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1 The aim of this paper is to analyze the specific figure of collective action: *resistance*. Our main argument is that resistance in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes not only describes socio-political conflict, but also expresses the modern democratization of social hierarchies and, as a result, the questioning of the traditional foundations of the political community. In other words, we want to investigate how their works expose the artificiality of the realm of the unquestioned and unquestionable, as well as the power games that are replicated in this realm that "appears" beyond power.

2 As a first step toward this definition of resistance as a form of collective action, we must remember, as John G. A. Pocock did, that each society debates political issues in multiple languages[1]. This implies that, in both Machiavelli's Florence and Hobbes's London, the boundaries of juridical-political language are pushed to the limit in order to consider the contingency of the foundations upon which a political community is built.

3 Let us expand on this point. It never hurts to emphasize that the study of political theory is not limited to a discussion conducted in a specific language. The ways in which people prayed to the divinity were a first-order political issue in the centuries in which both authors intervene. This included everything from the organization of the church to the ornament of temples. The same holds true in other, less obvious political areas. If Modernity begins by questioning hierarchies in all aspects of human life, it would not be surprising to find a Machiavelli who, in reflecting on the plague, places man in his proper perspective, alongside other men, nature, and the cosmos, or a

Thomas Hobbes discussing the vacuum pump essays as a corollary of a non-solipsistic liberty, and that all of this is linked to a discussion. In that sense, “This is not to say that there is no foundation, but rather, that wherever there is one, there will also be a foundering, a contestation. That such foundations exist only to be put into question is, as it were, the permanent risk of the process s of democratization”[2].

4 Indeed, the ways in which political conduct is attacked or defended are constructed at the crossroads between an available traditional language and other specialized ones that are elaborated to criticize it and expand the ways in which politics is talked about. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, law and political philosophy develop a lexicon of their own to define and analyze the *resistance.* However, an exclusive focus on the legal arguments would not capture the concomitant variations in the theorical strategies of Machiavelli and Hobbes. And yet these variations necessarily affect the overall meaning of their works. Thus, we emphasize the need to add to the analysis other political discussions conducted in various lexicons in order not to confine resistance only under the strict scope of law – even political law. Furthermore, we wanted to pay attention to how such amalgamation occurs in hobbessian and machiavellian works.

5 The choice of these authors is neither casual nor arbitrary. Both are an inescapable reference for those who dedicate themselves to the political theory of modernity. Various legends have been built about both authors that have been their fame, but also their damnation. Machiavelli as the master of evil, the technician of power. Hobbes as the designer of the mechanism of absolute sovereignty. However, the modes of their political theory reflections exceed such delimitations. From this “reading against the grain” of their works, we consider that it is possible to place them in a constellation of modern authors who point out the contingency of the foundations of the political and, at the same time, do not cancel it, but leave it operational.

6 In this regard, Machiavelli could be an archetype for analyzing the relationship between resistance and desires. Machiavelli names the verb resist (*resistere*) on several occasions in the *Discourses on Livy*[3] and the word resistance (*resistenza*) on one occasion[4]. However, the appearance of the word resistance is not enough to construct a definition. We propose two ways of thinking about resistance in Machiavelli. First, a resistance that is exercised against brutalized violence and against the oppression of a power and a resistance that is established against enemies and political adversaries; second, resistance outside and inside institutions.

7 Hobbes’s work proceeds in a very similar way. In *Leviathan*[5] the conflicts surrounding the right of resistance exceed a juridical logic. If the singularity of a body – individual or collective – does not come from the substance, but from the *name*, in alluding to *sovereignty* this identity is expressed in juridical terms, but in a profoundly disguised form. Sovereign right is not a faculty of whoever occupies that position, nor of the subjects, but of the aggregations of powers. These last in time as long as they reproduce the *common endeavor* that originally caused the attribution of that name. Resistance, therefore, implies not only modes of ascending irruption of the conflict (from multitude to government), but also the production of novelty – *innovation* – in the face of the crystallization of any kind of order.

8 This essay will be structured as follows to take into consideration the aforementioned hypothesis: first, we will deal with resistance according to Machiavelli. Secondly, we will analyze resistance in Hobbes’s work. In the last section, the conclusions of the

work carried out will be gathered and the resistance between both authors will be put in relation.

Niccolò Machiavelli: resistance and desires

9 Niccol Machiavelli has either been seen as a master of evil or a technician of power for centuries. So, what kind of resistance can inhabit Machiavelli's textuality? In what sense is he placed in a constellation of those who reflect on resistance? What can be said of resistance according to Machiavelli?

10 In his work it would seem, at first glance, that resistance is associated with the idea of setting limits to the ambition of the *Grandi* (the Nobles). But this resistance of the *plebs* does not imply the activation of conflict. As Del Lucchese rightly states, in any case, resistance and conflict are the ordinary dimension of a natural phenomenon and consequently of those who operate in that nature[6]. Consequently, for Machiavelli resistance is not a natural property of some politically privileged actor. On the contrary, it is a political strategy of the conflict between those who want to dominate and those who do not want to be dominated. That is, his reflection does not focus exclusively on the actions of those who oppose power, but rather on the mechanisms of collective action in relation to power rather than against it. From this vantage point, resistance serves not only a *katechonic* function of dominance, but also a creative one.

11 According to our reading, the discussion of Machiavelli's notion of resistance can be placed in two directions within the specialized literature. On the one hand, we have the research on the topic of passion has received an increased interest in the literature surrounding on Machiavelli[7]. As Fabio Frosini[8] points out, there is a connection between power, war, passions, and desire in Machiavelli's works. That is, war can lead to increased power and freedom, but it can also result in the dissolution of political order and the loss of freedom. In addition, Leandro Losada in a recent work has identified that in the figure of Machiavelli there is a conceptual and political fight characterized by the logic of the passions among the intellectuals and politicians of Argentina, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries[9]. On the other hand, we have the line of research proposed by the authors of the book *The Radical Machiavelli*. In its introduction point out an interesting perspective: "language and thought are conceived of as rooted in the practice, as 'tools' which are functional to the accomplishment of a task that emerges as a possible outcome of an ongoing struggle"[10]. In the relationship between the real world and linguistic expression, Machiavelli's thought is always shown in relation to concrete scenarios in which he seeks to produce effects.

