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Old and New Developmentalism in Latin America: Social Order, Social Policy, and Utopias Fifty Years Later[1]

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Abstract

1960s' and 1970s' Latin American development policies were guided by economic purposes, but there were strong utopias beneath them: a full-employment economy with social protection and accelerated technological progress. An expected trend towards social equality was not uncommon. At the beginning, there was even a belief on a sort of developmentalist spill-over: growth and industrialization would lead to universal well-being. After 30 years of undisputed neoliberalism a new developmentalist era arose. Social protection, economic development, and industrialization returned. But were the utopias the same as before? In this paper we argue that despite economic similarities, social utopias were very different.

Keywords: *Developmentalism, social utopias, social policy, Latin America*

JEL Codes: *H55, O29, O54, Z13, Z18*

Latin Amerika'da Eski ve Yeni Kalkınmacılık: 50 Yıl Sonra Sosyal Düzen, Sosyal Politika ve Ütopyalar

Öz

1960 ve 1970'lerin Latin Amerika'sında kalkınma politikaları iktisadi amaçlar tarafından yönlendiriliyordu ancak bu politikaların altında, sosyal korumanın olduğu bir tam istihdam ekonomisi ve hızlı teknolojik ilerleme gibi ütopyalar yatıyordu. Sosyal adalete yönelik olan beklenti olağandışı değildi. Hatta başlarda, büyümenin ve sanayileşmenin evrensel iyi olma durumuna yol açacağı gibi bir kalkınmacı inanç da vardı. 30 yıllık karşıkonulamaz neoliberalizmin ardından, yeni bir kalkınmacı dönem yükseldi. Sosyal koruma, iktisadi kalkınma ve sanayileşme geri döndü. Peki, ütopyalar eskisiyle aynı mı? Bu makalede, iktisadi benzerliklere rağmen, sosyal ütopyaların çok farklı olduğunu iddia ediyoruz.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kalkınmacılık, sosyal ütopya, sosyal politika, Latin Amerika*

Jel Kodları: *H55, O29, O54, Z13, Z18*

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1. Introduction

This paper consists of an analysis of the relations between development paradigms, social policy definitions and recommendations and social utopias in Latin America since the 1960s and into the 21st century. Recognizing that development paradigms include both a diagnostic of the economic situation —usually of some sort of backwardness or obstacle— and a set of causal connections between interventions and expected results —which relate to economic theories—, different development perspectives include diverse roles for social policy. The standpoint of this paper is that legitimate public policies can be understood as expressions of connections between socially accepted diagnoses, theoretical frameworks, and desired goals or utopias.

Methodologically speaking, this paper is an attempt towards an analysis of the social consensuses and hegemonic paradigms of each time. As a study that belongs to the field of the history of economic thought, the core will be the economic ideas that are not necessarily expressed or written by economists, or the feasible links between the theoretical ideas by the economists and the widespread ideas received and popularized by non-economists. There is a special interest for those ideas that reach the public opinion and the governmental projects and official texts.

Therefore, we try to connect the contributions of those authors that, from a semiotic framework, have tried to explain the building of strong hegemonic consensuses and common senses, such as Marc Angenot (1989), and of those that, criticizing the traditional intellectual history that has overvalued the autonomy of the author's minds and undervalued the contexts in which any idea is formulated, have understood the links between texts and contexts, but focusing on expert discourses, such as Quentin Skinner (1969) and Reinhardt Koselleck (1989).

In this sense, we introduce those categories that were widely acknowledged and used during each time, considering the practical meaning that they had, and not the formal or original definitions of the terms. Actually, as we will see in the next section, some categories change their meanings and sometimes there is a struggle between terms. Of cour-

se, period-segmentation is, as always, controversial, especially when we try to perform this without specific and fixed boundary-dates, recalling a whole region and not a single country and without using political references, such as wars or regime-changes as the shifting moments. In this sense, time segments refer to trends, movements and fluctuations.

In this paper we divide the Latin American history between the mid-20th century and the early-21st century into four moments. The key for the segmentation will be the different hegemonic paradigms regarding social, political, and economic models. Within each paradigm there are different conceptions of diagnoses, legitimacies, and utopias. As assumed, different diagnoses, legitimacies and utopias will necessarily lead to different conceptions of social policy and social rights. Of course, some paradigms will be exclusively Latin American, some will even be only acceptable for some sub-regions or countries (like the one that arises after the 90s) and some will be global (like neoliberalism). Besides, there will be moments of solid unchallenged consensuses, such as the late-50s and early-60s or the 90s, and moments in which the different paradigms will enter open struggles and, therefore, in which some unspoken criteria will become explicit, such as the late-70s or the early-2000s.

