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# The Multitude in the Mirror: Hobbes on Power, Rhetoric, and Materialism

Diego A. Fernández Psychaux

**Abstract** This article analyses the Hobbesian link between materialism and rhetoric through the metaphor of the multitude. The central claim is that it is not possible to understand Hobbes' intended political practice, which stems from his theory of language, if we do not take the relation Hobbes describes between materialism and the eloquence of words to its logical conclusion. Incorporating materialism into a rhetorical analysis, we realize the parasitical character of the Hobbesian notion of *person* related to the sovereign, as well as the fiction of the sovereign that constitutes the *entire cause* of order by itself.

An analysis of the rhetorical production of the relations between *multitude* and *people* must be based on a founding premise of Hobbesian thought: language exercises its power over and through *thinking bodies*. Thus, understanding the metaphor of *multitude* means identifying which *accident* and which *body* these terms are abstracted from. This article argues that we must pay greater attention to the material referents that such a metaphor depicts, thereby allowing us to better understand the political practices produced by the turn to metaphor whose powers are conjured up through its enactment. If we ignore this relation, we may still be able to reconstruct a description of the political objective of Hobbesian rhetoric, that is, to produce peace by means of uniting the different wills through the artificial person of the sovereign, but we will remain incapable of understanding what this unity of different wills actually is and how it is produced and reproduced. Without an understanding of the material referent in question, we will fail to understand the physicality of those bodies constituting the unity.

On the contrary, the conventional readings of Hobbes often assert that the contrast between the metaphors of the *multitude* and the *people* in *On Citizen*, or that of the *sovereign* in *Leviathan* allegorizes the unification of the different wills of the *multitude* in the *people* or the *sovereign*, while specifically excluding the existence of political agency beyond the limits of the uniting will of the sovereign.<sup>1</sup> The core of this reading goes as follows: the mimetic movement of the multitude transforms fear into panic terror — “*fear* without the apprehension of

why or what."<sup>2</sup> In this moment of *panic terror*, Hobbes tells us that the multitude "clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected."<sup>3</sup> In turn, this united action of the multitude does not provide it with the unity from which peace follows. On the contrary, the multitude moves, but the heterogeneity of its movements obstructs any possibility of group preservation. Hobbes says about the multitude: "if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection."<sup>4</sup> In Hobbes' view, uniform direction achieved by the judgement and appetites of one person, even if fictitious, will bring about the desired protection. The unity of the representative provides the necessary homogeneous direction to seek its own good. Hobbes claims that "in a Monarchy the subjects are the multitude, and (however it seems a paradox) the King is the *people*."<sup>5</sup> Put differently, the *multitude* becomes the *population* and the *sovereign* becomes the *only* political subject.

Nonetheless, when we analyse the implications of Hobbesian use of the term "multitude," it becomes evident that Hobbes does not simply aim to hide the precedent and constitutive character of its power. On the contrary, it makes manifest that the effectiveness of "sovereign power" does not arise from its autonomy from the matter upon which it acts, but rather from its interdependence with that materiality. In other words, once we accept the premises of Hobbes' materialism, it becomes evident that the homogeneous movement of the multitude resulting from the covenant cannot be explained by the sovereign faculty of controlling all the causal chains involved in producing that movement. Instead the causal chains arise from the material relations within which the multitude *acts* out the will of the *people*. Undoubtedly, as some scholars claim,<sup>6</sup> Hobbes seeks to create a distance between this multitude and the perception of its power. But, as this article will illustrate, the material base of sovereign political practice entails the active participation – not its exclusion – of the multitude.

How do we understand this distance between *power* and its *perception*? What does it tell us about the multitude and its relationship with the will of the people – the will of the person who reigns – in relation to the Hobbesian political argument? Martel distinguishes the attention due to political symbols as distinct, from an idolatrous reading that neglects the material relations they evoke and sustain.<sup>7</sup> So, once we have assumed a Hobbesian materialism, an interpretation is opened in which we can clearly distinguish the democratic construction of political power in Hobbes' theory. As Gramsci says of Machiavelli, the latter's revolutionary aspect consists in revealing the resources of power to those who "do not know."<sup>8</sup> Clearly, those who "do not know" about power, according to Hobbes, are the multitude who live overpowered by the privileged (whether monarchists or republicans, Catholics or

Presbyterians) who do not accept the principles of legal equality: "The common people's minds are like clean paper."<sup>9</sup>

In what follows, the article illustrates how the incorporation of Hobbesian materialism to the analysis of the metaphor of the multitude allows us to observe how the relation between the multitude and the people involves some kind of auto-censorship. Further, it enables us to realize how the inclusion of an *agent* into a context of heteronomy creates the conditions of possibility for action. This opens up the discussion about how it would be possible to *limit* the interpretation of metaphors. That is, it entails a question about the possibility of limiting or stopping politics based on fearful obedience. Finally, I will suggest that Hobbes works on a notion of *political order* which considers, without evading, that its possibility and intelligibility conditions are material, mutable, and dynamic relations.

### **Rhetoric from Intersubjectivity**

The move made here is to reinforce the importance of linking an analysis of Hobbesian rhetoric with the notion (also Hobbesian) of the universe as *consisting of* and *determined by* matter in motion.<sup>10</sup> To do so, one must pay attention to a couple of presuppositions that are recurrent in Hobbes' discursive practice to preserve the contributions they make, even today, to the comprehension of how figures in language work.