12 Reflections on resistance run parallel to Machiavelli's description of the presence of the common people in its various meanings (*multitudine*, *popolo*, *plebs*, *etc.*), as Sandro Landi[11] suggests. However, this description shows a particular way in which political bonds are configured and staged and how the limits of power are signified through desires and passions. In the recourse to tumults, conspiracies or various modes of political action, Machiavelli expresses the productivity of the modern disidentification between *potentia* and *potestas*. Therefore, it is essential to recover two types of Machiavellian resistance: (i) that exercised against a form of violence, but also (ii) that exercised in and by institutions.

13 (i) In the first mode of resistance we find how the logic of passion presents itself. That is, the struggle and conflict against a power that is perceived as *hateful,* and which wants to reduce the Others to a pure object. This situation gives rise to the desire for *revenge* and the desire for *freedom*. There are two passages that illustrate this typification: the exemplary execution of Ramiro d'Orco[12] in *The Prince* and the reconstruction of the link between honor and revenge when Machiavelli analyzes the plots in *Discourses*[13].

14 Cesare Borgia's theatricalization of power through the assassination of Ramiro d'Orco (his confidant whom he appoints as governor to reassure the people of Emilia Romagna) has several aspects. First, Ramiro d'Orco's excessive cruelty to the people undermines Borgia's legitimacy. Machiavelli claims that this is the reason of the execution in Cesena's public square: "the duke had Remirro placed in two pieces in the square at Cesena, with a block of wood and a blood-stained sword at his side. This terrible spectacle left the people both satisfied and amazed [*satisfatti e stupidi*]"[14]. This spectacle takes the form of a kind of public *revenge* on the man who nullified the mediation between him and the people. Cesare Borgia thus re-established his reputation as a mediator with the people, whom he left "satisfied and amazed". Thus, he seems to have understood, Machiavelli points out, that political *virtue* is not exercised in solitude, but always involves a relationship with the Others.

15 Second, this scene also illustrates that the power exercised by the leader over the people does not turn out to be a mere instrumental and oppressive fact over a mass that is inert and fickle. Rather, this scene is a representation of power where the people desire to take revenge in order to put the love of freedom into action. This revenge-resistance-freedom parallelism is reaffirmed with the alternative example mentioned above. When Machiavelli unfolds his analysis of conspiracies, he distinguishes the effect produced by executions and dishonour. While the *dead* cannot think of revenge, the *disgraced* is never dispossessed in such a way: "For he can never despoil one individual so much that a knife to avenge himself does not remain for him"[15].

16 It follows from both passages that power cannot strip human life naked without exposing its own emptiness. That is, it does not reduce the enemy to a pure passive object of application of power and violence, without making visible, in correlation, its own impotence. Which does not come from a failure, but from a constitutive ambivalence. For Machiavelli, only death can produce the emptiness that power desires because in peoples and persons an inexhaustible desire to free themselves abides, even if it is in the form of "a spirit obstinate for vengeance"[16].

17 (ii) The ways of exercising resistance can also be seen in institutional dynamics. That is, passionate and affective relations activate power games that are not only deployed in extraordinary circumstances, but also in institutional dynamics. For Machiavelli, institutions, far from being a neutral and formal artifact, have within them various conflicts that not only come from external overflows and tumults, but arise from themselves. His descriptions in *Discourses* of the institutions of the Roman republic are less interested in the formal rules of selection and voting than in making visible (like a political anthropologist) which passions and desires prevail in the institutional dynamics. Indeed, far from being neutral, the resistance exerted *in* and *by* institutions implies that they have, first, a function of container of the insolence and desire for dominance of "the Nobles"[17], second, the ability to generate and enable new modes of

political participation[18] and third, intrigues that cause internal and inter-institutional conflicts.

18 In the first chapters of the *Discourses*, Machiavelli shows how the conflict of desires between those who desire to dominate and those who desire not to be dominated has in Rome a partial inscription in the institutions. Although he emphasizes that the creation of the Tribunes responds to the conflict between the *plebs* and the Senate, it is not lost on him that this conflict also comes from the institutions.

19 Indeed, from the beginning, Machiavelli asserts that the process of creating the Tribunes of the Plebs is marked by social and political turbulence. The Roman nobility had become "insolent"[19]. This attitude triggers the uprising of the people and the creation of a new office: the Tribunes of the Plebs. In this sense, this new kind of political participation was originated by the reaction of the plebs, that is, in response to the passionate disposition of the nobility. But his institution not only seeks to mediate with the Senate but to constraint "the insolence of the Nobles"[20]. However, this insolence is seconded by sufficient authority to maintain its position in the Republic.

20 That Machiavelli is concerned about the ambition and mode of operation of the most powerful sectors of a republic, the *Grandi*, whose desire to oppress motivates them to acquire economic and political advantages, can be observed throughout his discourses. The *Grandi* were the rich nobility of the Republic who participated in the Senate and monopolized the main magistracies of Rome, especially the Consulate. In this regard, Machiavelli wonders where freedom can be more secure, whether in the hands of the Nobles or the people. The answer seems obvious to him: "Coming to reasons, taking first the side of the Romans, I say that one should put on guard over a thing those who have less appetite for usurping it. Without doubt, if one considers the end of the nobles and of the *ignobles,* one will see great desire to dominate in the former, and in the latter only desire not to be dominated; and, in consequence, a greater will to live free, being less able to hope to usurp it than are the great"[21].

21 However, the Tribune's resistance to the Senate's will of domination does not configure a scenario in which the plebs only react to the aggressive and proactive behaviour of the Nobles. On the contrary, Machiavelli also details how the disposition of the plebs empowered by the Tribunes transforms from a certain initial *passivity* into an *aggressive* indignation as it suffers continuous abuses by the Nobles and the Senate. In this way, he now emphasizes the *proactive* power of the Tribunes to prosecute magistrates and citizens suspected of political crimes.

