International
Labour
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Geneva

Non-standard forms of employment in Latin America: Prevalence, characteristics and impacts on wages

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CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT SERIES No. 75

INWORK

Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 75

Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations

and Working Conditions Branch

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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE - GENEVA

ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

Maurizio, Roxana

Non-standard forms of employment in Latin America: Prevalence, characteristics and impacts on wages / Roxana Maurizio ; International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch. - Geneva: ILO, 2016. (Conditions of work and employment series ; No. 75)

International Labour Office Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch.

precarious employment / temporary employment / part time employment / informal employment / wage differential / ILO standards / legal aspect / Argentina / Brazil / Chile / Ecuador / Peru

13.01.3

First published 2016

Cover: DTP/Design Unit, ILO

Printed by the International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland

Abstract

During the 2000s and early 2010s, Latin America experienced a process of significant improvement in the labour market. The countries of the region, however, still suffer from remarkable deficits in their labour markets and in their generation and distribution of income. In addition to informality, non-standard forms of employment affect a large number of wage-earners. This paper analyses three of such kinds of employment: part-time, temporary and triangular employment. The analysis is carried out for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. We estimate its incidence among total wage-earners and in different subgroups of workers, we analyse its evolution during the last decade and we assess the extent to which these non-standard forms of employment are a source of wage gaps and precarious labour conditions.

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1. Introduction[1]

Non-standard forms of employment (NSFE) have grown globally in the last decades, as a result of technological change, the search for greater labour flexibility by businesses, the implementation of new forms of industrial organisation and higher female participation in the labour market (ILO, 2013).

At the same time, however, Latin America has experienced a process of significant improvement in the labour market during the last decade. This translates into a reduction of unemployment, creation of new jobs, a rise in the average real wage and job formalisation. In spite of these improvements, these countries continue to suffer from remarkable deficits in their labour markets. The high incidence of informality becomes a source of low wages, lack of social security benefits and also labour instability. Nevertheless, even within formal work, the significant prevalence of non-permanent contracts frequently leads to consequences similar to those of informal occupations. Furthermore, for some groups of workers, part-time employment is more frequent than full-time employment.

There is widespread debate over the causes, role and consequences of these non-standard types of employment. On the one hand, it has been stated that these more flexible forms of employment, in particular temporary employment, might be a palliative for high unemployment rates, especially in some European countries. It has also been suggested that these jobs might be a "stepping stone" to access others of higher quality in the future, as employers might use these kinds of contracts as a probationary period or a screening mechanism to assess the worker's productivity and the quality of the matching between her individual characteristics and those required by the position before turning the latter into an open-ended contract.

On the other hand, NSFE might induce segmentation in the labour market as workers with permanent or full-time contracts benefit from higher hourly wages and better employment conditions than those with similar characteristics who have fixed-term or part-time contracts, respectively. Furthermore these new types of contracts might lead to a substitution from open-ended labour to not open-ended labour that might in turn lead to higher rates of exit from occupation and, therefore, higher rates of entry to unemployment.

One of the most evident differences between fixed-term and open-ended contracts is the stability of the position, not only due to the fact that the former stipulate an explicit end date but also since during contractive phases of the business cycle staff downsizing usually affects them the most, due to the possibility of non-renewal. Similarly, long-term workers generally have greater access to on-the-job training, which can also translate into greater stability.

Regarding part-time employment, in some contexts and for some groups of people it may be a way to combine work with other non-labour activities such as education, care work or other domestic responsibilities. Nevertheless, underemployment (insufficient hours in the job) might also be a reflection of the lack of job demand or a mechanism to reduce labour costs.

[1] This document was prepared within the "Non-Standard Forms of Employment" project, ILO-Geneva, coordinated by Janine Berg, whose valuable contributions are greatly appreciated. I also thank Andrés Marinakis and Juan Chacaltana for their helpful comments and suggestions.

The aim of this study is to analyse part-time and non-permanent employment in five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, as well as triangular employment in Chile. We aim at estimating the incidence of these phenomena in salaried employment and in different subgroups of workers, analysing their evolution along the last decade and assessing the extent to which NSFE implies wage gaps and precarious labour conditions.

The paper is structured as follows. The following section introduces the conceptual approach for the analysis of NSFE. Section 2 presents the legal framework that regulates these types of contracts in the countries under analysis. Section 3 provides a literature review on these dimensions for Latin America. Section 4 describes the sources of the information used. Section 5 details the methodology of estimation of wage gaps of non-standard forms of employment. Section 6 analyses the evolution of labour formality in the five countries so as to contextualise the following sections. Section 7 estimates the incidence of temporary employment, its characteristics and evolution along the last decade. Section 8 provides likewise analysis for part-time employment. Section 9 deals with the incidence and characteristics of triangular employment, specifically for the Chilean case. Section 10 discusses the resulting wage gaps estimated for each case. Finally, section 11 offers concluding remarks.

2. Theoretical approach

According to ILO (2013), NSFE include occupations that do not fit into conventional labour arrangements. That is to say, they differ from full-time, open-ended salaried work relations contracted by the employer who makes direct use of the labour. Therefore NSFE include non-standard working time arrangements, non-permanent contracts and non-standard employment relationships. In what follows each of these are analysed in detail.

(1) Non-standard working time arrangements: these include arrangements other than full-time work. As pointed out in ILO (2013), there is no international definition of what is considered a standard workweek. However, in most countries it involves 5 to 6 working days with fixed workday (generally, 8 hours). In non-standard forms of work time organisation, the workday is usually shorter, particularly in part-time employment or on-call work. The latter is an extreme case as the contract does not stipulate working hours but these depend on the employer's needs and the employee's availability.

(2) Non-permanent contracts: these include the ones other than open-ended contracts, such as fixed-term contracts, temporary work agency, task-based work, apprenticeship contract and day labourers.

(3) Non-standard employment relationships: standard employment relationships are those where an employer hires a worker to perform a task in her company in exchange for a certain wage. In contrast, there exist other forms of employment where the condition of wage-earner becomes fuzzy or where the hiring is not directly performed by the employer who ultimately uses the manpower. These include, among others, temporary agency or dispatched workers and dependent self-employed. The two first cases involve a triangular employment relationship where staff hiring is outsourced. The third case includes independent workers who work for a few clients, which implies a strong economic dependence on them but not through a work contract. Home workers might be included in this category as well.

Not only do these new arrangements differ from conventional forms of employment but they might also entail greater occupational risks, weaker protection, lower wages and greater instability when compared to wage-earners involved in standard employment relationships. Below we analyse some of the potential vulnerabilities associated with these forms of employment.

2.1 Part-time employment

Part-time employment has grown steadily in a large group of countries. On the one hand, underemployment could be a voluntary choice made by the employee who wishes to work fewer hours, which the employer might accept whether because such a schedule happens to be compatible with her company's needs or in an attempt to retain the worker. These shorter schedules might be preferable for a certain group of workers who are not able to commit to a full workday or do not wish to do so. Women or young people, who often bear other non-labour responsibilities, might need these kinds of positions to access the labour market. Anyway, this situation might also give room to abuse by employers, who might choose not to offer other types of employment to such groups.

Employers, in turn, might use these kinds of contracts to attain greater flexibility in staff management according to the business cycle or to reduce labour costs. At the same time, these types of employment might be associated with less favourable work conditions, lower hourly wages or difficulties to access social security benefits (Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).

Part-time workers usually receive less on-the-job training as employers deem them as contributing less to the company dynamic or as less interested in developing an active professional career. It has been pointed out that this leads to a "part-time employment trap" (Tilly, 1996), where the lack of access to specific training threatens the possibility of moving to a full-time position and growing inside the company. Therefore an important aspect of this phenomenon is whether these types of positions are transitory (eventually leading to a full-time one) or permanent (Connolly and Gregory, 2008).

In some cases, part-time employment is also associated with the possibility of flexible hours. When this is the result of a choice made by the employee, it might contribute to fitting labour and non-labour activities together. However, when it is the result of a choice made solely by the employer, it might lead to a situation of instability which threatens coordination with other tasks and either reduces or eliminates the possibility to access another part-time job. Similarly, some studies find that work in non-traditional hours (night shifts or weekends) negatively affects home performance and intra-family relationships (Strazdins et al., 2006).

On the other hand, it has been argued that these positions might lead to higher management costs associated with the coordination of a larger number of workers. These costs may increase along with the level of qualifications of the workers (Jepsen et al., 2005). If so, it might imply that these positions become concentrated on less educated workers and, at the same time, the wage gap is larger among more qualified part-time workers.

In consequence, this phenomenon might be a cause of labour market segmentation in so far as, on the one hand, work conditions of this type of positions differ significantly from those of full-time employment and, on the other hand, there is scarce mobility from a part-time job to a full-time one. At the same time, occupational segregation might emerge if these positions are correlated with certain personal characteristics of workers (for example gender, age or education).

In this regard, labour regulations in each country become of essential importance since they might reduce or amplify the vulnerabilities that might characterise part-time employment. For instance, whether or not labour laws contemplate the principle of proportionality in the determination of wages and other benefits for part-time workers in comparison to full-time workers becomes crucial. Sometimes, part-time workers are excluded from social security benefits due to minimum hours or minimum contribution requisites.

2.2 Temporary employment

The existence of not open-ended contracts might owe to the employers' need to count on a "trial period", where the quality of the matching between the characteristics of position and employee can be assessed in a less costly manner than it would be the case under an open-ended contract ("screening device" hypothesis). If the matching turned out not to be optimal the employer might choose not to renew the contract without facing firing costs. Alternatively, this type of positions might be a transit towards a permanent one ("stepping stone" hypothesis) (Booth et al., 2002; Zijl et al., 2009).

Due to the nature of this sort of employment, temporary workers are more likely than permanent workers to experience occupational instability, as once the contract ends the employer might choose not to renew it. At the same time, the lower costs of terminating the labour relationship might lead to greater business cycle effects on these positions.

According to Cazes and de Laiglesia (2015), not only do permanent workers benefit from greater stability than temporary workers but they also have greater access to promotion opportunities and higher wages, along with protection against firing and other occupational risks.

Nevertheless, it is often stressed that temporary workers might receive a wage premium (instead of a penalty) so as to compensate for the lack of other benefits and less favourable labour conditions. This leads to what Adam Smith (1776) referred to as "compensating differences", by which the wage of a certain position would reflect the advantages and disadvantages it offers. In this sense, hourly wages would be higher due to the "disadvantage" associated with, for instance, the lower stability of these positions which implies greater uncertainty on future wage.

At the same time, short job duration makes it more difficult to access on-the-job training (Carpio el al. 2011, Bassanini et al., 2005; Arulampalam et al., 2004). On the hand, it has been pointed out that in this context workers might be less inclined to receiving training if they consider that their probability of becoming permanent is low and therefore duration in the company is short. On the other hand, employers will be less encouraged to train a worker that will remain in the company for a short period of time which means they will not be able to fully exploit the productivity gains arising from the higher specific human capital (Cabrales et al., 2014). The combination of lower probability of receiving training and higher rotation threatens, in turn, the worker's possibility of experiencing upward labour trajectories.

As a result, temporary employment might also imply lower labour productivity. This might be associated with the fact that workers will exert a bigger effort the larger their expectations of acceding to a permanent position in the company (Dolado and Strucchi, 2008). Perception of labour instability might also entail health hazards which also affect productivity (Lora, 2008).

Lastly, like in the case of part-time employment, labour laws can contribute to amplify or reduce the gap in labour conditions between temporary and permanent workers. This depends on the extent to which the former are included or excluded from protective regulations and labour rights that benefit open-ended contracts. Likewise, macroeconomic stability, labour demand and cost gaps (firing costs, among others) between permanent and temporary workers are factors that affect the possibility of a temporary position effectively becoming a permanent one.

2.3 Triangular employment

Lastly, another source of unconventional employment is triangular employment. In some situations, labour seasonality or short-term fluctuations might call for such type of employment. Nevertheless, concerns arise when outsourced workers or temporary agency workers begin to fill essential positions inside the company but under worse labour conditions than the permanent workers hired directly. Indeed, the triangular relationship between the employee, the employment agency and the company that ultimately uses the manpower might be propitious for violations of labour regulation.

This implies, for example, that they might receive lower wages and have less access to social security benefits than workers with similar characteristics who perform the same tasks but hired directly. This is reinforced by difficulties in union representation as the right to unionization and collective bargaining is not always guaranteed. In fact this might be one of the very reasons why an employer resorts to triangular employment.

3. The legal framework that regulates NSFE

There exists both national and international legislation that regulates the use and characteristics of NSFE. Below we revise, firstly, ILO conventions and recommendations and, then, national legislation of each country under analysis.

3.1 ILO Conventions and Recommendations

The Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175) regulates labour conditions of part-time employment. It stipulates that these workers must receive equal treatment and access to the same rights as full-time workers. Their basic wage must be proportional to that of the latter, as must be their access to social security benefits. It must be ensured that part-time workers attain equivalent conditions as full-time workers regarding holidays, sick leave, maternity leave and the termination of the labour relationship. Monetary benefits might be determined on a proportional basis to hours worked or to income received. Finally, workers who do not reach minimum income or hours might be excluded from some of these benefits. However, these minima are suggested to be set low enough so as not to exclude a high proportion of workers from labour and social benefits.

The Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) explicitly stipulates that non-open-ended contracts must not be used as a mechanism to avoid the protection embodied in the Convention.

The Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) addresses national workers protection policy and stipulates, among other things, that it should combat disguised employment relationships where "*…the employer treats an individual as other*

than an employee in a manner that hides his or her true legal status as an employee". Likewise, it establishes the need to design regulations that are applicable to all contracts, aiming at ensuring all wage-earners the full exercise of their labour rights.

Finally, the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 188) stipulates that these companies provide the following services: *"(a) services for matching offers of and applications for employment, without the private employment agency becoming a party to the employment relationships which may arise therefrom; (b) services consisting of employing workers with a view to making them available to a third party, who may be a natural or legal person (referred to below as a "user enterprise") which assigns their tasks and supervises the execution of these tasks; (c) other services relating to jobseeking, determined by the competent authority after consulting the most representative employers and workers organizations, such as the provision of information, that do not set out to match specific offers of and applications for employment".* Temporal employment in such agencies implies that the worker is hired by them to perform a task in the user enterprise. There is no labour regulation between the latter and the employee, even though the user enterprise might have legal obligations toward the employee. Likewise, it is stipulated that countries should ensure that these workers benefit from adequate protection regarding freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wages, access to training, social security benefits and working conditions, among other benefits.

In addition to these regulations, in each one of the countries under analysis there is national legislation that also addresses NSFE, as detailed below.

3.2 Argentina

In Argentina, the Labour Contracts Act stipulates, as a general rule, that labour relationships are permanent. However, fixed-term contracts do exist, though they may not exceed a duration of 5 years. Conditions and duration must be explicit for the contract to be valid. Likewise, the type of task or activity involved must justify its use. The successive use of such contracts, exceeding the requirements of the task or activity at hand, makes it open-ended.

Unjustified dismissal before the end of the contract generates for the employee the right to receive, on top of the severance payment for the termination under such conditions, an additional bonus for damages originated in these circumstances. The first three months of an open-ended contract constitute the trial period, which cannot be used by the employer more than once with every employee.

It is also possible to sign seasonal or temporary contracts. The former responds to seasonality in the activities performed by the company whereas the latter originates in extraordinary demands of labour under specific circumstances faced by the firm. In both cases workers benefit from the same rights as permanent workers do, provided that they fill the requisites stipulated for access.

Furthermore the contract might be full-time or part-time. The latter is defined as that where the employee provides her services for a total of daily or weekly hours that does not exceed the two thirds of the regular workday or workweek of the activity. This sort of contract can be, in turn, permanent or temporary. It is not possible to resort to extra hours and any violation of the part-time workweek limit obliges the employer to compensate the employee according to the full monthly wage corresponding to a standard workweek, in addition to the consequences originated in such violation.

Wages in part-time contracts must be at least proportional to that corresponding to a full-time worker of the same category, according to the specific collective bargaining or to the minimum wage. If the workweek exceeds the two thirds of the standard one, the employer must pay the wage that corresponds to a full-time worker. Social security contributions are established in proportion to the worker's wage and must be unified in the case of multiple job-holding.

Collective bargaining must determine the maximum proportion of part-time workers per company. Similarly, it may establish that these workers have priority to fill the new full-time vacancies.

3.3 Brazil

The Brazilian Labour Contracts Act (*Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*) also admits both fixed-term and open-ended contracts. The former has a maximum duration of two years and it is not renewable.

Temporary workers benefit from the same rights as permanent workers, except for severance payments if the labour relationship is ended according to what is stipulated in the contract.

Contracts (either fixed-term or open-ended) might be full-time or part-time. The standard workday (which is mandatory unless otherwise specified) has a maximum of 8 hours per day (with a maximum of 2 extra hours per day), whereas part-time workweek cannot exceed 25 hours per week. In the latter case, extra hours are not allowed and the workday cannot exceed 8 hours, as in the former. The wage must be proportional to that obtained by a comparable full-time worker.

3.4 Chile

The Chilean Labour Code stipulates that the labour contract must be written and signed by both parties. It might be open-ended or fixed-term. In the latter case, duration may not exceed a year (except for managers, professionals or technicians, for whom maximum duration rises to two years).

Workers who provide services in a discontinuous manner through two or more fixed-term contracts for more 12 months within a period of 15 months will be considered open-ended workers. The same happens when the worker continues to provide services after the expiration of the contract or after the second renewal. In both cases the fixed-term contract becomes open-ended.

In general, the length of the standard workweek cannot exceed 45 weekly hours, with a few exceptions. However it is also possible to sign part-time labour contracts which, like in Argentina, are those where the stipulated workweek does not exceed two thirds of the standard one. In these cases the monthly wage cannot be lower than the current minimum wage proportional to the hours worked. These workers benefit from the same rights than those with full-time contracts. The Code allows for triangular employment and employment in temporary work agencies.

3.5 Ecuador

The Ecuadorian Labour Code establishes that the labour contract might be express (verbal or written) or tacit. In cases where there is no written contract, any labour relationship between employer and employee is deemed tacit. The employee acquires all rights in any of these circumstances.

In some cases it is mandatory to sign a written contract. In particular, this applies to situations where the job requires either technical, professional or artistic expertise; where the contract is task-based and the remuneration for the task does not exceed 5 minimum wages; where wages are paid on a piecework basis and duration exceeds a year; or also in the events of trial periods, temporary work or seasonal work.

Contracts might be fixed-term, open-ended, seasonal, occasional, task-specific, trial period (with a maximum length of 3 months and non-renewable) or piecework. As a general rule, a minimum duration of 1 year is stipulated for either fixed-term or open-ended contract. Exceptions include, among others, trial, occasional and seasonal contracts, as well as task-specific, which might have a shorter term.

One relevant aspect of these regulations is the fact that in occasional contracts hourly wages must be 35 per cent superior to the prevailing basic wage of the sector.

The *Mandato Constituyente* 8 (2008) banned triangular employment, labour outsourcing and hourly labour contracts, according to the view that these contractual forms contribute to poorer working conditions, threaten labour stability, prevent unionization and ignore international agreements.[2]

Standard workweek consists of 40 hours and any one shorter than that is deemed part-time, although alternative workweek length is allowed for in some specific cases. Part-time employment contracts must be written and might be fixed-term or open-ended.

Similarly it is established that wages must be determined in proportionality to full-time positions and they cannot be lower than general or sector-specific minimum levels. Other benefits contemplated by the law also apply, except for those which by their own nature cannot be divided. These workers have a right to every labour benefit, including social security benefits.

Finally, the *Mandato* allows for contracts with companies authorised by the Labour Ministry as providers of complementary activities "*whose exclusive aim is the performance of complementary activities of: vigilance, security, alimentation, courier and cleaning, other than the proper activities that pertain to the productive process of the user company*". These workers receive all labour benefits. Such contracts must be written and certified in the Ministry.

[2] In 2006, the Labour Code Reform Act regulated such contracts. However, the *Mandato* explicitly indicates the insufficiency of this Act as companies continued to make abusive use of such contractual forms.

3.6 Peru

In Peru the General Labour Act stipulates that the standard contract is open-ended unless otherwise specified. It may be written or verbal, although in some cases the first option becomes mandatory. Fixed-term contracts may be signed when the temporary nature of the task or activity so requires. The written contract must specify the causes for such choice, its characteristics and duration.

Causes, however, might be diverse. The first one is market requirements, where circumstantial demand rises cannot be fulfilled with the existing staff. Maximum duration of such contracts is one year. It might also be the case that the hiring responds to the start or growth of the activity. As for occasional contracts, they are used to hire workers for transitory activities other than the company's main ones. Their maximum duration is 6 months. Substitution contracts allow replacing a worker on justified leave, which means that her/his position is guaranteed and therefore this contract finishes when the leave comes to an end. Project or task-based work contracts have a duration that depends on the required time for such tasks. The renewal of such contracts is valid until the project or task comes to an end. Temporary contracts may be combined with occasional ones according to market requirements but their joint duration may not exceed 18 months. Seasonal contracts, associated with the cyclical nature of the activity are considered open-ended.

It must be stressed that fixed-term contracts allow for a trial period of 3 months, except for managerial workers in which case it might be raised to 6 months. Like in other countries, this sort of contract might become open-ended if the worker continues to work after the end date of the contract or its corresponding extensions; the worker continues the labour relationship after the project or task comes to an end; the substituted worker chooses not to be reinstated and the substitute continues to work or the contract has either not been written or been signed fraudulently. Workers with fixed-term contract benefit from the same rights as those with open-ended contracts.

Part-time employment is defined as the one with a workday shorter than 4 hours or a workweek shorter than 24 hours. Such contracts might be open-ended or fixed-term. Part-time workers have the same rights as full-time workers except for the rights whose exertion specifically demands a minimum of 4 daily hours or 24 weekly hours. Lastly, minimum wage in these contracts is a proportion of that stipulated for full-time contracts according to hours worked.

4. Literature review on temporary and part-time employment in Latin America

Unlike developed countries, there is scarce literature on incidence, evolution and characteristics of NSFE in Latin America.

In a recent study, Cazes and de Laiglesia (2015) assess the extent to which temporary jobs (including fixed-term contracts and temporary agency employment) are a source of segmentation and wage inequality. The study includes OECD countries and some Latin American ones as well. According to the authors, within NSFE, temporary employment has grown in the last years. They find a positive correlation between a higher prevalence of fixed-term contracts and wage inequality, even controlling for its other determinants. Likewise, they point out that in Chile a high proportion of temporary employment corresponds to triangular employment, which includes temporary agency contracts and outsourcing.

Carpio et al. (2011) find that in Chile, like in other countries, temporary workers receive less on-the-job training than permanent workers. Likewise, only a third of the temporary contracts turned into permanent contracts between 2002 and 2004. This casts doubts on the argument discussed above that temporary contracts are a stepping stone to a permanent position.

Leiva (2000) analyses changes in the Chilean labour market as a consequence of globalisation. He underlines the emergence of new NSFE characterised by precarious labour conditions. Among them he mentions labour instability, outsourcing and part-time employment. Rau Binder (2010) focuses specifically on part-time employment in this country. He states that Chilean legislation stipulates that companies with more than 19 employees must provide day-care centres for children under the age of two during working hours. This might discourage part-time contracts as the benefit applies to them as well, making part-time workers more expensive, even more so considering the majority of them are women. Similarly, he finds that part-time positions are characterised by greater instability, lack of contract, limited access to unemployment benefits and higher incidence of poverty when compared to full-time employment.

Sehnbruch (2004) concludes that the low quality of employment in this country is reflected in the high incidence of atypical contracts, in addition to low average wages, informality, high rotation, low social security coverage and scarce professional training.

Jaramillo (2013) documents the growth of temporary labour contracts in Peru since the 1990s, in spite of the reduction of firing costs for standard contracts since then.[3] He highlights that, in addition to informality, there exists another form of labour segmentation within formal contracts between open-ended ones and fixed-term ones. During the last decade, when the country experienced employment and income growth, jointly with a reduction in unemployment and informality, segmentation associated with the type of contract became more evident. In particular, the reduction of the proportion of workers without contract translated into the increase in the proportion of temporary contracts. These type of arrangements present more precarious labour conditions (related to wages, social security access, stability) than formal open-ended jobs. The author states that some of the reasons for the use of such contracts include avoiding firing costs (since it is the sole difference between one type of contract and the other) and the reduction of the union's scope of influence as the threat of non-renewal might discourage workers from unionization.

Novick (2007) also points out that informality is not the only form of labour vulnerability in Argentina but also non-standard forms of employment, for instance, part-time contracts and casual employment. Bertranou et al. (2014) identify the existence of involuntary part-time and fixed-term employment within this country's formal labour market. However, they underline the low incidence of temporary employment in formal wage-earners, below 10 per cent. They also find, during the last decade, transitions from these positions to other open-ended and full-time ones.

Leite (2011) discusses tendencies in the Brazilian labour market in the 2000s. She identifies, on the one hand, a process of labour improvements, especially after 2005; on the

[3] During the 90s, Peru experienced some of the most far-reaching flexibilization reforms in the region. Since the mid-80s severance payments were fixed at three months' wages for workers who had been in the company for less than a year, six months' wages for those who had been in the company for one to three years while for those who had been in the company for more than three years it rose to 12 months' wages. In 1991 it was reduced to one month's wage per year worked with a minimum of three and a maximum of 12. Later in 1995 the minimum was removed. Finally, in 1996 firing cost was raised to one and a half wages per year worked, holding the maximum fixed.

other hand, the persistence of precarious labour conditions, particularly those linked to temporary agency employment that have become widespread across several productive sectors, and include outsourcing, home working and cooperative employment, among others.