The first presupposition concerns the lack of linguistic referentiality. For Hobbes, even though we think and speak out of fancies,<sup>11</sup> we should not infer that such things are located in external objects: "the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another."<sup>12</sup> Hobbes points out that this general lack of referentiality justifies the necessity of an absolute authority that can stop the proliferation of meanings of words and, thus, to stop any potential conflict between various meanings and interpretations. However, this Hobbesian aim of "interrupting" the proliferation of meanings has a deep figurative character. Bearing this kind of interruption in mind is fundamental to understanding the implications on Hobbes' treatment of the confrontation between the multitude and the people, particularly in terms of the impossibility of closing the sphere of interpretation or making it completely autonomous from other social and political forces.

The second presupposition asserts that it is impossible to dissociate the rational and the corporeal.<sup>13</sup> For example, Hobbes links the "Virtues Commonly Called Intellectual" with the necessity for a "steady direction" towards a chosen end.<sup>14</sup> That "direction" remains, and it is boosted by a "desire" which regulates the train of thoughts of mental discourse.<sup>15</sup> In fact, Hobbesian materialism both precedes and opposes Cartesian rationalism.<sup>16</sup> Hobbes' critique of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* rejects the dualism that sustains Cartesian rational-

ism.<sup>17</sup> Hobbes deduces that “reason” is an abstract name given to an accident of the body—it is a name that “by a little change or wrestling” becomes the “thing itself.”<sup>18</sup> Lastly, the notion of “thinking body” developed by Hobbes in *De Corpore*, means that we cannot disregard what can be read as his basic links among imagination, passions, and reasoning.<sup>19</sup>

Once we have accepted both presuppositions—the lack of linguistic referentiality, and the impossibility of dissociating the rational from the corporeal—the link between materialism and rhetoric in Hobbes becomes far more evident. How does it proceed? If rhetorical figures exercise their power over and through “thinking bodies,” then the language also has the capacity of shaping thoughts and modes of conduct [*manners*]. Consequently, we reach a particular understanding of intersubjectivity in relation to agency and politics. We should remember that, according to Hobbes, “we have no imagination whereof we have not formerly had sense”;<sup>20</sup> and “the Imagination is the first internal beginning of all Voluntary Motion.”<sup>21</sup> To the extent that the beginning of voluntary actions depends on the sense of external objects, Hobbes concludes that man is not the autonomous beginning neither of his imagination nor of his will. Then, passions and thoughts are intersubjectively produced and reproduced.

Thus, any analysis of political practice rhetorically performed by Hobbes cannot hide his critique of the traditional concept of autonomy. Or, as Frost correctly suggests, we need to take it as “the unit of political analysis not the single individual but rather the unavoidable relationship of interdependence that constitute the conditions that make each individual’s actions possible.”<sup>22</sup>

What does this change of “unit of political analysis” from “single individual” to “relationship of interdependence” involve? To answer this, we must explain what Frost means when she emphasizes the interdependence of human actions. According to Hobbes, given the complexity of causal chains, a truly autonomous cause of movement cannot be conceived—with the sole exception of God, who, in any case, is too mysterious for us to understand. This is so because, in his critique of Aristotelian metaphysics, Hobbes reduces the four causes—material, efficient, formal, and final—to the material and the efficient cause.<sup>23</sup> He thus denies that an immaterial cause can serve as an origin for the movement of a body. But Hobbes does not conclude his argument there: neither the efficient nor the material cause act on their own—every effect demands the action of a “cause simply, or an entire cause [*causa integra*].”<sup>24</sup> That is,

The aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant.<sup>25</sup>

Applying this same concept in *On Liberty and Necessity*, Hobbes states that the last cause is not the sole action that produces the effect just as the last feather required to break the horse's back does not produce by itself the necessary weight to break it.<sup>26</sup>

Secondly, for Hobbes, the power also depends on the accidents of both the *patient* ("the body in which motion is so generated"<sup>27</sup>) and the *agent* ("the body by putting forwards another body generates motion in it"<sup>28</sup>). Equating cause and power as he does, Hobbes tells us that "no act can be produced but by sufficient power,"<sup>29</sup> that is, a "power plenary and entire power [*potentiæ plenæ*]."<sup>30</sup> Power or potency, then, does not constitute a faculty or propriety, but a "position" within a causal field.<sup>31</sup> Thus, obtaining a "future apparent Good"<sup>32</sup>—a fundamental motive force of the search of power after power<sup>33</sup>—is limited by the convergence of other. In this context, peace becomes a "value," since it implies a minimal quality within mutual relations that guarantees its effectiveness.

Although in *Leviathan* (1651) we do not literally find the notion of entire cause developed in *On liberty and necessity* (1645) and in *De corpore* (1655), in such work, the power of man—i.e., the "present means to obtain some future apparent good"<sup>34</sup>—cannot be understood as a preconstituted property or power of the agent, but rather as a result of a relation. We should remember that if honour is "whatsoever possession, action, or quality"<sup>35</sup> that signifies the power of them who have it, we must not forget that this "sign of power" needs the judgment of another person.<sup>36</sup>

Thirdly, the "necessity" of others to cause any movement does not imply the loss of power or agency. Rather, its condition of possibility arises from a radically different perspective. Although we tend to consider events as isolated incidents, each of them is produced within a causal field in which each body constitutes an agent and a patient simultaneously. So, if the deep Hobbesian perception means asserting that human beings are "the *Makers* of themselves and their worlds,"<sup>37</sup> he intentionally or unintentionally shows that the relation between the metaphors of the multitude and the people involve some sort of auto-censorship.<sup>38</sup> This auto-censorship cannot be read as the waiver of rights by the frightened subjects who passively fall under an external power that terrifies them, as the traditional reading suggests. On the contrary, this auto-censorship entails "the subjects of the sovereign are the moved-movers who actuate the sovereign's initiative."<sup>39</sup> In other words, the passivity of inert bodies cannot be deduced from Hobbes' premise that he who makes a covenant gives "away his right."<sup>40</sup>

The position that Hobbes provides to the heteronomous singular body opens two questions: Firstly, how does Hobbes conceive the participation of the subject in this reproduction of power—to what extent does auto-censorship move beyond merely converting the multitude

into a set of inert “subjects” of an external power that overwhelms them? Second, to what extent could the Hobbesian persons’ contribution to the reproduction of the relations of power a veiled way of legitimating those relations which, in fact, could not be called into question or altered by them?

