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# The Good Prince or The Good Mother: Reassessing the Question of Gender in Rousseau's Political Theory

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If the fairy tale is never a simple escape from reality or withdrawal into oneself, it was even less so during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At that time, this genre experienced a significance that is often overlooked, and that was linked to literary experiments of the Classical Age and their moral and political challenges. During the Enlightenment in particular, the universe of fantasy was one of the laboratories for codifying, challenging and transforming norms – both natural and social – that characterised the spirit of the time. In this sense, it is possible to contextualise the fairy tale genre alongside the numerous other intended utopian incubators of the Enlightenment era, such as projects for civilising, educating or perfecting of the human race.<sup>1</sup>

Rousseau's tale 'Queen Whimsical' – which was written between 1754 and 1756 for Mlle Quinault's salon and published against the will of its author in 1758 – must be read in this context. First, it is important to note that Rousseau considered the genre of fiction as a path to knowledge that neither historiography or philosophy could reach.<sup>2</sup> In opposition to Bayle's and Voltaire's pyrrhonism, he wrote in Book II of *Emile*: 'The ancient historians are filled with views which one could use even if the facts which present them are false . . . Sensible men ought to regard history as a tissue of fables whose moral is very appropriate to the human heart.'<sup>3</sup> And for this reason, in history it is necessary to '[set] aside all the facts'.<sup>4</sup> Rousseau thus moved the axis of truth from the exterior plane of manners into the interior world of consciousness: 'If you see in men's actions only the exterior and purely physical movements, what do you learn from history? Absolutely nothing'.<sup>5</sup> In *Reveries* he specified: 'It would certainly be my desire to substitute at least a moral truth for the truth of the facts, that is to say, to portray effectively the affections natural to the human heart . . . to make of them, in a word, moral tales or allegories (*apologues*)'.<sup>6</sup>

I focus on this text among Rousseau's vast corpus of fictional productions that include, of course, *Emile*, because it offers an opportunity to better understand the nature of the apologues which represent, as he states, the actual purpose of his writing. Second, the very choice of the fairy tale genre matters: here Rousseau mostly addressed women, and starting in the seventeenth century 'not only were two thirds of the *contes*

*de fées* published by women, but the vogue itself, from all appearances, was inaugurated by the *conteuses*'.<sup>7</sup> Third, in this text he produced original ideas on the status of the sexes that prove to be coherent with the doctrine he later developed in the *Social Contract*. For these reasons 'Queen Whimsical' can be regarded as a significant source for gender historians.

This essay develops the hypothesis that Rousseau did not establish an exclusive separation between a masculine public sphere and a feminine domestic sphere. Rather, he made a coherent distinction – very obvious in this tale – between sex and gender, that is, between the sexed body and all the functions, terms and norms that can be attributed to it. I argue that such a distinction allowed him to exclude women from participating in the management of public affairs – by confining them to the private realm – while still maintaining a conception of such management as intrinsically feminine. 'Queen Whimsical', often read as a claim for gender equality and even civil rights for women, helps clarify the issue: the feminisation of public authority is a structural element of Rousseau's political theory – not just in this one fabulous exception – but this feminisation never challenges patriarchal hierarchies and instead reaffirms them in a different manner. Rather than simply distinguishing between a masculine public sphere and feminine domestic sphere, Rousseau redeployed gendered notions of masculinity and femininity to make the public sphere a domain only available to men, who must nevertheless comply with certain feminine standards. These standards, as I will argue, are those defining his concept of government.

The first section of this essay presents a short summary of the tale and introduces two of the main interpretations it has inspired: one of sexual indeterminacy, and another one emphasising women's role as guarantors of civic virtues. I suggest that both readings are accurate but insufficient, and that they must be reconsidered in a larger framework. The second section emphasises that this tale is inscribed in a long tradition of delegitimising the effeminate sovereign, a tradition that needs to be addressed in parallel with the ways women were kept from pursuing humanistic and scientific study. The third section explains how Rousseau neutralised this sort of woman-king by establishing a new relation between femininity and power: he imagined a model for a maternal governance that functioned both at the level of the state and of the home through its subordination to a patriarchal sovereignty that was also valid in both spheres. Sections four and five analyse the tale in order to show how this operation was accomplished: I suggest that the King Phoenix functions as the type of effeminate king in question and I show why Princess Reason, being a girl gifted with her father's soul, is the embodiment of the ideal prince. The alternative between the king's children Caprice and Reason thus returns to the alternative between two modalities of feminisation. The second modality allows for a popular sovereignty that grants women a certain apparent degree of responsibility, but that remains inseparable from their submission to men. Section six argues that this tale should also be placed in relation to the historical genesis of a new science of administration: beginning here, I argue that Prince Reason, who unexpectedly concludes the story, completes the project of maternalising the Prince while securing the political exclusion of women. In the concluding section, I explain why maternity occupies such a central place in the tale by showing how it is related to the pronatalist projects of the era.

This article contributes to a history of gender construction by considering how sexed categories are continually remade on a conflicted historical field, rather than

as static structures. The focus will not be on the ways men and women were perceived by power throughout history, but to what extent power can function through the assignment – and continuous re-negotiation – of gendered identities. It will thus be necessary to adopt a historico-conceptual methodology that takes into account the fact that, as Marion Gray has argued, ‘continuity of terms does not denote constancy of meaning’.<sup>8</sup> This approach allows us to think about the relation between power and gender in a dynamic manner, with power having a role in producing – and not just capturing – the body.

### Interpretations of Rousseau

It is necessary to start with an overview of the tale’s plot. Although Rousseau did not use a ‘frame narrative’, he established an ambiguous relation between the narrator and the interlocutor, and between the writer and the reader. The tale is narrated by Jalamir – whose name is ‘Oriental’, perhaps Persian – but with several interruptions from the Druid who listens to him. Jalamir tells us that Phoenix is a good and fair king, who loves his people and governs wisely; and that his spouse, Whimsical, is ‘[l]ively, giddy, changeable, mad by her head, good by temperament, wicked by capriciousness’.<sup>9</sup> The couple wished for a child for a long time and after several tries Whimsical becomes pregnant. While she hopes for a daughter who could grow up to be a perfect woman of the world, her husband prefers a son who would replace him on the throne. The fairy Discreet resolves the dispute between the two by announcing to Phoenix, and to the kingdom, that the child is a boy, but by secretly assuring the queen that she will give birth to a girl. The contradiction is resolved in the end when the queen gives birth to twins, one of each sex. But a new conflict soon arises when the fairy – whose magical powers can mould the children according to their parents’ desires – invites Phoenix and Whimsical to pick names and personalities for the newborns. ‘Phoenix wanted children who might someday become reasonable people; Whimsical preferred to have pretty children and, provided that they shone at six years, she troubled herself extremely little over their being fools at thirty’.<sup>10</sup> When Phoenix, furious, demands that the Fairy give the boy Whimsical’s temperament, the queen asks that her daughter receive Phoenix’s: ‘Behold then the future successor to the throne adorned with all the perfections of a pretty woman, and his sister the Princess destined one day to possess all the virtues of a decent man, and the qualities of a good King’.<sup>11</sup> To signal this crossing, the prince is named Caprice and the princess receives the name of Reason. At this point in the tale we are given two alternate endings. The Druid interrupts Jalamir and goes on to describe a catastrophic ending: the jurists of the kingdom would ensure that the princess – be she as wise as her father or not – may never access the throne on the grounds that she is a woman, and Caprice would thus become an incompetent and despotic king. But Jalamir reassures the Druid: since they were unable to tell the difference between the twins, Phoenix and Whimsical mistakenly confused them. The prince therefore resembles his father and the princess her mother. The natural order is safe and the kingdom is out of danger.