In a book compiled by Farné (2013), labour quality in several Latin American countries is analysed. Weller and Roethlisberger include stability of the labour relationship as one of the components of occupational quality. They find a strong contrast between Argentina and Costa Rica, on the one hand (with about 70 per cent of wage-earners in a permanent relationship), and Ecuador (where half of positions are temporary) on the other. Marull analyses the labour situation of this country in comparison to Bolivia. She finds, in both cases, high labour instability associated with the lack of labour contract and the prevalence of temporary contracts. Gamero analyses this and other dimensions of labour quality in Peru during the last decade and warns about the massive use of fixed-term contracts and also about the lack of contracts, considering Peru to be one of the countries with a highest incidence of such labour modalities in the region.

Lastly, Aleksynska and Berg (2015) assess the determinants of the use of temporary contract by firms in 135 developing countries. Data come from the World Bank Enterprises Survey and are collected from formal companies with 5 or more employees, operating in manufacturing and services sectors. The authors found that, as in developed countries, the need for external flexibility is one of the most important reasons to use this kind of contract. Also the possibility to reduce labour cost is another motivation. At the macro level, some specific labour legislation can limit the use of this contract. On the contrary, business cycle does not seem to have a significant impact on temporary employment, but economic development is negatively correlated with temporary employment.

5. Data

Data used in this paper come from regular household surveys carried out by the national statistical institutes of each country.

For Argentina, the data source is the *Encuesta Permanente de Hogares* (EPH). Micro-data are available for 31 urban areas and the survey provides quarterly data. For Brazil, the *Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego* (PME) was used. It covers six major urban areas and provides monthly information. The *Encuesta de Caracterización Nacional* (CASEN) covers both urban and rural areas of Chile and is performed bi-annually or tri-annually. The *Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo* (ENEMDU) in Ecuador is performed quarterly in urban and rural areas. Finally, the *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares* (ENAHO) in Peru is performed annually with national coverage.

The period under analyses corresponds to the first decade of the 2000s. However, specific years considered vary in each country according to data availability. In Argentina and Brazil all years between 2003 and 2013 are analysed; years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011 for Chile and the period 2004-2012 for Ecuador and Peru.

The analysis distinguishes formal from informal workers. For this, the "legal approach" to informality is adopted. This approach associates informality with the evasion of labour regulations.[4] The empirical identification of the wage-earners' registration condition in each of these countries was based on the availability of information derived

[4] ILO (2002), Hussmanns (2004).

from these databases. In Argentina, a wage-earner is considered a formal worker if her employer makes payroll deductions to pay social security contributions. In Chile and Brazil, a wage-earner is considered as registered if she has signed a labour contract. In Peru and Uruguay registered workers are those who are affiliated to a pension system. Finally, in Ecuador a wage-earner is considered as registered if she receives social insurance.

Temporary employment is also measured according to data availability in each survey. In particular, there are two types of approach to this subject: a broader one that focuses on whether the job has an end date (Argentina) and a more specific one that inquire into the type of contract, whether or not it is open-ended (Brazil, Ecuador and Peru). In Chile, both alternatives are available; nevertheless, while the first approach is available for all years, the second one changes along the series. Similarly, in Ecuador, possible answers regarding temporary jobs change in 2007 which produces a discontinuity in the series. In Peru and Argentina domestic service is excluded from this question. In the first of these countries, in turn, temporality is only surveyed among wage-earners who have a signed labour contract. All these features mean the data are not strictly comparable between countries or even, in the case of Ecuador and Chile, along the period.

Finally, part-time wage-earners are defined here as those who work less than 35 hours per week. This time limit is frequently used to statistically identify such type of work, although national regulations might set different thresholds, as stated above. Within part-time workers it is possible to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary underemployed. Unlike the rest of the countries analysed, in Chile such distinction can only be made from 2009 onwards.

Chile is also the only country to provide information that allows identification of triangular employment so that the analysis of this particular kind of employment will be exclusively performed for that case.

6. Methodology of estimation of wage gaps

Wage equations are estimated to assess the wage gaps associated with NSFE. To do this, both Heckman's Two Step and the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) methods are employed. The former allows estimating the effects of the covariates only on the mean wage; the latter, proposed by Firpo et al. (2011), allows estimating the impact of covariates on different quantiles of the wage distribution. The concept behind this extension is the so-called Recentered Influence Function (RIF). This function is defined as:

$$RIF(y; q_r) = q_\tau + IF(y; q_r)$$

where q_r is the non conditional r-th quantile of wages and IF is the influence function. This function measures the effect of slight changes in the distribution on the different functionals of the dependent variable. IF is defined as:

$$IF(y; q_r;\ F) = \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \frac{\left(q_r(F_\epsilon) - q_r(F)\right)}{\epsilon}$$

where $F_\epsilon(y) = (1 - \epsilon)F + \epsilon\delta_y;\ 0 \leq \epsilon \leq 1$ and where δ_y is a distribution that only puts mass at the point value y.

One important aspect is that the expected value of the RIF is equal to the statistic of interest since the expected value of the IF is zero. From RIF regressions we obtain the marginal effect of one explanatory variable (X) on unconditioned quantiles of the wage

distribution, which are then integrated over the values of X like in standard regressions. Formally, we have

$$\alpha(q_r) = \int \frac{dE(RIF(y; q_r)|X = x)}{dx} dF(x)$$

Finally, since our interest is to analyse the effect of X on each quantile of the wage distribution, the IF associated with this functional is:

$$\phi(Y;\ q_r) = q_r + \frac{(r - \mathbb{I}\{Y \leq q_r\})}{f_Y(q_r)}$$

where f_Y is the marginal density function of *Y* and $\mathbb{I}(\cdot)$ is the indicator function.

Therefore, once the RIF is calculated, it is possible to perform OLS estimation using it as the dependent variable and the same covariates as in standard Mincer equations. Estimated coefficients indicate the effect of a marginal change in these covariates on the unconditioned quantile of the wage distribution.

7. An overview of labour formalization in Latin America

Although labour informality continues to be one of the region's distinctive characteristics, its incidence has fallen in a significant number of countries, especially over the past decade.

In particular, in all cases analysed here the proportion of formal labour in total employment rose, though with different intensities. As detailed in Table 1, in Argentina and in Brazil the increase was about 11 percentage points (p.p.). Even more intense was the formalization process that took place in Ecuador and Peru, where the proportion of formal workers increased 22 p.p. and 17 p.p. respectively from 2004 onwards. Lastly, in Chile, where formality was initially higher than in the rest of the countries, the increase was lower, of about 5 percentage points.

Table 1. Evolution of formal wage-earners (percentage)*

Year	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Ecuador	Peru
2000			77.0		
2003	56.1	69.7	77.7		
2004	55.4	69.1		32.9	35.0
2005	57.3	70.2		32.7	36.9
2006	58.7	71.3	79.8	32.8	40.6
2007	61.3	73.1		33.6	44.2
2008	62.5	74.4		35.7	44.2
2009	64.1	74.8	77.4	39.7	47.8
2010	66.8	77.0		45.0	48.1
2011	66.3	79.0	82.3	53.2	50.7
2012	65.6	79.3		54.5	52.5
2013	66.8	81.8			

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

*Figures for Argentina and Brazil correspond to urban areas

This labour formalization process must be evaluated even more positively considering that it took place during a period of aggregate employment growth, which led to the creation of a significant amount of jobs registered in the social security system. In Argentina and Brazil, for instance, the number of formal occupations rose about 60 per cent whereas total employment rose 25 per cent along the last decade (Maurizio, 2014).

Labour formalization achievements have been associated, on the one hand, to a greater dynamism in the generation of new jobs in a macroeconomic context generally characterised by relatively high and stable growth rates. On the other hand, to the implementation of specific public policies aiming at reducing the costs of informality, through varied incentive mechanisms, or at raising informality costs by strengthening labour inspection.[5]

In this context, the following sections analyse in detail the extent to which this labour formalization process has been parallel to improvements in other dimensions of labour quality.

8. Prevalence, trends and characteristics of temporary employment

The incidence of temporary employment is different in each country under analysis (Table 2). Even though, as explained before, these numbers are not strictly comparable to one another, we do observe that, considering the most recent observation for urban areas of each country, Brazil is one extreme case with a low incidence (3 per cent), followed by Argentina (10 per cent), then Chile (about 20 per cent), Ecuador (46 per cent) and finally Peru (about 64 per cent). In other words, in the last two cases at least half of wage-earners do not have an open-ended position. In Ecuador, this is all the more problematic when rural areas are incorporated into the analysis, which raises the rate by almost 10 percentage points. In Chile we find a similar situation although this increase is substantially lower. It is worth evoking that in Peru temporality is defined only for wage-earners with a written contract. However, in 2012 only half of wage-earners were in such a situation, which suggests the incidence of temporary employment might be even higher. [6]

[5] Berg (2011), Beccaria (2013), Bertranou et al. (2012, 2013), Maurizio (2014a, 2014b, 2015), Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social (2013), Pereyra (2012), Pires (2009).

[6] These figures are higher than those obtained by Aleksynska and Berg (2015) for these countries in comparable years. This is expected because here all wage earners are considered while in this study the analysis is restricted to full-time employees in formal enterprises with 5 or more workers in the industry or service sectors.

Table 2. Evolution of temporary workers (percentage)

Year	Argentina	Brazil	Chile		Ecuador		Peru	
			Total	Urban	Total	Urban	Total	Urban
2000			21.0	18.7				
2003	16.8	4.2	24.4	21.9				
2004	15.9	4.1			39.0	33.7	*	*
2005	14.4	3.8			35.0	29.2	59.3	59.9
2006	14.2	4.6	22.7	20.4	38.9	32.8	60.9	62.0
2007	12.8	4.1			59.0**	50.8**	59.7	58.9
2008	11.5	3.8			61.5	53.3	62.8	62.7
2009	11.6	3.5	23.8	21.5	60.0	52.4	62.6	61.6
2010	9.9	3.4			58.7	51.2	64.9	63.9
2011	10.6	3.3	24.2	21.9	55.4	47.2	62.5	61.6
2012	9.9	3.5			54.4	45.7	63.9	63.5
2013	9.8	3.0						

* El año 2004 no fue incluido aquí debido al elevado porcentaje de no respuesta
**Cambio en la estrategia de indagación

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

When we move to the evolution of temporary employment, we find a downward trend in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, although in the last case this is from 2007 onward. On the contrary, Chile and Peru show increases with respect to the beginning of the period but with fluctuations in between. Therefore the growth of employment and formality that took place in all these countries did not lead to a reduction in temporary employment in these two cases like it did in the first three. As pointed out before, Gamero (2013) warns about the generalised use of different types of temporary contracts in Peru, even to fill permanent staff needs.

Table 1A presents the proportion of temporary employment in different subgroups of wage-earners and each one's contribution to global temporary employment. It affects informal jobs more strongly than formal jobs (Figure 1). In Argentina, a third of informal workers are temporary, reaching 50 per cent in Chile. In Ecuador and Peru, about 90 per cent of informal wage-earners are temporary. This means that the poor labour conditions (mainly the lack of social security coverage) that characterise informal positions are aggravated by the instability that arises from fixed-term contracts. Nevertheless, except for Argentina and Brazil, temporary employment extends to formal workers, affecting 20 per cent of such workers in Chile, almost 30 per cent in Ecuador and about 60 per cent in Peru. This leads, in turn, to a higher incidence gap between formal and informal workers in countries where this phenomenon is less frequent.

Figure 1. Prevalence of temporary employment among formal and informal wage-earners. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Differences in relative incidence of this phenomenon, together with differences in formality rates between countries, make each one's contribution to global temporary employment different in each case. In Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, 70 to 80 per cent of temporary jobs are informal. In the first two cases, this is so in spite of relatively low informality rates; it is rather a consequence of the fact that temporary employment is virtually non-existent in formal jobs, as stated before. In Ecuador, on the contrary, it is the combination of high informality and a high incidence of temporary employment in this sort of positions which explains these results.

Unlike these three cases, in Chile and Peru 60 to 70 per cent of temporary jobs are formal. In the former, this is a consequence of high formality combined with relatively high incidence of this phenomenon in such jobs. Lastly, in Peru it must be born in mind that temporary employment is surveyed only among workers with written contracts, which biases estimation toward formal positions, the ones that most frequently count on such instrument.

The evolution of temporary employment has been different within each subgroup of workers. In Argentina, although both groups experienced a reduction in the proportion of temporary employment, the fall was relatively greater among formal wage-earners. In Brazil neither has shown significant changes. In Ecuador it is interesting to point out that both groups showed a remarkable increase in the proportion of temporary employment, of about 8 p.p. from 2007 onward, while global incidence fell. This suggests that this country experienced a "composition effect" such that the formalization process led to a reduction of temporary employment exclusively due to the fact that formal workers show lower incidence of this phenomenon. Finally, in Chile and Peru the rise in the proportion of fixed-term jobs owes to what happened with registered positions. On the contrary, temporary employment among informal workers remained relatively stable. These results show therefore that formalization in the last three of these countries has been characterised by a growing incidence of fixed-term contracts.

As for personal characteristics, there is not a clear correlation between fixed-term contracts and gender. While in Brazil and Peru it is higher for women, the opposite happens in the other countries. Regarding each group's contribution to total temporary employment, in Brazil about 60 per cent of temporary positions are filled by women while the opposite happens in the rest.

Consistent with previous results for these and other countries, we find a clear negative correlation between incidence of temporary employment and age or educational level. This means that it is the young and the least skilled workers who have a greater probability of entering such jobs and therefore who suffer the most from the occupational instability that pertains to them. This situation has not changed substantially along the decade.

The prevalence of this type of employment is not significantly higher in rural areas than in urban ones. However, given the high concentration of wage-earners in urban areas, most part-time jobs take are urban.

Construction, agriculture and domestic service show, except for Brazil and Peru, the highest rates of temporary employment. This is associated, on one side, to seasonality of (rural) tasks or to the irregular nature of the activity (construction) and, on the other side, to the fact that these sectors usually show the highest levels of labour informality. Fixed-term positions are particularly frequent in the public sector in Brazil while in Peru temporary employment is more similar between productive sectors, although it is also higher in construction.

Except for Peru, all countries show higher incidence of this kind of employment among part-time jobs than among full-time ones. In Argentina, Chile and Ecuador, the proportion of temporary jobs among the former approximately doubles that of the latter. In Brazil, this gap rises to 5 times. The correlation between the two types of employment, temporary and part-time, might indicate that employers resort to them in order to hire workers they do not judge essential to the firm's activities.

Finally, we find a negative correlation between temporality and on-the-job training in Chile and Ecuador, the only countries for which we have data on this. This is consistent with the statement that employers will be less prone to provide this kind of training to employees who will remain shorter time in the company, as under such circumstances it is less likely that they might benefit from the potential productivity rise associated with the increase in specific human capital. Likewise it might indicate that temporary positions require *per se* fewer qualifications.

So far descriptive analysis was carried out separately for each dimension. In order to considerer the independent impact of each characteristic, controlling for other attributes, we performed probit regressions, where the dependent variable adopts value 1 if the wage-earning position is temporary and 0 if it is permanent. Resulting marginal effects are presented in Table 2A. In all countries informal workers face higher probabilities of having a temporary job than formal workers. Similarly, construction activities prove the highest use of temporary contracts, except in Brazil where, as pointed out before, it is the public sector activities that do so. In Chile and Ecuador temporary employment is also important in "other sectors", associated with agricultural activities. In these two countries, when we control for other characteristics, domestic service no longer belongs to the sectors with the highest incidence of this type of employment.

Just like in the descriptive analysis, in Argentina men have a higher probability of being temporary workers, while the contrary holds in Brazil. In Ecuador we do not find significant differences between men and women. Unlike previous results, when we control for other characteristics, men have a smaller probability of being temporary in Chile and a higher one in Peru.

We confirm the negative correlation between the probability of being a temporary worker and the educational level in all countries except for Brazil. There we find a puzzling result, to be further studied in more detail, as the correlation is inverted up to the incomplete

tertiary level, the coefficient for the superior level not being statistically significant. In all cases we verify that this kind of employment decreases with age.

Finally, consistent with descriptive results, in all countries except for Peru having a part-time position has a strong positive correlation with it being temporary.

Summing up, these econometric results confirm that wage-earners with a less favourable vector of characteristics have a greater chance of having a temporary job. This will be probably associated with lower labour income and also with higher income instability, due to the fixed term of these contracts.

9. Prevalence, trends and characteristics of part-time employment

Another important component of NSFE is part-time employment. Table 3 presents, for each country, the proportion of part-time workers in total wage-earners, the proportion of involuntarily underemployed in total wage-earners and the proportion of involuntarily underemployed in part-time wage-earners.

By the end of the period under analysis, total part-time employment represented almost 10 per cent in Chile and Ecuador, 16 per cent in Brazil, 26 per cent in Peru and 32 per cent in Argentina. However, incidence is substantially lower in the case of involuntary underemployment: while it is virtually insignificant in Brazil (1 per cent of salaried work in 2011), it reaches 6 to 7 per cent in the rest of the countries.

In Chile and Ecuador over half part-time workers find themselves involuntarily in such position, about a fourth in Argentina and Peru and only 7 per cent in Brazil. Hence this should be born in mind when analysing total part-time employment in Latin America as its incidence does not necessarily reflect unfulfilled worker´s demand of labour hours, at least not the same way across countries. These remarks still hold when the analysis is restricted to urban areas.[7]

[7] Estimations for urban areas were performed so as to make data from Chile, Ecuador and Peru comparable to those from other countries. They were not included due to length considerations but are available upon request.

Table 3. Evolution of part-time employment (percentage)

Year	Argentina			Brazil			Chile		
	Part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total part-time	Part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total part-time	Part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total part-time
2000							9.4		
2003	33.9	16.4	48.4	15.3	3.1	20.5	13.4		
2004	32.5	14.1	43.4	18.2	3.0	16.8			
2005	32.2	11.7	36.5	17.9	2.7	14.9			
2006	31.4	10.9	34.7	22.0	3.1	13.9	11.5		
2007	30.8	9.2	29.9	20.7	2.3	11.2			
2008	32.9	9.3	28.4	16.0	2.3	14.2			
2009	32.3	10.6	32.8	19.7	2.2	11.4	12.8	5.5	43.4
2010	30.6	8.2	26.9	18.8	2.0	10.8			
2011	31.4	8.3	26.3	18.6	1.5	8.2	12.0	6.7	56.3
2012	31.8	8.8	27.8	20.7	1.5	7.3			
2013	31.6	8.0	25.2	15.5	1.0	6.6			

Year	Ecuador			Peru		
	Part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total part-time	Part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total wage earners	Invol. part-time / Total part-time
2004	17.7	12.7	71.6	29.0	12.8	44.0
2005	17.0	11.3	66.5	29.0	12.8	44.0
2006	16.8	11.1	65.8	27.9	12.3	44.2
2007	16.1	9.9	61.6	27.0	12.7	47.2
2008	13.2	7.8	59.1	26.5	11.0	41.3
2009	13.1	7.7	58.8	26.3	10.3	39.0
2010	13.1	8.0	60.7	27.1	10.3	38.0
2011	10.8	6.3	57.8	26.4	9.2	34.9
2012	10.3	5.2	51.0	26.0	7.3	27.9

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

The reduction in involuntary underemployment in the last decade has been more intense than that of part-time employment in all countries. This suggests that the increase in the employment rate during this period has been accompanied by remarkable reductions in involuntary part-time positions (where in almost all countries incidence was reduced by half, except for Chile where data are only available for the last years) probably due to transformations of these positions in full-time ones. As found in other economic growth cycles in the region, employment adjustment through labour hours is commonplace in these labour markets. These downward trends, in turn, seem to contrast with the increase of these positions observed in developed countries during the last decade (Messenger and Ray, 2015).

In order to grasp a global outlook on the incidence of these unconventional forms of employment in the five countries under analysis, Figure 2 shows, for the last year of each series, the proportion of temporary workers (analysed before), part-time workers and involuntarily underemployed. We find, on the one hand, that temporary employment is preeminent over involuntary underemployment in all countries; on the other hand, that differences between them are more related to temporary employment than to part-time employment. Lastly, if we order countries according to the joint incidence of both phenomena, the lowest case is Brazil, then Argentina and Chile and, at the end, Ecuador and Peru. This ranking is very similar to the one we obtain if we use the formality rate, suggesting positive correlation between the dimensions that make up employment quality.

Figure 2. Prevalence of temporary and part-time employment. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

9.1 Characteristics of total part-time employment

Like temporary employment, the incidence of total part-time employment is 2 to 8 times higher among informal workers than among formal ones. Along with the importance of informality, this makes the former represent from 40 per cent (Brazil) to 86 per cent (Ecuador) of part-time positions (Table 3A).

As expected, women and young people show a higher proportion of this type of positions. This result is consistent with others found in international literature. Jepsen et al. (2005) mentions that a common finding across countries is the fact that women are a majority among part-time workers and that the growth of female employment has been possible partly thanks to this. As explained before, domestic responsibilities and care work, together with education, might be explicative factors of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, as shown later on, it is also likely that part-time vacancies are aimed at these groups in spite of their willingness to work more hours.

The relation between part-time employment and age is not linear but rather U-shaped with a higher incidence of underemployment among wage-earners older than 45 than prime-age workers. This might suggest that older adults who stay in the labour market after the legal retirement age do so with a lower intensity.

It is worthwhile to remark that there is no common trend in the relation between this kind of positions and educational level. While in Argentina and Ecuador their incidence falls with the level of qualifications, the contrary holds for Brazil and Chile. In Peru the prevalence is relatively similar in the three levels considered.

Regarding specific sectors, domestic service shows a high incidence of part-time employment. In Argentina, for instance, about 80 per cent of positions in domestic service are part-time while about a fourth of these jobs are concentrated in this sector. In the other countries, about 30 per cent of domestic service employment is part-time. In Argentina, Brazil and Chile, personal services are also relevant, as is the public sector due partly to the high incidence of education and health (private and public, respectively). In Ecuador and Peru, "other sectors" (including agricultural activities) are important as well.

A relevant dimension, as mentioned before, is the extent to which these part-time positions are transitory or permanent. Although the data available do not allow us to address this issue in depth, the analysis of part-time employment incidence across permanent or temporary occupations, or across job duration, might provide some insight.

As observed in Table 3A, in all cases except for Peru, the proportion of part-time jobs is significantly higher in temporary positions than in open-ended ones. This indicates, as mentioned before, that wage-earners with unconventional time intensities might also suffer from non-standard hiring regimes. Consistent with these data, we find negative correlation between this sort of positions and duration in the position, although with higher intensity in some countries than others. In Argentina, for example, over half of workers who have spent less than 3 months in the job are part-time. This proportion falls to 25 per cent in workers who have stayed longer than 5 years.

These results give rise to two alternative hypotheses. On one side, this negative correlation might indicate that as the labour relationship continues the probability of transforming a part-time position into a full-time one increases. Alternatively, the combination of these two NSFE might indicate that individuals who enter a part-time position experience a higher exit rate from it than those in full-time positions, thus reflecting less favourable labour conditions.

As discussed for temporary employment, another relevant dimension analysed in international literature is whether shorter work time influences companies' training decisions. Let us bear in mind that this issue can only be assessed in Chile and Ecuador. In both cases we find that the relative importance of part-time jobs is greater among workers who do not receive any specific on-the-job training. This negative correlation has been documented in other studies and might reflect, on one hand, that the fixed costs of training discourage employers from offering it to part-time employees, considered less involved with the company. Alternatively, it might be the case that these positions are concentrated in activities that require little or no specific training.

So far we have carried out independent analyses of each attribute without controlling for the rest. Therefore we present in Table 4A the results of probit regressions. The dependent variable adopts value 1 if the wage-earner has a part-time job and 0 otherwise.

The results confirm that women and informal workers have higher probabilities of working part-time in comparison to men and formal workers respectively. We also verify the U-shaped relation between the probability of having a part-time job and age. Although it is not verified in all educational levels, the probability of being part-time generally rises with education, especially in the higher levels. Similarly, we find a negative relation between on-the-job training received and part-time work. Finally, like in the descriptive analysis, temporary workers exhibit a higher chance of being part-time, except in Peru.

9.2 Characteristics of involuntary part-time employment

In order to assess the extent to which these results vary when we restrict the analysis to involuntary underemployment, Table 5A presents the same estimates for this subgroup only.

Like before, we find positive correlation between informality and this type of occupation. However this is much stronger than the one found before. For example, while the incidence of part-time positions among informal workers doubles that of formal workers in Argentina, the prevalence of involuntary underemployment is 5 times greater among informal workers than among formal workers. Thus we do not find informality to be

"compensated" by allowing the workers to voluntarily choose to work fewer hours. On the contrary, labour informality coincides with a shorter workday as determinants of poor labour conditions and, at the same time, low monthly wages.

Involuntary underemployment is also more intense among women and young people. Nonetheless, unlike previous findings, we do not find the U-shaped relation with age or education (or only do so weakly). The only exceptions are Brazil and Chile for educational level. This suggests therefore that among adults older than 45 years and the higher-educated workers, the shorter workday previously found would be mostly voluntary, while the opposite holds for the rest of the workers. The fact that part-time employment might be voluntary, in turn, responds to several factors. Regarding education, it might be the case that workers with certain qualifications choose part-time positions as they prefer to devote fewer hours to work and that, given their skills, employers accept such conditions to retain them. As for older adults, they may choose to work part-time as a means of staying in the labour market after the retirement age, but with lower time intensity.

Like in the case of total part-time employment, domestic service is relevant here as the activity with the highest proportion of this sort of employment in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In the other two countries incidence of this phenomenon is also considerable in this sector. When we compare the distribution of involuntary underemployment across sectors to that of total part-time employment, we find that domestic service actually shows a higher proportion in those three countries, which suggests that involuntary underemployment is more prevalent than voluntary part-time employment in this sector. On the contrary, public sector is less relevant here due, as mentioned before, to education activities which are often part-time.

The correlation between involuntary part-time employment and temporary employment is higher than before, which suggests precarious labour conditions for those who enter such types of positions in the labour market.