### The Memory of a Political Body

The tension between heteronomy and action is evident. In Kahn and Strauss’ readings there is both a tension between, and a convergence of, views that Hobbes’ theory presupposes a sort of voluntarism from which the modern subject creates artifices without reference to a previous basis.<sup>41</sup> Whereas Kahn sees in this a contribution, Strauss finds in it the death of the classical notion of politics. Notwithstanding this difference, both agree that Hobbes tried to introduce some idealism within the materialist tradition.

In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, thinkers like Hobbes grappled with the question about the capacity of matter to found morals. This question, far from being the effect of an involuntary contradiction, expresses a typical concern of the century.<sup>42</sup> The connection between matter and morality points to the metalinguistic character of 17<sup>th</sup> century political science and, at the same time, recognizes the link between materialism and the conventions of language.<sup>43</sup> As Kahn says, “the matter of human nature was itself fundamentally discursive,”<sup>44</sup> while the understanding of passions depends on discursive mediations. Under the proper conditions, these mediations create new obligations *ex nihilo* for “embodied” subjects — “one[s] whose passions are a crucial part of the reasons for action, a crucial dimension for natural right.”<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, although Kahn claims to be an anti-foundationalist thinker herself, she also assumes a necessary break between “embodied” and “absolute freedom”. As Marchart affirms, the concept of absolute freedom demands absolute autonomy of language from the body upon which it acts.<sup>46</sup> For Kahn, Hobbes finds such autonomy in the absence of natural inclinations: “precisely because humans have no natural inclination to justice and virtue, these must be artificially created by means of human institutions and inventions”.<sup>47</sup>

Strauss’ reading is similar. He claims that Hobbes elaborates a synthesis between idealism and a Democritean-Epicurean materialism. To do that, Hobbes tries to find or invent a point of support that is immune to the scepticism created by the fact of the universe’s continuous act of becoming. This idealistic point of support should configure an “island” alien to the blind and meaningless causality of the passions. According to Strauss, the idea of “artifice” provides Hobbes with this “island” where man establishes a relation with his own creation, identical to that between God and nature.<sup>48</sup> The meaning Hobbes

gives to the analogy between “the human art that creates the State” and “the divine art that creates nature” lies here. Both artificers know the causes of their creations. The self-evidence of the principles of civil philosophy comes from the presupposition that “we make the commonwealth ourselves.”<sup>49</sup>

From this perspective, the movement can be identified with inappropriateness, and the knowledge of the causes may be identified with the capacity to control their production and effects. In Kahn’s and Strauss’s reading of Hobbes, any limitation of the absolute autonomy of the subjects—the impossibility of controlling what they have created, as well as the very context in which it takes place—leads to the failure of their creation. One way or another, both thinkers affirm the need for a creative principle isolated from the matter in which it works, that is to say, irrespective of the rules of matter movement. While Kahn finds this liberty in the absence of natural inclinations, Strauss alludes to man’s capacity to become, like God, a first cause (or entire cause, to be more accurate) of his artifices.

Kahn and Strauss claim that the effect Hobbes seeks to produce when creating or finding this free-from-causality island lies in establishing the *necessity* of the autonomous sovereign in order to render possible the autonomy of the person. If a person is an individual whose actions are considered *his/her own*,<sup>50</sup> and the sovereign institutes property,<sup>51</sup> such a *person* cannot exist before this institution. This would be the reason why Hobbes insists on the link between the lack of subjectivity of the multitude and its incapacity to be a homogeneous cause of its own actions.<sup>52</sup> Hence, the autonomy of the person is a product of the truly “autonomous” power of the sovereign. In other words, humanity is not free to cause the desired effects until the sovereign removes and adjusts for the impediments of human nature. Such dependence is what we could call the “parasitical” character of the Hobbesian notion of person related to the sovereign.

At first sight, this conclusion does not differ from the one presented in the previous section—that the person is not a pre-condition but a product of power. Once the concept of autonomy has been denied, it becomes necessary to rethink all power relations, even those of the covenant that rhetorically establishes the unity of the multitude in the people. This entails understanding that power is not a property of the person who establishes the conditions of possibility of order, but a condition of action within a heteronomous context. From this perspective, the fiction of the covenant becomes the rhetorical originator of a political body with a unified will that does not transcend its own body. Not paying attention to this deviation from the standard Hobbesian political argument means to neglect the difference between claiming that the Leviathan “has” a political body and claiming that the Leviathan “is” a political body. Such an elision misunderstands not



only the notion of *person* and the agency of the subject, but also, as it has been hitherto argued, the notion of *sovereignty*.

To ease this tension between heteronomy and the action, following the theoretical path opened up by Hobbes, we need to specify two elements: the retrospective position of the subject and the relation between language and sensation that forms the context for the subject in the first place. This will clarify the claim that the materiality of passions and thoughts implies an intersubjective constitution that does not impede the *singular* contribution of each person (each thinking body) to this process.