There are two main interpretations of this tale. On the one hand, ‘Queen Whimsical’ has been read as questioning beliefs about the difference between the sexes, opening to a consideration of androgyny, or at least ambiguity.<sup>12</sup> In her very interesting analysis, Rosanne Kennedy argues that: ‘Rousseau suggests that women are prevented

from entering political life by the irrational and absurd prejudices of men. "Queen Whimsical", a veritable parody of essentialist notions of gender, mocks the opinion that men should invariably rule women (or that men are wiser or more reasonable by nature).<sup>13</sup> In this sense, the tale could be seen as a critique and disruption of sexual norms, as emphasised by Kristeva: 'Rousseau's short story seems to enjoy exploring the possibilities of sexual confusion – confusion, that is, and not infantile asexuality. This philosophical tale covers sexual hybridisation, the double, and twins'.<sup>14</sup> Laure Challandes, in her book about Rousseau's meandering experiments with sexual distinction, affirmed that in 'Queen Whimsical', 'sexual confusion becomes . . . the main narrative principle', to the extent that 'the very possibility of a masculine incarnation of feminine characteristics, and vice versa, questions the thesis of sexual identity as based on nature'.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, many critics detect an emancipatory validation of the role of women in Rousseau's work, which would be compatible with some of the fundamental claims of feminism. Authors such as Palmer, Weiss, Morgenstern, Wingrove and Lange, have insisted on Rousseau's conception of the domestic world as a model for social change and of the role of women as moral vectors for the construction of the Republic.<sup>16</sup> Popiel, who shares this interpretation, has examined how Rousseau was received by his female audience between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, starting with the idea that women filled a crucial function in the formation of the good citizen: 'For that reason, in addition to inquiring into the meaning and location of women's particular roles, we must also understand the role of women in creating politically active and independent individuals'.<sup>17</sup> Other more radical interpretations include Julie MacCannell's and Lori Marso's, who both defended the thesis of a more or less explicit rejection of patriarchal relations, that would have led Rousseau to consider an alternate paradigm for sociability and community based on femininity.<sup>18</sup> Although 'Queen Whimsical' was not taken directly into account in these readings, there is no doubt that this text could be subsumed in this framework.

These two hermeneutic approaches must be placed in context. Rousseau certainly proposed a redefinition of gender norms; and he certainly promoted a sort of empowerment of women that had important effects amongst his contemporaries. But both of these perspectives remain partial. Far from denying their validity, I will show that these two hermeneutic approaches can be refined by paying attention to how Rousseau redefined gender norms, but reproduced gendered hierarchies. I do so first from a historical point of view, through a discussion of Rousseau's stance on the tradition of the effeminate monarch, and secondly from a theoretical point of view, by demonstrating how his redefinition of gender norms is inseparable from his theory of popular sovereignty.

Talking about 'Queen Whimsical', Sarah Kofman observed that: 'It is probably not just a coincidence that such writings remained unfinished, are considered "minor" and are usually ignored'.<sup>19</sup> This tale then might be dismissed as something exceptional in Rousseau's thought. While I find Kofman's phallogocentric interpretation convincing, I do not however think that we are faced here with a minor or alternative version of Rousseau. Instead, I see in this text the very same subjugation of the feminine that Kofman has noted in Rousseau's major works. My aim is to invite today's reader into a global and historically more precise comprehension of Rousseau's thought by explaining why his validation of women was part of a project of the reformation

and eventual subordination of femininity and how this subordination of femininity was integral to his political theory.

### Women in power

It is necessary to contextualise ‘Queen Whimsical’ within the development of a gendered critique of the monarchy in France between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This critique associated the power of the king with tyranny, capriciousness and deception, which were seen as feminine traits. This critique of the king was either direct, by mocking the debauched and effeminate temperament of the monarch, or indirect, by denouncing his association with women who sought to weaken and manipulate him.<sup>20</sup> Jeffrey Merrick offers a good account of this debate and explains that, beginning at the end of the sixteenth century, the king’s authority rested not only on theological arguments, but also on a paternal representation based on the homology between family and kingdom.<sup>21</sup> According to Merrick, this had produced an entire rhetorical apparatus around the virility of the sovereign, but had also exposed the monarchy to contestations that resulted in questioning it. The symbolic and military omnipotence of the monarch, as Peter Burke underscored in discussing Louis XIV, provoked a ‘reverse of the medal’ that made possible all sorts of ways to ridicule the sovereign. This was especially true concerning his virility, which was questioned through parodies associating it with his breakdowns on the battlefield.<sup>22</sup> From Agrippa d’Aubigné – who described Henri III as a ‘painted whore’ – to the Fronde revolt, and to the reprimands from Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Fénelon, censors of the feminine excesses of kings and their courtiers, anti-absolutism in the seventeenth century had often used gendered registers to delegitimise the monarchy. During the Enlightenment, the discourse on the effeminisation of the king did not go away, and was particularly manifest in criticisms of Louis XV, Louis XVI, and of course Marie-Antoinette. Despite Louis XVI’s attempt to distance himself from his father, he did in fact become the subject of gossip concerning his sexual impotence and the infidelity of his wife.<sup>23</sup> In her brilliant essay dedicated to the ‘Diamond necklace affair’ in which Marie-Antoinette was involved in 1785, Sarah Maza showed just how useful misogynist rhetoric could prove to the anti-monarchy cause. Through an analysis of the judicial records written around the case, the author reads the resulting demonisation of the queen in the light of the success of Rousseau’s theories on women:

With the execution of Marie-Antoinette in October of 1793, the Revolution brought to a horrible culmination the ideas set forth in Rousseau’s *Letter to d’Alembert*. From the 1760s to the 1790s, female power was seen by many as the embodiment quite literally of the worst of personal, hereditary, and despotic rule.<sup>24</sup>

In fact, this disqualification of women was later appropriated in republican discourses during the Revolution, from which nineteenth-century republicanism later drew inspiration.<sup>25</sup> When Rousseau wrote ‘Queen Whimsical’, he was inserting himself into this tradition. The criticism of Prince Caprice developed by the Druid directly evokes the critique of the effeminate monarch: Caprice’s masculine body is at the mercy of the feminine mind that inhabits it – his mother’s mind. The vocabulary linking femininity and power is in fact well known to specialists of Rousseau, and has been extensively documented. Linda Zerilli underscored the relation he

created between femininity and despotism, in which woman appears as an 'imperial mistress'.<sup>26</sup> The effeminisation of the prince is dangerous because of the tendency women have to subjugate men with their cunning and to blur the boundaries between the sexes. 'The sole end . . . of all women's whims', the Fairy tells Phoenix, 'is to disorient masculine pomposity a bit, and to accustom men to the obedience that suits them . . . in order to become wise, she is waiting for nothing but to have made you completely mad'.<sup>27</sup> Women are thus not capable of governing well and can only command capriciously, like a child who 'complains and screams in reaching out his hand . . .' when 'he is ordering the object to approach or you to bring it to him'.<sup>28</sup>