For instrumental rather than ontological purposes we will state that since the 1950s and until the mid-60s the most significant hegemonic paradigm in Latin America will be defined as early-developmentalism —sometimes defined in Anglo-Saxon literature as modernization theories (Hall & Midgley, 2004). This paradigm will insist on defining underdevelopment (identified by low productivity) as the main diagnosis of backwardness and on promoting the channeling of foreign investment into key sectors in order to increase productivity, boost industrialization and increase well-being (Phillips, 1977; Nahon et al, 2006).

The period that begins around the mid-60s and ends around the mid-70s will be defined as late-developmentalism, which stresses the description of Latin American economies as heterogeneous, in which sectors with high productivity coexist with others with very low productivity and minimum generation of surpluses (Pinto, 1970; Nohlen & Sturm, 1982). The key diagnosis of backwardness will be structural heterogeneity, and the set of recommended policies will be much wider and more complex than before.

Since the mid-70s and throughout the 80s and 90s Latin America will undergo its neoliberal paradigm, perhaps even earlier than other regions of the world. This will mean a profound disruption of previous consensuses. Backwardness will be explained by lack of financial stability and inadequate market incentives (Trincado et al, 2019).

Since the turn of the century and for around a decade, Latin America will experience another paradigmatic change that will be the consequence of the neoliberal crises, which can be defined as neo-developmentalism. This shift will be specific for this region, and actually perhaps just for the southernmost part of it, and there is absolutely no clear consensus on what it was, how it should be named and whether it is still on or not. Some authors, such as Sader (2008) and López Segrera (2016) have proposed the term "postneoliberalism" instead of neo-developmentalism, because of the emphasis on the rejection of neoli-

beral capitalism (Sader, 2008, s. 43). Others, such as Spronk (2008) referred to a "pink tide" as a sort of contagious process of constitution of popular legitimacies. And others, such as Thwaites Rey and Ouviña (2018), have defined it as a cycle of objections to neoliberalism, with no clear or common outcome.

What we can agree on is that the neoliberal utopias and legitimacies happened to decline during the first years of the 21st century as counter-neoliberal projects began to arise in some countries, and a new tendency towards the acceptance of state intervention and the disbelief in the unstoppable advantages of free-market and globalization took over the scene.

How do these paradigms relate to the role of social protection? What are the connections, in each of them, between development diagnoses, social policy initiatives and desired goals? In the next section we will try to provide some answers, which will not justify or demonstrate the validity of the scheme, but they might open discussions on the possibility of using a time segmentation that relies on consensuses and trends rather than on important historical events.

2. Historical Categories of Social Protection

If we are meant to analyze the role that social protection plays within different development agendas, we may begin defining the different categories that synthetize the concept and have appeared throughout the time. These selected categories are the following: social insurance, social security, social justice, social development, social assistance and social inclusion. Are they all alike? What are the differences between them? Do they relate to different utopias? What is the history of each of them? When did they become frequent? And, especially, what are the relations between policies and utopias according to each of them? For the specific cases of Latin American countries, we launch the following hypotheses:

a) Social security as a concept will change from a mere technical term by the early 20th century to a political goal around the mid-60s, altogether with the differentiation between social insurance and social security, which in previous years were considered as synonyms. Social insurance will begin to be considered as means towards social security. While the Anglo-Saxon literature will sometimes use the term social security to refer exclusively to old-age pension systems, in Latin America this concept will remain as a general reference to different social protection subsystems. Since the arrival of ideas on social security and social policy reform from the United States during the mid-70s, social security will remain as a more technical concept, separated from any utopic meaning. Therefore, unlike all the other exposed concepts, social security will not be specific of a certain time, but its meaning will not always be the same.