Results from probit regressions (Table 4A) confirm that women exhibit higher chances than men of working part-time both voluntarily and involuntarily. In other words, the statement that women are only partially devoted to the labour market in order to find a balance between labour and non-labour activities (especially care) fails to explain the greater incidence of involuntary underemployment that also affects them.

The U-shaped profile that links the probability of part-time work to age is stronger for involuntary underemployment. In particular, as discussed above, among the young the use of this sort of positions in a voluntary fashion is more frequent than among adults due to other activities such as education. Older adults might choose to continue in the labour market but under reduced time intensity. Informal workers have greater chances to work part-time, both voluntarily and involuntarily.

The positive impact of education on the probability of having a part-time job described above stems mostly or entirely (Argentina) from involuntary underemployment. This would suggest that, other things equal, wage-earners with higher qualifications have greater bargaining power to achieve a reduced workday.

10. Triangular employment. The case of Chile

As explained before, it is not possible to identify cases of labour outsourcing or triangular employment from the data available except for Chile in 2011. Hence in this section we will only report information for that case.

However a recent study jointly performed by the *Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de las Américas* and the *Confederación Sindical Internacional* (2013) on Temporary Employment Agencies provides some relevant data, not only for that country but also for Argentina, Brazil and Peru, among other not considered here (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay). In addition to pointing out the difficulties that this type of outsourcing might generate concerning labour conditions, this study aims at quantifying the relative importance of this kind of employment in the region.

In almost all countries, three multinational companies of great relevance are present: Adecco, Randstad and Manpower. Temporary agency employment spreads over a wide range of economic sectors. Even when industry and trade seem to be the most important ones, services, transport, construction and agricultural activities also use labour force that comes from employment agencies. Colombia is the country where this sort of employment is most widespread (8.7 per cent of total workers), followed by Peru (2.5 per cent), Brazil and Chile (1.8 per cent), Uruguay (1.3 per cent) and Argentina and Mexico (about 0.5 per cent). Young people, women and lower-educated workers are the ones who suffer the most from this kind of labour intermediation.

Focusing on Chile, as we can see in Table 6A, about 93 per cent of workers in 2011 were hired by the company where they work, 6 per cent signed a contract with a subcontractor and only 1 per cent had a contract with a temporary employment agency. This last number is similar to the one found in the previous study for this country.

There seems to be a higher incidence of informality among those hired directly while the prevalence of formal positions is somewhat higher in the second type of hiring. Men exhibit lower proportion of direct hiring than women. Similar to the results found for the region, outsourcing and temporary agency employment is more frequent among the young.

Virtually all higher-educated wage-earners have been hired directly while, as expected, this type of hiring falls with the worker's qualifications. It is in construction activities where outsourcing is the most frequent.

Finally, we find a significant difference in the incidence of direct hiring in temporary and permanent positions, it being higher in the latter. This suggests that companies prefer to outsource staff when they expect them to work temporarily in the company.

11. Non-standard forms of employment and wage gaps

This section addresses wage gaps associated with fixed-term employment and part-time employment.

Wage gaps associated with fixed-term employment

There are different arguments on the existence of wage gaps between temporary and permanent workers. Blanchard and Landier (2002) develop a model where it is assumed that firms initially hire temporary workers. Due to firing costs for permanent workers, companies

do not promote their employees to permanent positions unless general economic conditions or the company's specific needs so require. However, once the worker fills an open-ended position, she finds herself in a better position to bargain for labour conditions precisely due to the existence of firing costs (insiders-outsiders theory). Hence part of the premium associated with permanent positions is a consequence of the existence of such costs.

At the same time, as explained before, permanent workers have greater chances than temporary workers of being unionized, which can be an additional source of wage gaps. Nevertheless, in Latin American, these arguments only apply to formal workers.

On the contrary, temporary positions might entail a premium in order to compensate for certain disadvantages these jobs involve, particularly greater instability.

Empirical evidence for developed countries suggests the presence of a wage penalty associated with temporary work. Boeri (2011), for instance, performs a comparative study of European countries and finds that in all cases males with open-ended contracts receive higher monthly wages than those with fixed-term contracts, controlling for education and job duration. The range goes from 6 per cent in the United Kingdom to 45 per cent in Sweden. Jahn and Pozzoli (2013) estimate that the penalty suffered by workers hired through temporary employment agencies in Germany is 20 per cent for men and 14 per cent for women. A similar figure, 20 per cent, is obtained by Blanchard and Landier's (2002) for temporary workers in France.

As pointed out by Kahn (2013), these cross-section estimations might be upwardly biased insofar as permanent workers might have unobserved productivity levels that exceed those of temporary workers. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, this author applies fixed effects estimation using the European Community Household Panel for 13 European countries in 1995-2001. In spite of this correction, the author still finds premiums associated with permanent positions, although these vary according to certain characteristics of workers.

Table 4[8] summarises estimations of average wage gaps associated with temporary contracts, while Table 7A presents full results for these regressions.

Table 4. Wage gaps associated with temporary employment. Most recent observation for each country

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Argentina	-8.6%	-7.0%	-9.9%	-13.1%	-11.8%	-11.9%
Brazil	-8.6%	-13.3%	-7.7%	-10.4%	-22.0%	-6.5%
Chile	-15.0%	-15.2%	-13.2%	-16.7%	-15.5%	-17.7%
Ecuador	-12.9%	-9.6%	-15.5%	-13.2%	-9.7%	-16.4%
Peru	-3.7%	-5.6%	0%	-6.2%	-7.4%	0%

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Just like the results obtained for a large group of developed countries, in all cases analysed here we find a wage penalty associated with temporary employment, controlling for the other observable attributes. In particular, having a temporary job, by the end of the

[8] These results are obtained computing, for each regression coefficient, the antilogarithm and afterwards subtracting unity, so as to express the gap in percentage points.

period, reduces hourly wages by about 4 per cent in Peru, 9 per cent in Argentina and Brazil, 13 per cent in Ecuador and 15 per cent in Chile.[9]

Unlike the results presented by Cazes and de Laiglesia (2015) for OECD countries, we do not find a clear positive (or negative) correlation between the prevalence of this kind of contract and the size of the wage penalty. Peru, with the greatest incidence of temporary work, shows the lowest wage gap, followed by Argentina and Brazil, which feature the lowest temporary employment rates.

In general, wage gaps are found both for formal and informal workers, with no clear pattern regarding its relative intensity in each group. While in Argentina and Ecuador the gap is greater among informal workers, the opposite holds for Brazil and Chile. Actually, in Peru the penalty is only verified for formal workers.

The point made by Blanchard and Landier (2002) might account for temporary employment penalty in formal positions. It might also be the case that in these positions a permanent worker receives more on-the-job training and specific qualifications (unobserved here), which might in turn translate into wage premiums. In fact, based on the efficiency wage theory it is possible to say that the growth of vacancies can increase the voluntary turnover of employees in the search of better employment opportunities, causing a higher number of exits that can result in greater costs for the employers. Then, the higher the level of investment made by the employer in specific training of the employee, the greater the costs incurred when they exit the firm. Therefore, employers want to retain them, and even more as they become more experienced in their jobs. One way to do so is by offering them better working conditions, for example, through higher wages. Additionally, a higher level of unionization is expected in formal workers which might also contribute to the observed result.

However, these arguments seem more appropriate for formal wage-earners. In this sense, these results are all the more important considering that labour legislation stipulates in all cases that temporary workers should have equal treatment in wage determination. Nevertheless in the countries under analyses, where labour inspections usually have limited scope, the use of temporary contracts might weaken workers leading to lower wages and lower coverage of other labour rights. Additionally, even though temporary workers may be compensated according to legal standards, it might be the case that they do not receive bonuses, annual complementary salary or premiums that companies do pay to permanent workers.

The penalty is even higher when monthly wages are analysed, which is consistent with previously showed results regarding the greater incidence of part-time employment among temporary workers.

So far we have analysed average gaps without assessing the extent to which they reflect the penalties suffered by temporary workers located at different points of the distribution. Figure 3 shows the behaviour of gaps in hourly wages along the distribution, leading to a heterogeneous scenario.

In Argentina the penalty clearly falls through the wage distribution; that is, the wage reduction experienced by temporary workers is greater in the lower part of the distribution. This holds for total wage-earners and also for formal ones, while for informal workers the penalty stays relatively stable along the distribution. This suggests, therefore, a particularly

[9] Using cross-sectional data does not allow us to identify the extent to which these gaps might be overestimated due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.

serious situation since labour instability (and, in consequence, wage instability) is stronger for those with the lowest wages.

On the contrary, in Brazil, Ecuador and Peru we find an increasing profile in the penalty along wage deciles. Hence the wage gap is larger at the higher part of the distribution. In the first case, this is true for total wage-earners and for informal ones; the same holds for Ecuador and in Peru it is specially so in the latter group. This might suggest the existence of a "glass ceiling" as temporary workers do not achieve high wage positions as do permanent ones.

In Chile we do not find a monotone pattern. This implies that for total wage-earners and for formal ones, the penalty is similar in the lower deciles and in the higher deciles. For informal workers, much like in Argentina, the penalty is higher in the left tail of the distribution. Future studies should analyse in more detail the determinants of changes in the wage penalty along the distribution.

Figure 3. Wage gaps associated with temporary employment along the wage distribution. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Finally, Figure 4 shows the proportion of temporary workers in total wage-earners for each quintile of hourly wages. It becomes evident that the incidence of this phenomenon is decreasing in the distribution, although the profile is not always monotone. For instance, 82 per cent of workers in the lowest 20 per cent of Ecuador are temporary and 73 per cent are for Peru. But even in Argentina or Chile, where the global incidence of the phenomenon is significantly lower, 25 per cent and 40 per cent of workers in the first quintile have this kind of contracts, respectively. The higher concentration of wage-earners with fixed-term positions in the lower part of the distribution owes, on one side, to the fact that this phenomenon is more common for workers with a less favourable vector of characteristics but also to the specific penalty associated with this sort of positions. Hence, as mentioned

above, we find a combination of low wages and instability, in countries with scarce development of social or labour policies that enable mitigation of the impacts of labour instability on labour and family income.

Figure 4. Proportion of temporary wage-earners by hourly wage quintile. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Wage gaps associated with part-time employment

International evidence is mixed regarding the effect of part-time employment on hourly wages. Manning and Petrongolo (2008) find a wage penalty for this sort of positions in British women of about 3 per cent, which rises to 10 per cent if characteristics of the position are not controlled for. This reflects that there exist important differences in the kind of jobs available for part-time and full-time workers.

Data collected by Messenger and Ray (2015) from different studies for a large set of countries also show, in most cases, a penalty in hourly wages of part-time workers. They include, nonetheless, the results presented by Rau Binder (2010), who finds a premium associated with part-time jobs in the Chilean case. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that this result owes exclusively to coefficient effect as composition effect would imply lower hourly wages for part-time workers than those of full-time workers.

Diverse arguments account for these gaps, either positive or negative. One reason for wage penalty is that certain groups of workers (young people, women and the elderly) might prefer to work part-time, as explained before, and therefore accept wages lower than the ones they would receive in full-time positions, controlling for other characteristics. However this trade-off would only be true for voluntary part-time workers.

On the other hand, the existence of fixed costs (which do not depend on the amount of hours worked) associated with hiring, training and management of staff might make these workers more costly than full-time ones, so that firms might choose to compensate for these extra costs through lower wages. Similarly, in cases where specific training is required to achieve high levels of productivity and efficiency, part-time workers might require longer time to acquire it so that employers might again try to make up for such problem through lower net wages.

At the other end, to account for part-time employment premiums it has been stated that it is particularly frequent in sectors that suffer from seasonality, where high labour demand cannot be adjusted through extra hours, which leads to the need to offer higher hourly wages to find workers available for specific periods.

At the same time, the relation between labour productivity and hours worked is evoked as a determinant of the wage gap between the two types of workers. On one side, it is stated that productivity rises slowly from the beginning of the workday so that those who work fewer hours would reach a productivity maximum inferior to the one reached by full-time workers, hence receiving lower compensations (Barzel, 1973). Alternatively, it has been mentioned that shorter working hours would cause an increase in labour productivity thanks to the inexistence of the "fatigue effect", which leads to higher hourly wages (Hagemann, 1994; Shepard *et al.*, 1996).

Compliance of antidiscrimination regulations should tend to prevent the existence of such wage penalty. However, similar to the case of temporary employment, part-time workers might suffer from less bargaining power, among other reasons due to lower unionization, with negative consequences on wages.

On the contrary, Posel and Muller (2007) find a premium associated with part-time of about 40 per cent in South African women. They suggest that this result stems from existence of a lower bound to wages associated, in turn, to the minimum hourly wage, which is higher for those who worker fewer than 28 weekly hours.

Rau Binder (2010) also finds a wage premium of about 60 per cent in the Chilean case and states that it might owe, on one hand, to higher potential productivity of part-time workers (although he acknowledges that it is unlikely that this factor alone could account for such a large gap); on the other hand, to compensating differences that make this higher wage an incentive for workers to accept a position they would not accept otherwise. Even so, some firms, for instance retailers, agree to pay higher wages due to staff requirements on weekends.

Table 5 summarises estimations of hourly wage gaps associated with part-time employment, while Table 7A presents full results of the regressions.

Table 5. Hourly wage gaps associated with part-time employment. Most recent observation for each country

	Total part-time			Involuntary part-time			Voluntary part-time		
	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Argentina	26.5%	28.4%	24.4%	27.5%	28.5%	28.1%	26.2%	28.4%	22.6%
Brazil	34.6%	36.5%	32.7%	30.9%	35.5%	31.8%	35.0%	36.5%	32.8%
Chile	71.8%	77.9%	62.6%	61.4%	62.6%	58.9%	85.7%	96.8%	68.7%
Ecuador	24.7%	31.3%	25.5%	25.4%	42.3%	24.2%	24.1%	27.6%	27.0%
Peru	45.6%	45.6%	51.1%	43.9%	42.2%	58.2%	46.2%	47.0%	48.1%

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Unlike the results presented for temporary employment, we can appreciate that part-time work receives higher hourly wages than full-time work. In all cases these differences are statistically significant. Their magnitude however varies between countries, from about 25 per cent in Ecuador to 72 per cent in Chile.

Except for Peru, in the rest of cases the positive hourly wage gap of part-time workers is more intense for formal than for informal workers. Lastly, this premium holds for those voluntarily and involuntary underemployed.

Hence it is worthwhile to highlight the contrast between these results and those widely obtained for developed countries. In the countries under analysis, we might be looking at the existence of a certain lower bound for wages, even though they do not stem from higher legal minimum hourly wages for part-time wage-earners. It would be rather associated with the fact that in a context of generally low wages, those paid to part-time workers are higher than the ones that would proportionally correspond to full-time workers. The compensating difference argument might also explain this gap, in particular in the case of involuntary part-time.

However, like in the case of temporary employment, mean wage gaps do not always reflect what happens along the unconditional distribution (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Hourly wage gaps associated with part-time employment along the wage distribution. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

In particular, in all cases, both for formal and informal workers, we find that the premium rises with wage, although the profile is not always monotone. In other words, the higher hourly wages received, holding other attributes constant, by part-time workers, are even higher in the upper tail of the distribution. The only exceptions are formal workers in Argentina, where the gap is relatively constant. Therefore, the wage lower bound hypothesis does not seem to fully account for these premiums as it would only justify those observed in the lower tail of the distribution. In the higher part of the wage scale, some compensating difference might prevail again. Nevertheless further work should study this aspect in more detail.

Contrary to the case of temporary employment, except for Ecuador, in the rest of the countries the incidence of this sort of jobs is higher in the last quintile than in the first (Figure 6). This is consistent, on one side, with them receiving a wage premium that, in time, is increasing across the distribution; on the other side, this might also reflect the

"composition effect" since, as pointed out above, skilled workers show a higher incidence of this kind of employment (except for Ecuador where the pattern is reversed).

Figure 6. Proportion of part-time wage-earners by hourly wage quintile. Most recent observation for each country



Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

In any case, cross-sectional data do not allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that might bias the estimates.

12. Final remarks

During the last decade, Latin America experienced a process of significant improvement of the labour market, mainly reflected in a reduction of unemployment, creation of jobs, increase in the average real wage and labour formalisation.

These improvements notwithstanding, countries of the region still show remarkable deficits in labour matter and in the generation and distribution of income. The presence of non-standard forms of employment comes in addition to a high level of informality.

This paper aimed to study in-depth temporary employment and part-time employment in five countries of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, as well as triangular employment in Chile. We estimated the incidence of these phenomena in total salaried employment and in certain subgroups of workers; we analysed its evolution along the last decade and assessed the extent to which non-standard employment leads to wage penalties and worse labour conditions. The selection of countries provides an exhaustive evaluation of the region as they exhibit labour structures and dynamics that greatly differ from one another.

We confirm that temporary employment prevails over part-time employment. This reflects both the greater prevalence of the former and its higher incidence in some specific groups of workers. In particular, fixed-term work more strongly affects informal workers, women, young and lower-educated workers. At the same time, in addition to an evidently lower stability, it entails a significant wage penalty in all countries under analysis. This suggests correlation between low wages, precarious labour conditions and absence of labour income, all the more serious considering low or none protection from unemployment in

these countries. In so far as this phenomenon more strongly affects workers who on average exhibit a vector of less favourable observable characteristics, these wage gaps appear as additional sources of inequality.

Underemployment, particularly of the involuntary kind, has a lower incidence than temporary employment in the countries under analysis. However it is again women and young people who enter most of this type of jobs. Unlike the case of temporary employment, however, this unconventional form of employment does not appear to affect lower qualified workers but quite the opposite. An interesting result to be further studied is the fact that reduced workday jobs exhibit a wage premium which even rises across the distribution. This is consistent with the fact that in the higher quintiles of hourly wage we find a larger proportion of part-time workers than in the lower quintiles.

Finally, especially in the case of temporary employment, the wage penalty involved reflects violations of labour legislation that in all of these countries guarantees equal conditions to those of permanent workers in wage determination. However, the weakness in labour inspection and likely lower unionization on behalf of fixed-term workers contributes to these results.

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Annex

Table 1A. Evolution of fixed-term employment

Argentina. 2003-2013

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	79.8	20.2	38.0	5.3
2004	79.9	20.1	36.3	4.9
2005	79.5	20.5	35.2	4.4
2006	79.2	20.8	35.4	4.3
2007	73.7	26.3	31.8	4.8
2008	75.9	24.1	30.4	3.9
2009	74.9	25.1	31.1	4.0
2010	75.2	24.8	28.8	3.3
2011	75.8	24.2	30.8	3.5
2012	74.6	25.4	27.7	3.4
2013	74.8	25.2	28.2	3.3

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	31.6	68.4	14.5	18.1
2004	31.4	68.6	14.0	17.0
2005	28.2	71.8	10.9	16.5
2006	31.5	68.5	11.8	15.6
2007	36.5	63.5	12.5	13.0
2008	36.9	63.1	11.1	11.8
2009	35.4	64.6	10.4	12.4
2010	31.8	68.2	8.3	10.9
2011	33.2	66.8	9.3	11.5
2012	33.9	66.1	8.8	10.5
2013	31.1	68.9	7.9	10.9

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	31.6	50.1	18.3	33.3	15.6	10.2
2004	34.6	47.5	17.9	32.9	14.1	9.6
2005	33.5	50.3	16.3	29.3	13.5	7.8
2006	36.6	48.6	14.7	31.8	12.7	7.1
2007	31.7	50.0	18.3	23.4	12.0	8.0
2008	27.7	53.7	18.5	19.5	11.5	7.1
2009	33.2	49.4	17.4	25.8	10.6	6.5
2010	31.0	50.3	18.7	20.5	9.0	6.2
2011	30.1	50.0	19.9	21.9	9.7	6.9
2012	33.0	50.7	16.3	22.3	8.9	5.5
2013	34.1	50.6	15.2	23.3	8.9	5.0

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2003	53.5	31.5	15.0	22.6	14.2	11.0
2004	52.2	33.4	14.4	21.0	13.6	10.8
2005	56.3	30.9	12.9	20.7	11.5	8.3
2006	53.7	32.2	14.0	20.2	11.6	8.6
2007	50.0	32.7	17.3	17.3	10.3	9.8
2008	50.9	33.2	15.8	16.4	9.5	7.7
2009	49.6	37.6	12.8	16.2	10.6	6.3
2010	50.2	34.9	14.9	14.6	8.3	6.0
2011	48.3	34.0	17.7	15.6	8.7	7.4
2012	48.2	34.1	17.7	14.9	7.9	6.9
2013	46.7	40.9	12.4	14.0	9.5	4.8

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY															
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	12.8	21.3	20.9	7.5	8.6	5.1		16.0	7.8	14.1	58.6	16.8	14.5	13.8	10.7		12.0	16.2
2004	15.9	23.7	19.6	5.8	9.7	4.7		13.3	7.2	15.1	58.0	14.7	10.0	15.1	10.3		10.1	14.5
2005	18.1	26.4	17.6	6.6	5.2	4.5		13.6	8.1	15.3	50.0	12.9	12.2	7.4	8.0		9.1	13.6
2006	16.8	26.8	17.9	4.8	6.0	4.6		14.3	8.8	14.5	46.6	12.3	8.6	8.4	8.4		9.6	16.2
2007	14.4	21.9	19.9	5.0	7.9	5.7		16.6	8.5	10.8	37.7	12.4	8.1	9.0	10.1		10.4	13.2
2008	14.5	23.5	21.8	5.0	6.7	5.5		16.6	6.5	10.0	35.2	12.0	7.1	7.4	7.8		9.1	10.6
2009	16.6	21.5	17.2	6.5	7.1	5.6		15.7	9.8	12.4	36.2	9.9	9.5	7.7	8.1		8.2	13.6
2010	10.1	23.0	22.4	5.9	9.1	4.8		16.9	7.9	6.1	33.5	10.6	7.4	8.2	6.4		7.7	9.8
2011	14.3	25.0	18.4	5.4	6.9	5.1		17.1	7.8	9.4	36.8	9.7	6.6	6.6	8.0		8.1	11.1
2012	15.7	21.9	15.9	6.0	9.2	4.3		19.5	7.6	9.8	31.2	8.2	6.8	8.5	6.1		8.4	8.7
2013	12.0	24.0	18.3	6.6	7.2	4.0		15.6	12.3	7.6	34.3	9.7	7.7	6.7	5.2		6.8	12.1

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	83.0	17.0	18.5	11.7
2004	84.7	15.3	17.5	10.7
2005	84.6	15.4	15.8	9.8
2006	84.7	15.3	15.5	9.5
2007	80.6	19.4	13.3	10.8
2008	82.4	17.6	12.2	9.2
2009	81.3	18.7	12.3	9.3
2010	81.1	18.9	10.4	8.1
2011	80.6	19.4	11.3	8.4
2012	78.4	21.6	10.3	8.5
2013	82.5	17.5	10.7	7.0

	INTENSITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME
2003	51.8	48.2	12.6	27.7
2004	53.0	47.0	11.8	28.2
2005	58.3	41.7	11.7	22.9
2006	60.3	39.7	11.9	21.9
2007	58.6	41.4	10.1	21.1
2008	52.8	47.2	8.6	19.9
2009	54.5	45.5	8.7	19.4
2010	57.9	42.1	7.8	16.3
2011	58.3	41.7	8.6	16.7
2012	52.8	47.2	7.2	17.7
2013	56.8	43.2	7.7	16.4

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	53.6	9.7	11.4	18.4	6.8	67.5	34.5	28.9	10.3	2.5
2004	51.9	13.7	11.9	18.3	4.2	64.4	39.2	23.7	9.2	1.6
2005	46.0	15.0	13.5	19.4	6.1	60.8	39.1	27.0	8.5	2.0
2006	43.3	14.0	14.0	21.2	7.5	58.6	33.9	28.8	9.1	2.4
2007	44.9	11.3	13.2	23.2	7.4	53.3	27.9	21.8	8.7	2.2
2008	41.8	12.8	15.2	23.0	7.3	55.4	32.2	24.6	7.1	2.0
2009	40.8	14.1	13.8	24.2	7.0	58.8	38.4	27.0	7.6	1.8
2010	40.5	13.2	12.3	26.7	7.4	53.5	29.3	20.6	7.2	1.6
2011	41.3	12.0	12.0	23.6	11.1	56.5	31.4	22.0	7.3	2.5
2012	35.2	15.4	13.3	27.3	8.9	53.6	39.7	22.1	7.7	1.8
2013	38.3	12.7	11.5	27.8	9.7	49.4	30.6	22.2	7.8	2.0

Brazil. 2003-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	85.2	14.8	11.8	0.9
2004	85.6	14.4	11.4	0.9
2005	85.9	14.1	11.1	0.8
2006	86.5	13.5	13.8	0.9
2007	85.0	15.0	13.0	0.8
2008	82.9	17.1	12.2	0.9
2009	83.1	16.9	11.6	0.8
2010	78.5	21.5	11.7	1.0
2011	82.0	18.0	12.8	0.7

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	51.0	49.0	4.7	3.8
2004	50.4	49.6	4.5	3.8
2005	50.8	49.2	4.2	3.5
2006	51.4	48.6	5.1	4.2
2007	51.8	48.2	4.6	3.7
2008	51.6	48.4	4.1	3.4
2009	54.5	45.5	4.0	3.1
2010	55.0	45.0	4.0	2.9
2011	57.4	42.6	3.9	2.7

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	48.7	39.3	12.0	8.9	3.0	2.3
2004	49.8	36.8	13.4	9.1	2.8	2.4
2005	49.1	38.1	12.8	8.6	2.7	2.0
2006	44.2	41.0	14.8	9.4	3.5	2.8
2007	46.5	39.6	13.9	9.3	3.0	2.3
2008	47.7	40.1	12.2	8.7	2.8	1.8
2009	47.1	41.4	11.4	8.4	2.7	1.5
2010	47.5	40.0	12.5	8.4	2.5	1.6
2011	46.3	39.0	14.6	8.2	2.4	1.7