22 This new configuration of the plebs through the constitution of the Tribunes shows something about the institution itself. This is not, as Skinner[22] or Pocock[23] argue, a mere conduit of demands or formal artifact that contains the insolence of the Nobles. Or, as McCormick[24] argues, the clear and exalted representation of a populist power. But through its constitution new passionate dispositions are activated within the social fabric. To put it in other words, the formation of an institution has an impact on the passionate configurations of the actors, transmuting them and creating new ones. The important thing about this variation is that, for Machiavelli, the institution itself also produces the conditions of possibility for political participation. By this we do not mean that there is a unidirectional link, but, in any case, we wish to underline the exchange between ordinary (institutional) and extraordinary (in unrest) political actions.

23 This mode of characterization implies a broader notion of institution. This can be observed, for example, when Machiavelli argues that “a tribune, or any other citizen, could propose a law to the people, on which every citizen was able to speak, either in favor or against, before it was decided. This was a good order when the citizens were good, because it was always good that each one who intended a good for the public could propose it; and it is good that each can speak his opinion on it so that the people can then choose the best after each one has been heard”[25]. In this way both the Tribune and anyone else could propose a law and discussions could be held in the assembly. It is evident, then, that before a proposal of law (either from a Tribune, or from the plebs) are generated forms of participation as it is the right to speak in favour or against of the law.

24 Finally, Machiavelli works with several examples of inter- and intra-institutional conflicts caused by intrigues and desires for dominance. In *Discourses*[26] he refers to the time when Menenius is appointed Dictator, by the authority ceded by the people in 314 BC, to investigate the plots that were intrigued in Capua against Rome. From that moment on, the Nobility revolted against him, claiming that illegal procedures had been used. The Nobles spread the rumour that it was not they but the commoners, desirous of ambition, who sought honors through extraordinary means. That accusation was so powerful, Machiavelli points out, that Menenius had to depose his dictatorship and submit to the trial of the people, and then end up acquitted. In line with this in *Discourses*, Machiavelli argues that the *accusation* has very useful results for the Republic because “how far it may be useful and necessary that republics give an outlet with their laws to vent the anger that the collectivity conceives against one citizen”[27] and maintains the freedom of the Republic through the legal procedure of popular trials.

25 The case of agrarian law also shows a resistance *in* and *between* institutions: the Senate and the Tribunes of the Plebs[28]. This law provided that no citizen could possess more than a certain number of land and that the stripped fields had to be divided among the Roman people. These two points implied direct offenses to the Nobles, because they not only stripped them of goods, but also limited the will to increase them. Nonetheless, it favoured the general good, Machiavelli asserts. At this point we must notice that this general good was not that of a universal whole, but, in short, that of the plebs and that it implied a direct offense to the powerful, that is, to the Nobles.

26 The conflicts unleashed around the approval of this law, says Machiavelli, “ruined Roman freedom”[29]. While the struggle for honors produces the freedom that aggrandizes Rome, the confrontation for material goods ruins it. However, the interesting thing about the establishment of the agrarian law is that it illuminates the conflict between the nobility and the plebs, and it highlights the relationship between the desire to acquire, the fear of losing and the desire to dominate. In the conflicts over the participation of the plebs in the discussions of the Senate[30] and the approval of the agrarian law[31], Machiavelli maintains that it is one thing to fight out from necessity and another out from ambition. It makes it clear, thus, that the desire for goods is the deepest motive that guides the action of the Nobles from the Senate, even more than honors. Whoever from the highest of honors desires to have more and fears losing what has been acquired comes to produce so much hostility and war that it causes “the ruin of that province and the elevation of another”[32].

27 The institution of the Tribunes of the Plebs also serves as an example of this interinstitutional dynamic caused by intrigues and desires for dominance. In *Discourses* we find that Machiavelli argues that "how far it may be useful and necessary that republics give an outlet with their laws to vent the anger that the collectivity conceives against one citizen"[33]. So, the Tribunes not only have the holding force of the desire for dominance of the Nobles towards the plebs, but they also manage to balance the way in which such desire occurs among the Nobles themselves. In keeping with this point, in *Discourses*, Machiavelli reconstructs the reverse movement when he argues that tribunicial authority "became insolent and formidable (*insolente, e formidabile*)"[34]. To this end, he shows how Appius Claudius mitigates the behaviour of some Tribune so that he opposes the wishes of the other Tribunes when they want to take some action against the will of the Senate.

28 In short, institutional resistance manifests itself through three types of levels. Resistance acts as a form of containment in the first level. Machiavelli points out how the Tribunes of the Plebs are an institution that manages to contain the Nobles' arrogance manifested in their desire to dominate. That is, the plebeian institution serves the *katechonic* function of delaying a constant desire that arises from those who have the most and are afraid of losing it. Resistance in institutions generates and enables new forms of pleb passional expression in the second level. That is, rather than neutralizing popular participation, the Tribunes manage to enable new modes and configurations for it. The third level centers on intra- and inter-institutional conflict. Machiavelli accounts for intrigues among the Tribunes themselves about supporting or vetoing various regulations caused by the Nobles. Similarly, there was conflict in the Senate, and the Tribunes were forced to act as mediators.

29 These three levels help us understand resistance in institutions that are diverse, heterogeneous, and far from a formalist plane. Violence is also resisted in these, and thus the parallelism revenge-resistance-freedom exists in their conflicts. Machiavelli deactivates any social hierarchy based on the apparent distinction between political and anti-political passions by exposing these passionate logics within institutions.