b) Social justice will be a strong utopia between the 1940s and the early 1960s, and it will be coincident with the previously entitled early-developmentalist era. In some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil or Chile, the utopia of social justice begins earlier, by the end of the second world war and the consolidation of the substitutive industrialization processes

in the region. The utopia will be related to social homogeneity, which will agree with the Fordist paradigm: homogeneous goods to be produced at a large scale and to be consumed by a boosting middle-class that will enjoy both full-employment and social benefits. Economic growth and productivity growth shall make this process unstoppable, but social protection is needed in order to ensure that the supply will meet the effective demand and that, therefore, the economy will be able to keep growing at an accelerated rate. The core of the pursuit of social justice will be that homogeneous policies will lead to homogeneity.

c) Social development is a new concept that arises during the early-70s, which is precisely intended as a way to explain the difference between economic growth or mere economic development and well-being. This concept will be strongly used by the international organizations such as the United Nations or the International Labor Office. Social policy will have a much more important role, and the different goals expected in a social development process will be measured and quantified. Contrary to the social justice paradigm, the social development paradigm will be based on the fact that it is heterogeneous policies what will bring us to a homogeneous society.

d) The rise of neoliberalism will lead to an abandonment of most of the proposals, intentions, and policies from the previous decades. The new mainstream will state that the market itself is able to solve all our problems and that any attempt to regulate it or diminish its reach will necessarily lead to bad results. Nonetheless, whereas some extreme neoliberals will deny any social policy, some will still recognize that the intended transformation processes take time and that, thus, social policy will be needed during the transition. This is what the international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, started to promote during the 90s. The term that gained popularity was social assistance: it does not entitle any rights or claims, it should not be available for everyone nor forever, it must be justified and, most importantly, it should be reduced, so that it does not interfere with the free-market. In this sense, in the long-run there shall not be any differential regimes or special protections. This means, with the only exceptions of short-run social assistance policies that will provide the needed political stability, policies should be homogeneous. But neoliberalism will likewise deny the virtues of a homogeneous society, being heterogeneity the primary incentive that makes the market-forces move on. In this sense, homogeneous policy (or, in this sense, homogeneous rules and the absence of specific policies) will lead to the desired heterogeneity.

e) The following topic will be almost exclusively Latin American, precisely because it is in this region where the crises of neoliberalism led to a paradigm change around the beginning of the 21st century. The fall of neoliberal utopias will happen a few years later in other parts of the world, but the outcome will be very different. In Latin America, these processes will be accompanied by the recognition of minorities or undervalued groups, such as indigenous communities, women, gender minorities, and so on. There will be a deep recognition of both the impossibility and the inconvenience of social homogeneity, precisely because diversity and pluralism are now strong tendencies. There is a similar process in other parts of the world in terms of diversity (for instance, more and more countries are

authorizing gay marriage), but only in Latin America this process took place as a criticism of the results of neoliberalism. In this sense, social protection took social inclusion as its main concept. We will and we shall all be different, but these differences must not be excluding. We must all be included in a heterogeneous society, but as we are all different, we all deserve different treatments, and the historically excluded groups should be prioritized. In this sense, heterogeneous policies shall lead to a heterogeneous society.

All these hypotheses can be summarized in the following chart:

Chart 1: Development paradigms, social policy standards and utopias.

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="4">Utopic society</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">Homogeneous</td><td colspan="2">Heterogeneous</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Social policy</td><td rowspan="2">Homogeneous</td><td>Social justice</td><td rowspan="2">Early Developmentalism</td><td>Social assistance</td><td rowspan="2">Neoliberalism</td></tr>
<tr><td>1940s to 1960s</td><td>1980s to 1990s</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Heterogeneous</td><td>Social development</td><td rowspan="2">Late Developmentalism</td><td>Social inclusion</td><td rowspan="2">New Developmentalism</td></tr>
<tr><td>1970s</td><td>2000s</td></tr>
</table>

How can we explain these affirmations? What are the grounds of the connections between hegemonic paradigms, development models and social policies?

3. Social Policy and Economic Development: Ideas and Materiality

One of the first conclusions of the previous analysis is that when we are asked about the differences between the old and the new developmentalisms in Latin America we should not take just the policies into account, or the rejection of free market, but the utopias as well. Similar policies or schemes applied in different contexts and looking forward to different goals will lead to different outcomes. While old developmentalisms (early and late alike) pursued social homogeneity, new developmentalism has always pursued social inc-

lusion, pluralism, and diversity. Perhaps, this is the way to deal with the current and presumably unbreakable rising inequality. But, also perhaps, there is a change in the way we deal with heterogeneity and homogeneity from a political rather than economic point of view.