This can also be blamed on the same weakness of the mind that prevents women from being successful in the arts, sciences and theology.<sup>29</sup> A learned woman is ridiculous rather than just immodest: 'a brilliant wife is a plague to her husband, her children, her friends, her valets, everyone'.<sup>30</sup> Rousseau thus took a stance in the 'Querelle des femmes' by opposing the doctrines of equality between the sexes that were formulated beginning in the sixteenth century (from Marie de Gournay to Gabrielle Souchon, Poullain de la Barre, Louise Dupin or Mme Leprince de Beaumont).<sup>31</sup> Steinbrügge has shown that Rousseau used a series of juridico-moral and physico-medical arguments to justify the social marginalisation of women.<sup>32</sup> Dena Goodman detailed the way in which he carried on his battle against the salons by rejecting the forms of socialibility that he considered artificial and which were historically guided by a number of illustrious women.<sup>33</sup> According to Goodman, 'What Rousseau did, after all, was to displace the project of Enlightenment from the salons'.<sup>34</sup> Koselleck is right when he tells us that 'Bayle's Republic of Letters, extended to the State, is the total democracy which Rousseau conceived of half a century later'.<sup>35</sup> It is necessary, however, to specify that such an operation was only conceivable on condition that this republic of letters be virilised and women sent back to their sewing needles. Even though in the second half of the eighteenth century there was a growing interest in women's education, its limitations were always affirmed as well.<sup>36</sup> In this sense, Rousseau's influence was decisive. As Trouille emphasised, his ideal of domesticity was based on the right balance between ignorance and education: the housewife had to be an agreeable companion for her husband without stealing his prerogatives, be witty without being eloquent, cultivate her intellect without meddling in science.<sup>37</sup> In *Julie or the New Heloise*, Julie remarks on this in the case of Mme Guyon, who 'would have done better . . . to discharge her duties as a materfamilias attentively, raise her children in a Christian manner, govern her household wisely, than to go about writing devotional books, disputing the Bishops, and getting herself thrown into the Bastille'.<sup>38</sup> A woman of the salons and a woman of the Church are two extreme manifestations of a woman refusing her mission as wife and mother.

When we consider the authority gained by women in society under the Ancien Régime, and not only in the salons and at court, we understand how the *topos* of effeminisation of the king and kingdom could have been seen as a sign of the threat of the 'rule of women'.<sup>39</sup> As Emanuele Saccarelli described it, 'By the mid-eighteenth century, the apparent stability of traditional patriarchy concealed an alarming reality: a parallel shadow government of women'.<sup>40</sup> Of course, women had often internalised these aggressions, for instance when they refrained from identifying themselves as 'women authors' and even refused to publish their work – which was the case for



Louise Dupin, whose secretary Rousseau had been, and who never published her monumental *Ouvrage sur les femmes*.<sup>41</sup> Lilti actually showed that the contradiction between social relations and literary publication was almost insurmountable, and that the attempts to ‘promote a model for feminine social and literary action’ – such as Madeleine de Scudéry – had failed.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, many women settled for their role as the lady of the house. Yet, this did not stop many others from asserting their voice with pride: Françoise de Graffigny replied to Rousseau’s attacks, while Octavie Belot wrote a refutation of the *Second Discourse*.<sup>43</sup> Since the end of the seventeenth century – a ‘golden age of activity that is not only feminocentric but also feminist’ – the idea that women were the agents of a civilising process persisted for a long time and justified their role as arbiters of conversation and good taste.<sup>44</sup> DeJean studied the link between the debates on the position of women in the *Republic of Letters* (and in general in the public sphere) and the *Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns* concerning the rise of the literary market and the growing support from the readers. The controversy between Perrault, who characterised women’s judgment as a ‘model for the Modern vision of authority, taste, and genius’, and Boileau, who instead saw it as a source of corruption of traditions and families, is a good example of the context in which women had a crucial influence on the cultivated world – think about the origins of the novel, DeJean suggests – that the Enlightenment progressively erased.<sup>45</sup> Although its prominence in the salons and even philosophy did not disappear, the view of women as the masters of good taste, sociability and public opinion – which had asserted itself despite strong opposition – came to seem more and more dangerous to the point that it was eventually silenced by the Revolution.<sup>46</sup> In her *Souvenirs* from 1834, the portraitist Élisabeth Vigée Le Brun wrote: ‘Women ruled back then, the Revolution dethroned them’.<sup>47</sup>

Why did Rousseau stage the possibility for a woman – Princess Reason – to be as reasonable as a man, and capable of governing well? Joan Landes has argued that the republican critique of absolutism in France took the form of an ideology of chastity and of a new disciplining of femininity. Rousseau was the principal source of this tradition, with his exclusion of women from the public sphere and their confinement to the private sphere: in Rousseau, Landes states, ‘Woman’s virtue acquires a spatial dimension’.<sup>48</sup> Pateman notes that this was the necessary consequence of a political space composed of equal brothers. It is tempting to say that ‘Queen Whimsical’ contradicts this interpretation, but the issue is in fact much more complex: the tale, I argue, does not challenge Landes’ reading of Rousseau and instead confirms it. To understand how, it is necessary to consider a series of elements that Landes did not fully address.

Some have affirmed that Landes’ and Goodman’s analyses of Rousseau’s influence are historically questionable, since he had really only systematised an older corpus of ideas.<sup>49</sup> I argue on the contrary that Landes and Goodman are correct when they see Rousseau as one of the principal thinkers responsible for constructing a new form of patriarchy. While it is true that, as far as his sources were concerned, his discourse on women was not original, he nonetheless reorganised it within an unprecedented philosophical structure.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, before analysing ‘Queen Whimsical’ we must first explain what this structure entails. In the following section, I show why and how Rousseau committed himself to disrupting the old association between femininity and power and constructing a new one.

## Republic of fairies, or government of women?

In his *Letter to d'Alembert* Rousseau wrote: 'Whether a monarch governs men or women ought to be rather indifferent to him, provided that he be obeyed; but in a Republic, men are needed'.<sup>51</sup> Landes rightfully saw in this a manifesto for a transformation of the public sphere, yet, she did not fully explore its implications. Why does the difference between a monarchy and a republic require such a strict differentiation between the sexes?

