on foreign capitals and the US demand, both conditioning facts that stood present all along with Mexico´s economic history until the present-day.

The second period, from the mid-1970s until 2002, began with several military coups that radically changed the previous industrialization model and replaced it with neoliberalism. Brazil suffered a coup that lasted more than twenty years (from 1964 to 1985); Argentina's coup began in 1976 and lasted until 1983, and the military coup in Chile went from 1973 to 1990. The only exception to this pattern was Mexico, which kept maquila as the main strategy of external-led growth, international insertion of the country, and as a tool to modernize the national productive network. In all countries, the state that led the development process abandoned its leading role and became a night watchman of the market laws.

It is important to note that neoliberalism was applied radically in Argentina and Chile, but more gradually in Brazil and Mexico. In Argentina, the military dictatorship not only replaced the development path but also aimed to eradicate the social bases that underpinned the industrial development process. From 1976 to 1978, the working class share on income distribution went from 47 percent to 22 percent and GDP fell to an annual growth rate of 1,2 percent, half of what has been during the ISI period. In Chile, despite the objective of the military coup being centrally to end the socialist government, economic problems and external pressure led the authorities to implement neoliberal policies, which were strongly recommended by Milton Friedman and the Chicago school as of 1975 and last until the present.

Brazil and Mexico have undergone different transformations. Since 1964, Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship that faced some problems and has increased the level of persecution and repression since the mid-1970s, but without drastically modifying the general development model. Thus, the largest country in South America only applied neoliberal policies with a return to democracy under the governments of Itamar Franco and then Collor de Mello. On the other hand, Mexico in the mid-1970s was consolidating, as we saw, a development path centrally based on the maquila, and on resource extraction and agriculture activities.

It is important to point out that all the countries of the region suffered a debt crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, which seriously conditioned their development path, and together with neoliberal policies, ended up generating what is known as the “lost decade” in the region. As a result of the abandonment of the industrialization strategy during these years, the ratio of manufacturing value to GDP fell by almost ten percentage points (35.4 percent of GDP) on average, as well as a 13 percent decline in the evolution of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Argentina. In Chile, the industry value-added to

GDP ratio fell to 36.0 percent of the GDP, while the share of GFCF to GDP remained almost unchanged. Brazil´s industry value-added remained almost the same, given the industrial plans that took place during this period and the considerable domestic market. Meanwhile, in Mexico, the industrial value increased slightly, reaching 30.2 percent of the GDP as well as the pattern of investment, where the GFCF-to-GDP ratio exhibited a slightly upward trend under the deepening of maquila in the country.

Finally, when analyzing labor productivity, three situations can be mentioned: first, labor productivity in Argentina remained almost the same, with a slight increase of 7 percent; second, in Mexico, the variable fell by 12 percent; and last, in Brazil and Chile, labor productivity grew by significant amounts of 46 percent and 50%, respectively, but in both countries, the increase was lower than the one registered during ISI. In the four cases, the performance of this variable during this stage was worse than that observed in the previous period, which shows some of the consequences for these countries of changing the role of manufacturing as the axis of accumulation.

Because of the application of neoliberal policies, the beginning of the 21st century has seen several countries facing significant economic, political, and social crises. The most severe crisis was experienced in Argentina, which had five presidents in two weeks, and in Brazil, which in the last years of Cardoso's mandate yielded the assistance and pressures of the IMF and deepened the application of structural adjustment plans.

As a result of the crisis, in the two largest countries in the region, new governments were elected, and the economic policies applied aimed to rebuild the industrial core. This gave rise to our third stage of analysis, from to 2003-2015, where the political shift came in Argentina and Brazil under Kirchner-Fernández de Kirchner and Lula da Silva-Rouseff's administrations, respectively. Both governments abandoned neoliberalism and regained their role in improving the standards of living. However, these new neo-developmental policies did not simply replace their orthodox rivals but were juxtaposed with them, which led to an economic system in which policies and institutions with different objectives coexisted.

As far as Argentina is concerned, after the collapse of the convertibility regime, a wage-led growth regime took place that reached a GDP annual average growth rate of 5.4 percent (3.5 percent of GDP per capita), focusing on employment generation and the promotion of the manufacturing sector. Consequently, for the first time since the ISI period, the country showed annual growth rates higher than the average of the economy. On the other hand, during Lula's first presidency and after a period in which economic policies showed more continuities than differences, a new developmentalism model was imposed, achieving low inflation and high GDP growth rates. The administration began from a wage-led regime and then lifted to an investment-led regime with a clear administration's aim to deepen the production model of new-developmentalism. The government also expanded its social programs and promoted the formalization of employment, which protected millions of workers at the same time as it raised the intake of taxes and social security contributions (Saad Filho, 2019, 9). As a result, Brazil´s GDP annual average growth rate grew up to 3.1 percent, while the GFCF ratio fell on average by 2 percent given the higher relative growth of GDP in relation to the growth of GFCF (60 percent and 43 percent respectively).

Chile and Mexico have not experienced major transformations in their external-led growth and development strategies. In the former, the economic performance of the government was solid, with growth rates and a fiscal surplus, mostly due to the extremely high international price of copper (Solimano, 2017). The external-led growth regime of Chile led to a slightly lower rise in the GDP´s annual growth rate, which was 4.3 percent on average during this period. Moreover, even though the industry value added (34.69 percent) remained lower in the previous period, the GFCF to GDP ratio became higher (22.63 percent), given the greater relative growth of GFCF in relation to the growth of GDP (140 percent and 65 percent, respectively). Mexico followed a similar path, and its development strategy remained neoliberal until the arrival of the presidency of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in December 2018. In terms of growth performance, a decline in GDP´s annual average growth rate was registered (2.3 percent), while the average industry value added (32.66 percent) and the GFCF-to-GDP ratio (21.63 percent) increased compared to the values of the previous period.

Finally, during the period 2016-2019 and under the administrations of Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, and Sebastian Piñera in Chile; a drastic political and economic transformation was registered, and neoliberalism returned to power. In Argentina and Brazil, the development strategy abandoned re-industrialization and followed a debt-led growth regime (Argentina incurred the biggest debt of its entire history with the IMF), while in Mexico and Chile, neoliberalism was deepened by external-led growth based on maquila and copper exports, respectively.

As a result, the average GDPs' annual growth rate for this period was lower than that registered in the former period by all countries. As expected, neoliberal policies especially affected the manufacturing sector, and the industry value-added and GFCF to GDP ratios declined in the previous period. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico exhibited a drop in the share of manufacturing in value-added of 4.2 percent, 4.3 percent, 5.2 percent, and 2.2 percent respectively, while the drop in GFCF was 2.2 percent, 3.7 percent, and 0.9 percent for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, respectively; Mexico showed an upward average trend of 0,7 percent explained by a decline of GFCF for the period of almost 6 percent. Finally, in the context of all countries ruled by financial hegemony, labor productivity showed no significant changes.