The notion of “memory” illustrates how Hobbes conceives the subject, its capacity for action and the power of language. For Hobbes, memory is a constitutive element of the body’s process of perception that compares present and past “fancies” – it is not a faculty of the mind separated from the body.<sup>53</sup> However, Sorell claims that if memory was just a capacity of the senses that compares images without the possibility of distinguishing anything but accidents (such as colour, texture or smell), then the Hobbesian system would be incapable of explaining the operations of reasoning.<sup>54</sup> Dungey adds that, given this mechanical definition of memory, the possibility of temporarily organizing the fancies of the senses is lost. Then, it would result in an eternal – and featureless – present.<sup>55</sup> According to Sorell and Dungey, if Hobbes limits the capacity of reasoning and restricts the time horizon until we make it almost disappear, it would be impossible to conceive how a body acts, let alone, how it thinks. Thus, Hobbes’ only solution would be to give up his notion of thinking body – flee from the causal torrent of matter. In other words, they assert that Hobbes agrees with the solution of Cartesian rationalism which gives priority to a “spiritual substance,” which performs the act of reasoning or thinking, over and above the passive body, and thus, establishes that the latter is governed by the former.

Another reading of the Hobbesian definition of memory is available. Against Cartesian presuppositions, Hobbes distinguishes between the “effects of motion” and the “experience” or “appearance” of these effects. He clarifies that the *motion* of a body that works upon the senses constitutes one thing, and the *appearance* of this very same motion as a *fancy* constitutes another, something very different.<sup>56</sup> He then specifies this distinction further when he points out that the effect of sense is “nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion.” The *appearance* of this motion “is that we either call Delight, or Trouble Of Mind.”<sup>57</sup> Frost avers that this distinction allows us to understand the Hobbesian concept of memory in a different way from that of Sorell and Dungey’s readings. Indeed, these authors fail to grasp this distinction since they do not acknowledge the external origin of motion and the internal origin of memories.<sup>58</sup> For

Sorell, while “we are affected with phantasms,”<sup>59</sup> according to Hobbes these phantasms are only our own impression of the external world. The object of memory is not the motion that works upon the senses, but rather memory is how the body reacts to this movement—it is the fancy or phantasm that it creates out of this sensation. For Hobbes, this is why sense cannot only be reduced to mere reaction but it must also incorporate the construction of phantasms and the comparison between them. Considering the equivalence between sensation and reaction, Hobbes writes, “This hath nothing to do with that sense which is the subject of my discourse.”<sup>60</sup>

The distinction between motion and the appearance of motion allows Hobbes to explain, in opposition to Cartesian rationalism, that memory and thought are the acts of a (thinking) body. Consequently, the subject neither transcends nor governs the operations of the body. Hobbes concludes in his comments on the Cartesian *Meditations*, the subject is placed in a retrospective position: “For although someone may think that he was thinking (for this thought is simply an act of remembering), it is quite impossible for him to think that he is thinking, or to know that he is knowing.”<sup>61</sup>

In summary, the first step to re-establishing the meaning given by Hobbes to the unification of wills of the multitude in the artificial person of the sovereign lies in the recognition of the retrospective position of the subject, which, consequently, implies a total lack of control over passions and thoughts. Hobbes says, “[...] by the innumerable acts of sense; it must needs follow, that one conception followeth not another, according to our election.”<sup>62</sup> In the same vein, he writes in *Leviathan*, “For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change [...]. and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them.”<sup>63</sup>

The second step consists in recognizing the centrality of language that not only *remembers*, but also *commands* and *molds* the sequence of thoughts when they are not linked transparently. Hobbes acknowledges that bodies have a will without the necessity of language, but he nonetheless argues that language is necessary to understand its conceptions. Man and animals are equally capable of deliberation and will.<sup>64</sup> However, only man understands its conceptions “by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other forms of Speech.”<sup>65</sup> By means of marks and notes, “the Consequences of our Thoughts” are registered and taken into account in order to avoid a new labour to compound the train of thought.<sup>66</sup> Even more, recapitulating and organizing interior thoughts implies a submission to language: “*ratio* now is but *oratio*, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the rest follow habitually, and are not followed by the

mind."<sup>67</sup> In this way, language reveals its own power and its conflictive nature independently of human agency. This is because, given the retrospective position of the subject, it would be impossible for a human actor to interrupt the chains of interpretations concerning metaphors, images, and signs. In other words, it would be impossible to interrupt the sensations that are themselves generative of action and thought and, therefore, the new possibility of meaning. Hobbes knows, and indeed he repeats it again and again, that dealing with the conflicts of language entails accepting the impossibility of setting the *correct* limits of sense and, even more to the point, the memory that bodies have of it. This attempt to control are evident in, for example, Hobbes' claim that the terror of the mortal god's power *conforms* the wills of the subjects.<sup>68</sup> However, this does not imply that the rhetorically constituted power of the sovereign has by itself the capacity to determine the sensory apparatus of the thinking body. Bodies are not a passive material that reacts mechanically and immediately when reached by a flash of lightning. On the contrary, the wide temporal horizon in which our self-perception takes place shows a more complex and permanently unfinished process of the constitution of the subject.

Kahn's and Strauss' reading can be criticised by claiming that the sovereign—an allegedly autonomous artificer of order—, the people or the multitude are metaphors whose effectiveness does not transcend the limitations of their own materiality. Again, this does not deprive these metaphorical terms of their efficacy. Rather, it allows us to observe their necessary location within a field of relations. Once we have accepted this interdependence, we can distinguish, for example, between the sovereign's absolute power and an eternal and omnipotent power, such as the divine power. In his analysis of power, Hobbes shows how his interpretation is constantly being altered by signs of "reputation of power."<sup>69</sup> Such reputations are generated through public rites in which signs of *honor* appear.<sup>70</sup> Following Frost, we ask what all those rituals, activities and gestures of reverence are if not the demonstration of the dependence of sovereign power on a daily restitution, not so much of the covenant, but rather of the relation which that covenant presupposes.<sup>71</sup> Put differently, the *necessity* of rites of *honor* shows that, according to Hobbes, we cannot conceive of the act of obeying without first constituting a body that obeys. Consequently, notwithstanding its rhetorical constitution, the political body is not exempt from such material movements and associations. Thus, if we cannot find the subject outside the body, we cannot conceive a political subject outside its body either, no matter whether it is natural or artificial.