It is necessary to start with the definition of Republic. In his *Social Contract* Rousseau called Republic 'any state ruled by laws, whatever the form of administration may be'.<sup>52</sup> But what is a law? 'When the whole people enacts statutes regarding the whole people, it considers only itself . . . Then the subject matter of the statute is general like the will that enacts. It is this act that I call a law'.<sup>53</sup> The Republic is thus a political apparatus whose rules are laid down by the governed subjects – the people – and not by those who govern. Now we understand that when Rousseau talked about the 'Monarchy' in the *Letter to d'Alembert*, he did not mean the monarchic government described in the *Social Contract* (that is, as just one possible 'form of administration' of the Republic) but a system that is not regulated by true laws. In other words, a system in which the law instead coincides with the will of the prince. Think about Bodin's notion of sovereignty in which 'the Sovereign Prince is master of the law'.<sup>54</sup>

In this sense, Rousseau's Republic deactivates any definition of government understood as a natural and personal relation between a superior and his inferior, because 'no man has any natural authority over his fellow human'.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, the power to govern does not rest on a specific right of the governor: government becomes a technical function of the state, 'charged with the execution of the law' and subjugated to the legislative power of the people.<sup>56</sup> Strictly speaking, the prince no longer has any true authority, he is just authorised by the people to arbitrate its own relationship with itself. There is no more responsibility in the act of governing. This is to say that the governed are not really governed, because any difference between the subject who commands and the one who obeys has been logically erased.

And yet, the contract never fully succeeds in neutralising this difference. The prince inevitably retains a will that tends to get substituted for that of the people: 'Just as the particular will continually acts against the general will, so the government makes a constant effort against sovereignty'.<sup>57</sup> The aporia inherent in governing lies in this impossibility to fully reduce the governor's personal responsibility to the general will of the governed: there is a gap, an irreconcilable difference – or more precisely, a *différance* – between will and enactment, law and power.<sup>58</sup> Rousseau noted this impasse in his chapter dedicated to democracy: the people cannot be both the sovereign and the magistrate because the government would then be nothing but the law itself. Democracy would thus be 'a government without a government'; it would never be able to implement the people's will.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, it is indispensable that a difference exist in practice between those who govern and those who are governed. But this difference is also dangerous as it leaves the door open for the possibility of domination, for one man to make decisions over others.

How can such a 'democratic contradiction' be resolved? How can one imagine a different kind of 'government without government' in which citizens are managed without being commanded? The answer must be sought elsewhere, in the field of



sexuality. Thinking of the sovereign law as a masculine prerogative, and its application as a feminine task, offered an alternative model for Rousseau to conceive the action of the prince as purely technical, and not political. The act of governing could then become feminised: passive, executive, not morally (or legally) liable. Once the government is defined in this way, the governor's inevitable resistance vis-à-vis the people can be domesticated in the form of feminine modesty. Indeed, as described in book V of *Emile*, woman's modesty is nothing but a feeble resistance in the sexual role play that, far from hindering the male's will, ultimately allows him to prevail over her, thus preserving his freedom and autonomous deliberation over himself.<sup>60</sup> The woman and the prince thus have the same function, to make people 'love the laws' put in place by the male-citizen.<sup>61</sup> They both uphold a self-love relationship.<sup>62</sup> But this requires a public modesty from both of them, the necessity to set aside their personal will. This is why the pedagogical and physiological claims that held women incapable of general ideas is so important to Rousseau's argument: their reason is limited – the same as with children – to only 'their immediate and palpable interest', women have no actual will but just disconnected appetites.<sup>63</sup> As Steinbrügge reminds us, women were supposedly capable only of aesthetic knowledge – of good taste – which made them into selfless subjects. And this is why women are so fit to govern: to govern well one must not have any interests of one's own and just pursue the interests of others. Indeed, women are only capable of focusing on particular tasks, whereas the ability to articulate general principles belongs to the sovereign, masculine will. Reformulating Steinbrügge's words, it is possible to say that for Rousseau, the actual 'moral sex' was not woman, but man. Only the male can become a 'moral person', gifted with a rational will and autonomy, whereas feminine morality, focused on honour, is always subordinated to the judgment of others. In this way, he depoliticises government by denying the moral responsibility of women, and the autonomous rationality of their own actions.

But in order to accomplish this, Rousseau had to make an argument that Landes did not consider. Indeed, it was not simply a matter of separating the public sphere from the private sphere; but also about undoing what Sarah Hanley called 'the Family-State compact', namely, the continuity between the domestic and the political, in order to recompose it in a different manner.<sup>64</sup> Pateman is right when she says that 'Rousseau's claim that he wants to overthrow Filmer's odious system is exaggeration': in fact, he was more interested in looking for a new mirror between the two spheres than in separating them completely.<sup>65</sup> Contrary to the patriarchalist tradition, for Rousseau the State and the household have to be simultaneously similar and dissimilar. On the one hand, he undermines the old analogy. The power of the republican prince cannot be like that of the father, given that paternal authority is natural and absolute: 'their rights could not come from the same source nor could the same rule of conduct be suited to both'.<sup>66</sup> But on the other hand, the parallelism is re-established through the feminisation of the government: '[a] woman's empire is an empire of gentleness, skill, and obligingness . . . She ought to reign in the home as a minister does in a state – by getting herself commanded to do what she wants to do'.<sup>67</sup> Women thus govern without commanding, without making any actual decisions.

Rousseau's plan is clear: in a non-republican state, in which the law rests on the ruler's decision, an effeminate prince such as Caprice is the worst evil; but in a Republic, on the contrary, the prince has to govern in a feminine way if the goal is

to avoid arbitrary power. In other words, in the Republic, the prince is no longer a good father but a good mother. Of course, in this context, the feminine arts could be revalorised, placed at the centre of the arts of governing. But this also requires a vigorous disciplining of women that is visible in their transformation into maternal subjects whose fundamental traits are docility and caring.<sup>68</sup> The patriarchal domination is not at all eliminated, but defined in new terms. According to older tradition, the king had the same rights over the people as a husband had over his wife (for instance in Barthélémy de Chasseneux). In Rousseau's 'well organised' society this relation is inverted: the people are not the ones obeying the ruler, but the ruler is the one obeying the people, like a wife with her husband. Pateman showed that the debate between the patriarchalists and the contractualists in the seventeenth century resulted exactly in this inversion.

In conclusion, it is indispensable to maintain a paradoxal tension between state and household.<sup>69</sup> It is necessary to governmentalise women by feminising the government. But in addition, the housewife must not have any actual power (for the father makes the laws in the home), and the prince must not be an actual woman (for he governs like a woman but has to be a man). Therefore, the prince is a mixed figure, both magistrate and citizen, feminine and masculine like Princess Reason. This explains why Rousseau's woman needed to possess a whole series of abilities and a specific form of wisdom, but this also requires her definitive expulsion from politics.<sup>70</sup>

### Private and public: A distorting mirror

It is now possible to analyse this tale more in depth, in order to explain how it addresses the questions raised in the two previous sections. First, I will show that 'Queen Whimsical' accurately depicts the necessity to get rid of the old-style effeminate king to replace him with a new 'maternalised' prince.