A different pattern of development can be observed when studying selected HPAEs: South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. As we can see in Table 2, their economies experienced a radical transformation in their economic structures during the first period, with the most prominent element being the growth of the industry based on the government's plan and the economic policies applied towards industrial promotion (Amsden, 1994, 2001; Lin, 1988; Dietz, 1992). Regarding the first period under analysis (1950-1975), we found that the four selected HPAEs registered a shift in their economies. After World War II, and in line with their post-independence period, these countries acquired a great amount of experience in the production of primary goods such as foodstuffs and textiles in South Korea; rubber and tin in Malaysia; crude petroleum in Indonesia; and milled rice, maize, flour, and tin in Thailand. The accumulated knowledge in the production of these primary and light consumer goods helped these

countries move into medium-technology and later high-technology sectors (Amsden, 2001).

In the case of South Korea, the military coup of 1961 under the rule of General Park drew up successive five-year economic plans to promote industrialization and nationalized banks to have state control over credit. The industrialization process was built based on learning (Amsden, 1989), and the aim was to move from labor to capital-intensive industries and to construct an economy with the sufficient technological capability to permit a reasonable living standard without a chronic balance of payments deficit (Chang, 1993, 138). Their strategy consisted of first focusing on the textile and footwear sectors, gradually moving their manufacturing production into steel, heavy equipment, ships, and petrochemicals in the 1970s, and finally into electronics and automobiles in the 1980s. These processes were signed by a great presence of the state, through the development of five-year economic plans that allowed incredible industrial expansion and exports, the attraction of foreign direct investment, and the creation of centers to promote research and technological innovation, which also led to a sharp rise in wages.

Indonesia's development resulted from a long transformation that took place after its independence in 1949. Although military conflicts marked the first years, by 1967, the Indonesian Government had facilitated the introduction of foreign direct investments, capital account liberalization, and the unification of the exchange rate of the rupiah (Hill, 2000). These first attempts were short-lived, and by the 1970s, Indonesia had shifted to import substitution and a more inward-looking development strategy. This was supported by the increase in the international oil price, which provided economic resources, mainly through its state oil company, Pertamina, to afford various government-led economic projects.

Regarding Thailand's experience, industrial development was the result of successful government intervention in setting local content requirements and high cross-border protection. From 1960 until the mid-1980s, the government promoted an import-substitution strategy, with a high-level tariff structure in favor of those producing goods for the domestic market combined with prudent public investment in infrastructure. The country successfully transformed itself from an agrarian economy heavily dependent on rice and land-intensive production to an export-led economy that combined agriculture, agroindustry, manufacturing, and services (Doner, 2009, 26). Moreover, one of the main pillars of the country's progress was the great expansion in education and the installation of a very competent technocracy along with the Board of Investment (BOI) specialized in the development of industrial sectors (Santarcángelo, Schteingart y Porta, 2017).

Finally, despite Malaysia’s high dependence on its primary exports at the beginning, it managed to consolidate high growth rates, which allowed it to transform its productive structure considerably. Import-substituting industrialization was promoted in the country from the late 1950s, attracting foreign (mainly British) capital-intensive industries; however, it only took off in the early 1970s with the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Jomo, 1993, 2). The new government has designed a series of economic diversification strategies, including the promotion and development of the palm oil industry, petroleum and gas, and export-oriented manufacturing (Cassey, 2019).

The target of all the experiences analyzed in HPAEs was the development of light industry until the 1970s, where the efforts made were combined with protectionist measures, the promotion of R&D activities, and technical support programs. After this, the development of heavy industry and capital goods was achieved gradually, and in all cases, during the end of this stage, all countries achieved going from labor to more capital-intensive industries. As shown in Table 1, the annual average GDP growth rate is impressive, ranging from 9.7 percent, 7.4 percent, 7.0 percent, and 4.9 percent in South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, respectively. This was accompanied by a significant rise in the Industry Value added to GDP ratio that ended up with values of 30 percent, 22.4 percent, 23.7 percent, and 9.0 percent in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, respectively, and with a gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP between 17 and 20 percent.

The performance of HPAEs is impressive in terms of economic growth and shows two central differences from the case of LA countries. First, the weight of the industrial sector in generating added value in the economy is considerably less in Asia, where the countries have an average of 25 percent of GDP, while in LA, the weight is close to 37 percent. Second, despite this, the growth of labor productivity is much higher in the HPAEs, which averaged almost 193 percent in the period, while in LA, the growth was slightly higher than half this value. The region also experienced an increase in labor productivity due to higher-skilled workers and the technological innovation promoted by the governments and their greater presence. The highest productivity from this period in HPAEs and LACs was experienced by South Korea and Brazil, with expansions of 265 percent and 189 percent respectively.

During the period 1976-2002 the selected HPAEs deepened their industrial strategies in sharp contrast to the LA situation. Ruling by military governments in South Korea during the 1970s and the 1980s transformed its manufacturing production from textile and footwear goods to steel, heavy equipment, ships, petrochemicals (during the 1970s), and electronics and automobiles (in the 1980s). In this period, Malaysia began to imitate the four Asian Tiger economies and committed itself to a transition from being reliant on mining and agriculture to an economy that depended more on manufacturing, which was accomplished at the beginning of the 1980s. Similarly, Indonesia pursued the development of heavy industries through import substitution and a more inward-looking development strategy. Finally, from the 1970s to 1984, Thailand suffered from many economic problems, including decreasing US investments, budget deficits, oil price spikes, and inflation (Kohpaiboon & Jongwanich, 2019). As a result, the government implemented changes in its industrialization strategy, undertook a few currency devaluations in the mid-1980s, and relied heavily on foreign investors (especially Japan). The result was explosive growth in manufacturing exports, going from 11,1 percent in the first half of the 1980s to 40,5 percent in the second half of that decade. This was also possible due to the application of various exemption schemes designed by local authorities to establish the country as an export platform for multinationals.

The industrial development process of the HPAEs was very significant, but the rise of neoliberalism affected their development path, and the region went into crisis in 1997 (Jomo, 2005). The crisis began in Thailand, and as it spread, most Southeast Asia and Japan saw slumping currencies, devalued stock markets and asset prices, and a

precipitous rise in private debt (Doner 2009). Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand were the countries most affected by the crisis, which led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies of the three countries that were more affected. The support of the IMF was conditional (as usual) on a series of economic reforms that worsened the crisis and led to political upheaval, most notably culminating in President Suharto's resignations in Indonesia and Prime Minister Yongchaiyudh in Thailand. The solution again came from state intervention, regulation, and fiscal stimulus, and since the crisis, the economies have worked toward financial stability and better financial supervision.

The industrial expansion after the crisis explains the presence of remarkable growth rates in three out of four of the selected Asian GDPs, but lower than in the previous period under analysis. The GDP´s annual growth rates of these countries were 6.7 percent, 8.3 percent, 6.4 percent, and 5.3 percent in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, respectively. Despite the deceleration of the GDP´s annual growth rate, when analyzing the GDP in constant 2010 million USD, the rise in the variable during the period was significant:408 percent, 650 percent, 382 percent, and 270 percent in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, respectively. The industry value-added and gross fixed capital formation-to-GDP ratios grew in all countries, with higher values than in the previous period. It is important to note that, despite the crisis, a huge transformation and difference between regions were consolidated during this period. While AL abandoned its industrial project and replaced it with the rule of financial capital, HPAEs countries consolidated and deepened it.

