



Hobbes on the Passions and Imagination: Tradition and Modernity*

María L. Lukac de Stier

Senior Research Fellow, National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET)

Full Professor of Philosophy, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)
Alicia Moreau de Justo 1500- C1107AFD-Buenos Aires- Argentina

E-mail: mstier@fibertel.com.ar

Abstract

This article introduces the doctrine of the passions in the Hobbesian work, showing its debt with tradition, especially the scholastic Aristotelian one, even if, at the same time, it offers some breach features with this tradition, which are also analysed. In addition, the fundamentals of imagination manifest themselves in the appetitive process, in Hobbes's doctrine as well as in the scholastic Aristotelian tradition, showing their similarities and differences.

Keywords

animal motions, *conatus*, desire, aversion, pleasure, passions, imagination

It is frequently sustained that the acknowledgement of the passionate power in human behaviour and its positive assessment is a characteristic of modernity, as opposed to the classical anthropology that visualised passions as negative tendencies that men should repress. Both one and the other are stereotyped generalizations which cannot pass a thorough analysis based on the sources.

In this article, I shall try to introduce the doctrine of the passions in the Hobbesian work, showing its debt to tradition, especially the scholastic Aristotelian one, even if, at the same time, it offers some breach features with this tradition, which I shall also analyse.

According to the English philosopher from Malmesbury, who sustains that every reality is matter in motion, the passions express the bodily nature of the human being and he conceives them as motions. The passions are emotions, in a literary sense, since they are motions which result from other motions.

* Special thanks to Andrés Di Leo Razuk for his comments and suggestions on this article.

The human life, to Hobbes, can only be conceived functionally as various motions. The causal-functional consideration of the human behaviour is inspired by the expectation of finding an original principle of its dynamics which can explain the complete psychological phenomena of men. In chapter VI of *Leviathan*, Hobbes differentiates two kinds of motions in animals, the vital ones, which start with the generation and continue without interruption during a lifetime, such as breathing, blood circulation, digestion, nutrition, excretion, etc., and the animal motions, also called voluntary, such as walking, talking, moving a part of the body, etc.¹ To Hobbes, the difference between one motion and the other lies on the imagination. That is to say, the vital motions do not need imagination, whereas the voluntary motions always depend on the way in which they have been previously imagined in our minds. This allows him to assert that “it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion.”² Although imagination is the origin of these voluntary motions, it is not a motor that moves on its own, since Hobbes has defined it as a “*decaying sense*.”³ Therefore it is an effect of a sensation. External things produce a motion in our sensory organs and this motion is transmitted to the central organs: the brain and the heart. In the brain, this inertial motion constitutes the image. In the heart, the received motion favours or hinders the vital motion.

In *Human Nature* (the first part of *The Elements of Law*), Hobbes asserted that the concepts or images are nothing but motions in some internal substance of the head, and such motions do not stop there, but continue their way to the heart, where they necessarily help or hinder the so-called vital motions.⁴ This condition produces a new motion in particular, that is the

¹ The quotations of Hobbes’s English Works refer to ed. Molesworth, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes* (EW), London, 1839-1845, (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 2^o ed.1966). The quotations of *De Homine* (*Opera Latina*) refer to ed. B.Gert, *Man and Citizen*, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday,1972). E.W.III, 38: “There be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital...; the other is animal motion otherwise called voluntary motion”.

² E.W. III, 39.

³ E.W. III, 4.

⁴ E.W. IV, 1. At this point, I do not agree with what B. Gert sustained in the footnote number 2 in his article “Hobbes’s psychology” in Tom Sorell(ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 173, where he asserts that *Human Nature*, since it was an early draft of *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, should not be taken into account to determine Hobbes’s point of view on any topic. On the contrary, I sustain that texts such as the one I quote from *Human Nature*, are complementary to the ones from *Leviathan* or *De Homine* and they help to demonstrate an internal coherence in the Hobbesian system, and they are at pains to fall into Skinner’s criticism in “the mythology of coherence”, Skinner, Q., “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, *History and Theory*, vol.8, N^o 1(1969),16.