Let us first consider the character of Phoenix, who no longer comes across as a good king once we assess him in light of the problems previously mentioned. His first fault is to still identify himself as a paternal figure. Even if fate destined him to be a fair king, he still remains incapable of distinguishing between what is good for his kingdom and his family. His attitude towards the twins' education proves it: in deciding the destiny of the kingdom through that of his children, even though his concern is based on good intentions, he confuses two dimensions that must be kept separate, the domestic and the political, the particular and the general. Rousseau writes, 'the good Prince, who felt all the importance of such a choice, was careful not to abandon it to the caprices of a woman whose follies he adored without sharing them'.<sup>71</sup> It is thus necessary to dismantle and correct a system in which the people remains at the mercy of chance – of the wisdom or folly of kings – and this must be done by shifting the axis between the private and the public. This is in the end the true intent of the Fairy Discreet. She is the one who supports the separation between these two spheres by giving the king and the queen (in public and private) contradictory information concerning the sex of their baby, eventually validated by a second splitting (the birth of two babies). The Fairy's only goal with her ruse is to neutralise the dangerous liaisons between the state and the family. She is a true Legislator, working in secret to '[change], so to speak, human nature', firstly by creating a new relationship between bodies and minds.<sup>72</sup>

But Phoenix does have other flaws. First, he tends to concentrate power into his hands, which historically was the tendency of absolutism: 'he made the decision to do by himself everything he could'.<sup>73</sup> Secondly, he lacks what Botero called 'notitia', the knowledge of the kingdom and of his subjects: 'the people blessed him, but at Court he passed for a madman'.<sup>74</sup> He does not realise that the people is divided into two parts whose conflict could be fatal. He is a moderate king, but isolated, naive and blind, who in the end is not too different from Prince Caprice: 'He will turn the Kingdom topsy-turvy while wanting to reform it. In order to make his subjects happy he will put them into despair'.<sup>75</sup> Thirdly, Phoenix is certainly an effeminate king since he submits to the queen's whims.

He is thus a mad king indeed. Because it is crazy to believe that a king would be able to pursue the people's happiness as if it were his own happiness, and to govern the kingdom as if it were his own family.<sup>76</sup> He claims to represent the will of his subjects, but 'the will cannot be represented. Either it is the same or it is different – there is no middle ground'.<sup>77</sup> It is impossible to want something in someone else's place. We can only, perhaps, act in their place, as is done by an honest wife authorised by her husband to manage his assets. Phoenix risks governing through a simple seduction, like the 'imperious women' that the monarchs of the Ancien Régime resemble. If he is not a tyrant today, he may be one tomorrow.

### **The Good Prince, or 'the wisest of women'**

Princess Reason represents a desirable alternative not only to her brother but also to her father, precisely because she embodies the conditions required by Rousseau's political theory. Several elements indicate that 'Queen Whimsical' is a political text, starting with the way the Druid presents his catastrophic version of the ending:

Scholars . . . will prove that it is better for the people to obey blindly the rabid men that fate can give them as masters, than to choose reasonable leaders for themselves, that although one prohibits to a madman the government of his own possessions, it is good to leave him the supreme disposition of our possessions and of our lives, that the most insane of men is still preferable to the wisest of women.<sup>78</sup>

To which Jalimir answers: 'If I let you do it, you would soon change a Fairy tale into a treatise of politics, and someday one would find in Prince's studies Bluebeard or Donkeyskin instead of Machiavelli'.<sup>79</sup> Three important elements must be noted. The first one has to do with the debate concerning the legal fraud of the Salic law – disputed by jurists in the sixteenth century – that linked the royal succession exclusively through the male line back to the Salian Franks. The Salic law faced violent resistance, at least until the seventeenth century, especially during the League's opposition to Henry IV, but it is still evoked during the Enlightenment in the critiques of hereditary power.<sup>80</sup> In 1755, Rousseau wrote: 'Is the magistracy hereditary? Often a child is in command of men'.<sup>81</sup> While contesting male succession, 'Queen Whimsical' falls within the tradition of delegitimation of a quasi-private form of government.

The second element is the reference to Machiavelli. It certainly refers to the mercantilist doctrines according to which it was necessary to replace the Machiavellian prince with a paternal model, aiming at the happiness of the subjects.<sup>82</sup> Think for instance of Botero, Bodin or Montchrétien. Rousseau's stance on this issue is known:

his refusal of the analogy between state and family attests to a profound distance from mercantilism and the disaster of the Regency era. This is why he took up Locke's criticism of Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*. But the mention of Machiavelli, I argue, also has another signification. Using the *Second Discourse*, Saccarelli suggests that Rousseau's denunciation of women was based on a Machiavellian move: like Machiavelli, 'While pretending to teach lessons to kings, he taught great ones to peoples', similarly 'Rousseau also saw women as tyrants, and all too often he appears to flatter them. But this was a form of deceit'.<sup>83</sup> Perhaps this can explain Jalamir's ironic comment about the replacement of political treatises with fairy tales: having become a mostly feminine genre, women's tyranny would also manifest itself in the rise of their frivolous writing.<sup>84</sup> The fact that Rousseau wrote a fairy tale for Mlle Quinault's salon could be an example of such Machiavellian and sarcastic flattery.

The refutation of the paternal model takes us to the third element: the necessity to distinguish the owner from the simple administrator. Rousseau's prince falls under the latter category as his power has nothing in common with property right. The case of madness evoked by the Druid offers us the paradigm of this distinction. Indeed, the governor is forbidden to use the state as he wishes, and must act under supervision of another as if he were affected by a form of unreason: 'Even his own reason should be suspect to him, and he should follow no other rule than the public reason, which is the law'.<sup>85</sup> The Republic is a sort of perpetual regency, in which the regent is the people. So, it seems that the ideal prince should have the masculine soul of Phoenix, allowing him to govern well, but the female body of Whimsical, which puts an end to hereditary succession. In other words, it is necessary to remove royalty from the body of the patriarchal sovereign by disconnecting what Kantorowicz refers to as 'the King's two bodies'.<sup>86</sup> The new prince only keeps his mortal body, while the mystical body of sovereignty is claimed by the people. In a way, the fairy's spell allows to imagine such a miracle. But of course, this means that there is a reciprocal relation between masculinity and ownership, and a relegation of the feminine to minority status.

But, Princess Reason does meet these conditions. As a woman, she has no claim to the throne. But nothing prevents her from being freely chosen by the people in the same way a man chooses his wife.<sup>87</sup> Rousseau thus originally applied his project of 'sensitive morality', that represented the true philosophical challenge for him.<sup>88</sup> By placing the masculine 'moral order' in the framework of a feminine 'animal economy', the princess enables a radical reform of government: its partial masculinisation points out the taming of the 'imperious woman', which grants her the ability to carry out a management role traditionally reserved to men, but denies her any legislative power, which remains masculine. This is why it was important to educate women, but not too much. Contrary to Prince Caprice, the power of the princess would therefore be submitted to the will of the governed: after all, women are used 'to tame all their caprices in order to submit them to the wills of others . . . [A] decent woman's life is a perpetual combat against herself'.<sup>89</sup> She will apply the principles of political association – the laws – without being herself a political agent – she will not be able to make laws. She will govern without ruling. In 1794, Joseph de Maistre, who was engaged in a polemic with Rousseau, suggested that 'The people is a sovereign who cannot practise sovereignty': but if this is true, if the people can only act through another (the representative), it is also necessary that this other not be allowed to exercise, in

his own right, any actual power.<sup>90</sup> It is in this sense that the best prince is, as the Druid says, ‘the wisest of women’.