Thomas Hobbes: Resistance and Movement of the Body Politic

30 It can be perplexing to consider Thomas Hobbes as an archetype of *resistance theories*. As stated at the beginning, this occurs because his name has become synonymous with the defense of the absolute character of sovereignty over the centuries. However, we presume that we can go beyond that figuration if we look at the materialism of his political thought. That is, once we remember that we are reading an author for whom everything is corporeal and that, as a result, the juridical dynamics described in *Leviathan* must be understood alongside corporeal dynamics of movement. According to Hobbes, a central representative of modern materialism[35], if the entire universe is corporeal, phenomena (whether rain or political obedience, anger, love, fear, or hope) can be explained by reconstructing the causal relationships between a multiplicity of bodies.

31 These premises affect the meaning of the legal-political terms used in his works because they delimit a new scenario for thinking about politics. One in which resistance

is not an eventual circumstance, but the necessary effect of the continuous becoming different, of the continuous transformation of those individual and collective bodies that act politically. This new scenario in which Hobbes examines the materiality of politics, law, and liberty has little to do with the metaphor of defender of the "absolute state" that some readings construct[36]. This also differs from those who analyse Hobbesian resistance exclusively within his legal argument[37]. Finally, it also has little to do with these other readings which rescue him from the "contradictions" he runs into when thinking materialistically about law, politics, and liberty. For example, Tom Sorrell[38] suggests read Hobbes separating his natural philosophy from his political philosophy. This does not imply a despicable error, but a hermeneutical decision that redetermines the meaning of key words in his theory. In fact, Hobbes himself is aware of the difficulties involved in his proposal. However, he includes his natural philosophy in *Leviathan*, and, for example, in the dedication letter of the *De homine* he expresses his commitment to trying to reconcile natural and political philosophy.

32 Hobbes is both: the defender of the absolute character of sovereignty and of the liberty not to obey it. We will claim that the key to resolving this puzzling argument lies in the fact that the conjunction of both parts of his philosophy leads him to explain that there are no bodies with *absolute power* beyond the material limits within which they operate. For Hobbes, *sovereignty* is, at the same time, a political right, and a mode of collective action whose structural support is not legal but material (i.e., a conglomeration of passions and reasons that sustain the *common endeavor*).

33 Indeed, this methodological change introduces an argument about the origin of the State different from that of his contemporaries. In *De Cive*, he describes his method through the example of a watchmaker. The knowledge of the correct functioning of a watch requires disassembling it to its smallest parts and then recomposing it[39]. This is how we can know the characteristics of each part and the right functioning of the mechanism that brings them together. On the cover of *Leviathan,* he includes the image of a mythical figure composed of countless bodies. According to that same methodology, the task that Hobbes proposes is breaking down that unitary body, recognizing its parts, seeing how they work, and finally conjecturing a form of lasting assembly.

34 Both metaphors seek to reconcile the analytical, but not real, division between the natural and political body. The difference between *Leviathan* and *De Cive* is that Hobbes reintroduces both parts of his philosophy in a single text, as he had done in *Elements of Natural and Political Law*. In fact, he dedicates the first thirteen chapters of *Leviathan* to presenting the aspects of human nature relevant to understand how natural bodies are composed in a collective body. In this regard, we see that if this collective body were to decompose to its smallest constituent parts, what we would find would be intersubjective human sensations[40].

35 The state of nature in *Leviathan* describes such circulation of intersubjective sensations in the absence of the artifices that hold them together in political societies. What artifices? According to Hobbes, the public law provides certainties about what is right and what is wrong, what is mine and what is yours. Without these certainties, even the calculation of time would be impossible, and the eternal violent present would make life a poor, brutal, and short experience[41]. Precisely, as Ioannis Evrigenis' suggests[42], the first chapters of *Leviathan* could be read retrospectively from the *figure of anarchy* included in the thirteenth chapter on the state of nature. Those first chapters are an

attempt to demonstrate that human will instead nature or divine will constitutes political certainties. Contrary to what many of his contemporaries affirmed, according to Hobbes, nature determines a situation of physical and intellectual equality, which provides the same hopes, rights, and liberty to seek what each considers appropriate to achieve their self-preservation[43].

36 This scenario leads to a situation of mutual suspicion which, however, does not encourage solitary life. The individuals are so equal that none could by nature dominate the rest (i.e., one is not much stronger than the others as to subdue them by nature). Such natural equality pushes human beings to escape as much as to compose their forces with those of others[44]. With no greater certainties than those provided by own power, the most rational behavior lies in controlling as many people as possible either by force (*ie*, fear) or with stratagems (*ie*, promises) until none have, nor seem to have, sufficient power to endanger their own situation[45].

37 The convergence of the will of others composes the necessary and sufficient power to deal with the uncertainty of the state of nature. For Hobbes, the problem of such condition is not the inability to achieve this convergence. On the contrary, he shows how people do not live in isolation, but in mutual interaction. Instead, the problem Hobbes deals with, much likes Machiavelli's, is that even when that convergence is reached, *it is not very durable* due to the rapid disintegration of those who gather to defend themselves or attack preventively[46]. Sociability becomes problematic, Hobbes tells us, because it develops in a time of war without any kind of certainties beyond the singular human will[47]. Composing a diverse kind of sociability (which is precisely what Hobbes wants to propose) would mean forming political communities whose civil laws are to resolve the natural uncertainty. In Hobbesian language: a human will, but a collective one.

38 How can civil laws provide certainty? The core of the response of the thirteenth chapter of the *Leviathan* lies in the constitution of a *common power*. That is, in the constitution of a power of the whole body politic and not of one part over another. That political composition of power would be able to make the determinations of these laws about the good and the bad, the just and the unjust obligatory. Under the rule of that common power, one acquires sufficient certainties to unfold a good life, since consequences can be conjectured regardless of the behavior of others. In other words, one knows that others also know when one would have the *common power* to assert a public and concrete determination of the just and the unjust.