### **Between Obedient Subjects and Interpreters**

The previous sections addressed: (1) how the auto-exclusion that operates the figure of the “multitude” works when it is opposed to that of the “people”; and, (2) how the materiality of power does not close, but rather opens the conditions of possibility for action. What follows is an interrogation of the widely shared claim according to which Hobbes uses metaphors to frighten his readers and thus maintain “reverence” for the absolute authority of the sovereign. When presenting the monstrous image of Leviathan,<sup>72</sup> of anarchy,<sup>73</sup> of the multitude,<sup>74</sup> of civil war,<sup>75</sup> or of demons,<sup>76</sup> Hobbes seeks to imitate the sun that obscures the light of the stars: its greater power does not eliminate the other sources of light, but veils them.<sup>77</sup> The rhetorical figures eclipse other passions and a very concrete passion becomes predominant: the terror that their presence brings about.<sup>78</sup> In other words, political subjects become primarily motivated by the fear of the bad consequences that will follow if they abandon the obedience to the sovereign.<sup>79</sup>

These interpretations suggest that the effect of the metaphors work, and deliberately so, through a form of deceit. Fantasies establish a game of mirrors which hide the fact that that the apparently “external object” of fear is actually placed in the brain of those who are frightened.<sup>80</sup> Following Hobbes’ critique of demonology, rhetoric hides the fact that readers are being frightened by their own reflection in the mirror.<sup>81</sup> Otherwise, as Tralau claims, a rational reconstruction of the origin of power would be feasible and, consequently, so would the possibility of losing the fear of the sovereign.<sup>82</sup> It is usually deduced that, from this deception, the spectators become a mere receptacle in which enough terror can be placed in order to create a mechanical reaction.

But if we recognize the human incapacity to constitute the “entire cause” of voluntary motion, we can thereby reconsider the importance of the material and historical context in which every rhetorical figure takes place. This recognition involves not only seeing how the metaphor’s power derives from material and historical conditions, but also how the very figures involved need a specific context in order to work.<sup>83</sup> To what extent does the material conception of power and language allow us, without further considerations, to agree with Hobbes’ analogy between the metaphors and the sun, which imposes authority with its mere presence? Or, instead, this material conception of power urges us to rethink the process, keeping in mind the necessary concurrence of the multitude of readers of these metaphors, which may well upend the expected effect.

When considering the implications of materialism on metaphors, we realize not only the parasitical character of the notion of person related to the sovereign, but also the fiction of the sovereign that by

itself constitutes the entire cause of order.<sup>84</sup> This in turn leads us to reflect on the acts of the “fearful obedience” as well as the political praxis that are created, reproduced, or hidden through such terrifying metaphors. Although metaphors are intended to press upon the senses, at the same time, they open a field of interpretation which is impossible to close. This is due to the fact that no agent has the capacity to determine the limits of a “correct” reading. Or, speaking more radically, no agent is able to determine the “correct” delight or trouble of mind that each metaphor must generate. Following Martel, Hobbesian rhetoric does not adorn the rationality of the text. It opens it to the point of changing and actually challenging the authority of the author via that of the reader.<sup>85</sup>

Tralau, for example, refutes Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes’ uses of metaphors. For Tralau, there is no hermetical box, no realm at all in which power cannot enter.<sup>86</sup> The political use of any kind of image (either physical or literary) by Hobbes demonstrates his intention to create a “subliminal government.” In my view, the images produced by the sovereign are addressed to active subjects, not to passive ones. It could be thought, then, that just as God naturally speaks only the language that men give to themselves,<sup>87</sup> the sovereign can only speak the language of the multitude. This verification of the limits of power (even divine power) does not lead inevitably to an immanent logic that forgets the State in order to think the political. This is not because the State has been sacralised as the place of order, but rather because Hobbesian materialism, adopting a radical mode that is both immanent and mechanical, allocates antagonistic conflicts in a diffuse manner. Hobbes stresses the necessity of a sovereign to unify the multitude. Nonetheless, as demonstrated above, we cannot conclude that the sovereign transcends the materiality of its own presence.

This is precisely Hobbes’ dilemma with language in *The Answer of Mr. Hobbes to Sr. Will. D’avenant’s Preface before Gondibert*.<sup>88</sup> Hobbes analyses the effects of metaphors by comparing the “ingenuity” of the poet with the power of Pegasus. When presenting fantasies to the reader, the poet gains the strength and the wings of the mythical horse capable of flying “from one Indies to the other, and from the heaven to earth” and can “penetrate [...] into the future, and into herself.”<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, as he does in *Leviathan*, Hobbes points out this capacity to create and to realize not only singular and new metaphors, but also strange or *far-fetched* ones. Thus, the power of a metaphor depends on its novelty, singularity, and improbability. The importance of this premise for poetic and philosophical creation lies in the fact that readers become insensible to metaphors that have been used too often.<sup>90</sup> Ultimately, Hobbes adds in *Leviathan*, “the constitution of man’s nature is of itself subject to desire novelty.”<sup>91</sup>

Both the poet and the political philosopher need ingenuity to create powerful images. According to Hobbes, metaphors are intrinsic to the language of their respective disciplines. Hobbes knows that the use of metaphors also brings about conflict arising from the meanings of words. Nonetheless, as Tralau rightly points out, the risk did not discourage him, as he himself uses an unlikely and inconstant enough metaphor that represents a machine, a man, a god, the State and the sovereign.<sup>92</sup> The risk does not arise from presenting the metaphor of Leviathan to a passive spectator but leaving it to the reader's interpretation. This is why Hobbes asks the sovereign to protect the "public teaching" of his work.<sup>93</sup> He is not wrong in seeking this. His concerns arose from the reception of his political works and the controversies in which he was involved in 1651. For example, Tyrell denounced his work, pointing out the dangerous mimetic effect of the state of nature, in which its inhabitants look like "heroes." According to Tyrell, Hobbes' natural man needs more strength and cunning than the hero of a book of chivalry so as to survive.<sup>94</sup> Thus, far from being a call to "obedience," it evokes and risks future rebels.<sup>95</sup>