In this sense, in this section we will present the material and technical bases that may help us explain the rejection of homogeneity-utopias since the late 20th century. Fordist industrial technologies, grounded during the first decades of the 20th century but widespread for civilian use after the end of World War II, had a very important restriction: in order to take advantage of the enormous productivity-gains of the technical transformations, the scale had to be huge, and the goods produced had to be homogeneous (Coriat, 1979). For Latin American countries, whose manufacturing sectors did not have the capacity to compete abroad and, therefore, depended on the internal consumption, the production of homogeneous goods needed an expanded internal aggregate demand. The technological features of the industrial goods of the 50s and 60s implied that they would be long-lasting and, in today's terms, highly energy-consuming. If the industry needed to produce a large amount of equal goods to be sold within the national borders, everybody would buy the same goods. This is a technological constraint that leads, precisely, towards social homogeneity as an economic need.

The technological shift of the 70s, with the introduction of flexible production processes, robots and the possibility of replicating the Fordist-era productivity gains without needing to produce thousands or millions of equal goods, made capitalist accumulation once again compatible with a growing income inequality. Additionally, the mean durability of industrial goods decreased, mainly because of constant innovation and the fact that they are reaching obsolescence very quickly (Lipietz, 1997). We do not want to mean that the technological transformation is the primary cause of the rise of neoliberalism (this means, we will not make a material-deterministic statement), but it is necessary to recognize the compatibilities between industrial technologies and political and economic models. This flexibility allows companies to compete via product-differentiation and, most importantly, to sell different goods to different social groups, thus making it feasible to generate enough effective demand out of a reduced high-income share of the population.

The Latin American industries will face another challenge since the rise of neoliberalism. There is not only a change in the way industrial goods are produced but a change in in their spatial conditions. The development of global value chains and the outsourcing of some phases of the industrial productions have opened new questionings to Latin American industrial perspectives (De la Garza Toledo, 2001). Developmentalists had recognized that the most significant expression of the region's underdevelopment was the low workforce-industrial-productivity in comparison with European or North American countries. Thus, the industries were not able to export and needed strong protections from the government if they wanted to sell to the internal markets precisely because their productivity was lower than the international standards. The emergence of global value chains added a second challenge: the Latin American industries are not only constrained by the lack of productivity or technology when compared to Europe or the United States, but nowa-

days they must face the low wages that are paid in countries like Vietnam, Philippines, or Bangladesh. Even China has played this role in the past. How can Latin American underdeveloped industrial structures face this double challenge? It is not random that neoliberal policy suggestions for Latin America have always recommended the abandonment of industrialization, the return to the natural-resources bases of the region's economies and the elimination of barriers and restrictions to free-trade.

If the post-neoliberal paradigm is an expression of a rejection of neoliberal policies, projects, legitimacies and utopias, but the material and global structures are the same, how can this neo-developmentalism or post-neoliberalism be similar to the old-developmentalism? Can there be substitutive industrialization in times of global value chains, extremely developed and interconnected financial markets and post-Fordist technologies? Can there be a utopia for a homogeneous society in times of product differentiation and growing inequality? Or should the progressive utopias transform themselves into quests for plurality and diversity?

4. Equality vs. Inclusion

The most important outcome of the previous arguments is precisely the invention of social inclusion as a new concept that manages to combine the criticisms towards neoliberalism and the need for active state intervention with the recognition of diversities. But how is social inclusion linked to the utopias of its time? What is the difference with the utopias of previous times?

Like the European welfare states, the developmentalist program included an implicit call for social order. Actually, during its first stage there is a very evident belief in the possibility of a technical solution to the political conflicts. The growth of GDP and productivity would eventually eliminate every cause of struggle and the Latin American countries would live endless peace and progress. The late-developmentalist period did not express such a simple optimism, the impossibility of an easy technological solution to political struggle became evident and the emergence of authoritarian regimes was a consequence of this. Compared to the previous period, the call for a certain type of social order, now embedded with catholic morality and communitarism, was mainly a recognition of the unseen difficulties of the process rather than a change in the main principles.

But, regardless of the path towards the desired order, what was this order like? Certainly, this was an era of strong conflicted utopias worldwide. The 50s, 60s and early-70s can be considered as highly optimistic decades in Latin America, where almost every political party or interest group not only pursued radical transformations but believed that these would take place too. And they will quite soon.