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	ss than	CS-IT	CT
2003	45.1	46.7	8.2	4.0	5.1	2.5
2004	43.5	49.1	7.4	3.9	5.1	2.2
2005	40.2	50.4	9.4	3.4	4.7	2.5
2006	43.0	47.2	9.8	4.6	5.1	3.0
2007	37.6	52.5	9.9	3.8	5.0	2.6
2008	33.2	56.9	9.9	3.2	4.8	2.2
2009	31.3	56.3	12.4	2.9	4.4	2.6
2010	30.4	57.9	11.6	2.9	4.3	2.1
2011	30.0	55.7	14.3	2.8	3.9	2.4

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																		
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE									
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	13.0	10.9	14.9	4.4	15.3	6.8	5.8	21.2	7.7	3.1	9.5	3.1	2.6	4.4	4.0	2.4	7.1	5.2
2004	11.0	10.9	14.0	3.6	17.8	8.2	4.8	22.4	7.2	2.6	9.3	2.9	2.2	5.0	5.1	1.8	7.3	4.7
2005	11.6	10.2	13.5	3.2	17.8	8.1	3.5	26.1	6.0	2.5	8.2	2.6	1.8	4.5	4.7	1.3	8.0	4.0
2006	11.6	10.1	13.3	3.6	17.1	7.1	7.1	22.8	7.4	3.0	9.6	3.0	2.5	5.1	4.9	3.0	8.7	5.7
2007	11.4	7.8	14.2	4.1	17.4	7.7	6.7	23.6	7.1	2.7	7.0	2.9	2.3	4.6	4.4	2.6	8.2	5.2
2008	10.6	9.5	12.5	3.6	18.5	7.9	4.0	25.9	7.5	2.3	7.1	2.3	1.9	4.4	4.1	1.5	7.9	5.1
2009	9.2	7.4	11.4	3.3	20.0	7.6	4.1	29.7	7.3	2.0	5.1	2.0	1.6	4.4	3.8	1.4	8.5	4.8
2010	9.2	8.1	12.6	4.4	18.3	8.2	4.3	28.7	6.3	1.9	5.5	2.2	2.0	3.8	3.9	1.6	7.8	3.9
2011	8.7	5.8	11.0	4.0	18.5	9.0	6.1	29.8	7.2	1.8	3.4	1.8	1.8	3.4	4.0	2.2	8.0	4.3

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	75.4	24.6	3.7	7.1
2004	74.1	25.9	3.6	7.4
2005	71.3	28.7	3.2	7.7
2006	74.1	25.9	3.9	8.5
2007	73.3	26.7	3.5	8.0
2008	71.1	28.9	3.1	7.7
2009	66.5	33.5	2.7	8.3
2010	68.4	31.6	2.7	7.4
2011	67.1	32.9	2.5	7.7

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME
2003	62.1	37.9	3.1	10.5
2004	55.3	44.7	2.8	10.2
2005	56.7	43.3	2.7	9.5
2006	55.2	44.8	3.3	9.4
2007	53.5	46.5	2.8	9.4
2008	57.1	42.9	2.6	10.2
2009	47.3	52.7	2.1	9.5
2010	46.6	53.4	2.0	9.8
2011	45.2	54.8	1.8	9.7

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	38.1	15.5	17.0	22.2	7.2	14.6	8.6	6.6	2.3	1.0
2004	36.5	16.6	15.4	23.2	8.3	14.3	8.5	6.0	2.4	1.1
2005	31.0	17.6	19.7	24.3	7.4	12.7	8.8	6.6	2.3	0.9
2006	33.7	15.9	17.8	24.8	7.8	15.8	9.7	7.2	2.8	1.1
2007	33.2	16.0	18.3	24.5	8.0	14.8	8.7	7.0	2.5	1.0
2008	32.8	17.2	19.3	24.2	6.4	12.4	7.8	6.4	2.3	0.8
2009	29.2	15.3	21.7	28.9	4.9	11.1	7.5	6.9	2.5	0.6
2010	31.0	15.8	21.4	26.6	5.2	11.3	6.9	6.4	2.3	0.6
2011	25.6	16.1	19.6	30.5	8.2	9.7	6.7	5.5	2.4	0.9

Chile. 2000-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2000	54.5	45.5	49.8	12.4
2003	50.8	49.2	54.5	15.4
2006	45.3	54.7	50.4	15.4
2009	47.7	52.3	48.9	15.7
2011	36.7	63.3	50.1	18.5

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2000	34.9	65.1	19.2	22.1
2003	35.5	64.5	22.0	25.9
2006	37.5	62.5	21.7	23.3
2009	39.4	60.6	23.4	24.0
2011	39.6	60.4	23.3	24.8

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2000	23.7	54.8	21.4	35.3	19.3	17.2
2003	23.5	54.3	22.2	38.1	23.3	19.3
2006	25.6	48.8	25.5	37.3	20.7	18.6
2009	24.4	47.6	28.0	39.6	22.2	19.3
2011	24.1	46.8	29.1	39.5	23.1	19.4

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2000	63.5	29.4	7.1	31.6	16.1	7.7
2003	58.6	33.4	8.0	35.6	20.2	10.1
2006	56.1	37.1	6.8	33.2	19.3	8.2
2009	51.3	40.3	8.3	36.0	21.1	9.4
2011	51.0	48.6	0.4	36.6	18.0	8.5

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	CONTRIBUTION								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2000	10.3	18.5	11.1	5.6	4.4	5.6	8.4	4.0	32.0
2003	10.7	17.2	11.3	5.7	4.1	3.3	8.3	5.7	33.8
2006	9.9	17.9	12.0	4.8	4.0	3.7	8.0	4.8	34.8
2009	6.8	16.1	15.8	4.4	4.2	4.1	7.5	6.7	34.4
2011	6.5	18.3	19.9	4.8	5.0	4.3	7.1	7.4	26.7

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2000	14.9	49.5	16.0	16.8	11.1	9.9	19.9	13.3	33.2
2003	18.9	52.3	17.0	18.4	13.1	12.2	22.3	13.3	40.2
2006	16.5	43.6	16.9	14.5	11.5	13.1	22.3	10.6	39.1
2009	16.3	45.8	21.5	13.7	11.6	12.5	24.8	13.4	39.6
2011	15.7	47.4	22.9	15.2	12.9	13.1	23.6	15.9	39.8

	TRAINING			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING
2000	92.6	7.4	23.8	8.7
2003	92.1	7.9	27.9	9.9
2006	93.1	6.9	25.1	9.9
2009	92.4	7.6	25.7	12.4
2011				

	AREA			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN
2000	20.8	79.2	39.9	18.7
2003	19.8	80.2	45.7	21.9
2006	19.2	80.8	41.8	20.4
2009	19.0	81.0	42.3	21.5
2011	19.3	80.7	42.9	21.9

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2000	90.1	9.9	22.5	13.0
2003	92.7	7.3	26.0	13.9
2006	93.2	6.8	24.3	11.9
2009	90.3	9.7	25.3	15.0
2011	90.2	9.8	25.1	17.9

	INTENSITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME
2000	83.9	16.1	19.4	36.1
2003	81.2	18.8	21.6	32.0
2006	77.2	22.8	19.7	45.0
2009	76.4	23.6	20.7	43.8
2011	79.1	20.9	21.7	42.1

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2000	3.6	9.4	57.9	19.7	9.4	29.4	35.1	61.9	12.6	5.0
2003	3.1	9.0	56.9	21.9	9.2	31.6	36.3	65.1	16.4	5.9
2006	68.0			20.1	11.9	50.7			14.6	7.1
2009	69.1			20.3	10.6	54.5			14.1	7.1
2011	63.4			22.2	14.3	51.5			15.7	9.4

*A partir de 2006 la primera categoría agrupa a los asalariados hasta un año de antigüedad

Ecuador. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2004	89.3	10.7	52.0	12.7	23.2	76.8	27.1	45.0	34.7	45.9	19.4	50.0	36.6	31.6	74.3	21.3	4.4	50.7	27.1	14.2
2005	87.9	12.1	45.6	13.0	27.1	72.9	27.5	38.9	33.8	45.4	20.8	44.1	32.6	29.6	73.0	22.6	4.4	44.9	25.2	13.0
2006	86.7	13.3	50.2	15.8	25.2	74.8	29.6	43.5	34.0	46.2	19.8	48.6	37.2	31.4	70.9	23.8	5.3	49.1	28.3	18.5
2007	89.1	10.9	79.1	19.2	28.6	71.4	50.1	63.5	31.7	46.3	22.0	75.2	55.8	49.5	71.7	23.4	4.9	74.8	43.9	24.0
2008	87.2	12.8	83.5	22.0	29.3	70.7	52.9	66.0	30.4	46.1	23.4	77.2	58.7	52.7	68.7	25.9	5.5	76.6	48.1	28.5
2009	84.2	15.8	83.8	23.8	30.0	70.0	52.4	64.0	31.3	44.7	23.9	76.1	57.1	50.9	67.7	26.5	5.8	76.6	46.3	27.7
2010	80.4	19.6	85.8	25.6	28.6	71.4	48.8	63.9	30.1	46.8	23.1	77.2	56.9	47.1	64.3	28.6	7.0	74.5	46.5	31.4
2011	73.6	26.4	87.0	27.5	29.3	70.7	47.6	59.4	28.1	46.2	25.7	74.7	52.1	47.3	61.9	30.2	7.9	72.7	43.4	30.6
2012	72.6	27.4	86.8	27.4	29.9	70.1	46.5	58.6	26.3	47.4	26.2	72.9	52.1	46.2	59.6	31.9	8.4	71.6	44.0	30.1

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	11.1	16.1	13.3	4.8	4.0	3.9	5.2	3.3	38.3	33.3	76.1	31.8	35.2	26.4	26.7	33.4	9.3	59.0
2005	10.1	15.3	14.2	5.1	3.9	4.1	7.2	3.0	37.2	29.3	65.2	29.6	30.7	23.3	24.5	32.3	8.2	52.1
2006	10.9	18.5	12.5	4.8	3.6	4.2	4.6	4.9	36.0	33.6	75.7	28.5	31.9	24.5	31.0	28.5	14.8	56.4
2007	10.6	14.4	15.5	5.6	3.9	4.0	6.8	3.4	35.8	52.9	89.5	55.1	55.6	38.8	45.0	64.7	15.8	81.3
2008	10.8	14.0	15.1	5.2	4.2	4.1	6.9	4.7	35.1	53.6	91.8	57.0	61.0	43.7	45.9	67.9	21.9	83.6
2009	10.4	15.2	15.7	5.4	4.7	3.7	7.1	5.0	33.0	52.3	91.7	55.8	56.3	42.8	44.2	67.4	22.2	81.6
2010	10.6	14.2	16.2	4.9	4.4	3.9	5.8	7.4	32.6	50.1	90.5	55.3	52.5	38.9	48.4	65.1	28.5	80.4
2011	9.3	13.3	15.3	5.0	5.1	3.6	5.0	7.4	36.0	43.4	87.6	49.7	51.8	38.2	39.1	62.0	26.2	80.5
2012	8.7	14.2	15.6	4.7	4.9	3.5	5.3	9.0	34.2	41.1	85.0	50.4	46.1	32.6	34.8	63.1	32.6	77.9

	TRAINING				AREA				SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2004	94.9	5.1	44.3	12.2	36.3	63.7	54.1	33.7	96.5	3.5	44.5	8.9
2005	94.8	5.2	39.1	11.8	38.3	61.7	51.2	29.2	96.8	3.2	39.3	8.1
2006	93.9	6.1	43.5	14.9	38.3	61.7	55.6	32.8	94.7	5.3	42.6	15.2
2007	93.7	6.3	68.5	19.3	37.9	62.1	80.2	50.8	96.4	3.6	66.1	15.2
2008	93.5	6.5	70.9	21.2	37.6	62.4	82.5	53.3	94.6	5.4	68.1	22.8
2009	93.4	6.6	69.6	20.4	35.8	64.2	81.2	52.4	94.1	5.9	66.6	23.3
2010	91.7	8.3	68.5	22.9	36.2	63.8	79.1	51.2	91.7	8.3	64.8	28.8
2011	89.1	10.9	65.8	24.1	37.0	63.0	78.4	47.2	91.5	8.5	61.4	26.9
2012	88.9	11.1	65.9	22.7	38.6	61.4	77.9	45.7	89.6	10.4	58.6	33.6

	INTENSITY				TENURE					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years
2004	74.8	25.2	35.4	55.3	36.0	25.6	38.5	49.2	35.1	34.6
2005	77.5	22.5	32.6	46.4	34.0	27.3	38.7	43.4	32.8	31.1
2006	77.3	22.7	36.2	52.5	35.6	24.9	39.5	49.5	33.5	35.7
2007	78.0	22.0	54.7	80.6	36.5	26.9	36.6	77.4	55.9	49.3
2008	82.3	17.7	58.1	82.3	34.0	27.8	38.2	79.1	59.4	52.5
2009	82.0	18.0	56.5	82.5	36.5	29.1	34.4	79.0	57.8	49.1
2010	81.6	18.4	54.9	82.1	37.7	27.0	35.2	79.4	54.5	48.1
2011	83.1	16.9	51.4	86.3	38.9	25.5	35.6	78.6	48.4	45.4
2012	83.9	16.1	50.6	84.8	37.3	25.8	36.9	77.2	48.0	45.1

Peru. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	25 year	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2005	46.7	53.3	91.1	45.3	36.0	64.0	61.0	58.3	19.2	64.1	16.7	92.8	63.2	35.8	13.9	44.8	41.3	66.4	68.3	50.3
2006	38.3	61.7	92.7	50.3	37.1	62.9	63.2	59.6	18.7	66.1	15.3	93.8	67.6	32.9	12.4	43.0	44.6	70.2	68.1	53.5
2007	35.8	64.2	93.2	49.8	37.8	62.2	60.2	59.5	20.0	65.0	15.0	94.6	65.6	31.9	12.4	44.7	43.0	72.8	68.1	50.6
2008	34.5	65.5	93.3	53.6	36.9	63.1	62.2	63.1	22.2	62.7	15.1	93.4	68.9	34.0	13.0	46.1	40.9	74.7	70.6	53.5
2009	29.6	70.4	92.5	55.1	35.6	64.4	60.3	64.0	21.4	60.9	17.7	92.6	67.8	37.8	13.3	45.0	41.7	76.1	72.2	52.2
2010	28.4	71.6	95.9	57.5	37.9	62.1	65.2	64.7	20.7	61.7	17.7	91.4	72.7	37.8	14.0	44.2	41.8	77.0	73.1	55.4
2011	27.4	72.6	92.5	55.7	39.2	60.8	61.6	63.0	22.0	59.8	18.2	91.3	70.0	36.0	12.6	46.7	40.7	76.2	71.7	51.9
2012	25.8	74.2	92.7	57.6	38.8	61.2	64.1	63.7	22.3	58.6	19.1	91.9	73.7	36.2	12.8	45.9	41.3	78.8	71.7	54.1

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY															
	CONTRIBUTION								INCIDENCE							
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2005	15.6	3.4	14.4	4.3	14.1	10.1	25.7	12.4	74.6	88.4	74.8	66.5	80.5	79.3	37.7	62.3
2006	14.9	4.0	13.3	4.7	17.5	8.3	24.5	12.8	67.2	76.6	76.3	67.6	84.7	78.7	39.3	68.0
2007	15.3	3.7	13.3	4.9	15.1	8.9	27.5	11.4	64.5	95.4	76.0	64.2	81.1	75.6	40.3	70.6
2008	15.6	5.1	13.8	4.5	15.2	8.3	26.6	11.0	72.1	86.8	77.7	66.2	79.3	75.4	43.2	70.7
2009	14.6	5.9	13.3	4.7	13.4	8.6	28.4	11.1	68.7	91.0	74.5	66.9	73.1	73.3	73.3	46.1
2010	12.2	6.1	12.7	5.0	15.0	9.0	28.5	11.5	69.0	85.8	75.7	69.9	83.1	78.2	47.4	73.4
2011	12.7	6.6	13.3	4.9	15.0	9.1	26.0	12.4	69.1	88.5	72.0	71.7	78.3	76.7	42.5	74.1
2012	13.1	6.5	13.6	5.6	14.7	9.4	25.6	11.6	70.0	85.8	74.5	72.5	77.9	77.5	44.5	72.5

	AREA				SECTOR				INTENSITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME
2005	16.2	83.8	56.3	59.9	73.3	26.7	74.4	38.0	82.5	17.5	61.6	51.4
2006	13.6	86.4	54.7	62.0	74.2	25.8	74.5	40.0	82.6	17.4	64.6	50.8
2007	7.9	92.1	71.8	58.9	71.5	28.5	73.8	40.4	81.5	18.5	62.4	55.5
2008	17.2	82.8	63.5	62.7	72.3	27.7	75.5	43.6	82.1	17.9	66.4	57.6
2009	18.2	81.8	67.5	61.6	70.6	29.4	73.4	46.3	81.7	18.3	65.6	58.4
2010	18.5	81.5	69.7	63.9	69.9	30.1	76.4	48.0	82.1	17.9	68.5	59.3
2011	7.6	92.4	75.4	61.6	72.8	27.2	75.3	42.9	81.7	18.3	65.7	55.9
2012	18.6	81.4	65.4	63.5	73.2	26.8	75.4	45.0	82.6	17.4	67.5	56.6

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2005	13.3	12.1	13.1	41.2	20.3	96.2	97.4	95.6	82.5	25.5
2006	12.4	10.9	12.9	40.7	23.1	97.0	98.4	95.2	84.3	29.4
2007	18.8	12.0	13.3	37.4	18.6	97.3	97.7	95.7	81.8	24.4
2008	20.4	14.0	14.7	34.6	16.3	97.9	97.6	95.5	82.0	24.6
2009	18.6	13.0	14.7	38.6	15.1	97.5	95.5	92.7	80.5	23.9
2010	20.5	13.6	13.6	36.6	15.7	97.6	95.3	93.9	83.1	26.0
2011	19.7	14.4	14.2	37.0	14.7	95.8	94.2	91.5	80.8	23.4
2012	19.6	12.0	15.2	37.4	15.8	97.5	93.7	94.0	82.0	25.5

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Table 2A. Probit estimates. Probability of being a temporary worker

Co-variates	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Ecuador	Peru
Men	0.0108**	-0.00163***	-0.0740***	0.00332	0.0361***
	[0.00473]	[0.000448]	[0.00466]	[0.0110]	[0.0122]
Age	0.00158	-0.000646***	-0.0144***	-0.0102***	-0.0312***
	[0.000994]	[8.98e-05]	[0.000866]	[0.00192]	[0.00275]
Age2	-2.25e-05*	5.82e-06***	0.000105***	4.57e-05**	0.000179***
	[1.19e-05]	[1.12e-06]	[1.03e-05]	[2.23e-05]	[3.17e-05]
Informal	0.206***	0.100***	0.270***	0.452***	0.210***
	[0.0115]	[0.00285]	[0.00588]	[0.00906]	[0.0102]
Head of Hous.	-0.00379	-0.00123**	-0.0281***	-0.0123	-0.0597***
	[0.00468]	[0.000481]	[0.00424]	[0.0111]	[0.0124]
Less than Comp. Primary	0.0101	0.000159	0.0395***	0.0717***	0.0518
	[0.0117]	[0.000863]	[0.00760]	[0.0153]	[0.0342]
Incom. Secondary	-0.0153***	0.00705***	-0.0411***	-0.0476***	-0.0474
	[0.00592]	[0.00154]	[0.00660]	[0.0169]	[0.0366]
Compl. Secondary	-0.0208***	0.00174**	-0.121***	-0.0587***	-0.186***
	[0.00589]	[0.000854]	[0.00575]	[0.0147]	[0.0330]
Incom. Terciary	-0.0131*	0.0201***	-0.168***	-0.0630***	-0.232***
	[0.00678]	[0.00250]	[0.00544]	[0.0177]	[0.0377]
Compl. Terciary	-0.0166**	0.00162	-0.160***	-0.0665***	-0.276***
	[0.00665]	[0.00104]	[0.0121]	[0.0182]	[0.0273]
Part-time	0.0407***	0.0100***	0.137***	0.133***	-0.109***
	[0.00593]	[0.000792]	[0.00665]	[0.0144]	[0.0138]
Manufacture	-0.0380***	-0.00235***	-0.199***	-0.388***	-0.257***
	[0.00460]	[0.000788]	[0.00404]	[0.0215]	[0.0396]
Trade	-0.0569***	-0.00542***	-0.205***	-0.345***	-0.202***
	[0.00407]	[0.000611]	[0.00464]	[0.0218]	[0.0397]
Transport	-0.0453***	-0.00234***	-0.199***	-0.321***	-0.172***
	[0.00388]	[0.000891]	[0.00407]	[0.0260]	[0.0455]
Financial sector	-0.0450***	0.000801	-0.201***	-0.281***	-0.128***
	[0.00418]	[0.000983]	[0.00419]	[0.0262]	[0.0375]
Personal services	-0.0385***	7.03e-05	-0.201***	-0.259***	-0.0320
	[0.00524]	[0.00109]	[0.00429]	[0.0297]	[0.0372]
Domestic services		-0.00218**	-0.233***	-0.375***	
		[0.000918]	[0.00303]	[0.0266]	
Public sector	-0.0107	0.0236***	-0.192***	-0.222***	-0.237***
	[0.00771]	[0.00284]	[0.00472]	[0.0241]	[0.0301]
Others	-0.0330***	-0.00219***	-0.125***	-0.144***	-0.262***
	[0.00478]	[0.000836]	[0.00562]	[0.0217]	[0.0385]
Urban			-0.0170***	-0.0859***	0.000302
			[0.00528]	[0.0105]	[0.0125]
Training				-0.115***	
				[0.0122]	
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	11,987	105,869	59,069	16,438	9,549

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Table 3A. Evolution of part-time employment

Argentina. 2003-2013

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	59.0	41.0	44.9	24.9
2004	63.8	36.2	45.9	21.5
2005	60.3	39.7	45.0	22.5
2006	58.8	41.2	43.9	22.3
2007	56.9	43.1	44.7	21.8
2008	55.3	44.7	47.8	23.8
2009	52.6	47.4	46.8	24.0
2010	49.3	50.7	44.9	23.4
2011	49.2	50.8	45.2	24.2
2012	50.1	49.9	45.9	24.3
2013	48.5	51.5	45.2	24.6

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	64.6	35.4	52.0	20.7
2004	64.5	35.5	50.5	19.8
2005	67.0	33.0	50.2	18.6
2006	67.9	32.1	48.9	17.8
2007	68.5	31.5	48.8	17.0
2008	66.6	33.4	50.7	19.4
2009	68.3	31.7	49.9	18.4
2010	68.7	31.3	49.1	16.8
2011	68.2	31.8	49.5	17.6
2012	68.6	31.4	50.8	17.5
2013	68.4	31.6	49.6	17.7

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	19.3	47.4	33.3	38.4	30.7	36.9
2004	20.5	46.7	32.7	38.0	29.1	35.3
2005	18.8	47.6	33.6	35.1	29.2	35.7
2006	20.0	47.0	33.0	36.5	27.7	35.0
2007	20.5	46.2	33.3	35.0	27.1	34.5
2008	20.6	47.1	32.3	39.3	29.4	35.4
2009	19.1	48.6	32.3	39.1	29.4	33.9
2010	18.2	49.2	32.7	35.3	28.1	32.7
2011	17.4	49.4	33.2	36.1	28.8	33.6
2012	17.9	47.8	34.3	37.7	27.8	36.1
2013	17.4	48.6	34.0	36.4	28.1	35.5

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2003	43.6	32.5	23.9	32.9	30.9	41.7
2004	45.3	33.6	21.1	32.8	29.6	37.9
2005	42.3	33.0	24.7	30.7	28.9	42.0
2006	43.0	31.9	25.1	31.3	26.7	40.5
2007	43.2	32.9	23.9	31.6	26.2	37.8
2008	38.6	35.7	25.8	31.5	29.9	41.4
2009	39.8	35.0	25.2	32.3	28.6	39.8
2010	36.4	36.1	27.5	29.2	27.5	39.2
2011	35.5	35.6	29.0	29.7	27.8	40.8
2012	35.6	35.8	28.5	31.3	27.8	40.0
2013	36.1	37.4	26.5	31.1	28.6	38.0

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	5.8	5.0	14.0	3.8	5.8	11.3	20.8	27.8	5.7	14.1	29.0	23.9	15.9	20.9	56.9	68.0	50.3	27.3
2004	6.7	5.4	14.3	3.6	6.6	9.7	23.4	24.8	5.5	14.2	28.6	23.3	14.6	23.3	51.0	73.0	46.6	24.6
2005	6.8	4.2	12.9	2.9	6.5	11.5	23.5	25.0	6.6	14.5	18.8	22.5	12.9	23.4	54.4	72.3	45.4	27.7
2006	6.2	4.1	14.2	2.5	6.3	10.8	24.5	26.2	5.4	13.2	16.3	22.9	10.8	21.8	52.5	70.9	46.3	24.7
2007	6.3	3.6	13.6	2.9	7.3	10.3	24.3	25.5	6.2	12.7	15.5	21.6	12.3	22.3	49.2	72.0	46.0	26.6
2008	7.8	4.3	13.7	3.3	8.3	10.7	21.2	25.2	5.5	17.1	19.2	23.2	14.6	28.5	50.9	72.2	46.1	27.2
2009	7.0	3.3	12.9	2.5	7.4	11.3	22.7	26.9	6.0	15.9	16.5	21.9	11.5	24.5	52.4	74.6	45.7	26.4
2010	5.0	3.3	12.7	2.9	7.9	10.7	22.8	29.1	5.7	10.2	15.7	19.7	12.0	24.7	51.1	74.8	47.6	24.4
2011	5.4	4.0	12.5	2.1	7.1	9.6	21.9	31.1	6.3	11.8	17.8	21.1	8.5	22.1	50.8	70.8	50.7	29.1
2012	4.9	3.7	11.4	3.0	7.0	10.1	23.1	31.1	5.8	11.0	17.4	20.7	12.2	23.0	51.9	77.2	49.2	23.1
2013	4.8	4.0	11.4	2.8	6.7	10.2	24.0	28.3	7.9	10.7	19.3	21.2	11.7	22.4	48.9	76.4	45.8	26.9