conatus or *endeavour*. Hobbes presents this last concept to explain the unobservable motions, which are within or among the bodies to try to save the breach between the external body's movements, which are transmitted by any means to the sensory organs, and the inward-directed movements, like the tendencies and appetites.⁵ Hobbes defines *conatus/endeavour* in *De Corpore* as the: "motion made in less space and time than can be given; that is, motion made through the length of a point and in an instant or point of time."⁶ When this unobservable motion, which occurs inside the human body, is guided towards something that causes it, it is called appetite or desire, but when it falls apart from it, it is called aversion.⁷ The appetite or desire comes as a consequence of a favourable action for the vital motion by means of an external thing. If the object is favourable, that is to say, if it causes delight or pleasure, a motion is produced towards the object, and if it is unfavourable, because it causes discomfort or offence, an opposite motion is produced.⁸

Here we can see how the appetitive or passionate feature acts in a double direction, reinforcing or hindering the vital motions, or being the internal principle of the animal or voluntary motions. This last concept is asserted to make it clear that the passions are not themselves the motions of approximation or separation from the pleasant or uncomfortable objects. These are external motions and they are the effects or consequences of the passions understood as inward motions. That is why Hobbes, in *Human Nature*, sustains that: "appetite is the beginning of animal motion toward something which pleaseth us."⁹

The relationship between the pair appetite/aversion and the pair pleasure/pain is not explained in an even way in all the Hobbesian work. In *Leviathan*, by analogy with the issue of knowledge,¹⁰ Hobbes explains: "...when the

⁵ In the article cited in the precedent footnote, Gert sustains that: "Endeavor is the key concept in Hobbes's attempt to show the compatibility of his philosophy of motion with the explanation of voluntary behavior" (*Op.cit.* 160).

⁶ E.W. I, 206. Hobbes takes the term *conatus* from physics to apply it to the tiny little motions, and he extends its usage to differentiate it from physics, physiology and psychology. Wherever the jump might occur, between the objects and the sensitive organs, or between the organ stimulus and the appetitive or affective response, Hobbes postulates the *endeavour* as the transmitter of the motion.

⁷ *Leviathan*, E.W.III, 39.

⁸ *Leviathan*, E.W. III, 42: "This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and help therunto; and therefore such things as caused delight were not improperly called jucunda, à juvando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, moleste, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital".

⁹ E.W.IV, 5.

¹⁰ See *Leviathan*, E.W. III, 1.

action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call delight, or trouble of mind”.....“Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence or sense of good; and molestation, or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evil.”¹¹

In *De Homine*, however, he explicitly denies the analogy with knowledge asserting that the delight and the trouble differ in the sense, since in knowledge there is an outward reaction or resistance of an organ whose motion produces the appearance or *phantasm*, but the delight consists of the passion produced by the object’s action, which is an inward motion.¹² In *De Homine* the “appearances” have vanished and the pair appetite/aversion differs from the pair delight/pain just by the distinction between the present and the future situation. According to Gert, in both *Leviathan* and *De Homine*, after establishing the concepts of appetite, aversion, delight and pain, Hobbes’s further explanation of the topic of the passions ignores the relation between human behaviour and his materialistic philosophy. He simply proceeds through introspection and experience, basing freely on the Aristotelian accounts of the passions.¹³

Now, for Hobbes, the two basic passions are appetite or desire and aversion, because, in the end, they are the two fundamental directions of a movement towards an object. Our philosopher adds love and hate to desire and aversion. In *Leviathan*, he says: “So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object”.¹⁴ Therefore, desire, aversion, love, hate, together with joy and grief, which imply the prevision of an aim which is pleasant or not, constitute the simple passions from which all the rest derive.¹⁵

¹¹ E.W. III, 42.

¹² See *Man and Citizen*, XI, 1, 45. Timo Airaksinen in “Hobbes on the Passions and Powerlessness”, *Hobbes Studies*, VI (1993), 80-104, comments about the inward-directed motion in this way: “The sensory inward-directed motion, when it reaches the vital organ or the heart, moves and changes it and, so sharpened to self-awareness, creates motivational effects”.