### Matriarchal power and economic administration

Rousseau thus wanted to disassemble and recombine Phoenix and Whimsical, the king and the queen. At this point, I want to argue that the administrative model the Druid has in mind – that rests on the judicial minority of the prince in relation to the people – is only possible if the nature of the concept of ‘economy’ is profoundly redefined.

In transforming women into the perfect economic subject, devoted to the management of the life of the *oikos* (household), Rousseau also simultaneously converted traditional economic knowledge into the general science of administration. Marion Gray has shown that German Cameralist doctrines, starting at the beginning of the eighteenth century, articulated a more and more precise distinction between the domestic economy and sciences of the state (police, economy, administration). This separation had two fundamental consequences. On the one hand, the *Hausväterliteratur*, concerning the management of the aristocratic household (*Haushaltung*), was downgraded compared to the political economy.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, a gender division appeared that – beyond the many privileges previously bestowed to males – had no precedent in the old notions of the domestic, leading to the legal superiority of the father-proprietor and to the exclusively reproductive role of women.<sup>92</sup> But in addition, Rousseau bound the Cameralist division between private and public to his own doctrine of the Republic. This allowed him to propose a feminine type of administrative power in both spheres, while the Cameralists had still maintained the affinity between the power of the father and that of the king.

Judith Still is correct when she sees a ‘feminine economy’ removed from the masculine market order in Rousseau’s *New Héloïse*, but it is not possible to understand its role if we do not acknowledge these larger transformations in the arena of economy.<sup>93</sup> The Clarens community is rather an example of what Nancy Armstrong called ‘a countryhouse that is not a countryhouse’. Through her reading of conduct books, Nancy Armstrong noted that during the eighteenth century, literature about household management, traditionally addressed to gentlemen, was addressed more and more to women, and offered a model of domesticity that imitated the old manor house even while destroying it: ‘the new domestic ideal succeeded where Defoe’s island kingdom had failed. It established a private economy apart from the forms of rivalry and dependency that organised the world of men’.<sup>94</sup> The administration of Clarens by Julie shapes this insular economy (an economy that is the result of the juridico-spatial isolation of women), and her administrative action presents itself as a paradigm of government in general. The mirror between political economy and domestic economy is not actually rejected by Rousseau, but simply maternalised, in contrast to the old conception of the father-King. Julie and Princess Reason are thus more similar than it may seem at first.<sup>95</sup>

This allows us to go back to the two interpretations mentioned earlier: is Rousseau a philosopher of androgyny or indifferentiation and/or is he a supporter of women’s empowerment? As I have proved, if there is sexual confusion, it is only in relation to traditionally attributed roles in the field of domestic economy, that Rousseau aimed

to reform. At the same time, if there is matriarchal power, it is fully inscribed in the mechanism of a new patriarchy. 'Queen Whimsical' speaks directly to this reform. Princess Reason incarnates the good government, as we have seen, because the prince is no longer comparable to the *Hausvater*. His 'political economy' is no longer that of Montchrétien or Justi, whose doctrines entailed a paternal model of administration. But on the domestic side, the *Hausvater* has also lost his former functions, for he should no longer concern himself with the household administration:

The woman ought to command alone in the household; it is even indecent for the man to inquire about what is being done there. But the woman, in her turn, ought to limit herself to domestic government, not to get involved in the outside, keep herself closed up at home; and as mistress of everything that surrounds her always keep the person under the absolute law of the husband.<sup>96</sup>

Rousseau has set up a new mirror between the state and the household. The public sphere is composed only of men, to be sure, but they have to be understood as the fathers of their particular families when they are acting as simple citizens (as sovereign rulers, exempt from administration in both their home and the state). When they are acting as magistrates (that is, in pure administrative functions) they are the mothers of the 'general family'.

Now we understand that the ending offered by Jalimir gives us the best possible solution. This ending seems to establish a continuity between Phoenix's reign and that of his son: 'the people – twice happy – believed they had not changed master'.<sup>97</sup> In reality, something has changed, since, as Challandes noted, the new prince has something feminine about him: his name, Reason (*Raison* is a feminine noun in French). The Fairy's ruse is thus fulfilled: 'the fairy took advantage of this error to endow the two children in the manner that suited them best. Caprice was then the Princess's name, Reason that of her brother the Prince'.<sup>98</sup> This ensures that the prince has a feminine attitude indispensable to public administration, all the while remaining a man. The symbolic maternalisation of political power proves to be compatible with the depoliticisation of the actual mother.

### The role of maternity

According to Michel Foucault, in eighteenth-century France police sciences were liberated from the too narrow framework of the state-family analogy. He maintains that Rousseau was the one to clarify the urgent question of 'how the wise government of the family would be able, *mutatis mutandis* . . . , to be introduced into the general management of the state'.<sup>99</sup> The new terrain of what Foucault calls 'governmentality', especially as elaborated by the Physiocrats, was population. And yet, as we have seen, Rousseau's interrogation is more subtle. If it is about applying economy to politics in a new way, it is also about making it compatible with the apparatus of political authorisation that I have emphasised. The genesis of governmentality in Rousseau went hand in hand with the republican transformation of the state that Landes illustrated. The result of this combination was the codification of maternal power: a power that can be understood as both the passive implementation of the sovereign law and as caring for the health and reproduction of the population.<sup>100</sup> Rousseau's prince-mother allows for the people as a juridical subject to be integrated with the population as a natural subject.



This project of maternisation of power explains the centrality of the theme of maternity in Rousseau's oeuvre. It is not mere coincidence that we find a very detailed engagement with the maternal experience in 'Queen Whimsical'. Pregnancy, delivery, breastfeeding, the education of children, these are all matters that we find again in *Emile*. There is a certain concordance between the two works: we are not here faced with a feminist Rousseau, opposed to his later misogynistic self of 1762.<sup>101</sup> By way of conclusion, then, I would like to show how he articulated his interest in maternity in the tale.

Whimsical is well aware of the importance of her being a mother. She promotes a type of maternal behaviour that is thought to be disdainful to a 'woman of the world'. For example, on breastfeeding:

she was nursing her children. An odious example, the consequences of which all the women represented to her in a very lively fashion. But Whimsical, who feared the ravages of spilt milk, maintained that there was no time more lost for the pleasure of life than that which comes after death.<sup>102</sup>

The tale is preoccupied with the relationship between sterility and pregnancy.<sup>103</sup> The queen's maternity is at the centre of a collective discourse in which several forms of knowledge and technology intertwine. Medicine, religion, law, public opinion, magic, all of these intervene in the space of jurisdiction that Whimsical's womb has become:

[T]here was not a courtier whom she did not giddily ask for some secret for having one ... The Doctors were not at all forgotten ... The Derviches had their turn; it was necessary to have recourse to novenas, to vows, above all to offerings; and woe to the priests in charge of the temples where Her Majesty went on pilgrimage.<sup>104</sup>

When Whimsical becomes pregnant, she discovers the power of the machine that she has activated. The sex of her child, in particular, is the source of controversies that seem to call into question the life of the entire kingdom:

Each took an interest in the child that was to be born as if it were his own ... The Queen strongly disapproved of them taking it into their heads to prescribe to whom she was to give birth to, ... adding that it appeared rather singular to her that anyone might dare to dispute with her the right of disposing of a possession that incontestably belonged only to her alone.<sup>105</sup>

It is of course an ironic comment: we know that childbirth and education were public questions for Rousseau. In *Emile*, he explained that a woman's body must be available for public judgment. It was a matter of transparency and trust that was especially pertinent for pregnancy: 'By the very law of nature women are at the mercy of men's judgments, as much for their own sake as for that of their children ... [W]hat is thought of her is no less important to her than what she actually is'.<sup>106</sup> Whimsical decides not to care: 'by the express order of His Majesty, the Presidents of the Senate and the Academies began to compose, study, scratch out, and leaf through their Vaumoriere and their Demosthenes in order to learn how to speak to an embryo'.<sup>107</sup> But this mockery only sets up the stage for the disputes that erupt after the babies are born.