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	70.3	29.7	29.9	49.1
2004	74.0	26.0	29.8	44.4
2005	74.0	26.0	29.4	44.0
2006	72.5	27.5	28.1	45.0
2007	73.0	27.0	27.8	43.3
2008	73.8	26.2	29.9	45.8
2009	72.2	27.8	29.1	45.1
2010	69.9	30.1	26.8	46.2
2011	68.0	32.0	27.0	47.9
2012	68.1	31.9	27.8	46.1
2013	71.2	28.8	28.4	43.4

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2003	72.3	27.7	25.9	48.2
2004	71.8	28.2	23.2	47.0
2005	77.1	22.9	24.2	41.7
2006	78.1	21.9	24.0	39.7
2007	78.9	21.1	22.9	41.4
2008	80.1	19.9	25.4	47.2
2009	80.6	19.4	24.8	45.5
2010	83.7	16.3	23.9	42.1
2011	83.3	16.7	25.1	41.7
2012	82.3	17.7	24.4	47.2
2013	83.6	16.4	24.4	43.2

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	36.8	4.4	7.2	20.4	31.2	52.0	31.0	38.3	26.0	27.6
2004	39.2	5.5	7.0	21.8	26.4	54.2	32.0	29.5	25.2	24.6
2005	36.4	4.8	6.4	23.0	29.3	53.7	27.4	29.2	25.5	25.9
2006	35.9	5.4	6.2	23.0	29.6	51.7	29.8	28.6	24.7	25.4
2007	35.5	5.5	7.9	23.0	28.1	52.3	33.0	32.5	23.1	24.1
2008	32.1	5.0	6.9	27.8	28.2	55.8	35.2	33.3	27.3	25.8
2009	32.3	4.9	6.4	26.4	30.0	57.8	38.9	36.6	25.7	24.9
2010	31.2	5.0	5.8	26.1	31.9	56.2	33.6	31.0	24.4	24.5
2011	30.8	4.2	5.8	26.6	32.7	54.7	32.4	32.6	26.8	24.7
2012	30.9	4.0	6.3	26.7	32.1	59.7	33.7	34.2	26.9	24.1
2013	31.3	4.6	5.0	27.0	32.2	56.4	35.6	31.9	26.9	24.2

Brazil. 2003-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	54.4	45.6	27.2	10.0
2004	52.2	47.8	30.2	12.6
2005	50.9	49.1	30.0	12.6
2006	46.0	54.0	34.8	16.7
2007	44.9	55.1	34.0	15.7
2008	51.9	48.1	31.9	10.4
2009	46.1	53.9	35.6	14.3
2010	44.3	55.7	35.8	13.6
2011	40.9	59.1	35.9	13.9

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	67.2	32.8	22.6	9.2
2004	64.3	35.7	25.5	12.0
2005	65.2	34.8	25.3	11.5
2006	62.2	37.8	29.5	15.5
2007	62.5	37.5	27.7	14.5
2008	65.3	34.7	22.1	10.5
2009	64.1	35.9	26.6	13.5
2010	64.3	35.7	25.5	12.7
2011	63.2	36.8	24.8	13.0

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	27.7	47.8	24.5	18.2	13.4	16.8
2004	27.3	46.8	25.8	21.9	15.7	20.3
2005	25.8	46.5	27.7	20.7	15.3	20.9
2006	25.1	48.7	26.1	25.3	19.7	24.2
2007	23.7	49.8	26.5	23.5	18.8	22.4
2008	25.0	47.4	27.5	19.2	14.0	17.5
2009	23.7	47.4	28.8	23.5	17.3	21.7
2010	23.5	47.0	29.6	22.6	16.4	20.9
2011	22.9	46.3	30.8	22.8	15.9	21.0

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	ss than	CS-IT	CT
2003	43.4	36.4	20.3	14.0	14.4	22.6
2004	42.6	36.8	20.6	16.8	16.8	26.6
2005	41.5	38.1	20.5	16.6	16.6	25.5
2006	39.9	39.4	20.7	20.6	20.4	30.9
2007	37.8	39.9	22.3	19.1	19.0	29.6
2008	38.1	38.8	23.1	15.7	14.0	21.9
2009	36.9	39.7	23.4	19.1	17.5	27.0
2010	33.2	41.2	25.6	17.5	16.9	25.9
2011	32.4	40.9	26.6	17.4	16.4	26.2

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	7.5	2.8	11.1	3.3	11.3	14.0	20.8	22.8	6.5	6.4	8.8	8.4	7.4	11.9	29.8	30.9	28.0	15.9
2004	9.5	2.8	11.1	3.7	12.6	12.2	19.9	21.3	7.0	10.0	10.6	10.1	10.1	15.5	33.5	32.5	30.8	20.0
2005	9.3	2.8	11.3	3.2	13.7	11.5	20.2	22.0	6.1	9.4	10.5	10.0	8.8	16.1	31.6	32.9	31.8	18.7
2006	12.3	2.7	11.3	3.9	15.5	10.5	18.6	19.2	6.1	15.3	12.5	12.3	13.0	22.1	35.4	37.0	35.6	22.6
2007	11.3	2.8	11.8	3.9	15.2	11.4	18.4	19.3	6.0	13.6	12.6	12.0	11.3	20.1	32.8	35.5	34.1	22.3
2008	8.5	2.8	11.5	3.5	13.5	12.4	20.4	20.7	6.7	8.0	8.8	9.2	7.9	13.5	27.2	32.9	27.1	19.2
2009	10.2	3.2	11.3	4.1	14.9	10.8	19.4	19.9	6.1	12.2	12.1	11.1	11.3	18.1	30.5	37.0	32.3	22.4
2010	9.4	3.1	10.7	4.7	15.2	12.2	17.5	20.9	6.4	10.7	11.4	10.0	11.7	17.4	32.4	35.0	31.3	21.6
2011	9.2	3.4	10.8	4.3	17.3	11.6	15.9	21.4	6.0	10.9	11.1	10.1	10.6	18.2	30.0	33.3	33.4	20.5

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	74.9	25.1	13.4	26.5
2004	76.6	23.4	16.2	29.7
2005	75.9	24.1	15.8	30.5
2006	78.2	21.8	19.9	34.9
2007	78.3	21.7	18.7	33.1
2008	77.1	22.9	14.3	26.4
2009	77.7	22.3	17.8	31.3
2010	76.7	23.3	16.8	30.4
2011	76.2	23.8	16.4	32.3

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2003	89.5	10.5	14.3	37.9
2004	89.8	10.2	17.0	44.7
2005	90.5	9.5	16.8	43.3
2006	90.6	9.4	20.9	44.8
2007	90.6	9.4	19.5	46.5
2008	89.8	10.2	14.9	42.9
2009	90.5	9.5	18.5	52.7
2010	90.2	9.8	17.5	53.4
2011	90.3	9.7	17.3	54.8

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	14.4	9.6	12.4	34.7	28.9	19.8	19.1	17.5	13.2	14.7
2004	13.4	9.9	12.1	35.5	29.1	22.9	22.4	20.7	16.0	17.4
2005	12.2	9.6	12.7	35.8	29.6	22.9	22.1	19.7	15.8	17.3
2006	11.8	8.8	12.7	36.4	30.3	26.1	25.4	24.5	20.0	21.6
2007	10.7	9.0	11.9	37.9	30.5	23.6	24.4	22.7	19.1	20.3
2008	12.6	9.9	12.7	35.5	29.2	19.9	18.8	17.9	14.2	15.4
2009	11.0	8.6	13.2	38.3	28.9	23.1	23.1	23.3	18.3	18.5
2010	11.3	9.0	12.9	36.7	30.0	22.4	21.3	20.9	17.1	18.4
2011	9.5	9.5	12.8	38.1	30.1	20.3	22.3	20.4	17.2	18.3

Chile. 2000-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2000	51.4	48.6	20.9	5.9	66.8	33.2	16.4	5.0	18.2	53.1	28.6	12.1	8.3	10.2	41.2	32.0	26.9	9.2	7.8	13.0
2003	38.1	61.9	24.1	10.6	55.2	44.8	19.1	9.9	18.0	53.6	28.4	16.7	12.6	13.5	38.2	39.6	22.2	13.1	13.0	15.1
2006	55.4	44.6	31.0	6.3	65.8	34.2	19.3	6.4	24.6	44.8	30.6	18.1	9.6	11.3	40.7	41.6	17.7	12.2	11.0	10.9
2009	50.8	49.2	28.6	8.0	60.8	39.2	19.4	8.3	23.0	45.2	31.8	20.1	11.3	11.7	38.2	43.5	18.3	14.4	12.3	11.1
2011	46.8	53.2	31.6	7.7	63.1	36.9	18.6	7.5	22.5	43.2	34.3	18.2	10.6	11.3	36.1	61.9	2.0	12.8	11.4	19.0

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																		
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE									
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2000	6.0	1.7	12.6	5.3	6.1	26.0	23.7	5.4	13.4	3.8	2.0	8.0	7.1	6.9	20.3	24.8	8.0	6.2
2003	8.6	4.5	15.8	6.5	5.9	11.3	15.8	14.7	16.7	8.5	7.9	13.4	11.8	10.5	23.4	23.4	16.3	11.4
2006	5.9	2.4	21.1	4.8	6.0	11.8	23.1	10.0	14.9	5.0	2.9	14.9	7.2	8.8	20.9	32.5	11.0	8.5
2009	4.8	3.7	21.9	5.0	6.4	10.6	19.2	12.0	16.2	6.2	5.6	15.9	8.4	9.5	17.5	34.4	12.9	10.0
2011	4.5	3.9	25.4	5.3	5.8	10.6	21.0	11.3	12.2	5.4	4.9	14.5	8.3	7.5	16.0	34.7	12.2	9.0

	TRAINING				AREA				SECTOR				PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2000	83.5	16.5	9.4	8.4	8.0	92.0	6.8	9.7	79.8	20.2	8.9	11.9	63.9	36.1	7.6	16.1
2003	83.9	16.1	14.1	10.7	8.2	91.8	10.7	13.8	83.3	16.7	13.1	15.5	68.0	32.0	12.0	18.8
2006	91.9	8.1	12.5	5.8	7.0	93.0	7.7	11.9	88.6	11.4	11.7	10.1	55.0	45.0	8.1	22.8
2009	90.4	9.6	13.5	8.4	8.1	91.9	9.7	13.1	85.8	14.2	12.9	11.9	56.2	43.8	9.4	23.6
2011					9.2	90.8	10.2	12.2	86.9	13.1	12.0	11.9	57.9	42.1	9.1	20.9

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2000	3.2	9.5	23.2	31.7	32.3	11.8	15.9	11.1	9.1	7.7
2003	2.7	9.1	22.7	32.4	33.2	15.4	20.3	15.5	13.4	11.3
2006	42.0			33.2	24.8	15.8			12.2	7.4
2009	42.0			34.4	23.6	17.9			12.8	8.4
2011	39.7			36.4	23.9	16.1			12.9	7.9

Ecuador. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2004	86.4	13.6	22.8	7.3
2005	83.7	16.3	21.1	8.5
2006	86.0	14.0	21.5	7.2
2007	87.4	12.6	21.2	6.0
2008	87.9	12.1	18.1	4.4
2009	86.2	13.8	18.7	4.5
2010	85.5	14.5	20.5	4.2
2011	84.3	15.7	19.6	3.2
2012	86.4	13.6	19.6	2.5

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2004	38.2	61.8	20.3	16.4
2005	44.9	55.1	22.1	14.3
2006	39.3	60.7	20.0	15.3
2007	42.0	58.0	20.1	14.0
2008	41.7	58.3	16.2	11.6
2009	42.2	57.8	16.1	11.5
2010	39.0	61.0	14.9	12.2
2011	36.9	63.1	11.8	10.3
2012	40.5	59.5	11.9	9.4

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2004	33.9	41.3	24.8	22.2	14.9	18.3
2005	31.3	41.9	26.8	19.8	14.6	18.6
2006	34.8	39.4	25.8	21.5	13.7	17.7
2007	29.4	40.8	29.7	19.0	13.4	18.3
2008	30.7	40.3	29.1	16.7	10.9	14.1
2009	32.5	37.9	29.6	17.2	10.5	13.8
2010	28.1	40.6	31.3	16.2	11.0	14.3
2011	27.2	44.8	28.0	14.1	9.9	10.1
2012	28.5	38.3	33.2	14.9	7.9	11.1

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2004	65.8	24.8	9.4	20.4	14.2	13.8
2005	63.0	26.1	10.9	18.8	14.1	15.6
2006	63.9	26.5	9.6	19.1	13.6	14.4
2007	65.4	25.5	9.1	18.6	13.0	12.2
2008	66.6	26.2	7.2	15.9	10.4	8.0
2009	62.1	30.1	7.8	15.3	11.4	8.1
2010	63.1	30.9	5.9	16.4	11.2	5.9
2011	65.5	29.5	5.0	15.1	8.3	3.8
2012	67.3	28.6	4.1	15.3	7.4	2.7

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	CONTRIBUTION								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	7.7	5.1	14.4	4.0	3.0	9.2	7.5	10.2	38.8
2005	6.3	4.5	13.6	3.9	2.6	10.0	12.6	11.3	35.3
2006	7.1	5.5	13.7	3.4	3.3	10.5	7.7	9.6	39.3
2007	6.8	5.1	13.5	4.2	3.6	9.6	9.5	8.2	39.4
2008	8.5	4.9	12.4	4.5	3.3	10.3	9.9	6.0	40.1
2009	6.9	5.5	14.6	4.4	5.1	8.3	9.4	7.6	38.2
2010	6.2	7.2	15.3	4.4	3.6	7.0	9.1	7.3	39.9
2011	6.8	6.1	17.5	3.3	4.0	6.1	6.2	2.7	47.3
2012	7.1	5.7	17.6	3.2	2.9	5.4	9.7	1.8	46.5

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	10.4	11.0	15.5	13.5	9.2	28.2	21.9	12.9	27.2
2005	8.9	9.3	13.7	11.5	7.5	29.1	27.5	15.0	24.0
2006	9.4	9.7	13.6	9.9	9.8	33.2	20.6	12.5	26.6
2007	9.2	8.6	13.1	11.4	9.9	29.6	24.8	10.3	24.5
2008	9.0	6.8	10.1	11.2	7.2	25.4	21.4	5.9	20.6
2009	7.5	7.2	11.3	10.0	10.0	22.0	19.7	7.4	20.7
2010	6.5	10.2	11.7	10.5	6.9	19.8	23.0	6.2	22.3
2011	6.2	7.8	11.1	6.7	5.9	12.8	15.3	1.8	20.8
2012	6.3	6.3	10.7	6.0	3.7	10.3	22.4	1.2	20.0

	TRAINING			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING
2004	92.3	7.7	19.5	8.3
2005	90.2	9.8	18.1	10.9
2006	90.9	9.1	18.2	9.6
2007	91.2	8.8	18.2	7.3
2008	91.3	8.7	14.9	6.0
2009	92.0	8.0	14.9	5.4
2010	91.4	8.6	15.3	5.2
2011	93.9	6.1	13.6	2.6
2012	95.7	4.3	13.4	1.6

	AREA			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN
2004	37.0	63.0	25.0	15.1
2005	33.2	66.8	21.5	15.4
2006	37.6	62.4	23.6	14.3
2007	42.2	57.8	24.4	12.9
2008	41.1	58.9	19.4	10.8
2009	39.9	60.1	19.8	10.7
2010	38.9	61.1	19.2	10.9
2011	40.6	59.4	16.9	8.7
2012	47.4	52.6	18.1	7.4

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2004	89.9	10.1	18.8	11.6
2005	88.4	11.6	17.4	14.2
2006	90.3	9.7	17.6	12.0
2007	91.7	8.3	17.1	9.5
2008	93.7	6.3	14.5	5.7
2009	91.9	8.1	14.2	7.0
2010	92.6	7.4	14.7	5.7
2011	97.1	2.9	12.7	1.8
2012	98.0	2.0	12.1	1.2

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2004	44.7	55.3	12.9	25.2
2005	53.6	46.4	14.0	22.5
2006	47.5	52.5	13.1	22.7
2007	19.4	80.6	7.6	22.0
2008	17.7	82.3	6.0	17.7
2009	17.5	82.5	5.7	18.0
2010	17.9	82.1	5.7	18.4
2011	13.7	86.3	3.3	16.9
2012	15.2	84.8	3.4	16.1

	TENURE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years
2004	31.9	24.9	43.1	19.9	15.6	17.7
2005	30.1	27.4	42.5	18.7	16.0	16.5
2006	30.4	26.9	42.8	18.2	15.6	16.7
2007	31.1	26.2	42.7	18.0	14.8	15.7
2008	29.9	27.9	42.2	14.9	12.7	12.5
2009	32.6	27.8	39.7	15.3	12.0	12.3
2010	31.6	27.3	41.1	14.9	12.3	12.6
2011	34.2	25.6	40.2	13.5	9.5	10.0
2012	30.5	25.1	44.4	11.9	8.8	10.2

Peru. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	25 year	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2004	72.9	27.1	31.8	23.6	45.0	55.0	36.9	24.7	31.9	46.2	21.9	33.0	26.7	29.3	37.4	32.2	30.3	31.4	24.2	32.9
2005	73.0	27.0	32.0	21.2	45.3	54.7	35.4	24.0	31.4	45.4	23.2	33.0	25.2	28.9	40.9	32.9	26.1	33.6	23.0	28.7
2006	69.5	30.5	31.9	21.8	44.9	55.1	34.8	24.0	32.5	45.0	22.5	33.1	25.0	28.1	37.6	32.6	29.8	32.8	22.4	30.4
2007	68.8	31.2	32.4	19.6	47.9	52.1	34.6	22.4	32.2	44.8	23.0	33.2	23.6	27.3	35.0	36.1	28.9	30.8	23.5	28.0
2008	67.8	32.2	31.5	19.9	48.7	51.3	33.6	22.1	31.3	44.7	24.0	29.9	24.0	27.8	33.1	37.6	29.3	29.5	23.2	28.5
2009	64.7	35.3	31.9	20.0	47.9	52.1	33.5	22.0	32.6	42.9	24.5	32.0	23.0	27.0	33.4	36.5	30.1	30.3	22.8	27.6
2010	63.8	36.2	32.7	20.9	48.7	51.3	34.0	22.8	32.1	41.5	26.4	32.8	23.2	28.6	34.1	38.0	27.9	31.5	24.1	27.2
2011	60.9	39.1	32.0	20.8	49.4	50.6	32.8	22.2	31.1	41.8	27.1	31.6	23.3	26.9	30.4	38.7	30.8	29.6	23.7	27.5
2012	60.5	39.5	32.2	20.1	49.0	51.0	32.4	21.9	31.2	38.2	30.6	31.4	21.6	28.3	29.8	37.5	32.6	29.4	22.4	28.3

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	7.8	4.6	11.2	3.1	3.6	7.2	7.5	25.9	29.2	16.8	22.3	20.5	15.6	16.9	52.2	30.9	39.0	37.8
2005	7.9	5.1	11.3	3.7	4.7	7.1	7.2	21.6	31.3	16.9	24.9	20.0	18.1	20.9	48.1	28.9	32.1	38.4
2006	7.8	4.9	11.9	4.3	4.5	6.5	7.4	22.2	30.4	16.7	21.8	19.8	18.8	17.5	46.2	30.3	34.3	39.7
2007	8.8	5.1	13.6	4.7	3.9	8.6	7.2	21.3	26.7	16.0	20.2	22.2	20.4	15.4	51.0	31.1	30.2	38.3
2008	8.1	5.9	13.4	4.3	5.9	7.9	6.8	22.6	25.1	14.6	21.4	21.0	17.8	21.0	44.8	28.8	32.9	36.9
2009	8.3	5.7	12.5	5.1	4.6	8.3	6.5	22.2	26.9	15.8	18.1	18.9	22.1	16.6	45.0	29.5	31.1	39.8
2010	7.7	7.1	14.9	4.3	4.1	8.3	7.1	21.1	25.4	15.5	20.8	23.1	21.4	15.1	45.2	31.7	31.3	39.1
2011	7.8	6.1	15.3	4.2	5.6	7.9	6.0	23.6	23.5	16.2	18.0	22.3	20.1	19.1	41.1	29.6	33.0	35.4
2012	7.9	6.1	15.5	4.0	4.6	9.0	5.7	23.3	23.9	15.6	17.3	21.9	19.6	15.3	44.4	30.6	32.2	36.1

	AREA				SECTOR				PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2004	33.5	66.5	38.3	25.9	73.9	26.1	26.8	38.1	60.5	39.5	30.8	20.6
2005	35.2	64.8	36.3	25.0	78.2	21.8	27.3	31.5	48.6	51.4	24.4	17.5
2006	36.0	64.0	40.3	23.8	77.6	22.4	26.6	33.6	49.2	50.8	27.1	17.4
2007	21.4	78.6	38.1	25.0	78.5	21.5	26.4	29.3	44.5	55.5	23.2	18.5
2008	32.2	67.8	35.4	23.7	77.2	22.8	25.2	32.2	42.4	57.6	24.1	17.9
2009	33.7	66.3	35.8	23.2	77.2	22.8	25.2	31.1	41.6	58.4	23.3	18.3
2010	33.8	66.2	37.0	23.9	78.5	21.5	26.3	30.6	40.7	59.3	24.5	17.9
2011	18.2	81.8	36.7	24.9	76.0	24.0	25.0	32.2	44.1	55.9	25.3	18.3
2012	33.8	66.2	34.8	23.0	76.4	23.6	24.7	31.4	43.4	56.6	25.2	17.4

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2004	22.6	8.6	6.7	26.2	35.8	35.3	30.5	26.2	27.2	31.1
2005	29.2	9.5	7.1	25.8	28.3	36.1	28.6	25.1	25.0	25.9
2006	29.1	8.5	8.4	24.3	29.7	35.8	25.9	27.1	23.7	26.9
2007	34.2	9.2	7.8	22.8	25.9	35.3	26.1	24.1	23.3	23.9
2008	34.7	9.4	7.6	22.7	25.6	34.3	23.2	21.3	23.0	25.4
2009	33.4	10.2	8.5	22.2	25.7	34.2	26.6	22.5	20.7	26.0
2010	34.4	10.9	8.4	21.9	24.4	34.4	26.9	23.5	21.8	26.5
2011	31.4	10.7	8.8	22.6	26.4	33.5	26.0	24.1	21.9	25.6
2012	32.6	9.4	8.7	21.8	27.6	33.4	24.8	22.7	20.7	26.2

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Table 4A. Probit estimates. Probability of being a part-time worker

	Argentina			Brazil			Chile		
Co-variates	Total	Involuntary	Voluntary	Total	Involuntary	Voluntary	Total	Involuntary	Voluntary
Men	-0.163***	-0.0181***	-0.129***	-0.0563***	-0.00209***	-0.0515***	-0.0643***	-0.0336***	-0.0271***
	[0.0100]	[0.00374]	[0.00912]	[0.00264]	[0.000612]	[0.00251]	[0.00312]	[0.00228]	[0.00207]
Age	-0.0159***	0.000532	-0.0164***	-0.0123***	-6.87e-05	-0.0120***	-0.00691***	-0.00181***	-0.00423***
	[0.00212]	[0.000740]	[0.00190]	[0.000542]	[0.000116]	[0.000512]	[0.000536]	[0.000395]	[0.000335]
Age2	0.000204***	-9.93e-06	0.000210***	0.000154***	1.90e-08	0.000151***	8.10e-05***	1.61e-05***	5.38e-05***
	[2.44e-05]	[8.92e-06]	[2.18e-05]	[6.52e-06]	[1.41e-06]	[6.14e-06]	[6.28e-06]	[4.69e-06]	[3.86e-06]
Informal	0.163***	0.0260***	0.121***	0.195***	0.0269***	0.155***	0.148***	0.0865***	0.0505***
	[0.0144]	[0.00538]	[0.0134]	[0.00424]	[0.00153]	[0.00403]	[0.00466]	[0.00362]	[0.00308]
Head of Hous.	-0.0547***	0.00506	-0.0594***	-0.0130***	0.00163***	-0.0162***	-0.00521*	0.00191	-0.00754***
	[0.00948]	[0.00324]	[0.00851]	[0.00262]	[0.000589]	[0.00249]	[0.00277]	[0.00200]	[0.00179]
Less than Comp. Primary	0.0331	0.0132	0.00473	0.0265***	0.00389***	0.0190***	0.000947	0.00184	-0.000683
	[0.0284]	[0.0104]	[0.0258]	[0.00490]	[0.00118]	[0.00464]	[0.00502]	[0.00358]	[0.00326]
Incom. Secondary	0.0275	0.00319	0.0221	0.0697***	0.00393**	0.0626***	-0.00198	0.000729	-0.00254
	[0.0177]	[0.00570]	[0.0165]	[0.00669]	[0.00153]	[0.00641]	[0.00491]	[0.00353]	[0.00317]
Compl. Secondary	0.0129	-0.00386	0.0165	0.0162***	4.69e-05	0.0152***	-0.00707	-0.00475	-0.00244
	[0.0153]	[0.00487]	[0.0142]	[0.00434]	[0.000966]	[0.00414]	[0.00433]	[0.00305]	[0.00286]
Incom. Terciary	0.109***	0.00328	0.103***	0.136***	0.00434***	0.126***	0.0422***	0.0127***	0.0257***
	[0.0201]	[0.00619]	[0.0191]	[0.00727]	[0.00161]	[0.00702]	[0.00551]	[0.00377]	[0.00389]
Compl. Terciary	0.104***	0.00997	0.0890***	0.127***	0.0107***	0.111***	0.105***	0.0412***	0.0586***
	[0.0174]	[0.00616]	[0.0162]	[0.00616]	[0.00181]	[0.00588]	[0.0202]	[0.0142]	[0.0151]
Temporary	0.120***	0.0453***	0.0329**	0.127***	0.00495***	0.101***	0.0662***	0.0498***	0.0104***
	[0.0168]	[0.00759]	[0.0141]	[0.00781]	[0.00134]	[0.00720]	[0.00349]	[0.00270]	[0.00209]
Manufacture	0.0112	0.00386	-0.00454	-0.00239	0.000671	-0.00554	0.0149*	0.00415	0.00990*
	[0.0224]	[0.00713]	[0.0209]	[0.00619]	[0.00165]	[0.00582]	[0.00787]	[0.00556]	[0.00567]
Trade	0.0501**	-9.29e-05	0.0502**	-0.0289***	0.00146	-0.0304***	0.0692***	0.0375***	0.0298***
	[0.0209]	[0.00596]	[0.0204]	[0.00560]	[0.00156]	[0.00525]	[0.00747]	[0.00556]	[0.00537]
Transport	-0.0135	0.00122	-0.0231	0.00999	0.00434*	0.00330	0.0563***	0.0289***	0.0265***
	[0.0253]	[0.00799]	[0.0234]	[0.00739]	[0.00240]	[0.00688]	[0.00949]	[0.00709]	[0.00686]
Financial sector	0.175***	0.0144	0.153***	0.0671***	0.00617***	0.0571***	0.0435***	0.0233***	0.0191***
	[0.0275]	[0.00941]	[0.0274]	[0.00710]	[0.00207]	[0.00674]	[0.00911]	[0.00687]	[0.00634]
Personal services	0.435***	0.0505***	0.381***	0.166***	0.0302***	0.131***	0.100***	0.0624***	0.0371***
	[0.0283]	[0.0157]	[0.0313]	[0.00978]	[0.00490]	[0.00920]	[0.0108]	[0.00874]	[0.00743]
Domestic services				0.145***	0.0231***	0.107***	0.207***	0.104***	0.0896***
				[0.0102]	[0.00411]	[0.00948]	[0.0134]	[0.0105]	[0.0104]
Public sector	0.494***	0.0393***	0.433***	0.205***	0.0194***	0.178***	0.0560***	0.0366***	0.0189***
	[0.0212]	[0.00945]	[0.0226]	[0.00932]	[0.00354]	[0.00897]	[0.00821]	[0.00644]	[0.00553]
Others	0.140***	0.0175**	0.112***	0.0617***	0.0139***	0.0449***	0.0288***	0.0119***	0.0164***
	[0.0252]	[0.00881]	[0.0247]	[0.00859]	[0.00335]	[0.00799]	[0.00646]	[0.00459]	[0.00473]
Urban							0.0168***	0.00856***	0.00664***
							[0.00331]	[0.00234]	[0.00221]
Training									
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	11,987	11,987	11,987	105,869	105,869	105,869	59,069	59,069	59,069

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4A (cont.)