The third period of analysis (2003-2015) was marked by the consequences of the 1997 financial crisis. Restrictions on credit, the notorious contraction of foreign direct investment, and the fall of the financial market affected the financing of the manufactured sector (Jomo, 2005). As a result, the growth rate of HPAE GDP slowed down, and the annual average growth rates during this period were 5.2 percent, 3.6 percent, 4.0 percent, and 5.5 percent in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, respectively. The first three countries show a clear decrease in their annual average growth rates, while Indonesia maintained a stable rhythm. In addition, the increase that the four countries registered in their GDPs measured in constant 2010 million USD is considerably lower than that shown in the previous period.

The recovery of the economies of HPAEs was characterized by the strong performance of export-oriented firms with higher investments in R&D and stimulus policies applied by governments in the form of programs and subsidies directed at promoting specific industrial sectors. This led the industrial value-added to GDP ratio to stay slightly higher on average than in the former period, while the gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio remained lower than that registered during the previous period (except for the case of Indonesia, which exhibited an increase in its average share of almost 4 percent). Even though there are performance differences regarding the previous period, in general terms, there is a decline in the GFCF-to-GDOP ratio that began in the mid-1990s in Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, and in the 2000s in Indonesia (Intal & Chen, 2017).

In all cases, labor productivity has grown in recent years. However, regarding Malaysia (48 percent), Thailand (75 percent), and South Korea (27 percent), the increase in this variable was considerably less than the growth it registered during the second period.

Only Indonesia (158 percent) exhibited progress that represented more than double the values of the previous period, which was explained mainly by Indonesia's later start in the development path and its greater participation in the international production network (IPN), which created opportunities for the domestic industry to upgrade its performance and reach higher stages of production (Intal & Chen, 2017).

Finally, in the last period (2016-2019) the development strategy continued to be external-led and the development strategy was export-oriented industrialization. There are no significant changes in the average annual growth rates, except for South Korea, which reduces its rate by almost 28%, and there is a fall in the industry-value-added to GDP ratio in most of the selected countries. Finally, the GFCF to GDP ratio remained stable and grew slightly in Malaysia and Indonesia, while labor productivity grew slightly in all the countries analyzed.

3. Strategies and role of the state

In Table 3 we present a set of variables that can be grouped around three axes and show the role the state played in each country during the development process for LAC. The first axis corresponds to the global role of the state, its planning capacity, and its relative autonomy. Two clear stages can be identified: the first one goes from 1950 until the mid-1970s, during which the states of all countries played an extremely active role in driving ISI with high degrees of autonomy in their decision-making and significant levels of planning, especially in Argentina and Brazil. While the former developed successive five-year plans during the rise of Peronism (Basualdo, 2010), Brazil designed a series of five-year plans (Plan de Metas -1956-1961, and two other five-year plans between 1968 and 1979) that led to the economy experiencing what is known as the Economic Miracle, recognized for the great push that manufacturing, especially heavy industry, registered in the period.

Table 3- LAC Strategies and role of the state, 1950-2019

Country	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Argentina	Global role of the State	Active-driving ISI	liberal- minimal	Active	liberal- minimal
	Planning	Five-year plan towards general plan	None	from mid 2000s Objectives and goals	None
	Autonomy	High	Low	Medium	Low
	Aim of industrial policy	Light industry and since 1958 heavy industy	Mainly towards static advantages	Mainly towards dynamic adv'ges	Mainly towards static advantages
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Mainly horizontal	Mixed, increasingly vertical	Mainly horizontal
	Public credit importance	High	Low	Low, increasing to Medium	Low
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	0,61	0,42	0,56	0,52
Brazil	Global role of the State	Active-driving ISI	liberal- minimal	Active	liberal- minimal
	Planning	Five-year plans (Plan Metas 1956-61 and other plans under dictatorship)	General plan and since 80s neoliberalism	PITCE-PDP-PBM	PBM and since 2016 neoliberalism
	Autonomy	High	Low	Medium	Low
	Aim of industrial policy	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	static and dinamic advantages	static and dinamic advantages	static and dinamic advantages
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Mainly horizontal	Mixed, increasingly vertical	Mainly horizontal
	Public credit importance	High (BNDES, 1952)	High (BNDES)	High (BNDES)	High (BNDES)
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	0,45	1,04	1,12	1,26
Chile	Global role of the State	Active	liberal- minimal	liberal- minimal	liberal- minimal
	Planning	General Plan	None	CNIC-ARDP	CNIC-ARDP
	Autonomy	High	Low	Low	Low
	Aim of industrial policy	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards static advg.	Mainly towards static advg.	Mainly towards static advg.
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Mainly horizontal, vertical niches	Mainly horizontal, vertical niches	Mainly horizontal, vertical niches
	Public credit importance	High	Low	Low	Low
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	0,53	0,28	0,36	0,36
Mexico	Global role of the State	Active-driving ISI	liberal- minimal	liberal- minimal	liberal- minimal
	Planning	Sectoral Programs	Only objectives	Only objectives	Only objectives
	Autonomy	High	Low	Low	Low
	Aim of industrial policy	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards static advantages	Mainly towards static advantages	Mainly towards static advantages
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Mainly horizontal	Mainly horizontal	Mainly horizontal
	Public credit importance	High	Low	Low	Low
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	0,44	0,31	0,46	0,49

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC and IMF.

The second stage began with the dictatorships that changed the pattern of development and implied a reduction in states' participation in the economy in line with the dogmas of neoliberalism. Due to this withdrawal by the state, Latin American countries lost autonomy and experienced a reduction of their control and monitoring functions of the economy in pursuit of market designs. Moreover, all Latin American countries analyzed reduced their level of economic planning, which was only slightly maintained in two cases.

In Brazil, it was maintained until the arrival of neoliberalism in the mid-1980s, and in Mexico, planning was transformed to only set up general objectives. This logic of state functioning in the economy was consolidated, extended, and deepened throughout the period under analysis in the cases of Chile and Mexico. However, it was only altered in the case of Argentina and Brazil during the third subperiod (2003-2015) under the PT and Kirchner's administrations.

During these years, the state once again had an active role, regained degrees of autonomy, and fundamentally returned to lead the development path of both countries by applying different medium-term development programs. ("Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020", "Plan Argentina Innovadora" in Argentina; and the "Política Industrial, Tecnológica y de Comercio Exterior" (PITCE), the "Política de Desarrollo Productivo" (PDP) and the "Plan Brazil Maior" in Brazil).

The second axis of analysis provided by Table 3 is linked to the aims of industrial policy and the type of intervention that each country implemented. As we observe, the central objectives and the type of intervention of industrial policy have been changing in line with the development path. It gained importance during the stages of industrialization and lost relevance when neoliberalism became the dominant policy. Thus, from 1950 until 1975, all Latin American countries had a strong intervention in the sector using vertical policies specifically designed to promote the development of sectors linked to light industry and the production of consumer goods. After the 1960s, the countries pursued the development of heavy industrialization. During this stage, the goal of the industrial policy was to stimulate the dynamic advantages of industrial development to promote a complex manufacturing sector and not only sectors with certain natural advantages.