In Latin America, lots of youth movements were inspired by the Cuban revolution and by the events of May, 1968 in Paris in order to promote radical transformations and strong egalitarianism. Neo-Marxists, dependentists, anti-colonialists, even the third-world Christian movements were included in these trends, and most of them called for the overth-

rowing of capitalism. But, of course, despite connections and some similarities, they did not belong to hegemonic paradigms. Mid-20th-century developmentalism, both in its early or its late versions, envisioned a high-income capitalist economy. The society would be organized into nuclear heterosexual families, in which men should be employed and earn a wage that should be high enough to support a housewife, kids, and the possibility to spare and improve the consumption basket every year.

Summarizing, whereas early-developmentalists thought that technology would be the key to the ordering of the society, late-developmentalists believed that religion, community, or nationalism could be necessary ordering inputs, because the technological advance would not lead to social pacification so easily. Thus, in political terms whilst early-developmentalists believed in a strong democracy that would accompany the simultaneous recognition of civil, political, and social rights, late-developmentalists did not necessarily disagree with authoritarian regimes that would enforce the social order that economic development needed in order to be achieved.

Neoliberalism rejected the possibility of a society organized by the government, the communities, or any active institution: societies would be adequately organized by the market, which would provide the incentives for individual progress and individual responsibility. Sacrifice, good intentions, merit, and cleverness should be rewarded while laziness should be reprimanded. This opened the gate to new diversity claims. There are now different ways to organize our living. If the market approves them by rewarding us, why should morality contradict the market? And, if individual incentives should promote well-being, what would be the point of equality as a goal?

Of course, while neoliberal discourses happened to encourage diversity, their real consequences somehow reinforced traditional power structures. The withdrawal of the state left care-giving responsibilities to households, and within households to women. The reduction of real wages led to the fact that the salary of one member of the home (namely, the man) was not enough to satisfy the needs of the whole family. Women started to look for jobs, but they remained responsible for the home tasks and, after the relative withdrawal of the state, for caregiving as well. The real working hours of women, including working both outside and inside of their homes, experienced a huge increase.

As stated before, around the mid-90s the same financial institutions that had empowered and promoted neoliberal reforms recognized that the path towards a developed free-market economy was not as easy as expected, and that is when social assistance arose as the primary social policy (Draibe, 1994; Vilas, 1997).

Many social programs developed during the late-90s and early-2000s were designed to especially protect women. There were both programs to improve working skills and programs based on conditioned money transfers that prioritized women over men. The debate regarding the consequences on gender inequality of these programs, between empowerment and reproduction of submissive structures, is still open.

As pointed before, neoliberals thought that social assistance should play a temporary role. Social programs should only be applied during the short transitional term, until the structural transformation begins to show the expected results and everybody that deserves so can get a real job in a free labor-market. Social programs should have been transitional programs. Nonetheless, what ended up being transitional was neoliberalism.

We arrive at the new-developmentalist times, which can be seen as a Latin American response to the terrible economic and social consequences of neoliberalism. Of course, conditioned money transfers were not eliminated, but enlarged instead. Non-contributive pension-systems were widely expanded, especially for the old-aged that were not able to get a pension through the traditional contributive schemes, because due to either informality or unemployment they had not been able to pay the full amount of payroll-taxes required (Rofman et al., 2014).

Although the institutional frameworks of these new policies were not that different from the neoliberal times, its discursive legitimacy and its framing were different. In some cases, where neoliberal crises had not been so deep, such as Chile, the differences were slight. In others, such as Argentina, Bolivia or Brazil, they were much bigger.

The beginning of the new century made us realize that the structural transformations caused by neoliberal reforms would have long-run consequences. For the countries that had experienced a full-formal-employment situation in the past, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and parts of Brazil, the 2000s showed that the possibility of returning to such a situation in the short-run was highly unlikely. Thus, social policy was granted a permanent status. Large population-groups would require assistance and support for a long time before they could be able to get a formal job.

Would it be possible, thus, to turn this policy into a quest for equality? That would have required deeper social, political, and economic changes, which were part of the discursive legitimacy of governments in Venezuela and Bolivia, but not in the rest of the continent. The material heritage of neoliberalism and the political restrictions made it impossible to turn the neoliberal crises into radical transformations that could lead us to equality. Instead, the quest was for inclusion. If we succeeded, we would not be all alike, but nobody would be left apart.