	Ecuador			Peru		
Co-variates	Total	Involuntary	Voluntary	Total	Involuntary	Voluntary
Men	-0.0503***	-0.00919***	-0.0329***	-0.0734***	-0.00664	-0.0605***
	[0.00584]	[0.00319]	[0.00405]	[0.0101]	[0.00491]	[0.00862]
Age	-0.00427***	0.000978**	-0.00404***	-0.00353*	0.00242**	-0.00584***
	[0.000679]	[0.000419]	[0.000431]	[0.00213]	[0.00112]	[0.00178]
Age2	5.76e-05***	-1.35e-05***	5.40e-05***	4.82e-05*	-2.77e-05**	7.40e-05***
	[7.82e-06]	[4.97e-06]	[4.97e-06]	[2.49e-05]	[1.32e-05]	[2.07e-05]
Informal	0.0967***	0.0522***	0.0341***	0.0941***	0.0313***	0.0582***
	[0.00623]	[0.00466]	[0.00391]	[0.0136]	[0.00764]	[0.0116]
Head of Hous.	-0.0211***	-0.00160	-0.0168***	-0.0169	0.00133	-0.0173*
	[0.00471]	[0.00271]	[0.00308]	[0.0107]	[0.00531]	[0.00899]
Less than Comp. Primary	0.0151**	0.00321	0.0113***	0.0208	-0.0206*	0.0637
	[0.00592]	[0.00314]	[0.00421]	[0.0394]	[0.0121]	[0.0427]
Incom. Secondary	0.00288	-0.00326	0.00703	0.0358	-0.0153	0.0686*
	[0.00655]	[0.00335]	[0.00478]	[0.0357]	[0.0120]	[0.0382]
Compl. Secondary	-0.00510	0.00107	-0.00475	0.0651**	-0.00273	0.0799**
	[0.00578]	[0.00342]	[0.00369]	[0.0309]	[0.0127]	[0.0315]
Incom. Terciary	0.0389***	0.0106*	0.0226***	0.183***	0.0265	0.172***
	[0.0102]	[0.00588]	[0.00694]	[0.0379]	[0.0178]	[0.0400]
Compl. Terciary	-0.00240	0.00303	-0.00414	0.182***	0.0287**	0.156***
	[0.00952]	[0.00635]	[0.00573]	[0.0276]	[0.0132]	[0.0266]
Part-time	0.0416***	0.0306***	0.00833**	-0.103***	-0.0153***	-0.0800***
	[0.00508]	[0.00333]	[0.00326]	[0.0117]	[0.00579]	[0.0102]
Manufacture	0.0254**	0.0142**	0.0143	-0.0346	-0.00928	-0.0186
	[0.0117]	[0.00713]	[0.00917]	[0.0259]	[0.0121]	[0.0244]
Trade	0.0588***	0.0108*	0.0522***	-0.0361	-0.0163	-0.00845
	[0.0123]	[0.00596]	[0.0120]	[0.0247]	[0.0103]	[0.0242]
Transport	0.0508***	0.0212**	0.0294**	0.0385	-0.0240**	0.0788**
	[0.0163]	[0.00950]	[0.0137]	[0.0358]	[0.0109]	[0.0378]
Financial sector	0.0365**	0.00536	0.0359**	0.000573	-0.00840	0.0193
	[0.0165]	[0.00879]	[0.0147]	[0.0272]	[0.0116]	[0.0268]
Personal services	0.124***	0.0421***	0.0812***	0.308***	0.0647***	0.259***
	[0.0239]	[0.0148]	[0.0210]	[0.0396]	[0.0240]	[0.0427]
Domestic services	0.111***	0.0236**	0.0908***			
	[0.0204]	[0.0100]	[0.0201]			
Public sector	-0.0221**	-0.00386	-0.00990	0.210***	0.0380***	0.177***
	[0.0102]	[0.00694]	[0.00695]	[0.0260]	[0.0130]	[0.0254]
Others	0.0856***	0.0279***	0.0531***	0.0402	-0.00481	0.0584**
	[0.0102]	[0.00546]	[0.00911]	[0.0290]	[0.0119]	[0.0296]
Urban	-0.00818*	-0.00651**	0.000678	-0.00688	0.000477	-0.00687
	[0.00459]	[0.00269]	[0.00293]	[0.0104]	[0.00495]	[0.00882]
Training	-0.0297***	-0.0111**	-0.0144***			
	[0.00662]	[0.00456]	[0.00393]			
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	16,438	16,438	16,438	9,549	9,549	9,549

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Table 5A. Evolution of involuntary underemployment

Argentina. 2003-2013

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	73.6	26.4	26.9	7.7
2004	81.4	18.6	25.4	4.8
2005	80.6	19.4	21.9	4.0
2006	78.3	21.7	20.3	4.1
2007	75.3	24.7	17.7	3.7
2008	76.5	23.5	18.7	3.5
2009	74.2	25.8	21.7	4.3
2010	74.9	25.1	18.4	3.1
2011	70.3	29.7	16.9	3.7
2012	70.3	29.7	17.9	4.0
2013	71.4	28.6	16.8	3.4

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	58.8	41.2	22.9	11.6
2004	59.2	40.8	20.1	9.9
2005	61.5	38.5	16.8	7.9
2006	64.2	35.8	16.0	6.9
2007	67.3	32.7	14.3	5.3
2008	60.5	39.5	13.1	6.5
2009	64.4	35.6	15.4	6.8
2010	66.1	33.9	12.7	4.9
2011	67.0	33.0	12.8	4.8
2012	66.5	33.5	13.7	5.2
2013	66.6	33.4	12.2	4.7

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	22.8	47.4	29.8	21.9	14.8	16.0
2004	21.8	48.6	29.6	17.6	13.1	13.9
2005	22.0	48.1	29.9	15.0	10.8	11.6
2006	22.0	49.9	28.1	13.9	10.2	10.4
2007	20.7	50.4	28.9	10.6	8.9	9.0
2008	24.6	49.7	25.8	13.3	8.8	8.0
2009	23.1	53.3	23.7	15.5	10.6	8.2
2010	23.0	49.8	27.2	12.0	7.6	7.3
2011	21.0	51.5	27.4	11.5	7.9	7.3
2012	20.6	52.6	26.8	12.1	8.5	7.8
2013	21.1	51.4	27.5	11.1	7.5	7.2

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2003	54.2	29.6	16.3	19.8	13.6	13.7
2004	58.8	29.4	11.8	18.5	11.3	9.2
2005	56.1	30.9	13.0	14.9	9.9	8.1
2006	56.9	28.8	14.3	14.4	8.4	8.0
2007	56.1	28.3	15.6	12.3	6.8	7.4
2008	50.7	34.3	14.9	11.8	8.2	6.8
2009	50.6	34.7	14.6	13.5	9.3	7.6
2010	48.8	37.3	13.9	10.5	7.6	5.3
2011	47.6	32.6	19.8	10.5	6.7	7.3
2012	48.7	32.5	18.8	11.9	7.0	7.3
2013	50.8	34.6	14.6	11.0	6.7	5.3

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	CONTRIBUTION								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	7.8	8.4	16.3	4.8	5.3	9.8	25.7	16.5	5.5
2004	8.6	9.8	17.4	4.3	5.6	6.7	31.1	10.9	5.6
2005	9.0	7.0	15.2	4.6	5.5	7.9	32.0	10.3	8.4
2006	7.7	6.6	14.3	3.3	4.3	8.2	36.6	12.6	6.5
2007	8.3	6.6	16.8	3.4	6.3	5.9	33.5	13.7	5.6
2008	12.1	8.2	15.6	4.8	8.7	7.5	25.7	11.3	6.1
2009	7.6	6.4	16.3	3.2	5.6	9.4	32.9	11.0	7.7
2010	6.4	6.7	17.2	3.5	8.4	7.6	31.6	12.9	5.7
2011	7.8	7.8	14.9	1.9	5.4	7.9	32.3	15.9	6.2
2012	6.7	6.9	11.4	5.0	6.5	9.4	30.8	16.8	6.4
2013	5.7	7.4	13.5	2.1	4.1	8.4	36.7	13.2	9.0

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY								
	INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	9.2	23.6	13.4	9.7	9.2	23.9	40.5	14.4	12.7
2004	7.9	22.4	12.3	7.6	8.6	15.3	42.2	8.9	11.0
2005	7.0	11.6	9.7	7.3	7.2	13.7	35.9	6.9	12.7
2006	5.7	9.1	8.0	5.0	5.2	13.9	36.8	7.8	10.4
2007	5.0	8.5	8.0	4.3	5.7	8.4	29.6	7.4	7.1
2008	7.5	10.3	7.5	6.1	8.5	10.1	24.8	5.8	8.6
2009	5.7	10.5	9.1	4.8	6.1	14.3	35.6	6.1	11.1
2010	3.6	8.6	7.2	4.0	7.1	9.7	28.0	5.7	6.6
2011	4.4	9.1	6.6	2.0	4.5	11.1	27.4	6.8	7.5
2012	4.2	9.1	5.7	5.7	5.9	13.5	28.6	7.4	7.1
2013	3.2	9.0	6.3	2.2	3.5	10.2	29.5	5.4	7.8

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	81.4	18.6	16.8	14.9
2004	88.5	11.5	15.5	8.5
2005	88.7	11.3	12.9	7.0
2006	86.3	13.7	11.6	7.8
2007	85.1	14.9	9.7	7.1
2008	87.1	12.9	10.0	6.4
2009	87.6	12.4	11.6	6.6
2010	87.2	12.8	9.0	5.3
2011	83.0	17.0	8.7	6.7
2012	82.7	17.3	9.4	7.0
2013	85.6	14.4	8.6	5.5

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2003	59.9	40.1	9.4	30.8
2004	56.6	43.4	6.8	27.2
2005	57.7	42.3	5.5	23.6
2006	62.3	37.7	5.3	19.1
2007	66.0	34.0	4.7	16.5
2008	63.5	36.5	5.1	21.9
2009	66.1	33.9	5.6	21.7
2010	64.0	36.0	4.2	21.4
2011	66.2	33.8	4.4	18.5
2012	65.3	34.7	4.7	22.4
2013	64.6	35.4	3.8	18.6

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	48.6	4.8	7.3	19.3	20.0	33.1	16.4	18.9	11.9	8.5
2004	53.7	6.6	8.3	17.9	13.6	32.2	16.6	15.1	9.0	5.5
2005	53.0	6.4	7.4	18.4	14.8	28.5	13.4	12.3	7.4	4.8
2006	52.9	6.2	5.3	22.3	13.4	26.5	11.7	8.6	8.3	4.0
2007	48.9	7.0	9.6	20.7	13.7	21.5	12.7	11.9	6.2	3.5
2008	46.2	7.2	8.6	24.6	13.4	22.7	14.4	11.8	6.9	3.5
2009	48.6	7.5	6.7	23.1	14.0	28.6	19.5	12.6	7.4	3.8
2010	48.0	6.8	6.3	24.7	14.1	23.2	12.5	9.1	6.2	2.9
2011	47.4	6.8	6.2	21.9	17.7	22.1	13.8	9.3	5.8	3.5
2012	43.5	5.2	9.6	25.3	16.5	23.4	12.1	14.4	7.1	3.4
2013	50.6	6.3	5.9	22.1	15.1	23.1	12.4	9.6	5.6	2.9

Brazil. 2003-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2003	75.9	24.1	7.8	1.1
2004	77.2	22.8	7.5	1.0
2005	75.8	24.2	6.6	0.9
2006	74.5	25.5	7.8	1.1
2007	74.8	25.2	6.4	0.8
2008	74.0	26.0	6.5	0.8
2009	70.9	29.1	6.2	0.9
2010	68.2	31.8	6.0	0.8
2011	65.6	34.4	4.7	0.7

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2003	69.5	30.5	4.8	1.7
2004	70.1	29.9	4.7	1.7
2005	67.9	32.1	3.9	1.6
2006	68.4	31.6	4.5	1.8
2007	70.1	29.9	3.5	1.3
2008	70.7	29.3	3.4	1.3
2009	69.4	30.6	3.3	1.3
2010	68.1	31.9	2.9	1.2
2011	69.0	31.0	2.2	0.9

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2003	26.5	52.8	20.7	3.6	3.0	2.9
2004	26.4	53.2	20.4	3.6	3.0	2.7
2005	26.9	51.3	21.7	3.2	2.5	2.4
2006	27.3	51.7	21.1	3.8	2.9	2.7
2007	25.7	51.8	22.5	2.9	2.2	2.1
2008	24.4	51.7	23.9	2.7	2.2	2.2
2009	23.9	50.8	25.3	2.7	2.1	2.2
2010	23.8	52.2	24.0	2.5	2.0	1.8
2011	20.1	53.3	26.6	1.6	1.5	1.5

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	ss than	CS-IT	CT
2003	59.0	29.4	11.7	3.9	2.4	2.7
2004	60.9	27.4	11.7	4.0	2.1	2.5
2005	57.6	30.6	11.8	3.4	2.0	2.2
2006	57.4	30.6	12.0	4.1	2.2	2.5
2007	55.2	30.9	13.9	3.1	1.6	2.1
2008	50.4	33.4	16.2	2.9	1.7	2.2
2009	51.2	34.0	14.8	3.0	1.7	1.9
2010	45.5	36.1	18.4	2.6	1.6	2.0
2011	43.0	33.3	23.7	1.9	1.1	1.9

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE							
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2003	5.9	3.9	11.5	3.5	8.0	10.2	35.9	14.2	6.9	1.0	2.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	4.4	10.9	3.6	3.5
2004	5.6	4.0	12.8	2.9	7.9	9.0	36.4	13.5	7.9	1.0	2.6	2.0	1.3	1.6	4.1	10.0	3.3	3.8
2005	6.3	4.9	12.8	2.7	8.9	10.1	34.3	12.6	7.4	0.9	2.7	1.7	1.1	1.6	4.1	8.3	2.7	3.4
2006	6.7	3.8	11.9	3.1	9.5	10.3	36.7	10.7	7.4	1.2	2.4	1.8	1.5	1.9	4.8	10.2	2.8	3.8
2007	5.7	3.2	12.0	2.8	8.4	11.6	37.1	12.3	7.0	0.8	1.6	1.4	0.9	1.2	3.8	8.0	2.4	2.9
2008	5.8	3.7	12.7	3.0	9.3	11.8	33.9	12.1	7.6	0.8	1.7	1.4	1.0	1.3	3.7	7.8	2.3	3.1
2009	6.6	3.5	12.3	3.3	8.9	10.4	35.3	13.2	6.6	0.9	1.5	1.4	1.0	1.2	3.3	7.7	2.4	2.7
2010	6.0	3.2	11.4	4.8	8.9	12.9	31.6	13.0	8.1	0.7	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	3.7	6.8	2.1	3.0
2011	4.9	2.8	10.4	3.4	10.3	14.6	30.2	16.6	6.8	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	3.1	5.2	2.1	1.9

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2003	85.0	15.0	3.1	3.3
2004	84.8	15.2	3.0	3.2
2005	86.0	14.0	2.7	2.6
2006	87.8	12.2	3.1	2.7
2007	86.5	13.5	2.3	2.3
2008	86.8	13.2	2.3	2.1
2009	85.4	14.6	2.2	2.3
2010	85.6	14.4	2.0	2.0
2011	82.2	17.8	1.4	2.0

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2003	86.2	13.8	2.8	10.1
2004	87.2	12.8	2.8	9.4
2005	86.8	13.2	2.4	9.0
2006	86.3	13.7	2.8	9.1
2007	87.4	12.6	2.1	7.0
2008	88.4	11.6	2.1	6.9
2009	88.0	12.0	2.0	7.6
2010	87.3	12.7	1.8	7.4
2011	86.2	13.8	1.4	6.4

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2003	24.3	11.7	13.3	32.6	18.2	6.8	4.8	3.8	2.5	1.9
2004	21.5	12.9	13.7	34.0	18.0	6.2	4.9	3.9	2.6	1.8
2005	21.3	12.6	14.0	33.3	18.7	6.0	4.3	3.2	2.2	1.6
2006	21.4	12.0	14.0	32.7	19.9	6.6	4.8	3.8	2.5	2.0
2007	20.1	12.6	14.7	33.8	18.9	5.0	3.8	3.1	1.9	1.4
2008	19.8	12.0	13.9	34.3	19.9	4.4	3.2	2.8	1.9	1.5
2009	21.2	10.7	17.2	34.7	16.2	5.1	3.3	3.5	1.9	1.2
2010	18.3	13.8	14.7	34.9	18.3	3.9	3.5	2.6	1.8	1.2
2011	16.1	11.8	16.2	36.2	19.7	2.8	2.3	2.1	1.3	1.0

Chile. 2000-2011

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
2009	58.6	41.4	14.3	2.9
2011	49.7	50.3	19.0	4.1

	GENDER			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
2009	62.3	37.7	8.6	3.5
2011	63.0	37.0	10.4	4.2

	AGE					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
2009	22.6	47.3	30.1	8.6	5.2	4.8
2011	21.2	47.3	31.5	9.7	6.5	5.9

	EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2009	41.8	41.0	17.3	6.8	5.0	4.6
2011	36.1	61.4	2.4	7.2	6.4	13.0

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2009	4.3	4.7	20.1	5.3	5.3	10.8	20.9	11.2	17.4	2.4	3.1	6.3	3.9	3.4	7.7	16.2	5.2	4.7
2011	4.1	4.5	25.5	4.4	5.6	10.7	21.2	11.3	12.7	2.7	3.2	8.2	3.9	4.0	9.1	19.8	6.9	5.3

	TRAINING			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING
2009	92.8	7.2	6.0	2.7
2011				

	AREA			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN
2009	8.2	91.8	4.2	5.7
2011	10.2	89.8	6.3	6.8

	SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2009	87.0	13.0	5.7	4.7
2011	87.2	12.8	6.8	6.6

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2009	46.1	53.9	3.3	12.6
2011	51.7	48.3	4.6	13.5

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2009	47.5			34.3	18.2	8.8			5.6	2.8
2011	43.4			35.0	21.6	10.0			7.0	4.0

Ecuador. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2004	91.3	8.7	17.3	3.3	32.3	67.7	12.3	12.9	34.1	44.4	21.5	16.0	11.5	11.4	69.5	23.5	7.0	15.4	9.6	7.4
2005	88.4	11.6	14.8	4.0	40.3	59.7	13.2	10.3	30.8	44.7	24.5	12.9	10.4	11.3	66.8	24.3	8.9	13.3	8.7	8.5
2006	90.2	9.8	14.9	3.3	34.6	65.4	11.6	10.8	33.5	42.5	24.0	13.6	9.7	10.8	66.3	26.2	7.5	13.1	8.9	7.4
2007	91.8	8.2	13.7	2.4	36.2	63.8	10.7	9.5	27.1	43.7	29.2	10.8	8.8	11.1	68.9	23.7	7.4	12.1	7.5	6.1
2008	93.2	6.8	11.3	1.5	38.1	61.9	8.8	7.3	28.0	43.0	29.0	9.0	6.9	8.3	70.4	23.4	6.2	10.0	5.5	4.1
2009	90.8	9.2	11.6	1.8	37.4	62.6	8.4	7.3	30.6	40.5	28.9	9.5	6.6	7.9	66.7	26.2	7.1	9.7	5.8	4.3
2010	92.1	7.9	13.4	1.4	31.8	68.2	7.3	8.3	25.6	44.7	29.7	8.9	7.4	8.2	68.7	26.7	4.6	10.8	5.9	2.8
2011	91.1	8.9	12.2	1.0	27.3	72.7	5.0	6.9	27.2	46.7	26.1	8.2	5.9	5.4	69.7	27.0	3.3	9.3	4.4	1.5
2012	92.6	7.4	10.7	0.7	30.6	69.4	4.6	5.6	28.1	45.5	26.4	7.5	4.8	4.5	66.0	29.7	4.3	7.7	3.9	1.5

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																		
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE									
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	6.7	6.5	14.2	4.4	2.9	7.9	6.5	7.8	43.1	6.5	10.0	11.0	10.5	6.4	17.4	13.6	7.0	21.6
2005	6.1	5.8	13.3	4.3	1.7	9.7	12.5	8.1	38.4	5.7	8.1	9.0	8.4	3.2	18.9	18.1	7.2	17.4
2006	7.3	6.2	13.8	3.9	3.7	9.6	7.3	7.0	41.2	6.4	7.2	9.0	7.5	7.3	19.9	12.9	6.0	18.4
2007	6.6	6.5	13.0	5.1	3.3	8.8	8.9	5.9	41.9	5.5	6.8	7.8	8.6	5.5	16.7	14.3	4.5	16.1
2008	8.3	6.5	12.3	4.7	2.8	9.7	10.7	3.5	41.6	5.2	5.3	5.9	7.0	3.6	14.1	13.6	2.0	12.6
2009	6.1	6.9	14.1	5.2	4.7	7.1	8.3	4.9	42.7	3.9	5.3	6.4	7.0	5.4	11.1	10.2	2.8	13.6
2010	4.8	9.1	15.0	5.7	2.8	6.4	7.9	4.2	44.1	3.1	7.8	7.0	8.2	3.3	11.0	12.1	2.1	14.9
2011	4.8	8.5	16.2	3.6	3.3	4.7	5.2	1.4	52.4	2.5	6.3	5.9	4.2	2.8	5.7	7.4	0.5	13.3
2012	8.8	8.2	13.0	4.3	1.9	5.3	6.3	1.8	50.4	4.0	4.7	4.1	4.0	1.2	5.2	7.4	0.6	11.1

	TRAINING				AREA				SECTOR			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	NO TRAINING	TRAINING	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
2004	94.8	5.2	14.4	4.0	39.5	60.5	19.1	10.4	92.3	7.7	13.8	6.3
2005	92.7	7.3	12.3	5.4	34.5	65.5	14.9	10.0	91.7	8.3	12.0	6.7
2006	92.2	7.8	12.1	5.4	38.0	62.0	15.7	9.4	92.9	7.1	11.9	5.8
2007	93.5	6.5	11.5	3.3	43.9	56.1	15.6	7.7	93.9	6.1	10.8	4.3
2008	94.0	6.0	9.0	2.5	42.9	57.1	12.0	6.2	96.1	3.9	8.8	2.1
2009	95.2	4.8	9.1	1.9	41.7	58.3	12.2	6.1	94.7	5.3	8.6	2.7
2010	94.8	5.2	9.6	1.9	41.1	58.9	12.3	6.4	95.7	4.3	9.2	2.0
2011	96.1	3.9	8.0	1.0	42.5	57.5	10.2	4.9	98.5	1.5	7.5	0.5
2012	96.6	3.4	6.9	0.7	53.1	46.9	10.3	3.4	98.1	1.9	6.2	0.6