## Conclusions

Whimsical's maternal womb is a mirror image of the cabinet of the prince, the laboratory of Cameralist sciences whose topography transfigures the state apparatuses and the arts of governing. To understand what was at stake in the seizure of the mother's body we must examine under a new light the operations that allowed Rousseau, in the genre of the fairy tale, to produce a new sort of *Mirror for Princes*, designed for the modern ruler. As I have attempted to demonstrate here, the question of maternity was not really peripheral but rather central to Rousseau's political thought. His concern was not simply about building government through the figure of the mother in order to attain the goals I have discussed, but also about building the mother through government – by giving her a series of tasks that were primarily linked with caregiving, material and moral reproduction and good management. This awareness allows us to trace a critical genealogy of gender roles in European modernity, by treating maternity not simply as evidence, but as an emergent historical phenomenon whose roots need to be sought in a broader context. Joan Scott insisted on the necessity of studying gender by considering 'the opposition between male and female as problematic rather than known, as something contextually defined, repeatedly constructed'.<sup>108</sup> Rousseau showed this clearly, as he did not limit himself to reworking the association between women and the art of governing, but also produced a particular femininity in women by maternising them. In order to do so, Rousseau drew from complex debates about the nature of good government to characterise women. The Frenchman of the seventeenth century had already imagined women as a force for civilising, pacification and even governance during the time of firming up of monarchy after the Fronde revolt; yet, despite criticisms and ridicule, a certain model of 'strong woman' and chastity was able to persist.<sup>109</sup> In the eighteenth century, to transform the woman into a mother of a family meant rethinking her management within a new framework of governmentality, very different from the older absolutist project and its mirroring of the monarchy in the family. Here, as we have seen, a woman's empowerment cannot be understood outside of her domestication, and this model of empowerment through domestication was coherent with her political silencing.

## Notes

1. See, for example, what Donzelot called the 'policing of families', a process of social integration aimed towards work, populating and financial savings. See Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979). We can also consider the failed attempts at civilising the 'feral children' that Douthwaite mentions – such as the case of Marie-Angélique Le Blanc – guided by the ideas of perfectibility and malleability that mark the advent of the humanities. See Julia V. Douthwaite, *The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the Monster: Dangerous Experiments in the Age of Enlightenment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). For a general perspective, see Bronislaw Baczko, Michel Porret and François Rosset (eds), *Dictionnaire critique de l'utopie au temps des Lumières* (Genève: Georg, 2016).
2. From the demand, specific to the seventeenth century, to base knowledge on a factual truth, in the eighteenth century, fiction was faced with demands for a narration that was both probable and incredible, and had to establish a series of strategies of the wonderful. See Sarah Tindal Kareem, *Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Reinvention of Wonder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 62–9.
3. Historiographic pyrrhonism, from the Greek skeptic philosopher Pyrrho, means systematic scepticism towards sources and accounts, especially when it comes to ancient historians. Voltaire exposed this method in his *Pyrrhonism in History* (1768), although he had repeatedly made reference to it in his historiographic endeavours, like the *History of Charles XII* (1731).

4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile or On Education*, in Christopher Kelly and Allan Bloom (eds) *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 13 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2010), p. 29; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men*, in Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (eds), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 3 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 1992), p. 62.
5. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 246.
6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, in Christopher Kelly (ed.), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 8 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2000), p. 35.
7. See Lewis C. Seifert, 'Les fées modernes; Women, Fairy Tales, and the Literary Field in Late Seventeenth-Century France', in Elizabeth C. Goldsmith and Dena Goodman (eds), *Going Public: Women and Publishing in Early Modern France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 129–145, here p. 129.
8. Marion W. Gray, *Productive Men, Reproductive Women: The Agrarian Household and the Emergence of Separate Spheres during the German Enlightenment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), p. 13.
9. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', in Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace (eds), *On Women, Love, and Family* (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2009), pp. 39–51, here p. 40.
10. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 48.
11. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 49.
12. See in particular Robert J. Ellrich, 'Rousseau's Androgynous Dream: The Minor Works of 1752–1762', *French Forum* 13 (1988), pp. 319–38.
13. Rosanne Kennedy, *Rousseau in Drag. Deconstructing Gender* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
14. Julia Kristeva, *New Maladies of the Soul* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 144–5.
15. Our translation. Laure Chalandes, *L'Âme a-t-elle un sexe? Formes et paradoxes de la distinction sexuelle dans l'œuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Paris: Garnier, 2011), p. 183, 186.
16. See Michael Palmer, 'The Citizen Philosopher: Rousseau's Dedicatory Letter to the Discourse on Inequality', *Interpretation* 17 (1989), pp. 19–39; Penny A. Weiss, *Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1993); Mira Morgenstern, *Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity: Self, Culture and Society* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); Nicole Fermon, *Domesticating Passions. Rousseau, Woman, and the Nation* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997); Elizabeth R. Wingrove, *Rousseau's Republican Romance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 163–8; Lynda Lange, 'Rousseau and Modern Feminism', in Lynda Lange (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 24–42.
17. Jennifer J. Popiel, *Rousseau's Daughters: Domesticity, Education, and Autonomy in Modern France* (Durham: University of New Hampshire Press, 2008), p. 121.
18. See Lori J. Marso, *(Un)manly Citizens: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and Germaine de Staël's Subversive Women* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Julie F. MacCannell, *The Regime of the Brother: After the Patriarchy* (London and New York, Routledge, 1991), pp. 43–91.
19. Sarah Kofman, 'Rousseau's Phallographic Ends', in Lange (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Rousseau*, pp. 229–44, here p. 231.
20. See Pierre Ronzeaud, 'La Femme au pouvoir ou le monde à l'envers', *XVIIe siècle* 108 (1975), pp. 9–33.
21. See Jeffrey Merrick, 'The Body Politics of French Absolutism', in Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn Norberg (eds), *From the Royal to the Republican Body. Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 11–31; Jeffrey Merrick, 'Gender in Pre-Revolutionary Political Culture', in Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley (eds), *From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 198–219; Jeffrey Merrick, 'Fathers and Kings: Patriarchalism and Absolutism in Eighteenth-Century French Politics', in Jeffrey Merrick (ed.), *Order and Disorder under the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), p. 102–23.
22. See Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 135–49. *The French King's Wedding*, for example, associated Louis' lack of military courage to his effeminate traits and sexual impotence. Elsewhere, as in *The New Loves of Louis the Great*, his extreme weakness on the battlefield is placed in opposition with his preference for women. Note that the criticisms were often based on the figure of Mme de Maintenon, whom he secretly wed in 1683.
23. Throughout his reign, Louis XV was faced with harsh criticism – also coming from the so called parti dévot – based on his debauched behaviour with women. We must at least mention the cases of Mme Pompadour and Mme Du Barry. See Jean-Pierre Guicciardini, 'Between the Licit and the Illicit: The Sexuality of the King', in Robert Purks Maccubbin (ed.), *'Tis Nature's Fault: Unauthorized Sexuality During the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 88–97; Thomas E. Keiser, 'Madame de Pompadour and the Theaters of Power', *French Historical Studies* 4 (1996), pp. 1025–44;