Economic persistent inequality is coherent with social heterogeneity as well. Should all families be alike? Should every school teach the same contents? Although, as pointed before, this refers to a global trend, in Latin America this is the moment in which claims for minority rights received the highest pursuit. Gay-marriage, indigenous autonomy, racial quotas, handicapped-quotas, gender-identity, etc., became part of the daily agenda. The inclusion utopia was able to incorporate these claims much more easily than an equality utopia, because, precisely, we should not all necessarily be alike.

Of course, both late-developmentalism and new-developmentalism have shared the need for income redistribution as a key element of its social and economic intervention. If someone will be receiving something, at least in the short- or medium-run someone

must resign something. The 2000s were a decade of diminishing inequality for most Latin American countries, even for the ones that did not experience strong political changes in comparison with the previous decade. The foreign conditions were friendly during the first half of the decade, mainly because of the rise of export-prices and low interest-rates. This changed after the 2008 global financial crisis, and most of the new-developmentalist experiences started to be at stake. In some cases, there were minor reversions of the new-developmentalist processes and in other cases changes were huge. Now we can ask ourselves: Were the social utopias and proposals coherent with the economic transformations that took place? Did these transformations need stronger social and political support? Or was it that the cultural change was not enough in order to overcome three decades of neoliberalism? Would more radical economic reforms (for instance, massive expropriation of private lands and corporations) have been able to prevent the reversions? All these questions remain naturally open yet.

5. Final Remarks and Current Affairs

A persistent question is whether new-developmentalist agendas are still on or a new paradigmatic dispute has been opened between it and a renewed form of neoliberal legitimacy. In this sense, the year 2018 shocked the whole region when Jair Bolsonaro became elected president of Brazil. The conservative turn had already started in Latin America with the elections of Macri in Argentina, Piñera in Chile, Kuczinsky in Peru, and Duque in Colombia, the conversion of Moreno's administration in Ecuador, the judiciary coup against Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and found its most extreme expression during the violent destitution of Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2019.

Bolsonaro's discursive challenge has been replicated throughout the region as a combination of two issues: the return of economic neoliberalism and the pledge of a moral claim against diversity. Contrary to classical neoliberalism, that thought that moral issues were irrelevant or that they would be solved by market-incentives alone, this new conservatism proposes a moral and ethical struggle against inclusion and diversity. It is some sort of mixture between the moral, authoritarian political legitimacies of some late-developmentalism discourses with the economic perspectives of neoliberalism. This means: a total reaction against their predecessors.

What about social policy? None of the recent right-wing governments has made strong changes on this issue yet, apart from the effects of fiscal constraints. For instance, old-age pension reforms are part of the agendas in many countries, but none have been able to be passed. The political limitations are stronger when the ruling paradigms are not hegemonic, and this might be the case right now. But, actually, that was the case during the new-developmentalist times and still, despite facing lots of challenges, restrictions and retractions, it managed to pursue structural changes.

But, as we have tried to show, utopias, which will necessarily link social order, economic progress, and political regime, are not to undermined. When utopias emerge as consequ-

ences of hegemonic paradigms, they can be very powerful in defining the legitimacy and, thus, efficacy, of public policies.

As early as 2019 new protests against inequality and contrary to conservative claims arose in Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador. The Chilean case even led to an open constitutional reform. Since then, progressives, developmentalists, or left-wing candidates have won the elections in Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, but extremely conservatives, such as José Kast and Keiko Fujimori appeared as runners-up. This means, elections express strong paradigmatic struggles. Thus, it is still soon to provide an answer to the question on whether the new conservative turn will be the standpoint of a new paradigm change or not. However, we can affirm that whereas 20th century neoliberalism was, among other things, a reaction against old developmentalist legitimacies and homogenization-utopias, its 21st century's replica can be understood a reaction against new-developmentalist heterogenization-utopias, and, therefore, the differences among them should not be ignored.

So, discussing the successes and limitations of the new-developmentalist years in Latin America and understanding the new neoliberal trend will require an analysis of these discursive issues altogether with the material constraints and wider economic conditions. In this sense, this paper aims to show some lessons from the not-so-distant past in order to analyze the role that social policy can play in the ordering of society, legitimacy of politics and pursuit of development.

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