	PERMANENT/TEMPORARY				TENURE					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years	<1year	1-5 years	>5 years
2004	39.0	61.0	8.1	19.9	31.9	25.3	42.8	14.2	11.3	12.6
2005	49.8	50.2	8.6	16.2	30.8	28.6	40.6	12.7	11.1	10.5
2006	43.6	56.4	7.9	16.0	31.8	25.8	42.4	12.6	9.9	10.9
2007	14.8	85.2	3.6	14.3	31.2	24.9	43.9	11.1	8.7	9.9
2008	12.2	87.8	2.4	11.2	28.8	28.3	43.0	8.5	7.6	7.5
2009	11.6	88.4	2.2	11.3	32.1	27.2	40.7	8.9	6.9	7.4
2010	10.7	89.3	2.1	12.2	31.1	26.4	42.5	8.9	7.2	7.9
2011	6.4	93.6	0.9	10.6	34.0	23.7	42.3	7.8	5.1	6.1
2012	6.3	93.7	0.7	9.0	30.8	23.2	46.0	6.2	4.1	5.4

Peru. 2004-2012

	FORMALITY/INFORMALITY				GENDER				AGE						EDUCATION					
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE			CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN	<25 years	25-45	>45	25 year	25-45	>45	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT	Less than IS	CS-IT	CT
2004	76.1	23.9	14.6	9.2	42.8	57.2	15.4	11.3	30.9	47.9	21.1	14.1	12.2	12.4	38.3	35.2	26.5	14.1	11.6	12.6
2005	74.6	25.4	14.2	8.6	42.4	57.6	14.4	11.0	31.0	46.9	22.1	14.1	11.3	11.9	40.1	35.3	24.5	14.3	10.7	11.7
2006	70.0	30.0	14.2	9.5	44.6	55.4	15.3	10.7	31.1	47.0	21.9	14.0	11.6	12.1	40.0	33.0	27.0	15.4	10.0	12.2
2007	69.3	30.7	15.4	9.1	46.4	53.6	15.8	10.9	29.7	46.2	24.1	14.4	11.5	13.5	35.3	39.0	25.7	14.6	12.0	11.7
2008	67.9	32.1	13.0	8.2	46.6	53.4	13.3	9.5	26.9	48.5	24.6	10.6	10.8	11.8	33.3	38.3	28.4	12.3	9.8	11.4
2009	65.4	34.6	12.6	7.6	45.6	54.4	12.4	9.0	29.9	46.8	23.3	11.4	9.8	10.0	33.1	38.8	28.1	11.7	9.5	10.0
2010	65.1	34.9	12.6	7.6	45.9	54.1	12.2	9.1	29.9	43.6	26.5	11.6	9.3	10.9	33.0	42.6	24.4	11.6	10.2	9.0
2011	62.2	37.8	11.4	7.0	46.4	53.6	10.7	8.2	28.9	44.3	26.7	10.3	8.6	9.3	31.2	39.3	29.5	10.6	8.4	9.2
2012	60.2	39.8	9.0	5.6	42.7	57.3	7.9	6.9	27.3	42.3	30.4	7.6	6.7	7.8	32.6	35.8	31.6	9.0	6.0	7.7

	BRANCH OF ACTIVITY																	
	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Serv	Domes. Serv	Public sec.	Other sectors
2004	9.0	5.9	11.8	3.7	4.1	7.2	7.8	20.8	29.8	8.5	12.4	9.5	8.2	8.4	22.8	14.2	13.8	17.0
2005	9.5	7.2	11.8	3.6	4.6	5.3	7.1	18.3	32.6	8.8	15.4	9.0	7.7	8.7	15.5	12.4	11.8	17.4
2006	8.9	4.7	11.6	4.9	4.4	6.6	8.6	19.0	31.5	8.4	9.3	8.5	9.4	7.5	20.5	15.6	13.0	18.1
2007	9.5	6.2	13.7	5.0	3.4	7.8	8.5	18.7	27.2	8.1	11.6	10.6	10.3	6.2	21.8	17.2	12.4	18.4
2008	8.9	7.3	12.6	4.5	5.8	8.3	8.2	20.3	24.2	6.7	10.9	8.1	7.7	8.5	19.4	14.3	12.2	14.7
2009	9.1	6.8	12.3	5.7	3.8	7.9	6.9	19.8	27.6	6.8	8.4	7.3	9.7	5.4	16.7	12.3	10.8	15.9
2010	8.9	8.4	14.7	4.5	5.3	7.8	6.4	17.8	26.2	6.8	9.4	8.6	8.5	7.4	16.0	10.9	10.0	15.3
2011	9.0	8.4	13.0	5.1	5.3	7.5	6.0	20.6	25.2	6.5	8.6	6.6	8.5	6.2	13.7	10.4	10.0	13.3
2012	9.6	8.1	14.1	3.7	4.2	8.8	4.9	20.9	25.7	5.3	6.4	5.6	5.0	3.9	12.1	7.3	8.1	10.9

	AREA				SECTOR				PERMANENT/TEMPORARY			
	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE		CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	PERMANENT	TEMPORARY
2004	30.4	69.6	15.3	11.9	78.9	21.1	12.6	13.6	55.0	45.0	10.8	9.1
2005	34.0	66.0	15.2	11.1	81.6	18.4	12.4	11.5	45.4	54.6	8.1	6.6
2006	33.9	66.1	16.8	10.9	80.9	19.1	12.3	12.6	46.5	53.5	9.1	6.5
2007	19.2	80.8	16.1	12.1	81.2	18.8	12.9	12.1	43.5	56.5	9.2	7.6
2008	30.6	69.4	13.9	10.0	79.5	20.5	10.7	12.0	41.2	58.8	8.5	6.7
2009	34.5	65.5	14.3	9.0	79.5	20.5	10.1	10.9	41.2	58.8	7.8	6.2
2010	33.9	66.1	14.0	9.1	81.9	18.1	10.4	9.8	38.8	61.2	7.6	6.0
2011	17.5	82.5	12.3	8.8	79.1	20.9	9.1	9.8	41.3	58.7	7.2	5.8
2012	34.2	65.8	9.8	6.4	78.6	21.4	7.1	7.9	38.8	61.2	5.7	4.8

	TENURE									
	CONTRIBUTION					INCIDENCE				
	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years	<3 months	3-6 months	6-1 year	1-5 years	>5 years
2004	26.6	9.3	7.7	24.3	32.1	19.2	15.3	13.9	11.7	13.0
2005	33.9	9.4	8.1	23.5	25.0	18.2	12.3	12.4	9.9	9.9
2006	32.8	8.5	8.9	23.7	26.1	17.8	11.5	12.6	10.2	10.5
2007	38.1	9.5	8.1	20.4	23.9	18.6	12.8	11.7	9.8	10.4
2008	38.2	9.7	6.6	21.3	24.2	15.6	9.9	7.6	8.9	9.9
2009	34.9	10.3	8.2	22.7	23.9	13.9	10.5	8.4	8.3	9.4
2010	38.5	10.0	8.1	21.8	21.7	14.6	9.4	8.5	8.3	8.9
2011	32.8	11.5	8.5	21.5	25.7	12.2	9.8	8.1	7.3	8.7
2012	32.6	9.7	8.5	21.9	27.3	9.3	7.2	6.2	5.8	7.2

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

Table 6A. Characteristics of triangular employment in Chile. 2011

Employment relationship	
Direct hiring	92.9
Outsourcing	6.1
Temporary employment agency	1.1
Total	100.0

	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
Employment relationship	INFORMAL	FORMAL	INFORMAL	FORMAL
Direct hiring	17.8	82.2	93.8	92.7
Outsourcing	14.0	86.0	4.8	6.3
Temporary employment agency	22.5	77.5	1.4	1.0
Total				

	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FEMALE	MEN	FEMALE	MEN
	42.1	57.9	95.1	91.3
	26.8	73.2	4.0	7.5
	34.7	65.3	0.9	1.2

	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
	<25 years	25-45	>45	<25 years	25-45	>45
	14.5	49.1	36.4	91.5	93.0	93.3
	17.1	48.3	34.6	7.0	6.0	5.8
	20.3	48.1	31.5	1.5	1.1	0.9

	CONTRIBUTION			INCIDENCE		
Employment relationship	Less IS	CS-IT	CT	Less IS	CS-IT	CT
Direct hiring	32.9	65.7	1.4	91.0	93.7	99.9
Outsourcing	43.4	56.6	0.0	7.8	5.2	0.1
Temporary employment agency	37.3	62.7	0.0	1.2	1.0	0.0
Total						

	CONTRIBUTION									INCIDENCE								
Employment relationship	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Ser	omes. Se	Public sec	ther sect	Manuf	Construc	Trade	Transport	Finan. Serv.	Pers. Ser	omes. Se	blic s	Other sector
Direct hiring	10.3	8.7	21.2	7.6	9.3	8.1	7.7	11.6	15.5	94.9	86.2	93.8	91.9	92.6	94.8	99.5	96.1	88.6
Outsourcing	7.4	18.8	17.2	8.0	9.5	5.8	0.4	6.5	26.5	4.5	12.2	4.9	6.3	6.2	4.4	0.4	3.5	9.9
Temporary employment agency	6.1	13.6	24.3	12.8	10.6	5.6	0.7	4.3	21.9	0.7	1.6	1.3	1.8	1.2	0.8	0.1	0.4	1.5
Total																		

	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
Employment relationship	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN
Direct hiring	11.0	89.0	94.2	92.7
Outsourcing	8.6	91.4	4.8	6.2
Temporary employment agency	10.1	89.9	1.0	1.1
Total				

	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PUBLIC
	86.2	13.8	92.3	96.7
	93.2	6.8	6.5	3.1
	97.4	2.6	1.2	0.2

	CONTRIBUTION		INCIDENCE	
	FULL-TIME	PART-T	FULL-TIME	PART-TIME
	87.9	12.1	92.8	93.7
	90.8	9.2	6.2	4.6
	81.7	18.3	1.0	1.7

Table 7A. Heckman 2Steps estimates. Dependent variable: Hourly wages

Argentina. 2013

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages			Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
Co-variates	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Men	0.0289*	0.0244*	-0.217***	0.0888***	0.0729***	-0.326***	0.0286*	0.0244*	-0.221***	0.0932***	0.0735***	-0.312***
	[0.0157]	[0.0146]	[0.0819]	[0.0178]	[0.0145]	[0.0503]	[0.0157]	[0.0146]	[0.0816]	[0.0172]	[0.0144]	[0.0521]
Less than Comp	-0.118***	-0.0981***	-0.0284	-0.118***	-0.0477	0.0271	-0.118***	-0.0981***	-0.0287	-0.115***	-0.0503	0.0278
	[0.0331]	[0.0377]	[0.0576]	[0.0371]	[0.0369]	[0.0507]	[0.0331]	[0.0377]	[0.0574]	[0.0363]	[0.0368]	[0.0513]
Incom. Secondar	0.0393**	0.0466**	-0.0376	0.0453**	0.0585***	-0.0989***	0.0391**	0.0466**	-0.0387	0.0476**	0.0594***	-0.0942***
	[0.0176]	[0.0199]	[0.0389]	[0.0190]	[0.0193]	[0.0343]	[0.0176]	[0.0199]	[0.0389]	[0.0187]	[0.0192]	[0.0348]
Compl. Seconda	0.141***	0.157***	-0.0271	0.115***	0.135***	-0.164***	0.140***	0.157***	-0.0281	0.118***	0.136***	-0.159***
	[0.0193]	[0.0207]	[0.0582]	[0.0219]	[0.0205]	[0.0452]	[0.0193]	[0.0207]	[0.0579]	[0.0211]	[0.0204]	[0.0460]
Incom. Terciary	0.233***	0.253***	-0.0246	0.154***	0.170***	-0.237***	0.233***	0.253***	-0.0246	0.157***	0.173***	-0.238***
	[0.0256]	[0.0269]	[0.0887]	[0.0294]	[0.0268]	[0.0657]	[0.0257]	[0.0269]	[0.0876]	[0.0283]	[0.0267]	[0.0670]
Compl. Terciary	0.403***	0.408***	0.176	0.323***	0.305***	-0.0690	0.402***	0.408***	0.175	0.330***	0.311***	-0.0659
	[0.0294]	[0.0309]	[0.109]	[0.0346]	[0.0316]	[0.0767]	[0.0295]	[0.0309]	[0.108]	[0.0330]	[0.0314]	[0.0779]
Age	0.0151***	0.0131***	0.0167***	0.0214***	0.0165***	0.0203***	0.0151***	0.0131***	0.0160***	0.0225***	0.0165***	0.0222***
	[0.00273]	[0.00300]	[0.00520]	[0.00297]	[0.00292]	[0.00537]	[0.00273]	[0.00300]	[0.00523]	[0.00296]	[0.00289]	[0.00537]
Age2	-0.000120***	-8.81e-05**	-0.000124*	-0.000195***	-0.000127***	-0.000166**	-0.000120***	-8.81e-05**	-0.000116*	-0.000210***	-0.000129***	-0.000191***
	[3.25e-05]	[3.51e-05]	[6.50e-05]	[3.51e-05]	[3.39e-05]	[6.63e-05]	[3.25e-05]	[3.51e-05]	[6.55e-05]	[3.49e-05]	[3.36e-05]	[6.63e-05]
Head of Hous.	0.0112	0.0121	-0.183***	0.0134	0.0134	-0.306***	0.0109	0.0121	-0.185***	0.0209	0.0200	-0.301***
	[0.0153]	[0.0161]	[0.0640]	[0.0173]	[0.0164]	[0.0445]	[0.0153]	[0.0161]	[0.0636]	[0.0167]	[0.0163]	[0.0451]
Informal	-0.430***			-0.478***			-0.430***			-0.473***		
	[0.0153]			[0.0156]			[0.0153]			[0.0155]		
Part-time	0.235***	0.250***	0.218***	-0.455***	-0.340***	-0.635***						
	[0.0124]	[0.0127]	[0.0285]	[0.0131]	[0.0127]	[0.0307]						
Temporary	-0.0901***	-0.0724***	-0.104***	-0.140***	-0.126***	-0.127***	-0.0908***	-0.0724***	-0.107***	-0.121***	-0.117***	-0.115***
	[0.0189]	[0.0277]	[0.0260]	[0.0207]	[0.0292]	[0.0260]	[0.0188]	[0.0276]	[0.0258]	[0.0204]	[0.0290]	[0.0262]
Involuntary							0.243***	0.251***	0.248***	-0.680***	-0.539***	-0.736***
							[0.0288]	[0.0352]	[0.0472]	[0.0323]	[0.0356]	[0.0524]
Voluntary							0.233***	0.250***	0.204***	-0.409***	-0.314***	-0.593***
Construction	0.00598	-0.0324	0.0729*	0.0218	-0.0415*	0.0575	0.00615	-0.0324	0.0732*	0.0168	-0.0429*	0.0561
	[0.0212]	[0.0252]	[0.0377]	[0.0221]	[0.0239]	[0.0365]	[0.0212]	[0.0252]	[0.0377]	[0.0220]	[0.0238]	[0.0367]
Trade	-0.125***	-0.166***	0.000184	-0.0866***	-0.121***	0.0390	-0.125***	-0.166***	0.000565	-0.0870***	-0.121***	0.0368
	[0.0162]	[0.0165]	[0.0370]	[0.0173]	[0.0159]	[0.0373]	[0.0162]	[0.0165]	[0.0370]	[0.0173]	[0.0159]	[0.0375]
Transport	-0.0622***	-0.0334	-0.0858*	0.0532**	0.0266	0.0852*	-0.0622***	-0.0334	-0.0871*	0.0532**	0.0254	0.0897**
	[0.0225]	[0.0247]	[0.0459]	[0.0221]	[0.0231]	[0.0437]	[0.0225]	[0.0247]	[0.0459]	[0.0221]	[0.0230]	[0.0437]
Financial sector	0.0122	-0.0549**	0.206***	0.00275	-0.0610***	0.161***	0.0123	-0.0549**	0.206***	0.000246	-0.0625***	0.162***
	[0.0205]	[0.0214]	[0.0507]	[0.0210]	[0.0200]	[0.0492]	[0.0206]	[0.0214]	[0.0506]	[0.0209]	[0.0199]	[0.0501]
Personal service	-0.0801***	-0.143***	0.136*	-0.0846***	-0.174***	0.178**	-0.0799***	-0.143***	0.137*	-0.0885***	-0.175***	0.175**
	[0.0248]	[0.0237]	[0.0742]	[0.0260]	[0.0228]	[0.0773]	[0.0248]	[0.0237]	[0.0743]	[0.0258]	[0.0227]	[0.0770]
Domestic service	0.0129	-0.0328*	0.162***	0.0341*	-0.0527***	0.260***	0.0132	-0.0328*	0.165***	0.0249	-0.0566***	0.251***
	[0.0170]	[0.0172]	[0.0576]	[0.0179]	[0.0168]	[0.0608]	[0.0171]	[0.0172]	[0.0577]	[0.0179]	[0.0167]	[0.0606]
Public sector	0.000924	-0.00641	0.0434	0.0195	0.0242	0.0288	0.000855	-0.00641	0.0418	0.0215	0.0232	0.0346
	[0.0208]	[0.0226]	[0.0434]	[0.0217]	[0.0232]	[0.0417]	[0.0208]	[0.0226]	[0.0432]	[0.0217]	[0.0231]	[0.0419]
Others	0.0421	0.109**	-0.0133	0.0818**	0.140***	0.0120	0.0425	0.109**	-0.0114	0.0709*	0.138***	0.00343
	[0.0331]	[0.0488]	[0.0429]	[0.0372]	[0.0491]	[0.0430]	[0.0331]	[0.0488]	[0.0428]	[0.0366]	[0.0480]	[0.0432]
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	2.635***	2.615***	3.315***	7.747***	7.811***	9.230***	2.636***	2.615***	3.336***	7.733***	7.813***	9.168***
	[0.0817]	[0.0901]	[0.318]	[0.0949]	[0.0905]	[0.177]	[0.0818]	[0.0901]	[0.317]	[0.0918]	[0.0897]	[0.185]
Observations	39,857	37,453	32,163	39,857	37,453	32,163	39,857	37,453	32,163	39,857	37,453	32,163

Robust standard errors in bra

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Brazil. 2013

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages			Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
Co-variates	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Men	0.329***	0.393***	0.222***	0.343***	0.412***	0.238***	0.329***	0.393***	0.222***	0.344***	0.412***	0.239***
	[0.00406]	[0.00453]	[0.0102]	[0.00401]	[0.00445]	[0.0100]	[0.00406]	[0.00453]	[0.0102]	[0.00401]	[0.00445]	[0.0100]
Less than Comp. Primary	-0.223***	-0.276***	-0.146***	-0.223***	-0.278***	-0.141***	-0.223***	-0.276***	-0.146***	-0.223***	-0.278***	-0.140***
	[0.00498]	[0.00494]	[0.0111]	[0.00498]	[0.00464]	[0.0113]	[0.00498]	[0.00494]	[0.0111]	[0.00496]	[0.00463]	[0.0113]
Incom. Secondary	0.174***	0.225***	0.102***	0.157***	0.214***	0.0831***	0.174***	0.225***	0.103***	0.158***	0.214***	0.0850***
	[0.00615]	[0.00622]	[0.0137]	[0.00625]	[0.00612]	[0.0139]	[0.00615]	[0.00622]	[0.0137]	[0.00622]	[0.00609]	[0.0139]
Compl. Secondary	0.446***	0.540***	0.329***	0.427***	0.531***	0.306***	0.446***	0.540***	0.329***	0.429***	0.531***	0.309***
	[0.00496]	[0.00537]	[0.0123]	[0.00493]	[0.00543]	[0.0128]	[0.00496]	[0.00537]	[0.0123]	[0.00492]	[0.00543]	[0.0127]
Incom. Terciary	0.845***	0.969***	0.619***	0.806***	0.938***	0.569***	0.845***	0.969***	0.619***	0.806***	0.938***	0.567***
	[0.00720]	[0.00793]	[0.0176]	[0.00717]	[0.00777]	[0.0184]	[0.00720]	[0.00793]	[0.0176]	[0.00716]	[0.00776]	[0.0182]
Compl. Terciary	1.443***	1.570***	1.213***	1.399***	1.512***	1.176***	1.443***	1.570***	1.213***	1.400***	1.512***	1.185***
	[0.00741]	[0.00796]	[0.0216]	[0.00735]	[0.00777]	[0.0220]	[0.00741]	[0.00796]	[0.0216]	[0.00734]	[0.00776]	[0.0218]
Age	0.0181***	0.0113***	0.0242***	0.0237***	0.0154***	0.0309***	0.0182***	0.0113***	0.0242***	0.0242***	0.0155***	0.0318***
	[0.000840]	[0.000802]	[0.00171]	[0.000894]	[0.000795]	[0.00176]	[0.000840]	[0.000802]	[0.00171]	[0.000897]	[0.000794]	[0.00176]
Age2	-0.000226***	-0.000169***	-0.000299***	-0.000292***	-0.000221***	-0.000374***	-0.000227***	-0.000169***	-0.000300***	-0.000300***	-0.000222***	-0.000387***
	[1.05e-05]	[9.92e-06]	[2.10e-05]	[1.12e-05]	[9.73e-06]	[2.16e-05]	[1.05e-05]	[9.92e-06]	[2.11e-05]	[1.12e-05]	[9.72e-06]	[2.17e-05]
Head of Hous.	0.303***	0.354***	0.302***	0.295***	0.357***	0.261***	0.303***	0.354***	0.302***	0.298***	0.357***	0.269***
	[0.00457]	[0.00530]	[0.0123]	[0.00448]	[0.00531]	[0.0131]	[0.00457]	[0.00530]	[0.0123]	[0.00449]	[0.00532]	[0.0128]
Informal	-0.200***			-0.238***			-0.199***			-0.233***		
	[0.00439]			[0.00446]			[0.00439]			[0.00444]		
Part-time	0.297***	0.311***	0.283***	-0.226***	-0.120***	-0.368***						
	[0.00471]	[0.00512]	[0.00860]	[0.00495]	[0.00551]	[0.00889]						
Temporary	-0.0895***	-0.143***	-0.0802***	-0.110***	-0.249***	-0.0676***	-0.0893***	-0.142***	-0.0802***	-0.108***	-0.244***	-0.0688***
	[0.00953]	[0.0194]	[0.0122]	[0.00962]	[0.0218]	[0.0122]	[0.00952]	[0.0194]	[0.0122]	[0.00956]	[0.0218]	[0.0122]
Involuntary							0.269***	0.304***	0.276***	-0.473***	-0.244***	-0.563***
							[0.0152]	[0.0222]	[0.0189]	[0.0170]	[0.0273]	[0.0194]
Voluntary							0.300***	0.311***	0.284***	-0.201***	-0.113***	-0.332***
							[0.00479]	[0.00519]	[0.00890]	[0.00503]	[0.00555]	[0.00917]
Construction	0.0503***	0.0607***	0.0220	0.0535***	0.0571***	0.00902	0.0502***	0.0607***	0.0221	0.0523***	0.0568***	0.0101
	[0.00653]	[0.00671]	[0.0167]	[0.00649]	[0.00641]	[0.0170]	[0.00653]	[0.00671]	[0.0167]	[0.00646]	[0.00640]	[0.0169]
Trade	-0.109***	-0.106***	-0.0736***	-0.0774***	-0.0634***	-0.0661***	-0.109***	-0.106***	-0.0735***	-0.0769***	-0.0633***	-0.0644***
	[0.00456]	[0.00450]	[0.0138]	[0.00450]	[0.00431]	[0.0139]	[0.00456]	[0.00450]	[0.0138]	[0.00448]	[0.00431]	[0.0138]
Transport	0.00727	0.00651	0.0617***	0.0266***	0.0233***	0.101***	0.00731	0.00652	0.0617***	0.0270***	0.0235***	0.103***
	[0.00604]	[0.00620]	[0.0205]	[0.00598]	[0.00600]	[0.0209]	[0.00604]	[0.00620]	[0.0205]	[0.00596]	[0.00600]	[0.0208]
Financial sector	-0.0395***	-0.0605***	0.154***	-0.0453***	-0.0712***	0.169***	-0.0395***	-0.0605***	0.154***	-0.0461***	-0.0712***	0.168***
	[0.00487]	[0.00477]	[0.0176]	[0.00483]	[0.00465]	[0.0177]	[0.00487]	[0.00477]	[0.0176]	[0.00481]	[0.00465]	[0.0177]
Personal services	-0.0397***	-0.0454***	0.0572***	-0.0806***	-0.0816***	-0.00453	-0.0394***	-0.0454***	0.0573***	-0.0781***	-0.0801***	-0.00154
	[0.00662]	[0.00663]	[0.0211]	[0.00663]	[0.00644]	[0.0217]	[0.00662]	[0.00663]	[0.0211]	[0.00659]	[0.00643]	[0.0216]
Domestic services	-0.172***	-0.170***	-0.145***	-0.212***	-0.151***	-0.212***	-0.172***	-0.170***	-0.145***	-0.205***	-0.150***	-0.205***
	[0.00684]	[0.00652]	[0.0151]	[0.00697]	[0.00605]	[0.0152]	[0.00685]	[0.00652]	[0.0151]	[0.00693]	[0.00604]	[0.0151]
Public sector	0.103***	0.0812***	0.143***	0.0785***	0.0459***	0.0983***	0.103***	0.0813***	0.143***	0.0768***	0.0459***	0.0971***
	[0.00668]	[0.00720]	[0.0180]	[0.00663]	[0.00698]	[0.0186]	[0.00668]	[0.00720]	[0.0180]	[0.00661]	[0.00697]	[0.0185]
Others	-0.0329***	-0.0320***	-0.0207	-0.0211***	-0.0234***	-0.0313*	-0.0329***	-0.0320***	-0.0206	-0.0205***	-0.0233***	-0.0281
	[0.00785]	[0.00803]	[0.0177]	[0.00773]	[0.00760]	[0.0175]	[0.00785]	[0.00803]	[0.0177]	[0.00769]	[0.00760]	[0.0174]
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.0414**	-0.0671***	-0.735***	5.104***	5.099***	4.571***	-0.0421**	-0.0671***	-0.736***	5.097***	5.099***	4.543***
	[0.0176]	[0.0171]	[0.0441]	[0.0184]	[0.0170]	[0.0508]	[0.0176]	[0.0171]	[0.0441]	[0.0184]	[0.0170]	[0.0498]
Observations	223,339	201,984	142,184	223,339	201,984	142,184	223,339	201,984	142,184	223,339	201,984	142,184