- Thomas E. Keiser, 'Louis le Bien-Aimé and the Rhetoric of the Royal Body', in Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn Norberg (eds), *From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 131–60; John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue. Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 26–31. For an overview of criticisms on Marie Antoinette, see Lynn A. Hunt, 'The Many Bodies of Marie Antoinette: Political Pornography and the Problem of the Feminine in the French Revolution', in Lynn A. Hunt (ed.), *Eroticism and the Body Politic* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 108–30; Robert Darnton, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 137–66; Vivian R. Gruder, 'The Question of Marie-Antoinette: The Queen and Public Opinion before the Revolution', *French History* 16 (2002), pp. 269–98; Dena Goodman (ed.), *Marie-Antoinette: Writings on the Body of a Queen* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
24. Sarah Maza, 'The Diamond Necklace Affair, 1785–1786', in Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 167–211, here p. 208.
  25. See for instance Joan B. Landes, *Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). On the crisis of patriarchy at the time of the Revolution, see Lynn A. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1984), pp. 87–119; Lynn A. Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1992), pp. 17–56. The republican satire of the July Monarchy often used the stereotypes of effeminisation. See Jo Burr Margadant (ed.), *The New Biography: Performing Femininity in Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Amy Wiese Forbes, *The Satiric Decade: Satire and the Rise of Republicanism in France, 1830–1840* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 168.
  26. According to Zerilli, Rousseau was aware that 'There is a profound sense in his writings that gender boundaries must be carefully fabricated and maintained because they have no solid foundation in nature': Linda M. G. Zerilli, *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 18.
  27. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 41.
  28. Rousseau, *Emile*, pp. 195–6.
  29. On glory being forbidden for women, see Catherine Cusset, 'Rousseau's Legacy: Glory and Femininity at the End of the Eighteenth Century. Sophie Cottin and Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun', in Roland Bonnel and Catherine Rubinger (eds), *Femmes Savantes et Femmes d'Esprit. Women Intellectuals of the French Eighteenth Century* (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 401–18.
  30. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 591.
  31. For insight into the Woman Question in France, see Danielle Haase-Dubosc and Marie-Élisabeth Henneau (eds), *Revisiter la « querelle des femmes ». Discours sur l'égalité/inégalité des sexes, de 1600 à 1750* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 2013); Éliane Viennot (ed.), *Revisiter la « querelle des femmes ». Discours sur l'égalité/inégalité des sexes, de 1750 aux lendemains de la Révolution* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 2012). On controversies surrounding women's access to knowledge – especially related to theology and the hierarchy of the Church – see Dominique Godineau, *Les Femmes dans la France moderne. XVI<sup>e</sup>-XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015). Concerning the Suchon case, see Véronique Desnain, 'Gabrielle Suchon: de l'éducation des femmes', *Seventeenth Century French Studies* 26 (2004), pp. 259–69; Gabrielle Suchon, *A Woman Who Defends All the Persons of Her Sex. Selected Philosophical and Moral Writings* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 1–52. On Cartesian and anti-Cartesian feminism, see Erica L. Harth, *Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), but take into account the uncertainties raised by Sarah Maza in her Review of Eric Harth, *Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime* and Sara E. Melzer and Leslie W. Rabine, *Rebel Daughters: Women and the French Revolution*, in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1994), pp. 303–6.
  32. Steinbrügge mentions a 'sensualist turning point', that validated the masculinisation of rationality in front of a radical sexualisation of women that required the concerted inhibition of their moral development. Rousseau's woman, 'incapable of abstract thought, remains on the level of the concrete and tangible'. L. Steinbrügge, *The Moral Sex: Woman's Nature in the French Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 65.

33. See Carla A. Hesse, *The Other Enlightenment: How French Women Became Modern* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Anne E. Duggan, *Salonnières, Furies, and Fairies: The Politics of Gender and Cultural Change in Absolutist France* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005) pp. 25–49.
34. Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 63. For Goodman, the criticism against the salons was directly linked to that against the monarchy: 'The revolt against the monarchy in 1789 was prefigured by the revolt against salon governance in the 1780s', p. 11.
35. Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modernity* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 110.
36. See Dena Goodman, *Becoming a Woman in the Age of Letters* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 63–7.
37. See Mary S. Trouille, *Sexual Politics in the Enlightenment. Women Writers Read Rousseau* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 30–8. Trouille notes the contradiction between the innovative nature of masculine education and a feminine model of education that was conservative in comparison with the culture of the time. Yet, I do not see the same discontinuity between Sophie and Julie that Trouille does, and according to which there would be, with Rousseau, 'misogynic strands as well as feminist ones', p. 42. I do not wish to negate the complexity of his construction of women but instead to show its global coherence.
38. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Julie, or the New Heloise*, in Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (eds.), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 6 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 1997) p. 579.
39. Haechler analyses a number of women who established themselves in the culture and politics, even by manipulating powerful men, by taking advantage of the decline of the nobility: Jean Haechler, *Le Règne des femmes* (Paris: Grasset, 2001).
40. Emanuele Saccarelli, 'The Machiavellian Rousseau: Gender and Family Relations in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', *Political Theory* 4 (2009), pp. 482–510, here p. 502.
41. See Catriona Seth, *La Fabrique de l'intime* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2013). See Frédéric Marty, 'Rousseau secrétaire de Mme Dupin. L'article 2 de l'Ouvrage sur les femmes: De la Génération', *Annales Jean-Jacques Rousseau* XL (2013), pp. 47–91.
42. Antoine Lilti, *Le monde des salons* (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
43. See Karen Green, *A History of Women's Political Thought in Europe, 1700–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 153–64.
44. Joan DeJean, *Tender Geographies: Women and the Origins of the Novel in France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 19.
45. Joan DeJean, 'The (Literary) World at War, or, What can Happen when Women Go Public', in Elizabeth C. Goldsmith and D. Goodman (eds.), *Going Public*, pp. 116–28, here p. 126.
46. Kale, for example, focused on the persistence of the salons and salon goers in the nineteenth-century aristocracy. See Steven D. Kale, *French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). See Timothy J. Reiss, *The Meaning of Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 190–217.
47. Élizabeth Vigée Le Brun, *Les Femmes régnaient alors, la Révolution les a détrônées. