

Ideas, from Hegel to Deleuze

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ABSTRACT

*The Hegel-Deleuze relation has usually been considered as one of opposition, because of Deleuze's explicit anti-Hegelian statements. This article refutes the main conceptual grounds to this opposition: the critique of the negative and of the circle of return. It aims to present the possibilities offered by considering the Hegel-Deleuze relation as a problematic, productive one. "Hegel-Deleuze" would be a relation prior to the supposed terms. To achieve this, we bind them through the concept of Idea. This traditional concept of philosophy, which crowns the Hegelian system (also known as absolute idealism), appears in a key position in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*. It allows Deleuze to consider thought not as an image of the external reality or the condition of possible experience, but as the genetic principle of real experience. Even if Deleuze accuses Hegel of positing his Idea as the ground for the eternal repetition of the same, this article proposes to interpret it as the source of creation of a reality always different from itself.*

Keywords

Hegel, Deleuze, idea, philosophy of relations.

Difference and Repetition was written in France by Gilles Deleuze in 1968 and translated to English by Paul Patton in 1994, the year before Deleuze's death. It is one of the masterpieces of occidental philosophy, not only for the depth of its ontology and the power of its practical dimension, but also for the new means of philosophical expression it pursues: Ah! the new style.¹ This new style

1. "The time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long: 'Ah! the old style...' The search for new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today.... In this context, we can

is, however, not apparent. The works he later wrote with Felix Guattari have an aura of non-philosophical writing, starting with the first sentences of the *Anti-Oedipus*: “It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 1). But his 1968 book appears to be written in a regular philosophical style. However, there is something curious about this appearance, something that raises hermeneutical and pedagogical issues, something that is related to its peculiar use of the history of philosophy.² John Protevi reflected in a recent paper about the pedagogical issues that this book raises:

So that’s our challenge in introducing *Difference and Repetition*: can we help our students avoid subjecting themselves to it as a monument in the history of philosophy, as is the case with an Oedipal relation to the history of philosophy in which you give yourself up to be a mere *repetiteur*: an old occupational title in the French academic system? Rather, can we help them turn their reading of it into a “harsh exercise in depersonalization,” that is, an opening up of themselves to the multiplicities and intensities within them, indeed, within all of us, student and teacher alike? Can our encounter with it be a depersonalization through love? Can we learn from it, rather than gain knowledge from it?

(Protevi 2010, 36)

I think the problem Protevi raises is very much a problem of philosophy as an academic field, as history, as teaching. But I do not think it is a problem for *Difference and Repetition*. It is precisely here that the “new style” emerges. It is not a poetic style. It is not related here to a new form (no fragmentary Nietzschean prose, no free indirect speech). It does not relate to its vocabulary (no profanities). It is a question of architecture: Deleuze *constructed* this book as an adequate response to all the problems Protevi points out. I really don’t think it is possible to read *Difference and Repetition* as a monument in the history of philosophy—even if, however improbably, we persuaded the Academy to accept it as such. It is a little machine that *cannot be represented*. Its structure shields the book from the possibility of having a representation, an image that could reproduce it in another form (briefer, simpler: a commentary). Hence, the new style!

Of course this present essay could propose a new representation of *Difference and Repetition*. It could present itself as an accurate representation of the book.

raise the question of the utilization of the history of philosophy” (Deleuze 1994, xxi). The expression “Ah! the old style” is a reference to Beckett’s play *Happy Days*.

2. For a deep reflection on the issues regarding the history of philosophy, and the tensions between the burden it can be of thought and its importance for the possibility of philosophy, see Yves Zarka’s *Comment écrire l’histoire de la philosophie?* (Zarka 2001).

And it would work *in itself*, that is, as long as it is not confronted with the text it is supposed to represent. But as soon as it is confronted by the text, the illusion of a proper representation would melt. Any representation this paper had produced (doesn't matter which, that is the beauty of it!) *would not* represent what it aims to represent.

The representant says: "Everyone recognizes that..." but there is always an unrepresented singularity who does not recognize precisely because it is not everyone or the universal. (Deleuze 1994, 52)

Difference and Repetition is this unrepresented, stubborn singularity that does not recognize its representation. We could say that for Deleuze such is the case with any singularity ... but not to the same degree, not with the same power.

A philosophy of relations

If not a representation of *Difference and Repetition*, what, then, should this essay on *Difference and Repetition* aspire to be?

a) Perhaps we could regard it as an opening to multiplicities and intensities, an encounter of depersonalization through love. This is a quite tempting alternative. After all, we "ought to be taking Deleuze's positive philosophical gains seriously, and set about freely creating concepts" (Faucher 2010, 329). Creation, creation, creation! That is the sweet chant of sirens that prevail in contemporary Deleuzian ontology. Which is not without risks. The danger would be to disregard *Difference and Repetition* itself, and depend, for the *creation*, on the representation of common sense for what "multiplicity," "intensity," and "love" could mean. Not that love has no part in the equation; surely it has, and it always has, but it is too undetermined to get the job done.

b) Perhaps we could regard it as the proposal of a *relation*, into which *Difference and Repetition* will be brought. This is the most promising option. In Deleuze's ontology there are no terms outside a relation—there are no terms "in themselves." That is the great idea of differential calculus, which Deleuze loved so much: dy , dx are nothing in themselves. Dy is equal to zero in relation to y , dx is equal to zero in relation to x . But they are totally determined in their relation. Dy/dx is something perfectly determined. In contrast, for classical mathematics numbers are always something in themselves: 7, 4, $7/4$, a/b , x/y . They can be natural, they can be part of a fraction, they can be incognita, and they can be values within a function. But they are always something *in themselves*. That is not the case for dy , dx . Anticipating the *relation* this paper is really about, we can here cite the Hegelian conception of differential calculus:

Dx, dy, are no longer quanta, nor are they supposed to signify quanta; it is solely in their relation to each other that they have any meaning, a meaning merely as moments. They are no longer something (something taken as quantum), not finite differences; but neither are they nothing; not empty nullities. Apart from their relation they are pure nullities, but they are intended to be taken only as moments of the relation, as determinations of the differential co-efficient dx/dy .
(Hegel 1969, 253)

Even if it was an insufficient level in his ontology (it's part of the first book of the *Science of Logic*, the logic of Being), differential calculus was of great importance for Hegel. He dedicated nearly eighty pages to its exposition (in a series of notes that were one of the most reworked passages for the second edition of the book). In fact, Hegel's philosophy has also been called "a logic of relation."³ The terms are nothing in themselves apart from their relation. They are pure nullities. Likewise, *Difference and Repetition* is nothing in itself. In itself it is equal to zero. We must bring it into a relation with *dy* (that is also a pure nullity apart from its relation with *dx*). What can *dy* be? That is uncertain. There comes the creativity of the interpreter. It can be a problem, a question that seems for one or other reason urgent. It might be something that keeps ringing in our minds, something that does not let us sleep at night. It can be a personal question, a political question, or an ontological question. It can be a work: a work of art, a work of literature, a work of science, or a work of philosophy—even a "work" of sports. (How was that goal possible? How could that player, that athlete, achieve what he did? It seemed to break the time-space continuum! Well, let's see if we can make any sense of it by putting it in relation to *Difference and Repetition*). The field is open to creativity. But a creativity that is no longer *undetermined*, but rather perfectly determined by the relation into which it has been brought. We are not alone with our questions (powerless against the menace of the common sense). We are *with Difference and Repetition*. Of course, not every relation is equal to the others. Not all relations are equally powerful, equally interesting.

Deleuze-Hegel: A philosophy of relation

My research focuses on the Deleuze-Hegel relation, following the path traced by Jason Wirth, who has with great results researched the relation between

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3. "Between the reductionist monism with its fusionist tendency, and the dualism whose result would be the blockage of all thought, there is a middle way that follows the path of the comprehension of the *radical and grounding primacy of relation* [Entre le monisme reducteur, à tendance fusionnelle, et le dualisme dont le résultat serait un blocage de toute pensée, se dessine une voie, celle qui s'engage sur une intelligence de *la primarité radicale et fondatrice de la relation*]" (Jarczyk and Labarrière 1986, 31).

Deleuze and Schelling (Wirth 2003). The Hegel-Deleuze relation is, of course, not the only one into which *Difference and Repetition* can be brought; it is not even a necessarily productive one. It is for the reader to judge how interesting it is. But it's certainly a very *odd* relation. It goes against all odds. Was not Deleuze vehemently anti-Hegelian? More exactly, he *is* anti-Hegelian. Starting with *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), where he is extremely aggressive towards Hegel, Deleuze's work is rife with a very explicit anti-Hegelianism.

And what is the ground of Deleuze's aversion towards Hegelianism? First of all, there is an analysis that can be conducted in the field of the history of the ideas. From this point of view, the intellectual environment in which Deleuze works should be noted: France in the second half of the twentieth century. The place of Hegelianism there and then should be taken into consideration, as well as the shadow cast by the great Hegel interpreters (most of all Kojève and Hypolite) on Deleuze and his contemporaries during their education. It was a reading of Hegel that was tainted with anthropomorphism and teleology. Deleuze's aversion could then be attributed to a reaction to the strong Hegelianism of the first half of the century, and as a part of the "generalized anti-Hegelianism" in the air during this time (Deleuze 1994, *ixx*).

However, instead of these contextual grounds, we could also seek the conceptual ones. The most visible would then be Hegel's "negativity." In fact, Deleuze rages endlessly against Hegel's negativity. But, as Wahl pointed out in the 1963 review of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, "when he [Deleuze] talks about an affirmation of negation, we feel very close, maybe too close to Hegel" (Wahl 1963, 362). From the conceptual point of view, it is not at all that clear that this is a real *point of fracture* between both philosophers. If we read Deleuze's and Hegel's developments on negativity, they are sometimes indeed quite close.

In spite of all his critique of "negativity," Deleuze *does* have his negative: "being is also non-being ... This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis" (Deleuze 1994, 64). It is true that he is very careful, that he emphasizes greatly the difference between this 'non-being' and negativity, that he says that *non-being is not the being of the negative*, with italic type—just so we do not miss it. He adds that it should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being. But no emphasis, no notation, can avoid the conceptual analysis. We must conceptually confront this Deleuzian "non-being" with the Hegelian "negativity." It is from that standpoint that they do not seem so distant. In the first place, Hegel rejects the claim that negation could be "an ultimate to philosophy" (Hegel 1969, 113). In the second place, the Hegelian concept of the negative (not as ultimate but as the operation that mediates Notion and Being) is very precise, very technical. And

he points out that there is specifically one kind of negation that must be avoided: the “abstract negation,” the “negation posited as affirmative” (Hegel 1969, 113). To posit the negation *as* affirmative, is it not to affirm the *being of the negative* that Deleuze rejects? I believe that they are, as Wahl said, very close in this regard.

There is, though, another accusation that Deleuze addresses to Hegel and it goes deeper in the Hegelian ontology: the critique of the “circle of return.” Now the “negativity” is no longer the ground of Hegel’s ontology, and it cannot be confused with an ultimate to philosophy. In the circle of return (Hegelian *Rückkehr*) negativity is the operation of reflection that grants the return, that assures that the Notion will return to itself, that it will not distance itself endlessly into being, “becoming only a progressive loss” (Hegel 1969, 539).⁴ In contrast, Deleuze finds that the circle of return means that the philosophy of Hegel is one of identity even if disguised in the apparent difference of contradiction:

Difference is the ground, but only the ground for the demonstration of the identical. Hegel’s circle is not the eternal return, only the infinite circulation of the identical by means of negativity. (Deleuze 1994, 50)

Deleuze accuses Hegel’s circle of being the *ground* that assures the “circulation of the identical.” The Hegelian system would thus be the circle of identity, wherein everything returns once and over again, always identical to itself. Nothing ever changes. Reality is such as it is. If you don’t like the conditions of your existence, better get used to it. Deleuze’s repetition, on the other hand, would be the “eternal return,” the *differenciation of difference*: it assures the development of difference, thus the possibility of creation of reality, the possibility of change (personal, political, artistic, environmental).

But also this extreme difference between the systems of Hegel and Deleuze is not a definite point of fracture. Even here the relation between the two philosophers is less one of simple opposition than a problematical one, for on page 88 of *Difference and Repetition* this ground that “organizes the presents into the circle of time” is what Deleuze calls *Idea*.⁵ Idea: the Idea of Plato, of Leibniz, of Hegel, he says. Then the ground would only be a definite point of fracture

4. This is in the context of the Hegelian critique of Spinoza, where he aligns it with oriental philosophy, or Hinduism to be more precise. As Janicaud pointed out in 1968 (the same year of the publication of *Difference and Repetition*), this rapprochement is apparently incoherent, considering that the Spinozist philosophy and Hinduism are quite opposed to each other, and, also that “Hegel’s take on the Indian sacred texts is schematic and reductionist” (Janicaud 1968, 179). In any case, this critique is key to the rapport that I am calling Deleuze-Hegel.

5. “The Ideas none the less remain the ground on which the successive presents are organized into the circle of time, so that the pure past which defines them is itself still necessarily expressed in terms of a present, as an ancient *mythical* present” (Deleuze 1994, 88).

as long as *Difference and Repetition* was a critique of the Idea. But it is not. In Chapter IV (entitled “Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference”) the Idea appears as a concept that is at the heart of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference:

Just as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose *dx* to not-A, the symbol of difference [*Differenzphilosophie*] to that of contradiction ... *dx* is the Idea—the Platonic, Leibnizian or Kantian Idea, the “problem” and its being.
(Deleuze 1994, 170–171)

If we compare the statements on pages 88 and 171, the meaning seems to be at odds with itself: the Idea would be the ground that organizes the circle of identity *and* the symbol of the philosophy of difference. We could attribute this change to the modification of the series: from Chapter II to Chapter III, Plato-Leibniz-Hegel has become Plato-Leibniz-Kant. Hegel has been eliminated. But I do not think this account is sufficient. I still think that the concept of Idea binds Hegel and Deleuze in a profound way; in a problematic, non-linear way, for sure, but in also in a nonetheless profound way.

The genealogy of the idea

The Idea is one of the oldest and most recurrent concepts of philosophy. Ever since Plato, all major philosophers have included it in their reflections. It thus has many meanings, which change greatly from one philosopher to another, from one epoch to another, from one country to another. Deleuze is clear in his genealogy: Plato, Leibniz, Kant, the post-Kantians (Maimon, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). The similarities between these various concepts of Idea are not at all apparent, but, by tracing this genealogy, Deleuze confronts another tradition: the one that considers Ideas as images of things, something in the mind that is related somehow to the “external world.” It is one of the great problems, one the main obsessions of the philosophy of the seventeenth century, especially in England. The relation between Ideas and the exterior world is a huge topic for Hume, Hobbes, Berkeley and Locke.

It was also at issue in France, where Descartes admitted that Ideas usually are “like images of things.” Ideas and reality are often separated. Thus the possibility of error: is my life a dream?, he wonders in his *Metaphysical Meditations*. That is the “empiricist” way: to leave external what is separated (Deleuze 1994, 171). And usually the empiricist way has the upper hand. But there is one very special Idea, very unique, singular: the *Cogito*, I think therefore I am. In this Idea there is no separation. As long as I think, I can be immediately certain that I am:

It is as though Descartes’ *Cogito* operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an un-

determined existence (I am, because “in order to think one must exist”)—and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. (Deleuze 1994, 85)

Descartes bears the determination directly upon the undetermined existence. This is the “dogmatist” way, as Deleuze calls it (Deleuze 1994, 171): to fill what is separated. Kant, whom Hume had awoken from the “dogmatic dream,” makes a critique of the Cartesian Cogito that Deleuze finds very instructive:

Nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito ... The entire Kantian critique amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination (“I think”) obviously implies something undetermined (“I am”), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the “I think” ... Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination) ... Kant’s answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the “I think” is that of time.

(Deleuze 1994, 85–86).

It is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined because, even if the fact that I think *obviously implies* that I also am, nothing tells me *how* that undetermined is determinable by the “I think.” So Kant adds a third logical value, the determinable: time, the empty form of time. This Kantian answer is of great importance to the Deleuzian ontology, for these are the three moments of his Idea: the determination, the undetermined and the determinable:

Ideas, therefore, present three moments: undetermined with regard to their object, determinable with regard to objects of experience, and bearing the ideal of an infinite determination with regard to concepts of the understanding. It is apparent that Ideas here repeat the three aspects of the Cogito: the *I am* as an indeterminate existence, *time* as the form under which this existence is determinable, and the *I think* as a determination. Ideas are exactly the thoughts of the Cogito, the differentials of thought. (Deleuze 1994, 169)

Descartes, trying to avoid the empiricist trap (the form of external difference), fell into the dogmatic trap. Kant figured out the dogmatic trap, but as he tried to escape from it, he fell back into the trap of empiricism: “There is too much empiricism in Kant” (Deleuze 1994, 170). In effect, he leaves external what is separated: intuition and understanding are separate faculties, while determination, the undetermined and the determinable are *different* Ideas (God, the Self, the World). The relation between these *separate* terms becomes a problem that Kantianism cannot solve, and it consequently becomes mired in endless scholarly debate.

The point of view of genesis: Deleuze and the Post-Kantians

It is precisely when regarding the fact that Kant incarnated the different moments of the Idea in *distinct* Ideas, that Deleuze says something particularly interesting: “It is here, perhaps, that we should seek the real reasons for which, just as the post-Kantians objected, Kant held fast to the point of view of conditioning without attaining that of genesis” (Deleuze 1994, 170). This is one of the themes of *Difference and Repetition*: we must shift from the point of view of *condition* to the point of view of *genesis*. We have to move from the *possible experience* to the *real experience*. Ideas should become *genetic, creative*, and no longer just *limits* of human finitude.

This is an achievement that Deleuze recognizes in the post-Kantians: “Just as the post-Kantians objected, Kant held fast to the point of view of conditioning without attaining that of genesis.” *Just as the post-Kantians objected!* The post-Kantians are, traditionally, the German Idealists: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (Deleuze will add its “founder,” Salomon Maimon). As a consequence, Deleuze recognizes that the Idealist Idea attains the point of view of genesis. The third logical value, the determinable, becomes in Idealism the genetic principle. It is not just an image of the world enclosed in the human mind but the living source of all that exists.

The objection Deleuze holds against the Idealists, particularly against Hegel, is that as long as this genetic Idea is the *ground*, what it engenders is just the same, always the same. There is no *real* difference between the genetic principle and its products. As a consequence the post-Kantians, Deleuze claims, fall back into dogmatism and fulfill what is separated: the ontological gap between beings and their genetic principle. In the case of Hegel, this interpretation depends on reading the Hegelian system as the same old story: the Idea that becomes the Notion that becomes Being that becomes Nature that becomes Spirit that becomes State. The same, always the same, just a mechanical repetition traversing the long pages of Hegel’s system! It’s like the story of the very hungry caterpillar: first he is a small bug, then he eats and eats through different stages, and after he creates his cocoon, he nibbles a hole in it, and finally he becomes a beautiful butterfly!

This is a quite uninteresting way to read Hegel. Even the most fanatical of the anti-Hegelians would agree that Hegel is not Eric Carle. The *Science of Logic* is definitely not a story for little children—even if the history of philosophy threatens to make it seem like one. In order to recover the *interest* in continuing to perform the great effort of reading Hegel, we should try to read him differently.

This effort could be channeled into the path followed by Jason Wirth when he interprets Schelling in relation to Deleuze. Wirth claims that Schelling’s

notion of *time* could be thought as the gap between *Ungrund* and being: “Individuals emerge from the monstrously generative disparity, the disequal cut or gap, *die Scheidung*, between the *Ungrund* of eternity and the being of becoming” (Wirth, forthcoming). Following Wirth’s interpretation, the determinable (time) would be the fold between the undetermined (*Ungrund*) and the determination (being). This interpretation distances itself from the classic view of Schelling’s philosophy as lead by a principle of indetermination (the night where all cows are black) and places his ontology closer to that of Deleuze:

It is as though there were an “opening,” a “gap,” an ontological “fold” which relates being and the question to one another ... This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis.” (Deleuze 1994, 64)

In so far as the Cogito refers to a fractured I, an I split from end to end by the form of time which runs through it, it must be said that Ideas swarm in the fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners. It is not, therefore, a question of filling that which cannot be filled. (Deleuze 1994, 169)

Considering *time* as a *gap*, a *fracture* from which Ideas swarm, Schelling would be exonerated from the accusation of dogmatism that Deleuze attributes to the post-Kantians in general. I think something similar could be attempted with the Hegelian Idea. Not as an identical determination that compels reality to conform into its despotic form, but as the gap between the Essence (as determination) and Being (as undetermined existence) where the true genetic principle lies. As we read the pages on the absolute idea, at the end of the *Science of Logic*, we can, accordingly, try to think the Idea as the determinable: the source of creation, the soul of existence:

Now the negativity just considered constitutes the turning point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of the negative relations to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true.

(Hegel 1969, 835)

The *image* of the circle leads our thought to the *representation* of the activity, the movement and the creation. As if it were a question of a *physical* circle. *As if* there were really an Idea *in itself* that would create an “external reality,” as if actual reality were its *external* finality. In terms of the division of the *Science of Logic* in its three books (Being, Essence and Notion), *as if* Notion would be the external cause of Being, and Essence was just a dumb, mechanic intercessor. But the Idea, as the final level of the Notion (*Begriff*), is an *internal* or *immanent*

finality. The Idea is the final moment of the Notion, which differs “from what is elsewhere understood by ‘notion’” (Hegel 1969, 582). For Hegel, the Notion is the genetic principle, the condition of *real* experience: “Notion is the ground and source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness” (Hegel 1969, 589). But this source must not be thought as an external cause, because “no transition takes place” (Hegel 1969, 843). As a moment of the Notion, the Idea is in itself *already* the other from itself. For Hegel, the true investigation of nature aims at cognizing its properties “as *immanent determinatenesses*” (Hegel 1969, 735). There is neither alienation nor external causation. There is only immanence.

The concept of immanence tightly bonds the thinking of Hegel to that of Deleuze because it is also a key concept in the Deleuzian ontology. For this very same reason, the Hegelian critique of Spinoza does not reach Deleuze. There could be no distancing or progressive loss between the Deleuzian Idea and the determinations of extensive reality, because the Idea is immanent to the determinations of the world. At the same time, immanence could be the Hegelian response to Deleuze’s critiques. It may be that in this *immanent determinateness*, the Hegelian Idea does not repeat itself just as it is, mechanically, but creates new reality at each turn. We could read in this spirit the last pages of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

Although this Spirit starts afresh and apparently from its own resources to bring itself to maturity, it is nonetheless on a higher level [*Stufe*] that it starts.
(Hegel 1977, 492)

At each *Stufe*, the Idea may repeat itself as *different* from itself. “Higher” should not necessarily have an axiological weight. It could instead state the *difference* between the levels. This would make sense, because nothing is high or low *in itself* in immanence. It is a philosophy of relations. Then the Hegelian absolute knowledge will no longer be the stupidity into which every difference dissolves itself,⁶ but the point at which thought thinks what cannot be thought. Then Hegel would not be as far from Deleuze as Deleuze himself has always thought. Hegel may even become an ally to Deleuze in the fight against the dogmatic image of thought, as he analyses in the long pages of the *Science of Logic* all the traps of representation, identity and common sense with a level of detail that Deleuze never achieved.

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6. “There is nothing more stupid, finally, than Hegel’s ‘absolute knowledge’—a state or projection that, utterly untenable, would require knowledge to be immanent, finally, to itself” (Ronnell 2002, 68).

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