¹³ Gert, B., “Hobbes’s psychology”, in Tom Sorell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 160.

¹⁴ *Leviathan*, E.W. III, 40.

¹⁵ *Leviathan*, E.W. III, 43: “These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy and grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified”.

After having made this brief and partial exposition of the Hobbesian doctrine on the passions, we shall try to compare it with the traditional doctrine. Undoubtedly, the starting point is different. In the traditional doctrine, more specifically, in the scholastic Aristotelian one, the reality from which we take off is not restricted to bodies in motion. The mechanistic materialism is Hobbes's original starting point where he radically separates from tradition; however, the vocabulary that he uses is undeniably traditional. Let us examine the following passage from *Nicomachean Ethics*: "By passions I mean: concupiscence, anger, aggressiveness, envy, joy, love, hatred, desire, jealousy, pity, and all the movements followed by pleasure and sorrow."¹⁶ Aristotle's objective in the Second Book, chapter 5, is to differentiate virtue from the passions and faculties so that, in the end, he can classify it as a habit, however, related to this, he enunciates the passions and also points out that we are not called good or bad for our passions, but for our virtues and vices (*Et. Nic.* 1105b 28-31), that we are not praised nor censured by our passions, since they can be good or bad according to how intensely they are felt and according to the objects they are applied to (1105b 31-1106a 2), that we get angry or afraid involuntarily, but virtue implies some kind of choice (1106a 2-4), and finally, that we are said to be moved by passions, not by virtues or vices which give us a certain moral disposition (1106a 4-6). We observe that also for Aristotle, passions, apart from the common names, are basically motions and involuntary affections related to pleasure and pain.

In his *Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas, the emblematic scholasticism representative, expands the Aristotle's text we have just mentioned by asserting in the first place, that the passions do not correspond to the vegetative life because their characteristic is not passivity, understood as the capacity of reception, but activity. Here we could establish an analogy between this vegetative life and the vital motions pointed out by Hobbes. Secondly, Aquinas sustains that, even if feeling and understanding are both in a way passions, in the sense that both "suffer" some changes, passions are strictly described as the operations of the appetitive faculties, because it is in the pleasure that the one who desires inclines towards the desired object, as if attracted (*patientis*) by the agent (the thing that attracts him).¹⁷ Among the appetitive faculties, Aquinas differentiates rational appetite from sensitive appetite, and sustains that, exactly, just the sensitive appetite operations, which go together with the

¹⁶ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b 21-23 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Ethic.*, book 2, lec.5, n.3. *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, trans.C.I.Litzinger (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993).

changes in the body organs and which somehow motivate or conduct men, can be called passions, since in the rational appetite operations, which is the will, men are not passive receptors because being the owners of their actions, they conduct themselves.¹⁸

Undoubtedly, these latter affirmations are the ones which Hobbes explicitly rejects, since he says in *Leviathan*: “Will, therefore is the last appetite in deliberating”; and in *De Homine* he says: “The last appetite (either of doing or omitting), the one that leads immediately to action or omission is properly called the will”.¹⁹ In *Leviathan* he clearly states that the definition of will, given by scholasticism, as “rational appetite”, is not correct because if it were, voluntary acts contrary to reason would not exist.²⁰ Thus, the voluntary act is the one which proceeds from will, understanding will not as a capacity or a faculty of willing but as an act.²¹ In my thesis, I have defined this reduction operated by Hobbes as “will as volition”.²²

Coming back now to Aquinas’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas points out that the sensitive appetite is divided into two powers: the concupiscible, which concerns sensible good absolutely (this is pleasurable to sense) and rejects what is harmful (evil contrary to it); and the irascible, which concerns what is good and difficult to obtain, and rejects evil which is difficult to avoid. In the concupiscible, he identifies its acts or passions with love, desire and pleasure/joy related to what is good, and hate, aversion and pain/sorrow in respect to evil. In the irascible he identifies fear and boldness in regard to evil, hope and despair in regard to good, and anger as being a compound passion.²³ It is worth mentioning this scholastic classification of the passions, which certainly Aquinas explains not only in *Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics* but also in *Scriptum super Sententiis*, and in his own mature work *Summa Theologiae*,²⁴ to show Hobbes’s dependence upon this

¹⁸ *Idem*, n.4.