Summing up, from the inherent character of the metaphors related to poetic and philosophical language and the worry about the effects of public interpretation, it follows that, according to Hobbes, the effectiveness of rhetorical figures depends on an intersubjective framework of passions and thoughts which *must* be governed by the sovereign. However, the sovereign does not control them completely.<sup>96</sup> Thus, Hobbes is far from identifying motion with the monstrous or the anti-natural. Neither physics nor geometry nor politics can be thought as being against motion, but rather being in spite of it. By "in spite of," I mean that, instead doing away with motion, we need to seek an element in it (that can be neither known nor controlled) with which it could be possible to intervene substantively in causal chains.

### Possible Conclusions

Analysing the metaphor of the *multitude* used by Thomas Hobbes in his political argumentation begins with questioning a deep-rooted premise among conventional interpretations of Hobbes' works, according to which invoking the *multitude* renders a political practice of exclusion. On the contrary, I have sustained that the tension between Hobbes' metaphor of the *multitude* and the metaphor of the *people* shows that agency in Hobbes' theory does not come from a faculty of persons (whether natural or artificial) but rather from an interconnection of heteronomous relations. So as to explain the complexity of such relations (in which the positions of efficient cause and material cause are changeable), we have used the term auto-censorship. From that claim raises two questions about the participation of the subject in the repro-

ductivity of power, and the implicit censorship of those who consent to be subjected by it.

The article showed how power entails a “potency” that integrates the accidents of the agent and of the patient, and, consequently, the material conditions within which each person’s acts are composed by the abilities and actions of others. In other words, following Hobbes, each action, as it depends on other’s passions, is limited by the convergence between them. The entire causality of an effect cannot be ascribed to a single agent; thus, the strength of the metaphor of the multitude and the metaphor of the people depend on the co-implication between agent and patient.

Concerning the second issue, can we conclude that Hobbes uses the implicit auto-censorship in the metaphor of the multitude in order to deny any right of the subjects once they have “consented” the institution of sovereign? If Hobbes insists on disavowing any kind of censorship to the sovereign, it would not matter what the metaphors of the multitude and the people do. So, we must ask if that order comes from the artifice of a sovereign who is autonomous in relation to his or her own body.

The abuse of the condition of vulnerability evident in the foregoing analysis resonates with Butler’s *The Psychic Life of Power*. Although in a different context, Butler claims that the situation of dependence such as the one I have described between the Hobbesian sovereign and the Hobbesian “persons,” turns out to be a hugely exploitable desire.<sup>97</sup> In this vein, those who analyse Hobbes’ rhetorical figures in conventional terms, illustrated above, insist on pointing out that the ability of the sovereign is related to the capacity for presenting its power as the condition of possibility for the existence of the singular persons. Or, according to the terms of the analysis, as the artificer that creates the order *ex nihilo* (i.e., a necessary order to exercise the “individual” autonomy hindered by the heterogeneous and heteronomous logic of the multitude). Here we have persons who are asked, thereby, to “authorize” the very power that constitutes them like persons. Once this has been done, they would lose their rights to disagree with the sovereign, or, more specifically, the right to question the obligations they have committed to.

Contrary to this reading, it is evident that Hobbes claims the incommensurability of the artifice (i.e., the infinite possibility for innovation by the being) but denies that this innovation come undetermined and out of nothingness. If we translate this epistemological scheme to an analysis of power, now understood as a relation and not as a specific faculty, it becomes clear the degree to which the Hobbesian sovereign (as an artifice and as a natural person) is constrained in its liberty, as any other singular agent. This is so because “in the well governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions,”<sup>98</sup> and

not in the imposition of penal punishment. Those who are punished, Hobbes says, “take it but for an act of hostility.”<sup>99</sup> In *De homine*, some years after the publication of *Leviathan*, Hobbes specifies that authority is one of the six sources of manners and disposition. The other five are the constitution of the body, experience, habit, goods of fortune, and opinion one hath of oneself.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the unswerving exercise of the rights of the sovereign does not directly “control” the movement of a “passive” multitude, but rather establishes the signs whereby the subjects actively discern the relation, the acts, and agencies that must mediate between them and the sovereign. In other words, no one loses their natural right while alive.

If Hobbes designs a game of mirrors, he is at the same time perfectly aware of the limits inherent in it. We could thereby conclude that he reaches for a notion of order that does not ignore the continuity of motion, which, in turn, does not entail pure homogenization, but instead the stabilization of the heterogeneous. In contemporary terms, we would say that Hobbes proposes the impossibility of thinking about society or the sovereign as a whole, assuming consequently the need of what Butler regards as contingent foundations.<sup>101</sup> It is worth remembering once more that, according to Hobbes, motion cannot be identified with an improper aspect of human nature, but with the desire of novelty proper to “the constitution of man’s nature.”<sup>102</sup> Therefore, according to Hobbes, motion does not entail chaos inexorably or necessarily. So, the concern about future becomes essential. Such typically Hobbesian concern must not *stop*, but rather change from a trivial motion—“to have passions indifferently for every thing”<sup>103</sup>—into a discreet one, involving the “discretion of times, places, and persons”.<sup>104</sup>

Hobbes does not censor the ulterior claims of those who “consent” to the power which constitutes them, but only of those who pretend an autonomy that releases them from the interdependence in which they are (also and always) inserted. His theory of the entire cause points out that the effectiveness of individuals constitutes a consequence, precisely, of this interdependence, not a rejection of it. Those who commit the idolatry of thinking the political as external to the relations of power become censored in Hobbes’ philosophy, not because they do not have the right to do it, but because their deviations are more proper of a kingdom of fairies than of the materialist politics he claims to have founded.