39 The next step in the Hobbesian political argument is the celebration of the pact which politically composes that common power[48]. We must focus on some characteristics of the Hobbesian argument politic to understand the conjunction of natural and political elements in the pact. The *first one* is that the pact supposes a renunciation of natural rights. It should be noted that for Hobbes what writers commonly call natural right implies a liberty that each one has: "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature ... in his own judgment and reason"[49]. Consequently, such a *renunciation* implies not making use of his right, that is, not performing that liberty[50]. From this definition, Hobbes implies that the natural right of bodies is not alienable, as if one gave one thing to another, but that one *renounces* to its exercise. Therefore, further into the fourteenth chapter, when Hobbes explains the emergence of obligation, he also distinguishes the *pact* from the *contract*. The contract is a mutual transfer of things, but this kind of thing, which is liberty, cannot be *transferred*, but only

renounced. That concrete act is called *pact* or *covenant,* in which both parties *promise* to do something in the future, but in fact, they still do not do it[51].

40 The very formulation of the pact expresses the *second characteristic*[52]. According to Hobbes, within the pact nobody gives anything to anyone, and nobody receives anything. Just a certain population, many, the vast majority, renounce the exercise of that natural liberty and only some (the members of the Assembly or the Monarch) are allowed to continue exercising it in order to sanction civil laws. Only those who do not agree or promise anything retain their natural liberty and, according to Hobbes, exercise sovereignty without any legal limitation: divine, natural, or established in the pact. This aspect of his argument is fundamental: civil laws do not publicly sanction what nature inscribes in hearts, nor the divine will revealed by the scriptures, but, only, give public force to an artifice product of a *common will.*

41 However, how can the will of those who occupy the seat of sovereignty be considered "common"? To explain this, in the sixteenth chapter of the *Leviathan* Hobbes elaborates the argument of authorization. This argument serves to differentiate the *theory of power* from the *theory of property* by making it possible to "think at the same time the constitution of political will and the maintenance of the natural rights of individuals"[53]. The representatives receive the *authority* from the represented without this implying an effective transfer of anything. This happens when those who *authorize* consider themselves authors of the actions and words of the representative (who merely *acts* them). According to the formula of the pact, if everyone behaves in the same way, what the sovereign *actor* says receives the authorization of the multitude of *authors*. The power of his actions and words lies in such endorsement: "For by this authority, *given him by every particular man* in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to *conform the wills of them all*, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad"[54]. This is, what becomes common is not his natural power, but the one he receives through the artifice of the pact.

42 For Hobbes, the *common power*, the *pact* or the figure of the *authorized sovereign* make a substantial difference with respect to the defensive congregations mentioned a few paragraphs above. These small groups carry out collective actions brought together by common endeavors (to achieve certain ends) but dissolve themselves with impunity sooner rather than later. Instead, in political societies, common endeavors last over time because the artificial body constantly recreates the original circumstances that caused them. This durability does not come from the juridical nature of the pact, but from the fear that its rupture will entail punishment by the common power[55]. That is, Hobbes draws on natural philosophy to explain the passions and reasons that cause describable behaviors, in turn, in legal-political terms.

43 In this sense, if we put together both characteristics (the non-transferable nature of natural right and the promise of the pact) we understand a turning point that Hobbes introduces in his argument. In the fourteenth chapter of *Leviathan*, after describing the *renunciation* and *origin* of the obligation, he says: "Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself"[56]. That is, he returns us to the beginning of the argument: the origin of the composition of political power is a voluntary act. This implies, on the one hand, that it

is an act that has in its "small beginnings" a conatus of self-preservation[57]. If obedience were an effect monster, it would be fed by the voluntary movement expected in each singular sentient body. According to this movement, obedience would be fed by the *fear* of each body to what harms it and by the *desire for power* (*i.e.,* the means) with which to live well[58].

44 However, as Hobbes recalls, voluntariness implies that if hope is frustrated or fear disappears (or changes its object), what emerges is the right to resist, the liberty not to obey what has been commanded since it no longer leads to preservation[59]. This does not constitute a lateral conclusion of *Leviathan*'s central argument. Hobbes clarifies that this remaining power, that natural liberty that is expressed as resistance, is not exclusive of the state of nature, but also is a very liberty and subject of the political society[60]. Therefore, in the twenty-first chapter dedicated precisely to the liberty of subjects, he differentiates *civil liberty* (everything that is not commanded or prohibited is free to do or omit) from *the true liberty of a subject* ("what are the things, which though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless, without injustice, refuse to do"[61].

45 As we can see, there is a scenario that might seem contradictory. On the one hand, Hobbes claims that the only way to resolve the uncertainties of nature's state is to renounce natural liberty and form a common power. On the other hand, the constitution of this foundament of political society does not eliminate the resistance that results from the continuity of natural liberty (true subject's liberty). Let's follow Hobbes in his attempt to think out the common without contrasting it with the multiple. This does not solve the contradictions but recovers them in their productivity to think out politics at different times and places. To this end, it is worth underlining the two implications of his natural philosophy for political argument.

46 (i) The theory of Hobbesian resistance implies, in the first place, assuming a change in the way of conceiving liberty[62]. This no longer requires eliminating the determinations that interfere with the faculty of wanting or preventing relations of dominance with respect to others. In the Hobbesian corporeal world, both scenarios are impossible. First, because voluntary acts are caused by an imagination of the future that arises from relationships with others and that exceeds our control. "For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change [...]. and therefore, are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them"[63]. Then, liberty should not be looked for in the absence of causes but in the consideration of the effects they have. While in the state of nature these causal relationships install an eternal time of war, the political society seeks to end it through a common power capable of providing certainties of peace.

47 Considering this variation in liberty from attending to its materiality is fundamental because it changes the nature of the voluntary act that gives legitimacy to the pact. Such voluntary act is not one in which the agent acts driven by himself and without cause. In this regard, Hobbes argues in the first paragraphs of the sixth chapter of *Leviathan* that *voluntary* movements are those that begin with *imagination*[64]. It finds its causes in the memories that the sensible body keeps of the impression caused by other bodies on their sense organs. Therefore, the understanding of *will* and other *movements* of the body is identical. Its only difference is the location in the causal chain of any act. In each body the causes that explain the movement are chained, even that which is called a voluntary act. The will is at the last moment "immediately adhering to the

action"[65]. The previous links make up an accumulation of judgments about good and evil consequences that follows from all the phenomena that each body remembers of its life trajectory. Hobbes calls that cumulus of judgments and affections *deliberation*[66].