¹⁹ *Leviathan*, E.W. III, 49; *Man and Citizen*, XI,2, 46.

²⁰ *Leviathan* 6, E.W. III, 48.

²¹ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 48: “In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act, not the faculty of willing”.

²² See Lukac de Stier, M.L., *El fundamento antropológico de la Filosofía Política y Moral de Thomas Hobbes*, (Buenos Aires:EDUCA, 1999), 145-152.

²³ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Ethic.*, book 2, lect.5, n.5. *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, trans.C.I.Litzinger (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993).

²⁴ See Thomas Aquinas, *S. Th.*, I-II, q.22-48, known as *Treatise of the passions. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia cum hypertextibus* in CD-ROM, ed. Roberto Busa (Milano: Elettronica Editel, 1992). After a general analysis of the anthropological aspect and the moral aspect of the passions,

classification when he enunciates the derived passions in chapter VI of *Leviathan*, according to the object of the appetites and aversions and according to the possibility of reaching or not the desired object. Therefore he enunciates hope as the appetite that implies the conviction of obtaining the desired object; whereas despair implies the conviction of not doing so. And he continues to enumerate: “Aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, fear. The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, courage. Sudden courage, anger. Constant hope, confidence of ourselves. Constant despair, diffidence of ourselves.”²⁵ The parallelism which might be drawn between the simple passions enunciated by Hobbes with the passions of the scholastic concupiscible appetite, and the one which can be drawn between the derived passions from Hobbes, as we have just mentioned, with the passions of the scholastic irascible appetite, exempts me from making further comments.

I wish to clarify that, in regards to the other classic terminology, such as *natura*, *ars* and *ratio*, I have sustained the thesis of the semantic revolution done by Hobbes on the classic terminology from which he redefines the content and provides a new meaning to the terms.²⁶ Thus, I sustain that in the doctrine of the passions, this is not the case. Certainly, Hobbes continues to enumerate many other derivative passions: indignation, benevolence, charity, covetousness, ambition, pusillanimity, magnanimity, fortitude, liberality, miserableness, kindness, luxury, jealousy, revengefulness, curiosity, religion, superstition, panic terror, admiration, glory, dejection, vain-glory, sudden glory, sudden dejection, shame, impudence, compassion, cruelty, emulation, envy²⁷, whose description, in some cases, are summarised in just one line, so there is no need to transcribe them. In *De Homine* the enumeration and description are practically the same. In this text he adds that there can be an infinite number of passions if we assign different names to them, even if the difference is insignificant. However, he is satisfied with the given enumeration because that infinite number can be reduced to the ones he describes.²⁸ There is a more detailed study about some simple passions and derivative ones in the English compendium of *Rhetoric, The Whole Art of Rhetoric*, published in 1637 for the first time. There he expounds in a much more detailed way on the passions

he continues to study each of them in general, dividing the treatise into two big sections: the passions of the concupiscible (q.26-39) and the passions of the irascible (q.40-48).

²⁵ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 43.

²⁶ See Lukac, M.L., “Ruptura con la filosofía clásica y giro semántico”, in Lukac, M.L. (ed.), *Perspectivas latinoamericanas sobre Hobbes*, (Buenos Aires: EDUCA, 2008)173-184.

²⁷ *Leviathan* 6, E.W. III, 43-47.

²⁸ *Man and Citizen*, XII, 12, 62.

such as anger, pacification, love, hate, fear, courage, shame, grace, compassion, indignation, envy and emulation,²⁹ where we can verify the influence of the Aristotelian rhetoric on the English philosopher. In fact, the complete Book II of *The Whole Art of Rhetoric* accurately follows the table of contents of the book II of *Rhetoric* by Aristotle, since for both authors, this is the book devoted to state the orator's character and the receiver's passions, which are supposed to be taken into account by the orator if he wants to persuade with his speech.³⁰

John Aubrey, quoted by Leo Strauss, explains that Hobbes exempted two works from Aristotle's condemnation, his *Rhetoric* and his *History of Animals*.³¹ Even if there is no evidence of Hobbes's study of the discourse about animals, except for those made in chapter 17 of *Leviathan*, his study of *Rhetoric* led to a Latin paraphrase of this Aristotelian work, which is found in one of William Cavendish's exercise books from the 1630s, at Chatsworth. This paraphrase was later translated into English and was published with the title of *A Briefe of the Art of Rhetoric*, which was the first English version of the Aristotelian text. Until recently, this translation has been attributed to Hobbes himself. However, Quentin Skinner, based on Karl Schuhmann's erudite studies, sustains that the Latin paraphrase is Hobbes's work, but not the English translation published in the Molesworth edition with the title *The Whole Art of Rethoric*³². In the same edition there is also a shorter compendium with the title *The Art of Rethoric*, which is not attributed to Hobbes either³³. The topics developed in the Latin paraphrase, in addition to the fact that among Hobbes's private papers in Chatsworth there was a free compendium of *Nicomachean Ethics*, based on Aristotle's interpretation done by Francisco Piccolomini, Aristotelian from Padua, prove the Aristotelian influence and interest on the theory of the passions in Hobbes's humanistic period. Strauss sustains that "the use and value of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Hobbes's mature period are the last remaining Aristotelian traces of his youth."³⁴ The celebrated German professor, in the chapter called "Aristotelianism" of his famous work *The Political Philosophy of*

²⁹ *The Whole Art of Rhetoric*, E.W. VI, 419-510.

³⁰ See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II, 1377b-1403b. *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. G.A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

³¹ Strauss, L., *La filosofía política de Hobbes. Su fundamento y su génesis* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006), 63. First translation to Spanish of *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).

³² See Skinner, Q, *Visions of Politics*, Vol 3: *Hobbes and Civil Science*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 4, footnote 27; 47-48, footnote 79; 152, footnote 76.

³³ See Martinich, A.P, *A Hobbes Dictionary*, Bibliography, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 318.

³⁴ Strauss, L, *op.cit.*, 73.

Hobbes, makes a comparative table between *The Whole Art of Rhetoric*, *Elements*, *Leviathan* and *De Homine* showing the parallel points referred to the passions and concluding that, when Hobbes composed all his anthropological systematic expositions (*Elements*, 1640; *Leviathan*, 1651 y *De Homine*, 1658), in each of the cases, he studied Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.³⁵

Let us go back now to the relationship Hobbes establishes between appetite and pleasure or delight. Here he differentiates between the pleasures of sense which emerge directly through the primary relation expressed in the body's movements, and others, the pleasures of the mind which emerge from the generated expectation in view of the end or consequences of things.³⁶ In both kinds of pleasures, imagination is present, as we asserted at the beginning of this article, but it is time to analyse this in detail. In the case of the pleasures of sense, they mean all the sensations which are pleasant to the sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell. The effect of these sensations is the imagination as a "decaying sense", which, on the other hand, Hobbes considers as the faculty or the cognitive power.³⁷ At the same time, he himself sustains in *De Homine* that, "According to the method of nature, sense is prior to appetite. For it cannot be known whether or not what we see as a pleasure would have been so, except by experience, that is, by feeling it. Therefore it is commonly said that there is no desire for the unknown."³⁸ In *Leviathan*, Hobbes explains that experience is much memory, or memory of many things, adding that memory and imagination are the same. He says: "...when we would express the decay and signify that the sense is fading, old and past, it is called memory. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names. Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience."³⁹ Undoubtedly, then, imagination is the basis of the pleasures of sense.

As regards the pleasures of the mind, mainly related to the compound or derivative passions, by its own definition, imagination is essential to explain their nature, since without it, it is impossible to foresee the end or consequences of things. According to Hobbes, the principal effect of experience

³⁵ Idem, 64–71.

³⁶ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 42–43.

³⁷ See *Human Nature*, E.W.IV, 2–3: "This imagery and representation of the qualities of things without us is that we call our cognition, imagination, ideas, notice, conception or knowledge of them. And the faculty, or power, by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call power cognitive, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving".

³⁸ *Man and Citizen*, XI, 3, 46.

³⁹ *Leviathan* 2, E.W.III, 6.

consists in offering the possibility of considering things in a different way. These different considerations are the ones which cause the compound passions to derive from the simple ones. Hobbes enumerates four considerations in *Leviathan*: 1. when the passions come one after the other, they are called in different ways, according to how possible it is to reach the desired object; 2. according to the object of desire or rejection; 3. according to the consideration of many passions together; 4. according to the passions' alteration or succession itself.⁴⁰ Quite rightly, Astorga asserts that according to the kind and complexity of the images which cause the body to move, the kind and complexity of the passions shall be constituted. That leads Hobbes to consider the diversity of passions depending on the complexity that the imaginative world acquires according to the experience.⁴¹

As we reread Aristotle's *De Anima*, we find a text at the end of chapter 10 which could be the source of the Hobbesian doctrine we have just exposed. I quote: "Generally, then, an animal is self-moving inasmuch as it is appetitive, as we have said. But there is never appetite apart from imagination; and all imagination is either rational or sensitive. It is in the latter, then, that other animals also participate".⁴² In his *Commentary on De Anima*, Aquinas expands upon Aristotle's words when he asserts that imagination should be considered as being included by the philosopher under the term intellect and, as a result, such imagination is named reason. The imagination (*phantasia*) is a sort of representation or appearance (*apparitio*) because something appears from sense or from reason, since imagination operates in the absence of exterior sense-objects as it happens with reason or intellect.⁴³ Both for the Greek philosopher and for the medieval one, it is evident that imagination is fundamental in the appetitive process.

However, that Hobbes could accept the division of the imagination into sensitive and rational, as it is expounded by Aristotle and his scholastic commentator is in doubt. Let us see first what the Greek philosopher says: "Sensitive imagination, then, is found in other animals, as we have said; but the deliberative only in rational beings. For [to deliberate] whether to do; this or that is the

⁴⁰ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 43.

⁴¹ Astorga, Omar, *La institución imaginaria del Leviathan*, (Caracas: Univ. Central de Venezuela, 2000), 123.

⁴² Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 10, 433b 27-30. *Aristotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke*, trans. Foster-Humphries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951).

⁴³ Thomas Aquinas, *In De Anima*, III, lect. 16, 837. *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, trans. Foster-Humphries (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1994).

work of reason.”⁴⁴ Aristotle adds “Appetite sometimes overcomes and moves deliberation. But sometimes the latter moves the former.”⁴⁵ When Aquinas comments on these passages, he expresses the following considerations: “the lower appetite springing from imagination is non-deliberate: it moves at once into desire or repulsion following the sensuous imagination...Next [Aristotle] explains how rational deliberation may yield to the lower desire, may be overcome by it and drawn away from its own decision. Again, conversely, the superior appetite that follows rational deliberation sometimes sways the lower one that follows sensuous images (as a higher heavenly body may impel a lower). This happens in the case of continence; for the continent are those in whom deliberation gets the better of passion.”⁴⁶

In these texts, there are certain notions which, undoubtedly, Hobbes will reject, such as the deliberation that we will refer to later on. However, not only the difference between the concupiscible and the rational exist, but also it is manifested as being confronted in certain Hobbesian texts. For example, in the Epistle Dedicatory of *De Cive*, we find the following passage: “Having therefore thus arrived at two maxims of human nature; the one arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest; the other proceeding from the rational, which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature.”⁴⁷ In *De Homine*, Hobbes’s last writing about human nature, and therefore, his most mature version, we read: “Emotions or perturbations of the mind are species of appetite and aversion, their differences having been taken from the diversity and circumstances of the objects that we desire or shun. They are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning. They obstruct right reasoning in this, that they militate against the real good and in favor of the apparent and most immediate good.”⁴⁸ Along this trend, we can identify the passions enumerated by Hobbes in chapter 13 in *Leviathan*: “So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly diffidence; thirdly, glory.”⁴⁹ But we shall also point out that, for the English philosopher, not always and not all passions are disruptions or obstructions for reasoning,

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 11, 434a 5-7.

⁴⁵ *Idem*, 434a 12-13.

⁴⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *In De Anima* III, lect. XVI, 842-843. *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, trans. Foster-Humphries (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1994).

⁴⁷ *Epistle Dedicatory De Cive*, E.W.II, vii.

⁴⁸ *Man and Citizen*, XII, 1, 55.

⁴⁹ *Leviathan* 13, E.W. III, 112.

then, in the same chapter, he enumerates the passions that incline to peace and that constitute a complementary road to the one of reason to achieve that fundamental objective of his philosophy. These are: the fear of death, the desire for necessary things for a comfortable life, and the hope of obtaining them through efforts and diligence.⁵⁰

Finally, we refer to deliberation, a controversial notion because with this term, the thesis enunciated in the semantic revolution is certainly accomplished. Hobbes takes the expression from classical philosophy, but he gives a complete different meaning to it. In classical philosophy, as it has been shown in the quotations 44, 45 and 46, the deliberation is attributed to reason, not to appetite. For Hobbes, however, the deliberation is the alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears. In *Leviathan* the deliberation is defined as “the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible.”⁵¹ In *De Homine*, similarly, he sustains that in the deliberation “appetite and aversion will alternate, until the thing demands that a decision be made. The last appetite (either of doing or omitting), the one that leads immediately to action or omission, is properly called the will.”⁵² Perhaps, this strange notion of deliberation may appear from the doubtful etymology applied by Hobbes to the term itself, since he refers to the *de-liberation* with these words: “it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion.”⁵³ He further specifies in another paragraph when he asserts that: “Every deliberation is then said to end, when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or aversion.”⁵⁴ So as not to raise any doubt about the fact that the deliberation, for Hobbes, is not related to rationality, we shall remember that he relates it to beasts, because in them we can also verify that succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears.⁵⁵

However, if according to Hobbes, the will is a passion and the deliberation is the sequence of passions, we could ask ourselves: why is it said that men can make mistakes when they choose? The answer, in my opinion, must be searched again in the imagination, since, for our English philosopher, it constitutes the first internal cognitive origin of the voluntary movements, as we have already

⁵⁰ *Idem*, 116.

⁵¹ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 48.

⁵² *Man and Citizen*, XI, 2, 46.

⁵³ *Leviathan* 6, E.W.III, 48.

⁵⁴ *Idem*.

⁵⁵ *Leviathan* 6, E.W. III, 48: “Therefore beasts also deliberate”.

seen. Here again, and so as to conclude, in reference to the imagination, we can focus on the continuity of the Hobbesian doctrine to the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. We can enumerate several points of view that Hobbes shares with Aristotle and Aquinas. First, that incorporeal objects cannot be imagined and that imaginations proceed from sensation. Second, that imaginations are states of the mind where the object of sense-perception can be absent. And third, that imagination as a cognitive power stands between mere sense and understanding. The big difference lies on the fact that, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, understanding is an activity of the intellect which captures the essence of things, separating them from their material conditions. This is completely absurd for Hobbes, who substitutes intellect for imagination, asserting that universals are only graspable by language. The origin of this divergence goes beyond epistemology or gnoseology and should be found in the metaphysics that sustains the tradition, metaphysics which Hobbes rejects from his mechanistic materialism.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ See Lemetti, Juhana, *Imagination and Diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes*, Academic Dissertation, (Helsinki, 2006), 47-50. See also Leijenhorst, C.H., *The Mechanization of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes's Natural Philosophy*, Academic Dissertation, (Utrecht, 1998), 100-116.