## Notes

1. See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, *Stasis: la guerra civile come paradigma politico: Homo sacer, II, 2* (Bollati Boringhieri, 2015), 51–64; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth: el proyecto de una revolución del común*



- (Madrid: AKAL, 2011), 57–58; Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 22; Ioannis D. Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes' State of Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9 and ss.; Victoria Kahn, *Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 135 and ss.; Christopher Pye, “The Sovereign, the Theater, and the Kingdome of Darknesse: Hobbes and the Spectacle of Power,” *Representations*, no. 8 (October 1984): 84–106, doi:10.2307/2928559; Mikko Jakonen, *Multitude in Motion: Re-Readings on the Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2013), 117–26; Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), 192 y ss.
2. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 6.37.
  3. *Ibid.*, 8.21.
  4. *Ibid.*, 17.4.
  5. Thomas Hobbes, “The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society,” in *Man and Citizen: De Homine and De Cive*, ed. Bernard Gert, trans. Thomas Hobbes (Hackett Publishing, 1972), 12.8.
  6. Horst Bredekamp, “Thomas Hobbes’ Visual Strategies,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’ Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 29–60; Samantha Frost, “Fear and the Illusion of Autonomy,” in *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, ed. Samantha Frost and Diana H. Coole (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 158–77; Pye, “The Sovereign, the Theater, and the Kingdome of Darknesse”; Johan Tralau, “Subliminal Government: Secret Lessons from Hobbes’ Theory of Images, Representations and Politics,” trans. Javier Vázquez Prieto, *Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy* 5, no. 9 (December 20, 2016): 61–88.
  7. James R. Martel, *Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat* (Columbia University Press, 2013); James R. Martel, “The Radical Promise of Thomas Hobbes: The Road Not Taken in Liberal Theory,” *Theory & Event* 4, no. 2 (2000), <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/32586>.
  8. Antonio Gramsci, “Quaderno 13: Noterelle Sulla Politica Del Machiavelli,” in *Il Moderno Principe: Il Partito e la Lotta per l’Egemonia* (Roma: Donzelli, 1991), 85–104.
  9. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.6.
  10. Jürgen Overhoff, *Hobbes’ Theory of the Will: Ideological Reasons and Historical Circumstances* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 22.
  11. “[...] We have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. *All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense*”. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 3. 2. Italics added.
  12. *Ibid.*, 1.4

13. Samantha Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 29–30; Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 137; Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 168 y ss. In an opposite sense see, for example, Étienne Balibar, *Nombres y lugares de la verdad* (Nueva Visión, 1995), 29.
14. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 8.1.
15. *Ibid.*, 3.4.
16. An excellent analysis of the relation between Hobbes and Descartes has been made by Richard Tuck, “Hobbes and Descartes,” in *Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes*, ed. G. A. J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 11–41. Stewart Duncan has pointed out that it was not Hobbes but Toland, another Hobbesian, who claimed the active character of matter. See “Materialism and the Activity of Matter in Seventeenth-Century European Philosophy,” *Philosophy Compass* 11, no. 11 (2016): 671–80, doi:10.1111/phc3.12358. It is the same argument used by Andrea Bardin to reintroduce Cartesian dualism in Hobbesian metaphysics. See “The Monstrosity of Matter in Motion: Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes’ Political Epistemology,” *Philosophy Today* 60, no. 1 (2016): 25–43, doi: 10.5840/philtoday2015121195. This idea about the passivity of the body can be found in different analysis of Hobbesian materialism: Bernard Gert, “Hobbes’ Psychology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 157–74; Tom Sorell, “Descartes, Hobbes and the Body of Natural Science,” *Monist* 4, no. 71 (1988): 515–25; Tom Sorell, *Hobbes* (London: Routledge, 1999), 82–95; Thomas Spragens, *The Politics of Motion* (London: Croom Helm, 1973), 7. The argument I propose directly contradicts this thesis. See the following subsection.
17. The impossibility of conceiving a soul separated from the body raises a theological debate. Hobbes, unlike Mersenne, Descartes or Gassendi, completely rejects dualism of body and soul. See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 38.1–3; 44.15–6, 23; 45.15; René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 122–23, Overhoff, *Hobbes’ Theory of the Will*, 40 y ss.
18. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 4.16.
19. Thomas Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth, vol. 1 (London: J. Bohn, 1839), 1.3.4; 1.2.14. Mintz points out how, since the seventeenth century, Hobbes has been accused of not explaining the process through which a body can think. See Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan; Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), 70. Nonetheless, Samantha Frost claims that it is not impossible to find it indirectly, if we pay attention to the way in which Hobbes presents the metonymic jumps of reason. See Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker*, 48–54.
20. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1.2.

