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Cultural and communicative memories: contrasting Argentina's 1976 coup d'état and the 2001 economic-political-social crisis

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ABSTRACT

Studies on collective memory have recently addressed the distinction between cultural and communicative memory as a way to understand how the source of a memory affects its structure or form. When a groups' memory is mediated by memorials, documentaries or any other cultural artifacts, collective memory is shaped by cultural memory. When it is based mostly in communication with other people, its source is communicative memory. We address this distinction by studying two recent events in Argentinean history: the 2001 economic-political-social crisis (communicative memory) and the 1976 coup (cultural memory). We also examine the political ideology and the type of memory involved in collective memory. The memory of the studied events may occur during the lifetime of the rememberer (Lived Memory) or refer to distant events (Distant Memory). 100 participants responded to a Free Recall task about the events of 2001 in Argentina. Narrative analysis allowed comparing these recalls with our 1976 study. Results show: 1) Cultural memories are more contextualised, more impersonal and less affective. 2) Communicative memories are more personal and affective. Study shows how collective memory form changes when it has a different prevalent source.

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The last few years have witnessed a growing interest amongst psychologists in the way in which people recall their nation's past (e.g., Hegarty & Klein, 2017; Hilton & Liu, 2017; Hirst & Manier, 2008; Roediger & DeSoto, 2014; Wertsch, 2002). What do people recall? And how can one account for what is or is not recalled? These questions are not unique to the study of historical memory, of course. Interest in asking them about history arises because collective memories about a nation's past is thought to bear on national identity and actions, making the study of collective memory critical for civically engaged scholars of memory.

The present paper examines how Argentines remember the Economic-Political-Social Crisis of 2001 and contrasts these memories with previously collected memories for the Military Junta of 1976 (Muller, Bermejo, & Hirst, 2016). In doing so, it explores two critical distinctions found in the literature on collective memory: *communicative* versus *cultural memories* (Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995) and *lived* versus *distant memories* (Hirst & Manier, 2002). The 2001 economic crisis was the worst economic crisis in Argentina's recent history (Kiguel, 2011; Seitz, 2005). After some years of economic recession, the crisis was triggered by an economic measure called "corralito," which almost completely froze banks accounts and thereby prevented people from withdrawing money. Popular protests and

revolts soon followed, which, in turn, precipitated the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa shortly after he declared a state of siege. Police action resulted in 39 deaths. Many shops, mostly supermarkets, were looted. Institutional chaos, political uncertainty, and a succession of Presidents (five in one week) followed De la Rúa's resignation. As to the 1976 Military Junta, it led to a despotic government and a reign of terror in which more than 30,000 people "disappeared." See Table 1 for a comparison between the two. How do these two event bear on the distinction we just evoked?

Lived versus distant memories

As Hirst and Manier (2002; Manier & Hirst, 2008) used the terms, *lived historical memories* refers to historical memories that unfold during one's life. For many Americans living today, memories of the attack of September 11 would be lived (see Hirst et al., 2015). In contrast, distant historical memories refer to events that did not occur during the rememberer's lifetime. For most Americans, the Second World War WWII is a distant memory. Hirst and Manier were careful not to claim that one must directly experience an event for it to be a lived memory. One only has to be alive, attentive to it as it unfolds, and feel as if the event has resonance either as an individual or as a member

Table 1. Differences between the 1976 coup and the 2001 political/economic/social crisis.

1976 Coup	2001 Crisis
Military Coup started in 1976 when democratic President María Estela Martínez de Perón was overthrown and ended in 1983.	In December 2001 the crisis reached a peak, when democratic President de la Rúa left the government house in a helicopter. It started when the economic crisis started, in 1998, and lasted at least until the end of 2002.
Described as the darkest period in Argentina History, in terms of terror and death.	Described as the worst political, economic, financial and social crisis of Argentinian Democratic History.
During the period 1976–1983, 30000 disappeared. Some were thrown alive from airplanes into the sea. There was a systematic plan to kill people because of their ideology.	During December 19 and 21, 39 were killed in protest by security forces.
State of siege was maintained through the seven years and a half that the dictatorship lasted.	State of siege was declared on the final days of December 2001. De la Rúa declared it for 30 days, but two days later withdrew it.
Military repression and state of terror.	Institutional chaos, political uncertainty, and social crisis.
At the end of the period (1983) (data is usually partial and scarce and vary according to the different sources):	At the peak of the crisis (2001/2003):
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unemployment remained mostly stable, with a slight increase (a peak of 6% in 1982). • GDP per capita was volatile but relatively stable. • Poverty increases during the whole period (for Buenos Aires, some sources claim 19% and others 35%). • A process of deindustrialisation took place. • Foreign debt grew from about 7 billion to 45 billion dollars. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unemployment increased to about 25% percent of the labour force. • GDP per capita fell by around 20 percent during the whole period. • Poverty levels reached 55 percent of the population. • A process of deindustrialisation also took place. • The currency depreciated from one to more than three pesos per U.S. dollar in a matter of weeks.
There is a large cultural production regarding the period:	Cultural production about this period is limited:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 150 movies about the coup and its context. • More than 150 books published about this period. • Incorporated in school textbooks / curriculum. • There is a commemoration day (March, 24th). • Many memorials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less than 15 movies about the 2001 crisis. • Less than 30 books concerning the crisis. • No inclusion in textbooks (only in the City of Buenos Aires, and after 2009) • No national commemoration day. • Limited memorials.

of an affected community. Although 9/11 is a quintessential lived historical memory, few Americans were actually at Ground Zero when the 9/11 attack occurred. Of course, Americans might be alive when a natural disaster occurs in Papua New Guinea. It would not be classified as a lived memory inasmuch, although they may even be vaguely aware that it occurred, they probably will not feel that it affects them personally or as an American.