48 Some scholars try to track the instant in which Hobbes places the loss of liberty in the etymology of the term *deliberation*. Thus, they compare it with the logic of the pact. According to Wolfgang von Leyden, for example, once the agent finishes his deliberation he loses the liberty to decide again[67]. Similarly, according to Annabel Brett, promising obedience shuts down the legitimacy of any further resistance by alienating the liberty to re-decide[68]. However, this deliberation works differently from a materialist perspective. If the passional movement of the body is continuous, and the continuous accumulation of passions and reasons can produce new wills, then the end of deliberation cannot be conceived. As Hobbes explains, at the conclusion of a singular deliberation we act and lose only the liberty to change *the past*[69]. Once we perform acts (even if their effects are moderate) the situation on which we continue to deliberate becomes necessarily different. Therefore, the will that serves as the foundation of common power is constantly changing. The causal chain on which one deliberates whether one is to flee from the conflict of the state of nature or to disobey a sovereign power is not identical. However, the deliberations that lead to pact or resistance are identically free. Only their placement in a timeline and their content change.

49 (ii) From this it is understood, secondly, why resistance exceeds the legal framework of the pact. According to Hobbes, the obligation or bound does not have its strength from the juridical act of covenant. Men are bounded by the sword that recreates in the present, when the previous circumstances have changed, a passionate accumulation able to replicate the initial renunciation[70]. Thus, the Hobbesian foundation of the political order incorporates *movement*, *change* and *innovation* as its main characteristics. Given the corporeal universe, this everlasting movement is not something improper, condemnable, but the condition of human existence. Consequently, the attempts to construct a normative content that entails the annihilation of movement, or the suspension of the deliberation of the sensitive body, are implausible. This is it because without movement there is no life. The Hobbesian image of the geometric order moves away from those representations of the ideal city typical of the Renaissance. In the latter, the geometrically arranged buildings compose an empty public space. From Hobbes' vision, this absence of bodies and movement represents a space lacking in life[71].

50 In turn, it should be noted that the political order that Hobbes imagines, although caused, is also not mechanically controlled. Natural philosophy does not provide the sovereign with "the instruction manual" of the buttons console with which to have immediate and homogeneous behaviors of his subjects. First, because, according to Hobbes, such causal chains are immeasurable on a human scale. Second, even when sentient "automatons" had buttons and switches, when operated they would only get *responses*, not *reactions*. In De corpore, Hobbes differentiates both behaviors. A *living* body differs from an *inert* body in that when it encounters another it does not *react*, but elaborates a singular *response* based on memory. The mechanical reaction is what happens when the billiard cue reaches the ball. The *reply* is a voluntary movement of a living body[72]. According to Hobbes, a body responds to the sensation it has of another by comparing it to past sensations and calculating chains of consequences based on its experience[73].

51 Hobbes draws a political correlate from this distinction. In the face of fearsome objects, such as the leviathanic sword, the response of the multitude is not uniform, homogeneous, or so foreseeable that it can be activated by omnipotent devices. Thus, it contradicts Republicans, like James Harrington, who claimed that living under the absolute rule of a sovereign implied being in a condition of slavery. Hobbes replies that, indeed, they are bound by chains to the absolute sovereign, but these chains are not *actual* chains, but *artificial* ones. A fictitious subjection that lasts as long as they *authorize* the will enunciated as *common* from the seat of sovereignty. An authorization that, as Hobbes underlines in 1668, can conclude at any time, such as when King Charles I was captured and executed[74]. The difference between the artificial chains of fear and the actual ones in a slave ship is that the first ones could be broken at any given moment. That is because they are constantly being altered by the dynamic character of the passions and reasons that determine the will of the multiple bodies that "imagine" them.

52 From a Hobbesian perspective, we should think about *obedience* as an *effect*. Just as we can ask about its *past causes*, we can try to infer the power needed to produce it in the future. Hobbes defines the conjunction of the efficient and material power necessary and sufficient to produce any effect as "plenary or entire power"[75]. For the aforementioned reasons, a common, multiple, and dynamic will composes the *efficient* power of the body politic. They are the same adjectives with which Hobbes portrays the multitude that makes up the body politic, i.e., the *material* power. How can we make today's obedience happen again tomorrow? Imagining that this multitude of passive bodies will merely react to the terrifying presence of the sovereign sword? Imagining that these singular bodies no longer have natural liberty and are legally and materially confined to obedience? For Hobbes this could be done, but it would be ruinous for the vainglorious who imagines himself brandishing the divine sword of omnipotent power.

53 Hence the centrality he gives to the discussion of the signs of power[76], or, using the expression of Eunice Otrenksy, to "the government of the imaginary"[77]. Like the individual in the state of nature, the composition of symbols of power is necessary because of the insufficiency of the sovereign's natural power to produce common endeavors. In this case, however, sovereignty itself is the device that comes to symbolize, institutionalize, make sense, and mark where to converge the authorization, the composition of power, or the common endeavor. That is, where the unitary will that implements the norms of good and evil, of what is yours and what is mine, of what is just and what is unjust can be found. Given the contiguity between civil and natural liberty, such symbolization does not require stopping movement or eliminating differences. As with the multiplicity of images of the Virgin Mary, Hobbes says, these "serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more hut by the names only, to represent the persons mentioned in the history; *to which every man applieth a mental image of his own making....*"[78].

54 This is evidence of a kind of argumentative circle. If the *sword* is the cause of the strength of the bond of obligation expressed by the *words*, what is the cause of the power of the *sword*? According to Hobbes, the *cause* of this power is the *opinion* that people have about what is commanded by the sovereign. That is, the *words* of the covenant acquire their strength from a *sword* whose very power comes from an accumulation of mental images translatable into *words*. Symbolic representation *marks*

the composition of a power in a certain place or person, but materially that power of the *sword* and the *words* is scattered throughout the political community[79].