The situation changed drastically with the spread of military coups in the region, transforming industrial policy into more horizontal policies where almost all manufacturing sectors were treated equally, and static advantages were promoted. There are two exceptions to this tendency. The first one is Chile, which despite continuing with a neoliberal policy from the mid-1970s to the present, the dominant horizontal industrial policy has been combined with the establishment of export niches where vertical policy (especially linked to copper production) has been extremely significant. The second exception to this general trend is Argentina and Brazil, but only during the third sub-period (2003-2015), where re-industrialization attempts were combined with stimulus policies to promote sectors with static and dynamic advantages, as well as the growing application of mixed policies that were becoming increasingly vertical (Santarcángelo, Schteingart y Porta, 2017).

Finally, the last axis refers to the relevance that the state had in the development process, which will be approximated by two variables: the public credit importance and R&D expenditures to GDP ratio. As we can see from the Table, two stages are distinguished concerning these variables. The first one corresponds to the ISI period where public credit in all the countries of the region was significant and data on investment in R&D activities is similar in all countries (close to an annual average of 0.50 percent of GDP, with extremes at 0.61 percent and 0.44 percent in Argentina and Mexico respectively). However, the abandonment of the development model based on ISI reduced the importance of public credit in all Latin American countries except for Brazil; despite the changes in the general orientation of the development process, kept the National Development Bank (BNDES) played a significant role as a stimulator of development.

A very different picture appears when we study what happened to the HPAEs during the same period (Table 4).

Table 4- HPAE Strategies and role of the state, 1950-2019

Country	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Malaysia	Global role of the State	Active	Active	Active	Active
	Planning	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan
	Autonomy	Medium-Low (1957-69)	High	High	High
	Aim of industrial policy	static and dinamic advantages	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Horizontal	Vertical	Vertical	Vertical
	Public credit importance	Medium	High	High	High
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	ND	0,43	0,97	1,44
South Korea	Global role of the State	Active	Active	Active	Active
	Planning	Five Year Plan (since 1961)	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan & National Strategy for Green Growth (2009-50)	Five Year Plan & National Strategy for Green Growth (2009-50)
	Autonomy	High, efficient system of benefits and penalties at firm level	High, efficient system of benefits and penalties at firm level	High, efficient system of benefits and penalties at firm level	High, efficient system of benefits and penalties at firm level
	Aim of industrial policy	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Vertical	Vertical	Vertical
	Public credit importance	High	High	High	High
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	ND	2,23	3,36	4,39
Indonesia	Global role of the State	Active	Active	Active	Active
	Planning	Since 1967 New Order Period	New Order Period (1967-1998)	Master Plan 2011-2025	Master Plan 2011-2025
	Autonomy	High	High	High	High
	Aim of industrial policy	static and dinamic advantages	static and dinamic advantages	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Horizontal	Mixed	Mixed, increasingly vertical	Mixed, increasingly vertical
	Public credit importance	High	High	High	High
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	ND	0,06	0,08	0,25
Thailand	Global role of the State	Active	Active	Active	Active
	Planning	Six Year Plan (61-66) & Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan	Five Year Plan
	Autonomy	High, Authoritarian rule (1958-1973)	High	High	High
	Aim of industrial policy	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.	Mainly towards dinamic advg.
	Industrial policy (Horizontal, Vertical, Mixed)	Vertical	Vertical (sector development and promotion zones)	Vertical	Vertical
	Public credit importance	High (NEC, NESDC)	High (NESDC)	High (NESDC)	High (NESDC)
	R&D expenditures (as % of GDP)	ND	0,20	0,32	0,89

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC and IMF.

First, we can observe that in all cases, the state has played an active role throughout the nearly seventy years of analysis. A very high level of planning was expressed in five-year plans that were articulated with longer-term plans, such as in the cases of South Korea (with the National Strategy for green growth), or Indonesia (the New Order Period and the Master Plan). It is important to note that the continuity of the global policies applied throughout the period accounts for a process of consolidation but more importantly, the deepening of the economic policies applied, which were given not only by the resources and involvement of the states but also by the increasing complexity of the sectors that were targeted. Regarding the degree of autonomy of the states, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia exhibited strong autonomy to operate throughout the entire period, which was accompanied by efficient regimes of awards and punishments (even though South Korea and Thailand had authoritarian regimes during the first

period). While the case of Malaysia showed a low degree of autonomy during the first period because of structural deficiencies resulting from the legacy of British colonial policies which discourage local industries and confined manufacturing to processing raw materials (Jomo and Edwards, 1993; Tan, 2014); its export-oriented industrialization consolidated a state with strong autonomy, and the path ended up being similar to the rest of the countries in the region.

The strong presence of the state can also be seen in its policy towards the manufacturing sector. As we can observe in Table 4, three cases can be identified. The first one refers to the cases of South Korea and Thailand where the industrial policy was essentially vertical and used to stimulate specific sectors with dynamic comparative advantages. In South Korea industrialization was led during the take-off by military governments and can be characterized by a close pattern of cooperation between the state and large family-owned conglomerates known as chaebŏls (Seth, 2020, 1); while in Thailand, the system of tariffs and business taxes favored vertical integration, not local supplier development (Doner, 2009). The second example is given by Malaysia which began with horizontal policies that stimulated sectors with both static and dynamic advantages and since the mid-1970s implemented a stimulus policy that was similar to that of South Korea and Thailand. Finally, the last case is Indonesia, which shows a much slower and more progressive transformation in its industrial policy from horizontal to mixed policies, and then increasingly towards vertical policies, with the continuous stimulation of sectors with static and dynamic advantages. This transformation from horizontal to vertical policies was made during the oil boom period (1974-1981) when liberal economic policies were largely replaced by more interventionist policies (Wie, 2006, 342).

Finally, regarding the role of the State as a promoter of economic development through public credit as well as the ratio between R&D expenditures in relation to GDP, we can see that most SEA countries under analysis have had an important role to play as a provider of public resources which were articulated by different state agencies (the National Economic Board in Thailand, the Economic Planning Board created by general Park in South Korea and the National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and the regional planning boards (the Bappeda) in Indonesia). The only exception is Malaysia during the first sub-period where the role of the state was the only medium that was related to the legacies of British colonial policies previously mentioned.

Finally, regarding the evolution of R&D expenditures to GDP ratio, we can observe that all countries showed a growing trend over time but with significant differences in the amounts allocated to R&D activities. On one extreme, we have the case of South Korea, which in the last period reached an average ratio of 4.39 percent establishing itself as one of the countries with the highest ratio in the world. This was the result of a systematic policy of the state which created several centers to promote research and the dissemination of technical knowledge to business enterprises such as the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). On the other extreme, we had Indonesia, which allocated very few resources to these activities (even lower than Latin American countries); and the twelve national R&D laboratories and several regional laboratories of the Department of Industry are primarily engaged in training and product testing and certification rather than in R&D and have little or no linkages with industry (Lall 1998, pp. 153-54).

4. External sector and regional integration

To study the role played by the external sector and regional integration in economic development, Table 5 and Table 6 show the evolution of the foreign sector of each region and its integration in the world. As we can see, the evolution of LACs and HPAEs is remarkably different even though we can find similar paths during the first period of analysis. Beginning with LACs during the period 1950-1976 (Table 5), the governments of these nations embodied a great intervention and presence depicted in policies oriented to substitute imports through an increase in manufactured production mainly destined to satisfy the domestic market. Even though there has been noticeable development in light and heavy industries since the 1960s, the exports of Latin American countries were mostly primary products. Therefore, the principal exports of the selected countries in these years were bovine meat, wheat, and maize in Argentina; coffee, iron ore, and raw cotton in Brazil; copper and iron ore in Chile; and coffee and raw cotton in Mexico.

Despite products being included within the machinery and equipment category with increasing participation in exports, they were far from being among the principal exports. Considering this evidence, we find that Latin American economies are highly dependent on commodities and their volatile prices, a factor that will be decisive in their growth path since industrial expansion periods have been traditionally limited by an external restriction due to the strong demand for imports by local manufacturing production (Basualdo, 2010). In addition, when analyzing the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) gap with the US, which provides a measure of the relative productive knowledge intensity of the economies about a benchmark economy (the US), we find that LACs exhibited a greater distance from the US (on average, 18.5 percent).

Table 5- LAC External sector and regional integration, 1950-2019

Conutry	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Argentina	Exchange rate regime	Cycles of depreciation	Appreciated in 1990s	Depreciated and appreciating	Appreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Unfavourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Maize (14%), Bovine meat (14%), Wheat and meslin unmilled (10%)	Oilcake (9%), Crude Petroleum (6%), Maize (5%), Soy Beans (5%)	Oilcake (14%), Soy Beans (6%), Soy Beans Oil (6%)	Oilcake (17%), Mize (7%), Soy Beans Oil (6%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	79,6	56,6	50,4	47,2
	Orientation to international economy	Mainly internal	Shifting to external led	Shifting to internal led	External led
	Regional Integration	Low, especially with Brazil	Low and from 1991 Mercosur	Mercosur/Unasur	Dismantling Mercosur
Brazil	Exchange rate regime	Cycles of depreciation	Depreciated and appreciating	Depreciated and appreciating	Depreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Coffee (26%), Iron ore and concent. (12%), Soy Beans (6%)	Coffee (7%), Oilcake (6%), Iron Ore (5%)	Iron Ore (10%), Soy beans (8%), Crude Petroleum (7%)	Soy beans (13%), Crude Petroleum (9%), Iron Ore (8%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	76,5	87,2	88,4	88,6
	Orientation to international economy	Mainly internal	Mainly internal shifting to external	Shifting to internal led	External led
	Regional Integration	Low, especially with Arg.	Low and from 1991 Mercosur	Mercosur/Unasur	Dismantling Mercosur
Chile	Exchange rate regime	Cycles of depreciation and depreciation	Depreciated	Appreciated and then stable	Depreciated in 2015 and then slight apreciation
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Cooper (69%), Iron ore (10%)	Cooper (39%), Grapes and Raisins (5%)	Cooper (52%), Chemical Wood Pulp of Soda or Sulphate (4%)	Cooper (49%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	82,5	81,3	82,9	82,8
	Orientation to international economy	Internal	External led	External led	External led
	Regional Integration	Mainly internal	FTA, (Can, US, Ctral. Am) Mercosur (Ass.since 1996)	FTA, (Can, US, Ctral. Am, EU, Asia) Mercosur (Ass.since 1996)	FTA, (Can, US, Ctral. Am, EU, Asia) Mercosur (Ass.since 1996)
Mexico	Exchange rate regime		Cycles of appreciation and depreciation	Depreciated	Depreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Raw cotton (12%), Coffee (7%), Silver (5%)	Crude Petroleum (18%), Cars (10%), Electric Wires (5%)	Crude Petroleum (14%), Cars (9%), Color TVs (7%)	Cars (12%), Vehicles Parts and Accessories (8%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	85,3	90,6	95,4	93,6
	Orientation to international economy	Mainly internal	External led	External led	External led
	Regional Integration		NAFTA	NAFTA	NAFTA

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC, IMF, and Atlas of Economic Complexity.

Moreover, during this period, LACs countries followed the Bretton Woods rules, which established that countries had to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US dollar (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). From 1954 to 1976, Mexico had a fixed-exchange-rate regime, where 1 dollar was equal to 12.5 pesos which from that year became a managed floating rate. Chile also had a fixed-exchange-rate regimen at the beginning of the sixties, which had an appreciation of 12 percent from 1960 to 1962; later, in 1965, it was the first country to adopt a crawling peg system (Williamson, 1981). Inflation during the 1970s generated a real appreciation that caused the policy response to be devaluation and, by 1973, Chile had six official exchange rates (De Gregorio, 1999). Brazil also denoted a regime of a fixed exchange rate, which was then continued by a crawling peg system that lasted the entire inflation period (Bonomo, 1999). Finally, Argentina registered a series of devaluations characteristic of the "stop and go" cycles that the country experienced during its whole history (Wainer, 2017). During this period, there is a deterioration in terms of trade, leading these economies to increase their exports of primary goods to obtain the same amount of manufactured goods.

During the second period (1976-2002) and under the rule of military coups or governments aligned to neoliberal policies, industrialization was interrupted, and the financial sector began to rule. In line with this goal, state intervention disappeared, and promotion programs were replaced by free-market rules and the emergence of free trade agreements. One of the variables most affected by the liberalization and openness of the economy was the exchange rate of these countries, which had alterations going from appreciation cycles to depreciated ones, ending up being very harmful to industrial development. Consequently, economic dependence on primary exports not only stood but also deepened in Latin American nations. Meanwhile, the participation of high-tech exports, which are goods for export with high R&D intensity expressed as a percentage of manufactured exports, had the following distribution:31 percent in Argentina, 42 percent in Brazil, and 13 percent in Chile. Finally, Mexico's high-tech exports represented 72 percent of total exports, mainly explained by the maquila industry, through which the US used Mexican installations to produce and export industrial goods from there to the American country at a much lower cost.

Regional integration and the relationship between Brazil and Argentina increased with the establishment of Mercosur, a regional agreement founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Chile had a different regional integration and privileged the establishment of different FTAs with Canada, the US, and Central America, and entered Mercosur as an Associated State in 1996. Mexico signed NAFTA in 1992, a free trade agreement with Canada and the US, which deepened its dependence on Mexico on these countries´ demands and aimed for the total elimination of customs barriers between the three North American countries. In addition, terms of trade were unfavorable to all countries, and when analyzing the ECI gap, we found that LACs during this period reduced their distance from the US to 14.5 percent, mainly due to the performance of Brazil and Mexico.

During the third period (2003-2015), Chile and Mexico remained on their neoliberal path, while Argentina and Brazil returned to center-left governments and re-industrialization. Despite the achievement of some significant results, the international insertion of countries was not significantly modified. The path followed by LACs was

underpinned by global economic prosperity (especially in China) and the beginnings of the so-called commodity super-cycle, where terms of trade of primary goods were significantly improved. As a result, the main exports of the country were oilcake, petroleum, maize, and soybeans in Argentina; iron ore, soybeans, and crude petroleum in Brazil; copper, chemical wood pulp in Chile; and crude petroleum, vehicles, and auto parts in Mexico. The specialization profile of each country in the region was agricultural and resource-based goods. The only exceptions were the presence of vehicles and auto parts among the greatest exports of Argentina and Brazil (explained by the enormous degree of integration that the automotive industry had in these two countries) and Mexico´s exports, which are determined by the country´s trade relationship with the US, as already mentioned.

Regarding the complexity of Latin American economies, we find a diminishment of the gap between the ECI of the four selected countries and that of the US. During this period, the ECI gaps in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were 84.9, 88.4, 82.9, and 95.4, respectively. The improvement in Argentina and Brazil can be explained by the industrial promotion observed in these countries. The evolution of the ECI in Chile shows values similar to those registered before the military coup (1973-1990); and Mexico´s ECI gap can be explained by the evolution of exports linked exclusively to US demand and the maquila industry and not to an autonomous improvement in the type of external insertion of the country (Moreno Brid and Ros, 2009).

In line with the greater openness of the economies, the period exhibited several transformations in international integration worth mentioning. First, in 2005 there was a historic confrontation between governments that defended the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas, aka ALCA) - led by United States President George Bush - and those who opposed it - led by Presidents Lula da Silva, Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela respectively - which resulted in the definitive paralysis of the FTAA. This dispute showed the desire of the countries of the region to seek a new development path not dependent on or subordinate to the US, and the ability to negotiate with a more powerful country and impose their will. Second, the UNASUR (a South American integration organization) was created by the union of twelve independent states of South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela) in 2008, aiming to build a regional structure capable of aiding in times of need and allow countries to discuss and define common and complementary development strategies. Despite this, Chile deepened its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) policy by adding several FTA to the European Union, the US, and South Korea. Finally, in Mexico, NAFTA remained and continued responding to the strategic interests of the US, which has been trying to fight back against the advance of China and the outsourcing process of US firms (Arellanes Jiménez, 2014).

Regarding the fourth period, the region experienced liberalization of their economies and favored an external-led orientation instead of a domestic strategy. As a result, the former attempts to develop manufacturing sectors in Argentina and Brazil faded away, and the state reduced its participation and influence in the economy. The market ruled again and if we study the exported products of the region, we confirm the presence of primary and mineral goods in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, while Mexico continued with its relationship too much dependent on the US.

In the context of favorable terms of trade and depreciated exchange rate regimes for three of the four countries under analysis (Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), the performance of the ECI of Argentina and Brazil shows a slight improvement explained mainly by a larger contribution of the automobile industry in exports, where the former provides parts, and the latter assembles the final good. Chile´s ECI gap (82.8) remained almost invariable, while Mexico (93.6) experienced a slight reduction after a rise in exports of some goods with more value-added (such as telecommunications). Finally, most attempts to configure alternative integration organizations were reversed, in line with the economic transformation experienced by LACs. As a result, in 2016, Venezuela, which became a full member of Mercosur in 2012, was indefinitely suspended. Likewise, in April 2018, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru decided to indefinitely suspend their participation in UNASUR.

In sharp contrast to LACs and the recurrent changes in their development path, the experience of HPAEs is much more consistent and aligned with industrialization through import substitution and then export-oriented (Table 6).

Table 6- HPAE External sector and regional integration, 1950-2019

Conutry	Variable	1950-1975	1976-2002	2003-2015	2016-2019
Malaysia	**Exchange rate regime**	Appreciated	Depreciated	Cycles of Appr. and Depr.	Depreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Unwrought Tin and Alloys (22%), Non-Coniferous Sawlogs (19%), Palm Oil (11%)	Crude Petroleum (10%), Computer Parts and Accessories (9%), Palm Oil (7%)	Liquified Petroleum Gases (10%), Crude Petroleum (8%), Palm Oil (8%)	Palm Oil (5%), Liquified Petroleum Gases (5%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	76,1	84,9	93,0	92,1
	Orientation to international economy	External led	External led	External led	External led
	Regional Integration	Low, since 1967 ASEAN	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)
South Korea	**Exchange rate regime**	Appreciated	Depreciated	Depreciated	Appreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Knit Clothing Accessories (10%), Textile fabrics not knitted or crocheted (10%), Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods (4%)	Cars (7%), Ships and Boats (6%), Synthetic Woven Fabrics (3%)	Cars (11%), Ships and Boats (7%)	Cars (8%), Vehicles Parts and Accessories (4%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	90,0	93,4	101,0	99,7
	Orientation to international economy	External led	External led	External led	External led
	Regional Integration	Low, especially with Japan	ASEAN Plus Three (since 1997)	FTA (EU since 2011), KORUS FTA since 2012	FTA (EU since 2011, KORUS since 2012, Canada & Australia since 2014, New Z. Since 2015)
Indonesia	**Exchange rate regime**	Appreciated	Depreciated	Depreciated	Depreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Favourable	Favourable	Favourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Crude Petroleum (53%)	Crude Petroleum (24%) and Liquified Petroleum Gases (10%)	Coal (11%), Palm oil (8%), Liquified Petroleum Gases (8%)	Palm oil (11%) and coal (10%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	71,6	75,4	84,2	79,0
	Orientation to international economy	internal led	Internal and since 1990s shifting to external led	Shifting to external led	Shifting to external led
	Regional Integration	Low, since 1967 ASEAN	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)
Thailand	**Exchange rate regime**	Appreciated	Depreciated	Depreciated	Depreciated
	Terms of trade	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Favourable	Unfavourable
	Exports Table (Main goods average share)	Milled Rice (27%), Maize (13%), Unwrought Tin and Alloys (9%)	Milled Rice (6%), Computer Parts and Accessories (6%), Footwear (3%)	Trucks and Vans (5%), Cars (4%)	Cars (5%), Vehicles Parts and Accessories (4%)
	ECI Index (gap with the US; US=100)	74,7	83,9	91,7	89,1
	Orientation to international economy	External led	External led	External led	External led
	Regional Integration	Low, since 1967 ASEAN	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)	ASEAN, ASEAN+3 (since 1997), ASEAN+6 (since 2008)

Source: own elaboration using World Bank data, OECD, ECLAC, IMF, and Atlas of Economic Complexity.

Regarding the first period (1950–1975), the selected countries (except for Thailand) had recently experienced independence and were mostly agricultural economies. During the 1960s, the four countries maintained an appreciated exchange rate regime and unfavorable terms of trade, and military coups in power applied several policies oriented

toward promoting the manufacturing sectors that would give stronger results in the 1970s. Exports were dominated by primary goods such as iron ore, non-coniferous saw logs, tin, and palm oil in Malaysia; knit clothing accessories, raw silk, and miscellaneous manufactured goods in South Korea; crude petroleum in Indonesia; and milled rice, maize, unwrought tin, and alloys in Thailand. In all cases, the orientation to the international economy was external-led, and the resources generated allowed the development of the industrial sectors. In addition, regional integration was low during this period, until the appearance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, while some countries, such as Malaysia, complemented this with the development of Free Trade Zones (FTZs), which came to be a crucial component of the export-oriented development strategy adopted at the beginning of the 1970s (Jomo, 1993). In addition, we can observe an average ECI gap from the US of 26 percent for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, while South Korea exhibited the best performance of all countries in the two regions and a distance from the productive capacities of the US barely greater than 10 percent.

During the second period (1976-2002), we observe the results of the first industrial programs designed by the selected HPAE governments. States had a greater presence and different subsidies were applied to the development of specific strategic industrial sectors. Along with a depreciated exchange rate regime in all HPAEs, these measures facilitated the development of the manufacturing sectors reflected in the evolution of their principal exports: crude petroleum, palm oil, computer parts, and accessories in Malaysia; vehicles and auto parts, ships and boats, computer parts and accessories, footwear in South Korea; crude petroleum and liquefied petroleum gases in Indonesia; and milled rice, maize, computer parts, and accessories in Thailand.

During this period, the famous Southeast Asian crisis of 1997 occurred, which ended up being a crucial factor in explaining the greater integration that the region denotes from that moment onwards. Once it was clear that the IMF's recommendations did not favor the development interests of the HPAEs, the strategy chosen by the countries of the region was to deepen relations within ASEAN, generating the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea). The goal was to consolidate regional relations that not only foster economic growth but also provide possible help alternatives in the event of future crises.

During the third period (2003-2015), regional integration went even further, and a new FTA was created that generated ASEAN Plus six (ASEAN plus three plus Australia, India, and New Zealand) after the 2008 crisis. In addition, South Korea pursued significant consolidation of its trade agreements by signing an FTA with the European Union and the US in 2011 and 2012, respectively. This larger regional integration was combined with greater pressure to increase firm efficiency, the transmission, and adaptation of foreign technologies, improvement in management practices, and economic stimulus to face greater economic openness and integration. This elucidates part of the secret of development experienced in the production of high value-added goods. In addition, electronics and electrical equipment parts and components account for the largest share of intra-ASEAN commodity trade, under which tariff rates have declined sharply since 2010 in the ASEAN-Six countries (Intal & Chen, 2017). As a result, and facilitated by a depreciated exchange rate, these economies maintained their

external-led orientation, thus allowing them to narrow the ECI gap with the US:93.0 in Malaysia, 84.1 in Indonesia, and 91.7 in Thailand, while South Korea surpassed the economic complexity of the US (by almost 1 percent).

In the fourth period, although we find greater participation of manufactured exports in the region, the ECI gap with the US widened for all cases: 92.1 in Malaysia, 99.6 in South Korea, 78.9 in Indonesia, and 89.1 in Thailand. On the other hand, regional integration stood, and the ASEAN region remained highly attractive for foreign direct investment since it is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world with a strong consolidated development path. The creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) on December 31, 2015, marked a new development strategy towards 2020, which included a progressive expansion of integration initiatives along with forward-looking leadership in ASEAN members capable of responding to global and regional challenges. Thus, it is important to point out that since mid-2016, 99 percent of all intra-ASEAN tariffs have been eliminated. Nonetheless, the tendency of their exchange rate regime is not as defined as in previous periods since there is a coexistence of appreciated (South Korea) and depreciated values (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand).

5. Lessons to be learned

Developmental experiences are unique and difficult to replicate, although significant elements can be highlighted from a comparison of experiences. One of the most important elements is the devastating effect of neoliberalism in developing countries. It is evident that countries with interventionist states obtained better results than those pursuing strategies based on leaving everything in the hands of the free market. In this sense, it becomes apparent that state participation in the economic process of changing prices, such as rates, quotas, subsidies, and credits, constitutes an essential element in development policies. The LACs and HPAEs show that development without state intervention and leadership is unfeasible.

Second, a key element in achieving economic development is a long-term economic development program, in accordance with the characteristics of the country. Political stability is a necessary, but insufficient condition for achieving this goal. These long-term objectives must be defined by the state and need to be articulated with careful short- and medium-term planning, which in the HPAEs took the form mostly of five-year plans that LA countries completely abandoned in the mid-1970s and only partially resumed in the 2003-2015 period. Not coincidentally, these were periods when countries in the latter region were better off in terms of economic and social development.

Third, it is essential that the government has the autonomy to impose its will on a long-term development project. It is crucial that the state generate a strong consensus in its development plan and somehow manage to align the interests of private capital under this project. A very effective way to do that and could be learned from HPAEs countries' experience is to have strong state participation in key sectors of the economy. If the state has influence over the financial sector, the provision of food, or the country's foreign trade; it can generate incentives to shape the economy in a way that is compatible with economic and social development.

Another important aspect is the role of the manufacturing sector. The industrial sector has been the engine of development in both regions, regardless of whether the strategy was export-oriented or import substitution. Moreover, as Amsden (1989, 2001) argued, it is necessary to use the principle of reciprocity between the state and companies. This implies that, in exchange for receiving benefits (such as subsidies or controls on the entry of new competitors into the market), companies could be subjected to performance controls (production, innovation, export levels, etc.). This new form of control exercised by the state is decisive when it comes to achieving development and is one of the main lessons that can be derived from the HPAEs experience.

Fifth, the states with the highest degree of development have been the ones that have invested more in education and in the development of new technologies. No other elements can bridge this gap, such as the ability to generate and produce new technological developments. Thus, whatever development strategy is selected, it must be founded on achieving technological autonomy (Dietz, 1992).

Sixth, international organizations such as the IMF do not really intend to help developing countries achieve economic development. The experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, as well as the HPAEs during the 1997 crisis, show that international institutions such as the IMF have their own agenda, which is defined by core developed countries, and defend their interests that are not to pursue economic development in the periphery. Therefore, it is essential that once and for all developing countries generate alternative financing and aid mechanisms that could help when needed but are not tied to following guidelines and policies that severely condition future possibilities of economic development. Regional integration plays a significant role in this regard.

To sum up, it is also clear, especially from what was experienced by Argentina and Brazil in the 2003-2015 period, that the state´s will alone is not enough to lead a successful development process. In a democratic society, the power of the state should be rooted in popular support capable of counteracting the interests of capital elites whose interests never coincide with the country's development objectives. There is no single development recipe that can be applied to different countries, and a successful development strategy must be made up of numerous dimensions. The challenge is to find a way to achieve this.

References

Adams, Gerard, and Davis, Inger. 1994. `The Role of Policy in Economic Development: comparisons of the East and Southeast Asian and Latin American experience, *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature* 8 (1): 8-26.

Arellanes Jiménez, Paulino 2014. El Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte: antes, durante y después, afectaciones jurídicas en México, *Revista IUS del Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de Puebla*, México, 8(33): 257-274.

Amsden, Alice. 1989. *Asia's next giant. South Korea and Late industrialization*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Amsden, Alice. 1994. Why isn't the whole world experimenting with the East Asian model to develop?, Review of the East Asian Miracle, *World Development* 2 (4): 627-633.

Amsden, Alice. 2001. *The rise of "the rest": challenges to the west from late-industrializing economies*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Atlas of economic complexity, Harvard Growth Lab, Boston MA, various years.

Banuri, Tariq. (ed.) 1991. *Economic liberalization: No panacea. The Experiences of Latin America and Asia*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Basualdo, Eduardo. 2010. *Estudios de historia económica argentina*. Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI.

Bethell, Leslie. 1993. Chile since independence. Cambridge University Press.

Bethell, Leslie. (Ed.) 1989. *The Cambridge history of Latin America. Volume IX. Brazil since 1930*. Cambridge University Press.

Bonomo, Marco, and Terra, Cristina 1999. The political economy of exchange rate policy in Brazil, *Revista Brasileira Economia* 53 (4): 1964-1997, Rio de Janeiro.

Cassey, Lee 2019. *Globalization and Economic Development: Malaysia's Experience*, ERIA Discussion Paper Series. No. 307

Chang, Ha J. 1993. The political economy of industrial policy in Korea, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 17:2: 131-157, England.

De Gregorio, José 1999. *Exchange rate policy in Chile since 1960: political economy and the choice of regime* (No. 68). CEA, Working Paper.

Dietz, James, 1992. Overcoming Underdevelopment: What Has Been Learned from the East Asian and Latin American Experiences?, *Journal of Economic Issues*, 26 (2): 373-383, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1992.11505297

Doner, Richard, 2009. The Politics of Uneven Development. Thailand's Economic Growth in Comparative Perspective, *Cambridge University Press*.

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean*, Many years: 1980, 1990, 1998, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, Santiago de Chile.

Evans, Peter 1987. Class, state, and dependence in East Asia: lessons for Latin Americanists, in: Frederic Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 203-226.

Fishlow, Albert 1989. `Latin American failure against the backdrop of Asian success´, *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science*, 505 (1): 117-128.

Frenkel, Roberto 2004. *Real exchange rate and employment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico*. Group of 24, CEDES.

Frenkel, Roberto and Rapetti, Martin 2010. A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America, *Center for Economic and Policy Research*, April, Washington DC.

Gereffi, Gary 1990. Paths of industrialization: An overview, in: Gary Gereffi & Donald Wyman (eds*.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Gómez Vega, María Carmen 2004. El desarrollo de la industria de la maquila en México, *Problemas del Desarrollo* 35 (138): 57-83, julio-septiembre, Distrito Federal, México.

Guisan, Maria-Carmen 2023. Economic development of 8 Latin American countries, 1950-2021: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, *Applied Econometrics and International Development*, Vol. 23-1: 159-180.

Hein, Simeon, 1992. Trade Strategy and the Dependency Hypothesis: A Comparison of Policy, Foreign Investment, and Economic Growth in Latin America and East Asia, *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40 (3): 495-521.

Hill, Hal 2000. *The Indonesian economy*, Cambridge University Press.

International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics Data*, various years.

Intal, Ponciano., and Chen, Lurong 2017. *`ASEAN and Member States: Transformation and Integration´*, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.

Jomo, Kwame Sundaram. 2005. What remains of the East Asian model?, in Lapavistas Costas (eds.), *Beyond Market-Driven Development Drawing on the experience of Asia and Latin America*, Routledge: 129-147.

Jomo, Kwame Sundaram, and Edwards, Chris 1993. Malaysian industrialization in historical perspective, in Jomo Kwame Sundaram (ed.) *Industrialising Malaysia. Policy, performance, prospects*, Routledge: 14-39

Kay, Cristobal 2002. Why East Asia Overtook Latin America: Agrarian Reform, Industrialization and Development*, Third World Quarterly* 23 (6): 1073-1102

Kohpaiboon, Archanun, and Jongwanich, Juthathip (2019) Economic Consequences of Globalisation: Case Study of Thailand, *International Affairs*, 22, 23.

Lall, Sanjaya 1998. `Technology policies in Indonesia´, in Hill, Hal and Wie, Kian Thee (eds.) *Indonesia's Technological Challenge*. Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: 136-68.

Lin, Ching-yuan 1988. East Asia and Latin America as contrasting models, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 36 (3): S153-S198.

Mardones, Rodrigo 2007. Chile: todas íbamos a ser reinas, *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Santiago), 27 (ESP): 79-96.

Morais, Lecio and Saad Filho, Alfredo 2012. Neo-Developmentalism and the challenges of economic policy-making under Dilma Rousseff, *Critical Sociology*, 38(6): 789–798.

Moreno Brid, Juan Carlos, and Ros, Jaime 2009. *Development and growth in the Mexican economy. A historical perspective*, Oxford: University Press.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Statistical database*, various years.

Ranis, Gustav, and Orrock, Louise 1985. Latin America and East Asian NICS: development strategies compared, in: Esperanza Duran (ed.), *Latin America and the World Recession*, London: Cambridge: University Press: 49-66.

Saad Filho, Alfredo 2019. Varieties of Neoliberalism in Brazil (2003–2019), *Latin American Perspectives*, SAGE: 9-27.

Salazar, Gabriel y Pinto, Julio 2002. *Historia contemporánea de Chile III- La economía: Mercados, empresarios y trabajadores*, LOM ediciones, Santiago de Chile.

Santarcángelo, Juan, Schteingart, Daniel, y Porta, Fernando, 2017. Recent industrial policy in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: A comparative approach, *Revue Interventions économiques / Papers in Political Economy* 59, p. 1-42, Canadá.

Seth, Michael 2017. South Korea's Economic Development, 1948–1996, In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, Oxford University Press.

Solimano, Andrés 2017. *Estrategias de desarrollo económico en Chile: Crecimiento, pobreza estructural y desigualdad de ingresos y riqueza. Propuestas desde la economía*, Documento de trabajo 63, Chile, CEPAL

Tan, Jeff 2014. `Running out of steam? Manufacturing in Malaysia´, *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 38 (1): 153-180, Oxford: University Press.

Taylor, Lance 1997. `Challenges of Latin American development and East Asian experiences´, in: T. Yanagihara and S. Sambommatsu (eds.), *East Asian Development Experience: Economic System Approach and its Applicability*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies: 221-240.

Thee, Kian Wee 2006. `Policies Affecting Indonesia's Industrial Technology Development´, *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 23 (3): 341-359.

Wainer, Andrés 2017. Sector externo y ciclos económicos: Un análisis comparativo de la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones y la posconvertibilidad.

Williamson, John 1981. `The Crawling Peg in Historical Perspective´, in John Williamson (ed.) *Exchange Rate Rules*, St. Martin: University Press, New York: 3-37.

World Bank, Statistical database Databank, various years, World Bank Group, 2020.

World Bank, 1993. *The East Asian Miracle. Economic growth and public policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, World Bank Group, 2020.

Wylde, Christopher 2017. *Emerging Markets and the State: Developmentalism in the 21st Century*. Palgrave.