Studies of lived and distant historical memories usually contrast memories across generations. These studies indicate that lived historical memories are more likely to involve personal recollections than are distant historical events. Flashbulb memories are a telling example of how memories of historical events can also include autobiographical memories, in that flashbulb memories are memories

for the circumstance of learning about a currently unfolding, potentially historically important event (Hirst & Phelps, 2016). In their study of generational memories, Schuman and Scott (1989) also underscore the prevalence of personal recollection in lived memories when they observed that those who had lived through the Second World War explained the war's importance in personal terms, e.g., "My husband lost an eye." whereas those for whom the Second World War was a distant memory, a "younger generation," tended to speak about it in general terms, "The war led to a reconfiguration of power in Europe" (p. 373). Similarly, in their study of memories of the Second World War. Stone, van der Haegen, Luminet, and Hirst (2014) found that the recollections of the war for the oldest generation – those who lived through it – frequently included personal memories, such as a memory of being approached by a German as the respondent was standing in a rationing line. Some of these personal memories were also included in the second generations' recountings. These personal recollections no longer figured in the recounting of the youngest, "third," generation.

Then there is the study that serves as the springboard for the present work. In their examination of Argentine memory for the 1976 Junta, Muller et al. (2016) solicited both open-ended recountings and responses to specific questions about the events surrounding the Junta from those who had or had not lived through it (or were at least too young to be aware of it, specifically, less than 10 years of age in 1976). They found that lived memories tended to include many personal narratives when compared to the distant memories held by the younger generation.

In addition to containing personal recollections, lived historical memories might also be more elaborate or contain more causal descriptions than the distant memories, in that, according to construal level theory, more recent events should be remembered more concretely than more temporally distant ones (Trope & Liberman, 2003). In addition, people may discover more causal connections for events they lived through because they are more interested in such events and process them more deeply. The evidence for claims along these lines is inconsistent, however. In their intergenerational study of historical memories, Zaromb, Butler, Agarwal, and Roediger (2014) found that their "younger generation" tended to have a more "expansive" take on the events related to the Second World War than those who lived through the war. For instance, those who lived through the Second World War tended to recount events directly related to the war, e.g., D-Day, whereas the younger generation tended to put the war into a larger context, e.g., stating that Hitler was elected Chancellor. On the other hand, Muller et al. (2016) found that lived memories tended to contain more contextualising statements and more causal statements than distant memories. This difference may arise because Muller et al. asked both open-ended

and specific questions, some of which were aimed at eliciting contextualising statements, causes, and consequences. Zaromb et al., on the other hand, asked participants to list critical events associated with the Second World War.

Finally, there is the valence and emotional intensity of the event. Here, we can only speculate. The emotional intensity of an event might decline as it become more temporally distant. On the other hand, interpretations of a historical event can change over time, in some instances, leading to a shift from one valence to another. Zaromb et al., for instance, found that those who lived through the Second World War tended to have a more positive view of the war than those who did not. They attributed this result to changes in the emotional rating associated with the bombing of Hiroshima: The “older generation,” those who lived through it, viewed the bombing as more positive than the younger generation, those for whom it was a distant memory. Interestingly, Muller et al. discovered no differences in the valence assigned to the Junta across generations, presumably because it was and is still viewed as extremely negative. Although not directly related to the issue of emotions, Welzer’s (2005) finding that younger Germans often claim that their grandfather was not a Nazi when he was also underscores the shifting views people can have of history. Not only did grandchildren report that the Nazi grandpa wasn’t a Nazi, they went on to “heroize” the role their grandparents played during the war.

Communicative versus cultural memories

At least as we interpret it, the distinction between communicative and cultural memories deals with how memories are transmitted. As the name suggests, *communicative memories* are memories transmitted among people, often in the form of a conversation. Family memories of how a parent lived through the war would be prototypical of communicative memories.

As to cultural memories, according to Assmann and Czaplicka (1995), communicative memories become cultural memories when they become part of “objectivized culture,” taking the form of what Assmann called *cultural formations* and we refer to as *cultural artifacts*. Although both forms of memory involve communication, in that cultural artifacts such as memorials and textbooks no doubt are forms of communication, they differ as to the source of the communication. Communicative memories are personally transmitted, for instance, between father and son, whereas the sources of the cultural memory are cultural artifacts.

At times, cultural memories and communicative memories can overlap. Cultural artifacts about historical events are often being constructed even as people continue to talk to each other about the events. Even when memories may still be personally communicated across generations, in some instances, they may be little or no apparent societal attempt to “preserve” them in cultural artifacts and other instances, there is a robust or concrete effort

to construct cultural artifacts. As Table 1 makes clear, this distinction maps nicely onto the 2001 Crisis and the 1976 Junta. The Junta is clearly in the process of becoming a cultural memory in that Argentina is undertaking an extensive effort to “objectivize” the events surrounding the Junta. To be sure, there are still those who lived through the Junta that can talk to others about it. In this regard, it still functions as a communicative memory, but it clearly is also becoming “objectivized” through memorials, monuments, films, and books. As a shorthand, if you like, will refer here to memories of the Junta as cultural. The 2001 Crisis has not received similar treatment. Although in recent years a few memorials have been built, novels, movies, and documentaries about this time are rare. For instance, until the last year, High School history programmes at the city of Buenos Aires included a whole chapter for the 1976 coup, but did not mention the 2001 (see “Historia,” 2009). To the extent that those who did not live through the Crisis know anything about it, their knowledge would need to come mainly from others, rather than through cultural artifacts. We will refer to memories of the 2001 Crisis as communicative.

Interactions between the distinctions

How might we expect lived communicative memories, lived cultural memories, distant communicative memories, and distant cultural memories to differ? That is, how might the memories of the Junta and the 2001 Crisis differ across generations? If a memory is mainly communicative, as it is for the 2001 Crisis, then those who lived through it might have a substantial influence on the memory of those who did not live through it, inasmuch as they are the main source of information. Indeed, the influence of someone with personal experience of a historical event on someone who not experienced it might be substantial (Wertsch, 2002). On the other hand, when the memory is largely cultural, cultural artifacts may be either the only source of information or, at least, a competing source. Consequently, the influence of an older generation might be diminished. We might expect, then:

(1) Given the possibility of competing alternatives as memories become cultural, all things being equal, we would predict that lived, communicative memories will contain more personal memories than lived, cultural memories. Furthermore, and perhaps more tellingly, the greater frequency of personal memories in lived memories when compared to distant memories should decline, if not disappear, when contrasting lived, communicative memories and distant, communicative memories. One may live through the event and another person might not, but if the source is confined to conversational exchanges, then the content of these two individual’s memories should be more similar and reflect the personal nature of the older generation serving as the source of the memory.

Although some events may beg for personal anecdotes in ways that others do not, making comparison across

events risky, extant research supports these predictions. Stone et al. (2014) found that their middle generation (children of those who lived through the Second World War) had a reasonable number of personal memories in their renderings of the war, whereas the youngest generation (grandchildren of those who lived through the war) had few memories. The Second World War had presumably become more of a cultural memory by the time the youngest generation began to learn about it. In addition, Svob and Brown (2012) found that children of immigrant children knew about personal incidents from their parents' lives. Interestingly, these memories tended to be associated with events that occurred during their parents' late adolescence and, more importantly for the present discussion, they were more frequently mentioned by the younger generation if they occurred when their parent's home country was at war at the time of the reported personal event. Inasmuch as the children were living in Canada for most of their formative years, they would not have easy access to the cultural artifacts that constitute the cultural memory of their parent's war and hence would rely more on their parents' communicative account of the war than any account that might be found in a "cultural artifact."

(2) To the extent that the cultural artifacts supporting cultural memories are reflective products of historians and other social commentators, one might expect that they may provide more contextualisation than the kind of often brief communications that support communicative memories. In other words, the recall of cultural memories should contain more contextualising statements than the recall of communicative memories. Of course, if one lived through the event, one might be more inclined to study carefully these cultural artifacts than if one did not live through the event. The most contextualised recall, then, might involve lived memories that are in the process of becoming cultural memories.

(3) Inasmuch as communicative memories can be replete with personal recollections, they might also be more likely to be emotional in nature or have associated with them strong evaluative judgments. One would clearly feel

strongly about the scalping that wives of suspected collaborators endured at the end of the Second World War in Belgium if one heard from a relative that one's grandmother's head was shaved (Hirst & Fineberg, 2012). The same point could be made not just with respect to the intensity of the emotion, but also to the valence of the emotion. A daughter would be much more likely to feel emotionally and evaluatively similar to the way her mother feels if the only source of her memories is her mother. To be sure, at times, children rebel against their parents, but this rebellion is more likely to reshape memories if there is an alternative rendering, which a cultural memory could provide. We summarise these predictions in Table 2.

The present study

To test these predictions, we compare individual's recall of communicative memories with cultural memories across a wide age range, so that, for some of the participants, the memories are lived, for others, distant. As noted, the present study collects memories for the 2001 Crisis and then contrasts these with previously collected memories of the 1976 Junta. In this paper, we repeat the free recall phase of the procedure developed by Muller et al. (2016) to study the 1976 coup, but now probe for memories of the 2001 Crisis. As in Muller et al., we will have participants in age ranges that ensure the memories will either be lived or distant. The close mirroring of the present study with Muller et al. should allow us to compare the present results with the results from Muller et al., something that the diverse methodology of the other relevant studies have made challenging. In what follows, we first report on the present study of memories for the 2001 Crisis. We then compare these findings with the findings of Muller et al. concerning the 1976 Junta.

In addition to the lived/distant and communicative/cultural distinctions, the present paper explores one other factor, ideology. A large number of factors could affect how people recall the historical past, e.g., gender, education, income, ethnicity, among others. We focus on ideology in part because it is frequently mentioned in discussions of collective memory (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy, 2011) and in part because history textbooks often come in different ideological stripes. This is not to say that other factors are not important, but, at least for us, ideology stands out as a need-to-be-considered factor. Whatever effects ideology have on memory, they should be more consistent across generations when the memory is communicative than when it is cultural.

Main study

Method

Participants.

The sample of 100 participants consisted of 65 women and 35 men, with a mean age of 38 years (range 19–80). Participants

Table 2. Predictions concerning the lived and distant, communicative and cultural distinctions.

		Lived	Distant
Communicative (2001 Crisis)	Personal Contextualised	Same Fewer Communicative	Same Similar Lived and Distant
	Affective- Evaluative	Same	Same
Cultural (1976 Coup)	Personal Contextual	More More Cultural	Fewer Lived Greater than Distant
	Affective- Evaluative	Greater	Fewer
		Also, Fewer for Cultural Overall	

were referred by research assistants and were divided into two classes: Those above the age of 42 years, who presumably would have lived memories of the crisis of 2001, and those below the age of 25 (but at least 18), who presumably would have distant memories. (Given when we conducted the study, these participants were younger than 10 when the 2001 Crisis unfolded.). Students received course credits for participation. Other participants were not compensated.

Thirty-six of the participants defined themselves as ideologically Right-oriented, 19 were Left-oriented, and 34 were Centre-oriented. Eleven participants did not indicate their ideology. Following Muller et al. (2016), two coders reclassified participants who said that were Centre-Oriented and those that did not choose any option, using the politicians and political party with whom individuals reported they identified and the candidate whom they had voted for in the last elections. In this reclassification, there were only 6 disagreements, which we removed from our sample. Consequently, the final sample consisted of 94 participants: 62 were Right-oriented and 32 were Left-oriented.¹

We also asked for participants' educational attainment. Regarding ideology, there were no educational differences between those on the Right and those on the Left, $\chi^2 = 3.43$, $p = .48$. However, the level of education for those with lived

memories differed significantly from those with distant memories, $\chi^2 = 70.11$, $p < .001$. 52% of the participants with lived memories had at least undergraduate studies completed; 86% of the distant memory group were undergraduate students. The difference between those with lived and distant memories probably reflect the increase in educational attainment that has occurred in the last 50 years in Argentina. Overall, 33% of our sample had a degree greater than high school education, 46% were undergraduate students, 18% had high school education and 3% had elementary education.

Materials and Procedure.

We used a questionnaire that contained two sections. In the first section, participants were given several sheets of paper with the following instruction (in Spanish): "Please write everything you remember about the events around the 2001 crisis in Argentina". They were told to take their time and recall as much as possible. The second section was a demographics questionnaire, in which participants were asked for their age, sex, education, political ideology (Right, Centre, or Left-oriented, in a 1–7 scale), as well as the political party and the politician with whom they identified most and the political candidate they had voted in the previous presidential election. An assistant was present to answer any question participant might have. The order was always free recall and then demographics.

Coding.

As in Muller et al. (2016), we followed Hirst and Manier's (1996) coding scheme to analyze the Free Recalls. See Table 3 for details. The scheme first identifies Structural Units, which are those units that capture any single idea in a narrative and then further divides these units into Narrative and Non-narrative units. An example of a Narrative Unit might be "There was a lot of social tension". Non-narrative units are usually metamemory statements, such as "I was very young, so I can't remember much of the crisis". Following Hirst and Manier, we divided the Narrative Units into Narrative Tellings, Contextualising Statements, and Affective-Evaluative Remarks (for definitions and examples, again, see Table 3). We did not further divide the Affective-Evaluative Remarks into subcategories of Affective and Evaluative in that such classification can prove difficult, especially when examining written text. Is the statement "It was good" an evaluation or an expression of an emotional reaction? Similarly, is the statement "It was disturbing" simply a statement about an emotional reaction, or also an evaluation? In addition, following the scheme of Stone et al. (2014), we divided the Narrative Tellings into those that were Personal and those that were Non-personal; the Affective-Evaluative Remarks into those positively or negatively valenced. Following Manzi et al. (2004), we also divided Narrative Units into Facts, Causes, Consequences, and Other. Causes and Consequences could be viewed as subclasses of Contextualising Statements.

For every recall, we used two coders. After they arrived together at an agreement about which sentence or idea in

Table 3. Coding scheme for free recall.

Structural Unit	Definitions and Examples
NON-NARRATIVE UNITS	
Metamemory statements	"I am very poor at remembering things"
NARRATIVE UNITS	
Personal Narrative Tellings	States or events related to a central topic or theme of the narrative that involved a personal anecdote or relevant fact or state, dealing either directly with the person recalling the material or with someone personally known "My father was worried about his savings." "I lost my job when the crisis started."
Non-Personal Narrative Tellings	States or events related to a central topic or theme of the narrative that did not have the characteristic of being personal, as described above "The government declared the state of siege."
Contextualising Statements	Narrative tellings related to events or states outside the immediate spatio-temporal context of the narrative, adding "context" to the narrative tellings "This was the worst economic crisis of our country."
Consequences	Statements causally linking one event or state to another "The political scene changed definitely in Argentina after 2001 crisis."
Causes	Statements causally linking one event or state to another "The crisis was due to a big recession that had begun three years earlier."
Affective-Evaluative Remarks	Editorial judgments or expressions of emotional reactions to the narrative tellings "It was a chaotic situation."
Positive	"Immediately, the country started to solve the problems."
Negative	"It was a chaotic situation."

the recall represented a structural unit, they individually classified that structural unit into the categories described in Table 3. There was an 83% initial agreement between coders. Discrepancies were discussed and resolved. In the end, raters could agree on 95.7% of the codings. The remaining 4.3% were not further analyzed.

Results

Number of words and narrative units.

We first tabulated the number of words in the narrative participants provided in the free recall task (across all conditions, $M = 91.93$ words; $SD = 77.67$; see Table 4). In a Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) with two between-subject factors – Type of the Memory (lived vs. distant) and Ideology (Right vs. Left) – we found no main effects or interactions. We then turned to examine the proportion of narrative units. The narrative mainly contained narrative units, with non-narrative units, such as metamemories, making up only 4.5% of the total narrative. When we undertook an ANOVA with the proportion of narrative units as the dependent variable, we found a main effect for Type of Memory, $F(1, 93) = 11.92$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$. Participants with lived memories ($M = .98$, $SD = .03$) used a higher proportion of narrative units than those with distant memories ($M = .91$, $SD = .13$). Although we found no significant difference in the number of words, it appears that people who lived through the 2001 Crisis offered more detailed memories of the event than those who only heard about it indirectly. Here and elsewhere, because of the large number of comparisons, caution is needed in interpreting the results if p is greater than .01.

Personal narrative tellings.

Our coding scheme allowed us to classify the Narrative Units in the free recall into Personal and Non-personal Narrative Tellings, Contextualising Statements, and Affective–Evaluative Remarks (positive and negative; see Table 5). Although there is a trade-off between these different types of statements – if narrative tellings increase, for instance, the other types of statements will decrease – we analyze each of them separately. We kept the trade-off in mind as we interpreted the results.

We focused first on narrative tellings and asked what conditions affected the proportion of personal narrative tellings. Consequently, we undertook a mixed ANOVA with Type of Memory (lived vs. distant) and Ideology (Right vs. Left) as between-subjects factors. The dependent

variable was the proportion of personal narrative tellings. No significant differences were found. For Ideology, $F(1, 93) = .03$, $p = .869$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ (Left: $M = .21$; $SD = .28$; Right: $M = .18$; $SD = .28$). For Type of Memory, $F(1, 93) = 3.52$, $p = .064$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$ (Lived: $M = .13$, $SD = .22$; Distant: $M = .25$, $SD = .32$). This finding is consistent with our claim that communicative memories will reflect that characteristics of the source's memory.

Contextualising Statements.

When the proportion of contextualising statements was the dependent variable, main effects for Type of Memory and for Ideology were found, $F(1, 93) = 4.55$, $p = .036$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, and $F(1, 93) = 4.43$, $p = .038$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, respectively. Participants with lived memories used a higher proportion of contextualising statements ($M = .04$, $SD = .11$) than those with distant memories ($M = .01$, $SD = .05$). The 2001 Crisis may be transmitted from one generation to the next through personal interactions, but the younger generation was less likely to incorporate into their narrative of the crisis a larger context. They may remember the facts, but not necessarily the contextualising statements. We also found that participants from the Left produced a higher proportion of contextualising statements ($M = .05$, $SD = .12$) than those from the Right ($M = .02$, $SD = .06$).

Affective-Evaluative Remarks.

As to the proportion of affective-evaluative remarks, irrespective of the valence, we found a main effect for Type of Memory, $F(1, 93) = 5.54$, $p = .021$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Participants with lived memories ($M = .26$, $SD = .23$) produced a higher proportion of affective-evaluative remarks than those with distant memories ($M = .16$, $SD = .17$). Most of these remarks were negative (88%). Although distant memories tended to be more negative than lived memories, the difference was not significant (100% v 88%). Those who lived through the event tended to recount it in a more emotional manner.

We also divided Narrative Units into Facts, Causes, Consequences, and Other. Most were classified as facts (70%). In an ANOVA, we found no main effects or interactions for facts. 27.3% were classified as others. Causes and consequences made up, collectively, 2.7% of the narrative units. As a result, we need to be cautious in interpreting any statistical result concerning causes and consequences, though we would expect that they should parallel the findings for contextualising statements. And, indeed, we find, for the

Table 4. Mean of number of words, as a function of source, type of memory and ideology.

	Cultural Memory				Communicative Memory			
	Lived		Distant		Lived		Distant	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Number of Words	171.86 (176.51)	85.73 (49.28)	233.33 (140.70)	139.73 (106.51)	.89.85 (61.27)	112.34 (111.97)	82.55 (50.25)	83.20 (54.87)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 5. Mean proportion of different type of responses as a function of source, type of memory and ideology.

	Cultural Memory				Communicative Memory			
	Lived		Distant		Lived		Distant	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Narrative Units	.97 (.04)	.93 (.14)	.96 (.08)	.86 (.18)	.98 (.03)	.98 (.03)	.91 (.13)	.91 (.13)
Narrative Tellings	.43 (.25)	.55 (.30)	.61 (.25)	.68 (.33)	.61 (.27)	.69 (.22)	.73 (.19)	.72 (.22)
Personal	.19 (.26)	.16 (.26)	.00 (.02)	.05 (.13)	.06 (.10)	.09 (.17)	.17 (.22)	.15 (.21)
Non-Personal	.24 (.19)	.39 (.35)	.61 (.24)	.63 (.31)	.56 (.30)	.59 (.25)	.56 (.30)	.57 (.32)
Contextualising Statements	.46 (.23)	.18 (.23)	.30 (.27)	.13 (.22)	.09 (.15)	.03 (.07)	.03 (.08)	.01 (.03)
Causes	.33 (.26)	.16 (.21)	.15 (.16)	.03 (.07)	.03 (.09)	.01 (.04)	.02 (.06)	.02 (.04)
Consequences	.01 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.02 (.07)	.02 (.04)	.06 (.14)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)
Affective-Evaluative Remarks	.10 (.18)	.26 (.23)	.07 (.08)	.17 (.19)	.27 (.27)	.26 (.21)	.14 (.18)	.17 (.17)
Positive	.00 (.00)	.08 (.10)	.00 (.00)	.02 (.05)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Negative	.08 (.18)	.15 (.15)	.06 (.09)	.13 (.15)	.19 (.18)	.24 (.21)	.13 (.17)	.17 (.17)

Note: Figures do not add up to 1.00 for each Coding Scheme because some items were classified as Other. Standard deviations in parentheses.

proportion of consequences, main effects for Type of Memory and Ideology, $F(1, 93) = 6.09, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .06$, and $F(1, 93) = 6.71, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .06$, respectively. Participants with lived memories produced a higher proportion of consequences ($M = .01, SD = .08$) than those with distant memories ($M = .00, SD = .00$). Participants from the Left used a higher proportion of consequences ($M = .02, SD = .09$) than those from the Right ($M = .00, SD = .00$). Interestingly, we found an interaction between Type of Memory and Ideology for proportion of consequences, $F(1, 93) = 5.33, p = .023, \eta_p^2 = .05$ (Lived-Right: $M = .00, SD = .01$; Lived-Left: $M = .06, SD = .14$; Distant-Right: $M = .00, SD = .00$; Distant-Left: $M = .00, SD = .01$). Only those on the Left who lived through the 2001 Crisis produced a significant disproportionately larger number of consequence statements.

Taken as a whole, it would appear that those who lived through the 2001 Crisis told a more detailed, contextualised, affective-evaluative story than those who did not. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in the extent to which personal narratives figured in the free recalls of those with lived or distant memories. As noted, this finding is consistent with the communicative nature of the memories.

Comparing the 2001 crisis with the 1976 Junta

Our chief concern is with the interaction between the communicative/cultural and the lived/distant distinctions. Because of the similar methodology, with the appropriate caveats, we compare the results found here for the 2001 Crisis with those found by Muller et al. (2016) for the 1976 coup. The 60 participants in Muller et al. did not differ from those in the present study on the 2001 Crisis in terms of education or ideological extremism. However, the ages differed, in that we had a different cut-off point for lived and distant memories, given when the events occurred and when we conducted the studies. Specifically, in the 1976 sample, the distant group was composed by people younger than 30 at the moment of the study (mean age, 24 years old), and the lived group were older than 10 at the moment of the coup (mean age, 55 years old). We discuss this discrepancy in more detail in the General Discussion.

In order to compare across the two studies, we carried out univariate ANOVAs with three between-subject factors (Source: communicative, that is, the 2001 Crisis vs. cultural, that is the 1976 coup; Type: lived memories vs. distant memories; Ideology: Right vs. Left). Inasmuch as we are interested here in comparing memories for the 1976 Junta, which have characteristics of a cultural memory, and those of the 2001 Crisis, which have the characteristics of a communicative memory, we will first report results in which this comparison, or some interaction involving this factor, proved significant. That is, we will be interested in main effects of Source and interactions between Source and Type or Source and Ideology. Other significant effects and interactions are reported at the end of this section.

Number of words and narrative units

We found a main effect for Source when the dependent variable was number of words, $F(1, 153) = 14.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$. The free recalls for the Junta contained a greater number of words ($M = 157.66, SD = 135.14$) than the free recalls of the 2001 Crisis ($M = 93.98, SD = 79.28$). This result is not surprising, given the traumatic nature of the 1976 coup. More interesting are the two interactions we found: between Source and Type of memory, $F(1, 153) = 4.98, p = .027, \eta_p^2 = .03$, and Source and Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 8.89, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Focusing first on the interaction between Source and Type, we find do not find a significant difference in the number of words used by that those with lived through the Junta ($M = 128.80, SD = 134.65$) and those who lived through the 2001 Crisis ($M = 100.80, SD = 96.85$), $t(78) = 1.08, p = .284, g = .24$. On the other hand, those for whom the Junta was a distant memory used more words in their recall ($M = 186.53, SD = 131.53$) than did those for whom the 2001 Crisis was a distant event ($M = 83.06, SD = 51.07$), $t(78) = 4.97, p < .001, g = 1.14$. This difference for distant memories probably does not reflect the emotional quality of the Junta, in that we did not find a similar difference for those who lived through the Junta. Rather, we expect that the difference arises because those who did not live through the Junta could learn about it through cultural

artifacts, whereas they could learn about 2001 Crisis did so mainly through communication with their elders. Such communication can be limited.

As to the interaction between Source and Ideology, participants used more words when recalling the Junta if they identified with the Left ($M = 202.60$, $SD = 159.92$) than if they identified with the Right ($M = 112.63$, $SD = 86.04$), $t(58) = 2.71$, $p = .01$, $d = .69$. There was no significant difference for Ideology when one examined the recalls associated with the 2001 Crisis (Left: $M = 85.75$, $SD = 54.52$; Right: $M = 98.24$, $SD = 89.54$), $t(92) = .72$, $p = .47$, $g = .15$. This finding is probably best explained by the nature of the two events. The Junta was probably more politically charged than the 2001 Crisis. Thus, we find that those on the Left used more words when remembering the Junta ($M = 202.60$, $SD = 159.92$) than when remembering the 2001 Crisis ($M = 85.75$, $SD = 54.52$), $t(60) = 3.90$, $p < .001$, $g = .99$. There were no significant differences for those on the Right (Junta: $M = 112.73$, $SD = 86.04$; 2001 Crisis: $M = 98.24$, $SD = 89.54$), $t(90) = .737$, $p = .463$, $g = .16$.

Turning to the proportion of narrative units, the only relevant result was an interaction between Source and Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 4.02$, $p = .047$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, which follows the results found for number of words. Participants who recalled the Junta had a greater proportion of narrative units in their recall if they were on the Left ($M = .97$, $SD = .06$) than if they were on the Right ($M = .89$, $SD = .16$), $t(58) = 2.3$, $p = .03$, $d = .59$. There was no significant difference observed when examining the recalls of the 2001 Crisis (Left: $M = .94$, $SD = .10$; Right: $M = .95$, $SD = .10$), $t(92) = .219$, $p = .827$, $g = .04$.

Personal narrative tellings

Treating personal narrative tellings as the dependent variable, an ANOVA failed to find a main effect for Source. Participants' recall of the Junta did not significantly differ in the proportion of personal narrative tellings ($M = .19$, $SD = .35$) from participants' recall of the 2001 Crisis ($M = .18$, $SD = .27$). There was, however, an interaction between Source and Type, $F(1, 149) = 17.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$. Those with lived memories ($M = .34$; $SD = .44$) used a higher proportion of personal narrative tellings than those with distant memories ($M = .03$; $SD = .10$) when recalling the Junta, $t(57) = 3.66$, $p = .001$, $g = .95$. Regarding the 2001 Crisis, there were no significant differences between lived and distant memories, $t(95) = 1.96$, $p = .053$, $g = .39$. This finding once again reinforces the notion for that when the source of a memory is mainly communicative, it reflects the personal nature of the memories supplied by the source. When a memory of a historical event becomes more cultural, it begins to be dominated by "non-personal" narrative tellings and hence lived memories differ from distant memories.

Interestingly, looking at the interaction in another way, we find that those with lived memories used more personal narrative tellings when recalling the Junta ($M = .34$;

$SD = .44$) than when recalling the Economic Crisis ($M = .13$; $SD = .21$), $t(76) = 2.84$, $p = .006$, $g = .66$. This result may reflect the emotional intensity associated with the Junta. On the other hand, those with distant memories used more personal narrative tellings when recalling the 2001 Crisis ($M = .24$; $SD = .31$) than when recalling the Junta ($M = .04$; $SD = .10$), $t(76) = 3.35$, $p = .001$, $g = .78$. This result again may reflect the communicative nature of the 2001 Crisis and the fact that knowledge of the Junta can be acquired through cultural artifacts.

Contextualising statements

When we treated contextualising statements as the dependent variable in an ANOVA, we found a main effect for Source, $F(1, 153) = 68.97$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .32$. Those with a cultural memory ($M = .27$, $SD = .27$) used a higher proportion of contextualising statements than those with a communicative memory ($M = .03$, $SD = .08$). We also found an interaction between Source and Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 11.27$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. The interaction arises because those on the Left had a greater proportion of contextualising statements ($M = .38$, $SD = .26$) than those on the Right ($M = .15$, $SD = .22$), $t(58) = 3.56$, $p = .001$, $d = 1.00$. There was no significant difference with respect to ideology in the recalls concerning the 2001 Crisis (Left: $M = .05$, $SD = .12$; Right: $M = .02$, $SD = .06$), $t(92) = 1.87$, $p = .064$, $g = .40$.

Turning now to our division of narrative units into Facts, Causes, Consequences, and Other, we first examine the proportion of facts. An ANOVA revealed a main effect for Source, $F(1, 153) = 25.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$. Recollections of the 2001 Crisis ($M = .70$, $SD = .22$) contained a higher proportion of facts than those concerning the Junta ($M = .48$, $SD = .28$). This could be attributed to the main effect for Source observed for proportion of causes, $F(1, 153) = 53.35$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .26$. Participants supplied a greater proportion of causes when recalling the Junta ($M = .17$, $SD = .21$) than when recalling the 2001 Crisis ($M = .01$, $SD = .05$). There were two relevant interactions. There was an interaction between Source and Type, $F(1, 153) = 11.40$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. The recall of those who lived through the Junta contained a greater proportion of causes ($M = .25$, $SD = .25$) than the recall of those who did not ($M = .09$, $SD = .13$), $t(58) = 2.93$, $p = .005$, $d = .75$. No such significant difference was observed for the 2001 Crisis (Lived: $M = .02$, $SD = .06$; Distant: $M = .01$, $SD = .04$), $t(98) = 1.07$, $p = .285$, $d = .21$. Again, the failure to find a significant difference for the 2001 Crisis underscored its distinctive mode of transmission, but given the low scores, caution is recommended in interpreting the results. The interaction is also consistent with our claim that the lived, cultural memories should have the most contextualising statements.

There was also an interaction between Source and Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 9.85$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. The recollections of Junta of those on the Left ($M = .24$, $SD = .23$) had a greater proportion of causes than the recollections of

those on the Right ($M = .10$, $SD = .17$), $t(58) = 2.8$, $p = .007$, $d = .72$. No significant difference was observed in the recall of the 2001 Crisis (Left: $M = .02$, $SD = .07$; Right: $M = .01$, $SD = .04$), $t(92) = 1.07$, $p = .287$, $g = .23$. Again, the low scores for the 2001 Crisis counsels caution in interpretation. We did not analyze the data for consequences because, across all recalls, mentions of consequences were few (always less than .03).

Affective-evaluative remarks

As to affective-evaluative remarks, inasmuch as proportion of positive affective-evaluative remarks was low (on average, .01), we focused here on negative affective-evaluative remarks. In an ANOVA, we found a main effect for Source, $F(1, 159) = 6.44$, $p = .012$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Surprisingly, the recollections concerning the 2001 Crisis had a greater proportion of negative affective-evaluative remarks ($M = .19$, $SD = .19$) than the recall concerning the Junta ($M = .11$, $SD = .15$), $t(158) = 2.73$, $p = .007$, $g = .44$. Although this result was surprising, given the nature of the 1976 Junta, it may again reflect that memory for the 2001 Crisis among those who did not directly experience it is learned by listening to those who did experience it, whereas memory for the Junta is often mediated through cultural artifact, allowing for a more moderated emotional response.

Other results

The ANOVAs we undertook comparing our two events produced some significant results others than those that involve main effects of Source and interactions between Source and Type or Source and Ideology. We summarise them here, for our various univariate ANOVAs with three factors (Source: communicative, that is, the 2001 crisis vs. cultural, that is the 1976 coup; Type: lived memories vs. distant memories; Ideology: Right vs. Left). When the dependent variable was number of words, we also found a main effect for Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 5.30$, $p = .023$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Participants from the Left ($M = 142.29$, $SD = 130.90$) used more words than those from the Right ($M = 102.96$, $SD = 88.21$). When the dependent variable was the proportion of narrative units, main effects for Type of memory and Ideology were found. For Type of memory, $F(1, 153) = 9.27$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Those with lived memories recalled a higher proportion of narrative units ($M = .97$, $SD = .07$) than those with distant memories ($M = .91$, $SD = .14$). For Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 4.17$, $p = .043$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Those from the Left ($M = .95$, $SD = .09$) used a higher proportion of narrative units than those from the Right ($M = .93$, $SD = .13$).

As to our division between of narrative units into narrative tellings, contextualising statements, and affective-evaluative remarks, we found, for proportion of narrative tellings, a main effect for Type, $F(1, 153) = 7.38$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Those with distant memories ($M = .69$,

$SD = .24$) used a higher proportion of narrative tellings than those with lived memories ($M = .60$, $SD = .26$). Inasmuch as there is a trade-off among the proportion of narrative tellings, contextualising statements, and affective-evaluative remarks, the main effect for narrative tellings may reflect a disproportionate use of contextualising statements and affective-evaluative remarks in the recalls of the Junta. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, for proportion of contextualising statements, there were main effects for Type and Ideology. For Type of memory, $F(1, 153) = 6.60$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Those with lived memories ($M = .15$, $SD = .23$) used a higher proportion of contextualising statements than those with distant memories ($M = .09$, $SD = .19$). For Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 22.72$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$. Those from the Left ($M = .21$, $SD = .26$) used a higher proportion of contextualising statements than those from the Right ($M = .06$, $SD = .15$). As for proportion of affective-evaluative remarks, again, there were main effects for Type of memory and Ideology. For Type of memory, $F(1, 153) = 5.94$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Those with lived memories ($M = .23$, $SD = .22$) used a higher proportion of affective-evaluative remarks than those with distant memories ($M = .15$, $SD = .16$). For Ideology, $F(1, 153) = 4.13$, $p = .044$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Those from the Right ($M = .21$, $SD = .20$) used a higher proportion of affective-evaluative remarks than those from the Left ($M = .14$, $SD = .20$). We did not find significant main effects nor significant interaction for the proportion of personal narrative tellings that did not involve Source.

With respect to our division of narrative units into facts, causes, consequences, and Other, we first examine the proportion of facts, and an ANOVA revealed a main effect for Type, $F(1, 153) = 8.51$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Those with distant memories ($M = .66$, $SD = .24$) used a higher proportion of facts than those with lived memories ($M = .56$, $SD = .28$). When proportion of causes was the dependent variable, there was a main effect for Type of memory, $F(1, 153) = 14.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$. Those with lived memories ($M = .11$, $SD = .19$) recalled a higher proportion of causes than those with distant memories ($M = .04$, $SD = .10$). There was a main effect for Ideology as well, $F(1, 153) = 14.26$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. Those from the Left ($M = .13$, $SD = .20$) used a higher proportion of causes than those from the Right ($M = .04$, $SD = .10$).

Overall, then, these additional analyses suggest that lived memories had more contextualising states and causes associated with them than distant memories. Not surprisingly, this is consistent with what Muller et al. (2016) reported for the Junta and we report here for the 2001 Crisis.

Finally, we compared the proportion of contextualising statements and affective-evaluative remarks for both recalls of the Junta and of the 2001 Crisis. We carried out two paired samples t-test's. In the first case, for the recall of Junta, participants used a higher proportion of contextualising statements ($M = .27$, $SD = .27$) than of affective-evaluative remarks ($M = .15$, $SD = .19$), $t(59) = 2.55$, $p = .013$, $d = .50$. In the case of the recalls of the 2001 Crisis, participants used

a higher proportion of affective-evaluative remarks ($M = .21$, $SD = .20$) than contextualising statements ($M = .03$, $SD = .08$), $t(99) = 7.65$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.12$.

General discussion

Scholars have distinguished lived from distant and communicative from cultural memories of a historically relevant past. Although they have asserted that these memories are different in kind, there is only limited empirical literature contrasting them. Of course, it is difficult to offer a controlled, definitive comparison, in that, at least when it comes to the communicative and cultural distinction, one will inevitably have to examine different events if one is to undertake a cross-sectional study. That being said, the present study comes as close to a telling comparison as possible in that we are examining two events that created dramatic upheaval in the same country, Argentina. Even though some of our sample lived through both events and some did not, the degree to which the two events have been crystallised in cultural artifacts differ markedly, as we spelt out in the Introduction. To be sure, the traumas associated with the two events are at different levels. Moreover, one event is more recent than the other. Nevertheless, many of our observations cannot be straightforwardly attributed to these differences.

For instance, we posit that, inasmuch as there are few sources for learning about the 2001 Economic-Political-Social Crisis other than from conversations with one's elders, personal narrative tellings would be as prevalent in distant memories for the crisis as they are in lived memories. This is in contrast to lived and distant memories of the Junta, in that there are alternative sources for learning about the memories. The results conform with these expectations: There was no difference in the proportion of personal narrative tellings in the lived and distant memory of the communicative based memories of the 2001 Crisis, whereas distant memories of the Junta contained fewer personal narrative tellings than lived memories of the Junta. Neither the recency of the 2001 Crisis nor the trauma of the Junta can readily account for this pattern in the straightforward way that the communicative/cultural distinction can.

The presence of similar interactions did not clearly emerge when considering contextualised statements. Both Muller et al. (2016) and the present study found that lived memories contained more contextualising statements than their distant counterpart. Moreover, examination of the results across these two studies found that cultural memories contained more contextualising statements than communicative memory. Although caution is in order given that we are dealing with a limited set of events, the results suggest that there are two distinct sources for placing an event into a larger context: the act of living through the event and the act of engaging cultural artifacts, such as history books. Moreover, these two distinct sources may contextualise memories in different ways. As people live through an event, they presumably want to

understand its causes and the context in which it is occurring. That is, they want to make sense of the world they are experiencing. This should be true whether or not the memory will eventually become crystallised into cultural artifacts. Such a motive is probably less likely for more distant events. Only a history student would be interested in the context in which the Punic Wars took place. The same disinterest may hold even for more recent events like the 2001 Crisis, at least for people younger enough to have not experienced it directly. It is worth noting that we found some evidence to suggest that the combination of being lived and cultural provided the most contextualised memories, not in terms of our coding for contextualising statements, but in terms of our coding for causes. Moreover, although the difference is not significant, as inspection of Table 5 indicates, the proportion of contextualising statements was lowest for distant, communicative memories. Clearly, the way people contextualise their memories of history needs to be more thoroughly studied.

As to the memories' affective-evaluative character, we did not find a difference between lived and distant memories in terms of the proportion of affective-evaluative remarks, either for the Junta or the 2001 Crisis. We therefore did not expect a pattern similar to what we observed for personal narrative tellings. However, surprisingly, the 2001 Crisis evoked more affective-evaluative remarks than the Junta. This was true whether the memory was lived or distant. One could account for this result in terms of the temporal disparity between the two events: The 2001 Crisis occurred 17 years ago, whereas the Junta occurred 42 years ago. This may have played a role, but the Junta was a far more disruptive and traumatic experience for Argentina, suggest that it should have the higher proportion of affective-evaluative remarks. For us, the fact that the major source of information about the 2001 Crisis for the younger generation who did not live through it were the personal communications of those who did live through it provides a compelling alternative account. Rather than the source being the more abstracted narrative of the Junta found in many cultural artifacts, the source about the less traumatic 2001 Crisis – those who lived through it – may convey an emotional intensity that often goes with recountings of lived experiences.

Turning now to ideology, although not a central concern in this paper, we did find that ideology was a strong factor when dealing with the Junta, less so for the 2001 Crisis. For instance, those on the Left were more likely to offer contextualising statements concerning the Junta than those on the Right, but no such strong difference was found for the 2001 Crisis. This was true whether the memory was lived or distant. We suspect that the Junta energised the Left, and continues to energise the Left, in a way that the 2001 Crisis did not. The latter affected the entire political spectrum, whereas the former had a disproportionate negative effect on the Left. Thus, it is quite possible that the present findings may be particular to the events we studied. Moreover, in focusing on ideology, we have not considered other factors, such as

gender, income, social status, or ethnicity and race. These also may play a role. Studying all these factors are beyond the scope of a study like the present, which involves a relative small sample and detailed coding.

In sum, the present results underscore how transformation from communicative to cultural memories can change the character of a memory. When society fails to crystallise an historical event into a cultural memory, the resulting communicative memory may not differ across generations, especially in terms of the personal and affective character of the memory. It continues to capture the past in a way that reflects the perspective of those who lived through it. Once a memory becomes crystallised in cultural artifacts, it takes on a different character – less personal, less affective, and more contextualised. To be sure, these conclusions must be approached cautiously, in that we have only studied two events with slightly different characteristics. Clearly, a wider range of events needs to be researched. But the present research provides an empirical basis for embracing distinctions such as lived and distant, communicative and cultural. Not only do these distinctions speak to conceptual differences, but they also point to differences in the content of the memories people have of the historical past.

Note

1. We also asked participants for their political engagement in the present and if they had been affected by the 2001 crisis. These factors did not affect any of the results and hence we do not report them here.

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