Further Considerations: Towards a Definition of Resistance

55 From what has been said so far, the appearance of the word resistance is not enough to construct a definition. In fact, if we used this method, it would help us to verify some proximity between the authors, but also distances in certain unbridgeable aspects. For example, those that are verified when Thomas Hobbes affirms that resistance implies a natural right against non-consensual or impossible to consent aggression, and when Machiavelli alludes to it to name the individual or collective virtue opposing the fluctuations of fortune. In short, the mere appearance of the word says rather little of a comprehensive definition of the object of study.

56 Therefore, we direct our inquiry to the ways of thinking about the fundamentals of the political community. According to Judith Butler, not every theory that has a foundation is fundamentalist. So are those that disguise the power game that allows "to establish a set of rules that are beyond power or force"[80]. On the contrary, "a social theory committed to democratic dispute" is one that finds a way to question the foundations it gives itself[81]. In other words, it assumes the constructed character of the foundation and, consequently, authorizes to discuss the exclusions that are necessary for said "foundation" to be reproduced. By doing this he manages to "open a term ... to a reuse or relocation that has not previously been authorized"[82].

57 Through the proposed reading of Machiavelli and Hobbes we consider that this critical modality is not a particularity of contemporary democratic debates. On the contrary, it can be identified in the theories of those who from the early modernity participate in the multiple debates on the foundations of the political community. That is, in the interventions of those who, like Machiavelli and Hobbes, try to break the glass ceiling of the unquestioned and the unquestionable in their societies. If we say that they participate in the critical modality that Butler characterizes, it is because, as we have mentioned in the previous sections, they do not limit themselves to inventing ways of processing public affairs that replace new limits. On the contrary, both immanently theorize on the *contingency* of the foundation. That is, as Butler suggests, they leave it open or, at least, recognize that the key to that lock is not in this world and, with it, expose the power games that reproduce the scope of the unquestionable. In short, they do more than justify disobedience or rebellion against tyranny or abuse of authority. According to the readings we propose in Machiavelli and Hobbes, both assume and expose the contingency of the foundations of the political community.

58 Precisely on the verification of the passage between one possibility and another we build a possible definition of *resistance*. The interest of each addressed text is not limited to mapping the terrain of political conflict, but to evidencing the folds or points of tension in which the immutability of the foundations of political authority is questioned. Careful consideration of this nuance is essential because a reflection on the limits of political authority would clearly not be a particularity of those who theorize about resistance in the terms proposed here. For example, in the confrontation with the absolutist theories of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the French

Huguenots find in the scholastics of the University of Paris and in the texts of the Council of Constance (1414-1418) a clear definition of political resistance as a corollary of subjective natural law.

59 While it is true that the Conciliarists terrestrialize the tyrant by stating that "an evil and irreformable prelate does not seem ordained by the will of God"[83], the touchstone remains a divine will whose access is taken from the Supreme Pontiff or the monarch but does not become a field of dispute. The organic and corporate conception of the political community restrains these consequences. The assumption underlying the work of the conciliar movement is the superiority of the representative organs of the community over the monarch[84]. However, the council takes the form of a parliament that brings together the hierarchical ranks in order to deal with matters of public utility of the community[85]. These ranges, like the *intermediate articulations* between the individual and the monarch, block any further discussion of the foundation of the just[86].

60 As we saw, this happens in a different way in Machiavelli's and Hobbes's works. In the case of Machiavelli not only does he reject the futility of political philosophy when he does not agree to think about the effective truth of political life (*The Prince*, fifteenth chapter), but also the descriptions he provides of the circulation of affections and passions imply a creative and novel gesture. Reflecting on resistance according to Machiavelli implies investigating its multiple meanings: from the exercise of resistance in political institutions to the desire for revenge as a way of exercising freedom. This epistemological opening of the notion of resistance in the Italian author contributes to the possibility of thinking about a notion of modern resistance associated with passions and desires.

61 Highlighting these implications of resistance theory in the instance of Hobbes does not expose a secret argument; rather, it just emphasizes the premises of the natural philosophy that Hobbes invokes in order to explain how the body politic moves. Unlike his contemporaries, he placed mankind in the position of the efficient cause, in addition to the material cause of the State, by arguing that the changing human will should take the place of God and nature as the foundation of the political system. It is highly illustrative to recall that the full title of *Leviathan* is "of the form, origin, and subject matter of political rights". To summarize, the title may be translated as follows: the origin is neither divine nor natural, but a human collective action; the shape is the result of that collective will's artifice; the matter is composed of a *We* who, in turn, decides the form.

62 In short, the fact that political thought contemplates the historical dimension of its first principles does not imply, of course, that it assumes their contingent character. Instead, it assumes the contingency of fundamentals when the emphasis is placed on freedom and the ability to formulate choices. This implies that the life of the community no longer presupposes the historical practice of a set of first principles of practical reason or eternal law, but a collective becoming of humanity directed, now, by the notion of public utility and not of truth. In this spirit we have analyzed the interventions of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

NOTES

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3. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998 (1531), I.1, I.7, I.43, II.2, II.8, II.24, II.30, II.32, III.10, III. 24, III.43.

4. *Ibid.*, II.24. We use the English version edited by Q. Skinner and R. Price (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Edited by Quentin Skinner y Russell Price, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1532)) for the case of *The Prince* and edited by H. C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov for the *Discourse on Livy* (*op. cit.*). For the Italian version, we use the one edited by Mario Martelli (*Niccolò Machiavelli, Tutte le opera*, Edited by Mario Martelli, Florence, Sansoni, 1971.

5. We use Edwin Curley's edition (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, Edited by Edwin Curley, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1994 (1651)), which numbers the paragraphs according to the English Works.

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7. Guido Cappelli, "Machiavelli, l'umanismo e il amore político", *La Rivista di Engramma*, 134, p. 143-166; *Id.*, "Machiavelli e l'umanesimo politico del Quattrocento", *Res publica*, 20(1), 2016, p. 81-92; Jean-Louis, Fournel, "La questione dell'amore nella politica machiavelliana: amore, odio, paura", in G. M., Anselmi, R. Caporali, y C. Galli (ed.), *Machiavelli Cinquecento. Nezzo millenio del Principe*, Milano, Mimesis, 2015; Fabio Frosini, "Guerra e politica in Machiavelli", *Tempo da ciência*, 20(40), 2013, p. 15-48; Nicole Hochner, "Machiavelli: Love and the economy of emotions", *Italian culture*, 32(2), 2014, p. 122-137; Sandro Landi, *Lo sguardo di Machiavelli: una nuova storia intellettuale*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2017; Eugenia Mattei, "'Una pietosa crudeltà'. La figura de César Borgia en Nicolás Maquiavelo", *Papeles de Trabajo*, 9, 2015, p. 124-149; *Id.*, "Sobre conquistas y deseos. La figura de Lucrecia en La Mandrágora de Nicolás Maquiavelo", *Las Torres de Lucca: revista internacional de filosofía política*, 9(17), 2020, p. 293-318; Gabriele Pedullà, "Machiavelli the Tactician: Math, Graphs, and Knots in The Art of War", in Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini y Vittorio Morfino (ed.), *The Radical Machiavelli. Politics, Philosophy, and Language*, Leiden, Brill, 2015, p. 81-102; Gabriela Rodríguez Rial, "Miedos políticos. Emociones, sentidos y efectos en tres momentos de la teoría política", *Anacronismo e Irrupción*, 10(19), 2020, p. 120-148; Sebastián Torres, *Vida y tiempo de la república. Contingencia y conflicto político en Maquiavelo*, Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, 2013; Stefano Visentin, "Immaginazione e parzialita. Note sull'interpretazione neorepubblicana del popolo in Machiavelli", *Giornale di Storia Costituzionale*, 31, 2009, p. 18-47; *Id.*, "Il luogo del principe. Machiavelli e lo spazio dell'azione politica", *Rinascimento Ser*, 2, 53, 2013, p. 57-72.

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12. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Edited by Quentin Skinner y Russell Price. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1532), ch. 7.

13. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, *op. cit.*, III.6.
14. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *op. cit.*, ch. 7, 26.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, III.6, 2.
17. *Ibid.*, I.2; I.3.
18. *Ibid.*, I.18.
19. *Ibid.*, I.2.
20. *Ibid.*, I.3.
21. *Ibid.*, I.5, 2.
22. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Vol. I, *The Renaissance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978; *Id.*, *Machiavelli. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
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28. *Ibid.*, I.37.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, I.5.
31. *Ibid.*, I.37.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, I.50.
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36. See D. J. C. Carmichael, "Hobbes on natural right in society: The 'Leviathan' account", *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, 23, 1990, p. 3-21; Barry Hindess, *Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996; Andrew Levine, *Engaging Political Philosophy: From Hobbes to Rawls*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002; Friedrich Wolf, "Kant and Hobbes. Concerning the Foundations of Political Philosophy", in Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, New York, Humanities Press, 1972, p. 607-613.
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40. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 2.1, 6 passim.
41. *Ibid.*, 13.9.
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43. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 13.1.
44. *Ibid.*, 31.5.
45. *Ibid.*, 13.4.
46. *Ibid.*, 17.3; Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, *op. cit.*, I.1.
47. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 13.8.

48. *Ibid.*, 10.3, 17.13.
49. *Ibid.*, 14.1.
50. *Ibid.*, 14.6.
51. *Ibid.*, 14.9-11.
52. *Ibid.*, 17.13.
53. Yves Charles Zarka, *Filosofía y política en la época moderna*, Translated by Alejandro García Mayo, Madrid, Escolar y Mayo, 2008, p. 118.
54. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 17.13.
55. *Ibid.*, 14.7.
56. *Ibid.*, 14.8.
57. *Ibid.*, 6.1.
58. *Ibid.*, 11.2.
59. *Ibid.*, 27.8.
60. *Ibid.*, 14.2, 14.8.
61. *Ibid.*, 21.10.
62. Julián Ramírez Beltrán ("Thomas Hobbes y el liberalismo político: una lectura sobre la noción de Felicidad", *Ápeiron. Estudios de filosofía*, 14, 2021, 17-48) examines the continuities in the corporeal conception of liberty between Hobbesian texts from different periods.
63. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 32.4.
64. This Hobbesian argument is used by Gabriela Rodriguez Rial and Gonzalo Cernadas ("Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza on fear: the relationship between democratic politics and passions", *Las Torres de Lucca: revista internacional de filosofía política*, 10(19), 2020, 169-184) to move Hobbes closer to Spinoza.
65. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, *op. cit.*, 6.53.
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80. Judith Butler, "Contingent foundations: Feminism and the question of 'postmodernism'", art. cit., p. 16.
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ABSTRACTS

In this article we analyze a particular figure of collective action: *resistance.* Our main argument is that in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes resistance not only describes socio-political conflict, but also expresses the modern democratization of social hierarchies and, consequently, the questioning of the traditional foundations of the political community. In other words, we want to investigate how their works expose the artificiality of the realm of the unquestioned and the unquestionable, exposing the power games reproduced in this realm that "appears" beyond power.

Dans cet article, nous analysons une figure particulière de l'action collective : la résistance. Notre argument principal est que dans les œuvres de Nicolas Machiavel et de Thomas Hobbes, la résistance ne décrit pas seulement le conflit sociopolitique, mais exprime également la démocratisation moderne des hiérarchies sociales et, par conséquent, la remise en question des fondements traditionnels de la communauté politique. En d'autres termes, nous voulons étudier comment leurs œuvres exposent l'artificialité du royaume de l'incontesté et de l'indiscutable, en exposant les jeux de pouvoir reproduits dans ce royaume qui « semble » au-delà du pouvoir.

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