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chile. 2011

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages			Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
Co-variates	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Men	0.157***	0.135***	0.117***	0.109***	0.112***	-0.0700***	0.157***	0.135***	0.119***	0.109***	0.112***	-0.0689***
	[0.00883]	[0.00913]	[0.0235]	[0.00833]	[0.00787]	[0.0187]	[0.00892]	[0.00921]	[0.0236]	[0.00836]	[0.00788]	[0.0187]
Less than Comp. Primary	-0.0286***	-0.00109	-0.0457**	0.0137	0.0157*	0.0749***	-0.0285***	2.01e-05	-0.0461**	0.0140	0.0163*	0.0753***
	[0.00999]	[0.0102]	[0.0227]	[0.00930]	[0.00902]	[0.0182]	[0.0100]	[0.0103]	[0.0227]	[0.00930]	[0.00902]	[0.0181]
Incom. Secondary	0.0633***	0.0535***	0.0315	0.0306***	0.0325***	-0.0632***	0.0639***	0.0534***	0.0325	0.0311***	0.0327***	-0.0621***
	[0.00938]	[0.00958]	[0.0238]	[0.00878]	[0.00864]	[0.0197]	[0.00939]	[0.00957]	[0.0238]	[0.00878]	[0.00864]	[0.0196]
Compl. Secondary	0.183***	0.173***	0.0934***	0.109***	0.127***	-0.119***	0.183***	0.172***	0.0948***	0.109***	0.127***	-0.118***
	[0.0108]	[0.0111]	[0.0257]	[0.0108]	[0.00981]	[0.0216]	[0.0109]	[0.0112]	[0.0257]	[0.0108]	[0.00983]	[0.0216]
Incom. Terciary	0.690***	0.678***	0.493***	0.577***	0.612***	0.161***	0.689***	0.676***	0.493***	0.576***	0.611***	0.160***
	[0.0145]	[0.0148]	[0.0358]	[0.0136]	[0.0125]	[0.0296]	[0.0147]	[0.0149]	[0.0357]	[0.0136]	[0.0125]	[0.0296]
Compl. Terciary	1.430***	1.432***	0.897***	1.295***	1.340***	0.551***	1.429***	1.429***	0.898***	1.293***	1.339***	0.551***
	[0.0356]	[0.0366]	[0.110]	[0.0339]	[0.0340]	[0.120]	[0.0357]	[0.0366]	[0.111]	[0.0339]	[0.0339]	[0.120]
Age	0.0245***	0.0245***	0.0185***	0.0243***	0.0245***	0.0144***	0.0249***	0.0247***	0.0189***	0.0246***	0.0246***	0.0150***
	[0.00117]	[0.00125]	[0.00274]	[0.00109]	[0.00116]	[0.00239]	[0.00117]	[0.00125]	[0.00274]	[0.00109]	[0.00116]	[0.00239]
Age2	-0.000237***	-0.000227***	-0.000196***	-0.000236***	-0.000230***	-0.000148***	-0.000242***	-0.000230***	-0.000201***	-0.000241***	-0.000232***	-0.000155***
	[1.40e-05]	[1.51e-05]	[3.14e-05]	[1.31e-05]	[1.40e-05]	[2.77e-05]	[1.40e-05]	[1.50e-05]	[3.14e-05]	[1.30e-05]	[1.40e-05]	[2.77e-05]
Head of Hous.	0.0220**	-0.00402	-0.0487	-0.0570***	-0.0510***	-0.405***	0.0232**	-0.00352	-0.0471	-0.0561***	-0.0503***	-0.404***
	[0.0103]	[0.0103]	[0.0321]	[0.00974]	[0.00868]	[0.0237]	[0.0104]	[0.0104]	[0.0321]	[0.00977]	[0.00869]	[0.0236]
Informal	-0.231***			-0.248***			-0.229***			-0.246***		
	[0.00720]			[0.00654]			[0.00719]			[0.00654]		
Part-time	0.541***	0.576***	0.486***	-0.434***	-0.353***	-0.499***						
	[0.0114]	[0.0147]	[0.0177]	[0.00860]	[0.0102]	[0.0152]						
Temporary	-0.162***	-0.165***	-0.141***	-0.183***	-0.169***	-0.195***	-0.159***	-0.162***	-0.140***	-0.181***	-0.167***	-0.192***
	[0.00575]	[0.00621]	[0.0136]	[0.00525]	[0.00564]	[0.0118]	[0.00574]	[0.00621]	[0.0136]	[0.00525]	[0.00564]	[0.0118]
Involuntary							0.479***	0.486***	0.463***	-0.491***	-0.418***	-0.533***
							[0.0140]	[0.0191]	[0.0207]	[0.0110]	[0.0134]	[0.0181]
Voluntary							0.619***	0.677***	0.523***	-0.361***	-0.282***	-0.447***
							[0.0171]	[0.0217]	[0.0273]	[0.0126]	[0.0149]	[0.0215]
Construction	0.0835***	0.0814***	0.0966***	0.0923***	0.0840***	0.109***	0.0834***	0.0812***	0.0968***	0.0921***	0.0840***	0.108***
	[0.0106]	[0.0111]	[0.0333]	[0.00963]	[0.0100]	[0.0277]	[0.0106]	[0.0111]	[0.0332]	[0.00961]	[0.0100]	[0.0277]
Trade	-0.115***	-0.112***	-0.118***	-0.0923***	-0.0905***	-0.0886***	-0.115***	-0.111***	-0.118***	-0.0920***	-0.0899***	-0.0890***
	[0.00913]	[0.00943]	[0.0302]	[0.00824]	[0.00848]	[0.0248]	[0.00912]	[0.00941]	[0.0302]	[0.00823]	[0.00847]	[0.0248]
Transport	-0.0284**	-0.0322***	0.00464	0.0244**	0.0136	0.0633**	-0.0284**	-0.0321***	0.00460	0.0245**	0.0137	0.0634**
	[0.0117]	[0.0122]	[0.0354]	[0.0105]	[0.0111]	[0.0303]	[0.0116]	[0.0122]	[0.0354]	[0.0105]	[0.0111]	[0.0303]
Financial sector	0.121***	0.108***	0.237***	0.113***	0.102***	0.229***	0.122***	0.109***	0.236***	0.114***	0.103***	0.228***
	[0.0126]	[0.0129]	[0.0456]	[0.0115]	[0.0118]	[0.0427]	[0.0125]	[0.0129]	[0.0456]	[0.0115]	[0.0118]	[0.0428]
Personal services	0.0453***	0.0289**	0.165***	0.0430***	0.0300**	0.118***	0.0462***	0.0303**	0.166***	0.0439***	0.0310***	0.120***
	[0.0124]	[0.0127]	[0.0464]	[0.0114]	[0.0117]	[0.0390]	[0.0124]	[0.0127]	[0.0465]	[0.0114]	[0.0117]	[0.0390]
Domestic services	-0.205***	-0.186***	-0.216***	-0.181***	-0.126***	-0.260***	-0.205***	-0.186***	-0.217***	-0.181***	-0.126***	-0.261***
	[0.0130]	[0.0141]	[0.0332]	[0.0117]	[0.0126]	[0.0270]	[0.0130]	[0.0141]	[0.0332]	[0.0116]	[0.0126]	[0.0269]
Public sector	0.167***	0.141***	0.372***	0.169***	0.143***	0.327***	0.169***	0.142***	0.373***	0.170***	0.144***	0.329***
	[0.0107]	[0.0111]	[0.0361]	[0.00981]	[0.0102]	[0.0317]	[0.0107]	[0.0111]	[0.0361]	[0.00979]	[0.0102]	[0.0318]
Others	0.0145	0.0308***	-0.0554*	0.0578***	0.0757***	-0.0229	0.0143	0.0308***	-0.0560*	0.0575***	0.0757***	-0.0244
	[0.00924]	[0.00957]	[0.0301]	[0.00834]	[0.00865]	[0.0246]	[0.00922]	[0.00955]	[0.0301]	[0.00833]	[0.00864]	[0.0246]
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	6.500***	6.568***	6.803***	12.09***	12.04***	13.71***	6.491***	6.567***	6.790***	12.08***	12.04***	13.70***
	[0.0419]	[0.0424]	[0.147]	[0.0398]	[0.0363]	[0.0927]	[0.0424]	[0.0427]	[0.148]	[0.0399]	[0.0364]	[0.0926]
Observations	178,387	168,272	130,860	178,387	168,272	130,860	178,387	168,272	130,860	178,387	168,272	130,860

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ecuador. 2012

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages			Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
Co-variates	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Men	0.162***	0.166***	0.261***	0.179***	0.198***	0.280***	0.162***	0.165***	0.261***	0.181***	0.198***	0.283***
	[0.0147]	[0.0136]	[0.0236]	[0.0131]	[0.0128]	[0.0215]	[0.0147]	[0.0135]	[0.0236]	[0.0132]	[0.0128]	[0.0215]
Less than Comp	-0.102***	-0.207***	-0.0828***	-0.0865***	-0.198***	-0.0689***	-0.102***	-0.207***	-0.0830***	-0.0870***	-0.199***	-0.0698***
	[0.0152]	[0.0232]	[0.0166]	[0.0142]	[0.0214]	[0.0161]	[0.0152]	[0.0232]	[0.0166]	[0.0142]	[0.0214]	[0.0161]
Incom. Secondai	0.0881***	0.238***	0.0528***	0.0865***	0.227***	0.0639***	0.0882***	0.238***	0.0526***	0.0859***	0.227***	0.0630***
	[0.0146]	[0.0191]	[0.0183]	[0.0139]	[0.0176]	[0.0180]	[0.0146]	[0.0191]	[0.0183]	[0.0139]	[0.0176]	[0.0180]
Compl. Seconda	0.188***	0.458***	0.154***	0.167***	0.442***	0.149***	0.188***	0.458***	0.154***	0.167***	0.442***	0.149***
	[0.0166]	[0.0219]	[0.0184]	[0.0146]	[0.0205]	[0.0175]	[0.0166]	[0.0219]	[0.0184]	[0.0147]	[0.0205]	[0.0175]
Incom. Terciary	0.371***	0.759***	0.237***	0.316***	0.714***	0.210***	0.371***	0.759***	0.236***	0.316***	0.714***	0.207***
	[0.0232]	[0.0298]	[0.0321]	[0.0202]	[0.0283]	[0.0310]	[0.0232]	[0.0298]	[0.0322]	[0.0202]	[0.0283]	[0.0310]
Compl. Terciary	0.630***	1.091***	0.459***	0.564***	1.040***	0.444***	0.630***	1.091***	0.459***	0.564***	1.040***	0.445***
	[0.0271]	[0.0334]	[0.0434]	[0.0235]	[0.0318]	[0.0402]	[0.0271]	[0.0333]	[0.0434]	[0.0236]	[0.0318]	[0.0403]
Age	0.0175***	0.00717***	0.0228***	0.0222***	0.0109***	0.0280***	0.0174***	0.00710***	0.0230***	0.0226***	0.0108***	0.0287***
	[0.00182]	[0.00233]	[0.00243]	[0.00177]	[0.00218]	[0.00232]	[0.00182]	[0.00232]	[0.00244]	[0.00177]	[0.00218]	[0.00233]
Age2	-0.000176***	-1.83e-05	-0.000272***	-0.000238***	-6.69e-05***	-0.000341***	-0.000175***	-1.73e-05	-0.000274***	-0.000243***	-6.63e-05**	-0.000351***
	[2.18e-05]	[2.75e-05]	[2.93e-05]	[2.11e-05]	[2.59e-05]	[2.77e-05]	[2.19e-05]	[2.74e-05]	[2.95e-05]	[2.12e-05]	[2.59e-05]	[2.79e-05]
Head of Hous.	0.0744***	0.255***	0.108***	0.0805***	0.281***	0.123***	0.0743***	0.255***	0.109***	0.0807***	0.281***	0.124***
	[0.0172]	[0.0195]	[0.0216]	[0.0149]	[0.0190]	[0.0188]	[0.0172]	[0.0195]	[0.0216]	[0.0150]	[0.0190]	[0.0188]
Informal	-0.271***			-0.281***			-0.271***			-0.280***		
	[0.0103]			[0.00963]			[0.0103]			[0.00962]		
Part-time	0.221***	0.272***	0.227***	-0.553***	-0.421***	-0.558***						
	[0.0168]	[0.0415]	[0.0180]	[0.0164]	[0.0363]	[0.0178]						
Temporary	-0.138***	-0.101***	-0.168***	-0.142***	-0.102***	-0.179***	-0.138***	-0.102***	-0.167***	-0.141***	-0.102***	-0.176***
	[0.00985]	[0.0109]	[0.0190]	[0.00922]	[0.0100]	[0.0178]	[0.00984]	[0.0108]	[0.0190]	[0.00921]	[0.00999]	[0.0177]
Involuntary							0.226***	0.353***	0.217***	-0.581***	-0.374***	-0.597***
							[0.0233]	[0.0985]	[0.0238]	[0.0227]	[0.0821]	[0.0234]
Voluntary							0.216***	0.244***	0.239***	-0.523***	-0.438***	-0.511***
							[0.0231]	[0.0432]	[0.0260]	[0.0225]	[0.0390]	[0.0255]
Construction	0.223***	0.195***	0.161***	0.205***	0.199***	0.140***	0.223***	0.195***	0.160***	0.204***	0.199***	0.138***
	[0.0168]	[0.0279]	[0.0237]	[0.0163]	[0.0253]	[0.0235]	[0.0168]	[0.0278]	[0.0237]	[0.0163]	[0.0253]	[0.0235]
Trade	-0.0444***	-0.0440***	-0.0595**	-0.00963	-0.00823	-0.0268	-0.0442***	-0.0439***	-0.0604**	-0.0108	-0.00815	-0.0303
	[0.0149]	[0.0169]	[0.0244]	[0.0142]	[0.0150]	[0.0239]	[0.0149]	[0.0168]	[0.0244]	[0.0142]	[0.0150]	[0.0239]
Transport	0.0578***	0.0357	0.0416	0.112***	0.0695***	0.115***	0.0579***	0.0355	0.0413	0.112***	0.0694***	0.114***
	[0.0205]	[0.0252]	[0.0315]	[0.0191]	[0.0230]	[0.0292]	[0.0205]	[0.0252]	[0.0315]	[0.0191]	[0.0230]	[0.0292]
Financial sector	-0.00226	-0.00401	0.0743	0.00948	0.0137	0.0744*	-0.00213	-0.00401	0.0736	0.00883	0.0137	0.0717*
	[0.0196]	[0.0200]	[0.0478]	[0.0181]	[0.0180]	[0.0436]	[0.0196]	[0.0200]	[0.0478]	[0.0181]	[0.0180]	[0.0435]
Personal service	0.00388	-0.0128	0.0479	-0.0178	-0.0274	-0.0129	0.00400	-0.0121	0.0479	-0.0185	-0.0270	-0.0130
	[0.0233]	[0.0235]	[0.0539]	[0.0226]	[0.0222]	[0.0519]	[0.0234]	[0.0234]	[0.0540]	[0.0226]	[0.0221]	[0.0517]
Domestic service	-0.0584**	-0.143***	-0.0341	-0.0684***	-0.146***	-0.0511	-0.0580**	-0.142***	-0.0351	-0.0706***	-0.145***	-0.0549*
	[0.0238]	[0.0286]	[0.0337]	[0.0225]	[0.0258]	[0.0326]	[0.0239]	[0.0285]	[0.0338]	[0.0226]	[0.0258]	[0.0326]
Public sector	0.364***	0.337***	0.366***	0.321***	0.295***	0.327***	0.364***	0.337***	0.366***	0.321***	0.295***	0.325***
	[0.0165]	[0.0178]	[0.0491]	[0.0158]	[0.0164]	[0.0479]	[0.0165]	[0.0177]	[0.0492]	[0.0158]	[0.0164]	[0.0481]
Others	-0.0947***	0.0360**	-0.184***	-0.113***	0.00846	-0.197***	-0.0946***	0.0361**	-0.185***	-0.113***	0.00849	-0.199***
	[0.0145]	[0.0176]	[0.0223]	[0.0140]	[0.0156]	[0.0220]	[0.0145]	[0.0176]	[0.0223]	[0.0140]	[0.0155]	[0.0220]
Training	0.104***	0.0974***	0.135***	0.106***	0.100***	0.153***	0.104***	0.0973***	0.135***	0.106***	0.100***	0.153***
	[0.0108]	[0.0107]	[0.0415]	[0.0102]	[0.0101]	[0.0377]	[0.0108]	[0.0107]	[0.0415]	[0.0102]	[0.0101]	[0.0377]
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.103*	-0.591***	-0.453***	5.086***	4.567***	4.698***	-0.102*	-0.588***	-0.457***	5.078***	4.568***	4.683***
	[0.0599]	[0.0693]	[0.0721]	[0.0521]	[0.0645]	[0.0640]	[0.0597]	[0.0688]	[0.0721]	[0.0524]	[0.0643]	[0.0644]
Observations	57,287	49,082	49,655	57,287	49,082	49,655	57,287	49,082	49,655	57,287	49,082	49,655

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Peru. 2012

	Hourly wages			Monthly wages			Hourly wages			Monthly wages		
Co-variates	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal	Total	Formal	Informal
Men	0.0382*	0.0270	0.0115	0.0438**	0.0364*	-0.0238	0.0385*	0.0278	0.0125	0.0452**	0.0379*	-0.0236
	[0.0214]	[0.0245]	[0.0743]	[0.0185]	[0.0207]	[0.0372]	[0.0214]	[0.0245]	[0.0770]	[0.0184]	[0.0205]	[0.0372]
Less than Comp. Primary	0.0787*	0.0902*	0.0876	0.120***	0.134***	0.160**	0.0782*	0.0889*	0.0871	0.117***	0.131***	0.160**
	[0.0429]	[0.0508]	[0.0972]	[0.0379]	[0.0446]	[0.0643]	[0.0428]	[0.0506]	[0.0997]	[0.0378]	[0.0444]	[0.0643]
Incom. Secondary	-0.0262	-0.0217	-0.0696	-0.0771**	-0.0854**	-0.0971	-0.0264	-0.0222	-0.0676	-0.0788**	-0.0880**	-0.0971
	[0.0350]	[0.0394]	[0.0852]	[0.0333]	[0.0368]	[0.0623]	[0.0350]	[0.0394]	[0.0872]	[0.0332]	[0.0368]	[0.0623]
Compl. Secondary	-0.0283	-0.0644	-0.0149	-0.132***	-0.169***	-0.184***	-0.0283	-0.0643	-0.0113	-0.133***	-0.171***	-0.184***
	[0.0409]	[0.0463]	[0.140]	[0.0370]	[0.0414]	[0.0636]	[0.0409]	[0.0463]	[0.145]	[0.0368]	[0.0413]	[0.0637]
Incom. Terciary	0.0164	7.82e-05	-0.0797	-0.175***	-0.190***	-0.336***	0.0167	0.000615	-0.0745	-0.175***	-0.191***	-0.336***
	[0.0540]	[0.0613]	[0.190]	[0.0474]	[0.0531]	[0.0791]	[0.0540]	[0.0612]	[0.198]	[0.0471]	[0.0528]	[0.0792]
Compl. Terciary	0.198***	0.172**	0.0297	-0.0159	-0.0480	-0.297***	0.198***	0.173**	0.0350	-0.0159	-0.0495	-0.297***
	[0.0632]	[0.0717]	[0.253]	[0.0548]	[0.0617]	[0.0908]	[0.0631]	[0.0716]	[0.264]	[0.0545]	[0.0613]	[0.0910]
Age	0.0106***	-0.00107	0.0381***	0.0158***	0.00636*	0.0349***	0.0107***	-0.000944	0.0378***	0.0162***	0.00670**	0.0350***
	[0.00318]	[0.00355]	[0.00672]	[0.00304]	[0.00325]	[0.00699]	[0.00317]	[0.00355]	[0.00670]	[0.00304]	[0.00325]	[0.00699]
Age2	-8.58e-05**	3.85e-05	-0.000370***	-0.000158***	-5.73e-05	-0.000321***	-8.66e-05**	3.70e-05	-0.000367***	-0.000162***	-6.16e-05	-0.000322***
	[3.82e-05]	[4.22e-05]	[9.03e-05]	[3.70e-05]	[3.89e-05]	[9.25e-05]	[3.81e-05]	[4.22e-05]	[9.06e-05]	[3.70e-05]	[3.89e-05]	[9.25e-05]
Head of Hous.	-0.0620**	-0.0754**	-0.153	-0.116***	-0.128***	-0.287***	-0.0617**	-0.0746**	-0.149	-0.115***	-0.127***	-0.287***
	[0.0276]	[0.0302]	[0.141]	[0.0238]	[0.0260]	[0.0566]	[0.0275]	[0.0300]	[0.148]	[0.0237]	[0.0258]	[0.0567]
Informal	-0.214***			-0.250***			-0.214***			-0.250***		
	[0.0161]			[0.0148]			[0.0161]			[0.0148]		
Part-time	0.376***	0.376***	0.413***	-0.332***	-0.291***	-0.396***						
	[0.0180]	[0.0204]	[0.0383]	[0.0160]	[0.0177]	[0.0354]						
Temporary	-0.0380**	-0.0579***	-0.0363	-0.0640***	-0.0766***	-0.0677	-0.0380**	-0.0578***	-0.0355	-0.0640***	-0.0765***	-0.0678
	[0.0174]	[0.0184]	[0.0609]	[0.0165]	[0.0172]	[0.0609]	[0.0174]	[0.0184]	[0.0609]	[0.0165]	[0.0172]	[0.0610]
Involuntary							0.364***	0.352***	0.459***	-0.403***	-0.373***	-0.403***
							[0.0317]	[0.0366]	[0.0639]	[0.0270]	[0.0296]	[0.0628]
Voluntary							0.380***	0.385***	0.393***	-0.306***	-0.262***	-0.393***
							[0.0204]	[0.0230]	[0.0441]	[0.0180]	[0.0198]	[0.0385]
Construction	0.267***	0.254***	0.299***	0.243***	0.237***	0.229***	0.267***	0.254***	0.301***	0.243***	0.237***	0.229***
	[0.0301]	[0.0336]	[0.0669]	[0.0277]	[0.0308]	[0.0622]	[0.0301]	[0.0337]	[0.0669]	[0.0278]	[0.0308]	[0.0622]
Trade	-0.0925***	-0.107***	-0.0584	-0.0993***	-0.106***	-0.0993*	-0.0926***	-0.107***	-0.0574	-0.0997***	-0.106***	-0.0994*
	[0.0243]	[0.0260]	[0.0609]	[0.0226]	[0.0243]	[0.0529]	[0.0243]	[0.0260]	[0.0610]	[0.0226]	[0.0243]	[0.0529]
Transport	0.0549*	0.0458	0.108	0.0725**	0.0758**	0.0782	0.0545	0.0451	0.111	0.0703**	0.0734**	0.0779
	[0.0332]	[0.0359]	[0.0829]	[0.0312]	[0.0330]	[0.0830]	[0.0332]	[0.0359]	[0.0830]	[0.0312]	[0.0330]	[0.0831]
Financial sector	0.0280	0.0268	0.0397	0.0203	0.0278	-0.0127	0.0279	0.0264	0.0387	0.0199	0.0267	-0.0124
	[0.0239]	[0.0263]	[0.0556]	[0.0224]	[0.0244]	[0.0517]	[0.0239]	[0.0263]	[0.0558]	[0.0223]	[0.0244]	[0.0518]
Personal services	-0.0370	0.0168	-0.156***	-0.183***	-0.143***	-0.286***	-0.0371	0.0162	-0.156***	-0.184***	-0.145***	-0.286***
	[0.0307]	[0.0365]	[0.0591]	[0.0277]	[0.0321]	[0.0541]	[0.0307]	[0.0365]	[0.0592]	[0.0276]	[0.0321]	[0.0542]
Public sector	-0.0195	-0.0254	0.00506	-0.126***	-0.126***	-0.151***	-0.0197	-0.0256	0.00662	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.151***
	[0.0211]	[0.0234]	[0.0487]	[0.0198]	[0.0217]	[0.0456]	[0.0211]	[0.0234]	[0.0489]	[0.0197]	[0.0217]	[0.0456]
Others	0.0912***	0.111***	-0.0114	0.0635***	0.0991***	-0.0819	0.0910***	0.110***	-0.0125	0.0623***	0.0970***	-0.0818
	[0.0238]	[0.0256]	[0.0611]	[0.0222]	[0.0235]	[0.0581]	[0.0238]	[0.0256]	[0.0610]	[0.0222]	[0.0234]	[0.0580]
Region	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	1.374***	1.681***	1.295**	7.000***	7.229***	7.593***	1.372***	1.677***	1.282*	6.994***	7.224***	7.591***
	[0.132]	[0.150]	[0.659]	[0.111]	[0.125]	[0.217]	[0.131]	[0.150]	[0.689]	[0.111]	[0.124]	[0.217]
Observations	33,596	31,786	25,893	33,596	31,786	25,893	33,596	31,786	25,893	33,596	31,786	25,893

Robust standard errors in b

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<(

Source: Own elaboration based on Household Surveys

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

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ISSN 2226-8944