21. *Ibid.*, 6.1.
22. Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker*, 17.
23. Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” 2.10.7.
24. *Ibid.*, 2.9.3.
25. *Ibid.*
26. “The last dictate of the judgment, concerning the good or bad, that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse’s back, when there were so man laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it” (Thomas Hobbes, “Of Liberty and Necessity: A Treatise, Wherein All Controversy Concerning Predestination, Election, Free-Will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, &c. Is Fully Decided and Cleared. In Answer to a Treatise Written by the Bishop of Londonderry on the Same Subject,” in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth, vol. 4 [London: J. Bohn, 1840], 247).
27. Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” 2.9.1.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, 2.10.2.
30. *Ibid.*, 2.10.3.
31. Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker*, 135–40.
32. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 10.1.
33. *Ibid.*, 11.1–2.
34. *Ibid.*, 10.1.
35. *Ibid.*, 10.37.
36. *Ibid.*, 10.16. See Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker*, 106–32.
37. Richard E Flathman, *Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics* (Newbury Park, California: SAGE, 1993), 1.
38. The expression “auto-censorship” is taken from Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 1–30.
39. Frost, “Fear and the Illusion of Autonomy,” 173.
40. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 14.6.
41. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts* and Strauss, *Natural Right and History*.
42. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 15.
43. “For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 15. 34). Italics added.
44. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 137.
45. *Ibid.*, 197. From this centrality of language concerning the creation of obligations, Kahn concludes that, in his analysis of contracts, Hobbes anticipates John Austin’s work about performative utterance and illocutionary acts.

46. Oliver Marchart, *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2007), 14.
47. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts*, 137.
48. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 169–74.
49. Thomas Hobbes, “Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematics,” in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth, vol. 7 (London: J. Bohn, 1845), 183–84; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 20.19; Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” 1.1.9. This argument by Strauss was retaken by Tom Sorell in order to show the autonomy of politics from the physical world (See *Hobbes*, 21–28). Both Sorell and Strauss neglect the rhetorical device implicit in the equivalence between human power and divine power. Otherwise, it is impossible to draw the inference they make between participating in a causal chain and controlling it.
50. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 16.1.
51. *Ibid.*, 13.13.
52. *Ibid.*, 16.13–14; 17.4–5; Hobbes, “The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society,” 12.8.
53. Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” 4.25.5.
54. Sorell, *Hobbes*, 84.
55. Dungey, “Thomas Hobbes’ Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics,” 202.
56. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1.4.
57. *Ibid.*, 6.9.
58. Likewise, see Bernard Gert, “Hobbes on Language, Metaphysics, and Epistemology,” *Hobbes Studies* 14, no. 1 (2001): 40–58.
59. Sorell, *Hobbes*, 85.
60. Hobbes, “Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body,” 4.25.5.
61. Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 2:122–23.
62. Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies, 2d ed (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), 1.5.1.
63. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 32.4.
64. *Ibid.*, 6.51.
65. *Ibid.*, 2.10; 5.22.
66. *Ibid.*, 4.3.
67. Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, 1.5.14; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 32.4.
68. “By terror thereof he is enable to *conform* the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17.13). Italics added.

69. Ibid., 10.5.
70. Ibid., 45.12.
71. Frost, *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker*, 168.
72. In addition to the already mentioned works by Bredekamp, Tralau and Pye, see Fabian Ludueña Romandini, "Soberanía y demonología en el pensamiento político de Thomas Hobbes," in *Distancias Políticas: Soberanía, Estado, Gobierno* (Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila, 2014), 113–30; Carlo Ginzburg, "Fear Reverence Terror. Reading Hobbes Today," 2008, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8711>.
73. See Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy*, 157–225.
74. See Jakonen, *Multitude in Motion*, 16–26.
75. See Eduardo Rinesi, *Política y tragedia: Hamlet entre Hobbes y Maquiavelo* (Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2003), 177–205.
76. See Tralau, "Subliminal Government."
77. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 2.3.
78. Ibid., 17.2, 17.13.
79. Ibid., 14.7.
80. Ibid., 45.2.
81. Ibid., 45.3.
82. Johan Tralau, "Leviathan, the Beast of Myth: Medusa, Dionysos, and the Riddle of Hobbes' Sovereign Monster," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes' Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75–76.
83. Ibid., passim.
84. Diego Fernández Peychaux, "Castigar y hostilizar. Corolarios del derecho al castigo en Leviatán de Thomas Hobbes.," *Anacronismo e Irrupción* 5, no. 9 (February 17, 2016): 54–78.
85. See Martel, *Subverting the Leviathan*.
86. See Tralau, "Subliminal Government," 82–83; and Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 53–64.
87. Thomas Hobbes, "On Man," in *Man and Citizen: De Homine and De Cive*, ed. Bernard Gert, trans. Charles T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert (Hackett Publishing, 1972), 10.2.
88. The importance of this brief treatise on poetry prefacing William D'avenant's heroic poem lies in two facts: it was published in the same year than *Leviathan* (1651) and it was written in parallel.
89. Thomas Hobbes, "The Answer of Mr. Hobbes to Sr. Will. D'avenant's Preface before Gondibert," in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth, vol. 4 (London: J. Bohn, 1840), 449.
90. "As the sense we have of bodies, consisteth in change of variety of impression, so also does the sense of language in the variety and changeable use of words. I mean, not in the affectation of words newly brought home from travel, but in new, and withal significant, translation to our purposes,

of those that be already received; and in far-fetched, but withal, apt, instructive, and comely similitudes" (Ibid., 455).

91. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 29.13.
92. Tralau, "Leviathan, the Beast of Myth," 67.
93. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 31.41.
94. James Tyrrell, *A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature according to the Principles and Method Laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (Now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin Treatise on That Subject: As Also His Confutations of Mr. Hobb's Principles Put into Another Method: With the Right Reverend Author's Approbation.* (London: Richard Baldwin, 1692), 323.
95. The paradox of the early reception of Hobbes' works lies in that it shows several coincidences between authors who belong to the opposite political spectrum in the seventeenth century England. Cf., John Bramhall, "The Catching of Leviathan, or the Great Whale," in *Leviathan: Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Thoemmes Press, 1995), 98.
96. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30.40.
97. Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 18–22.
98. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 18.9.
99. Ibid., 30.4.
100. Hobbes, "On Man," 13.1.
101. Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism,'" in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, ed. Joan Wallach Scott (Routledge, 1992), 3–21.
102. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 29.13.
103. Ibid., 8.16.
104. Ibid., 8.3.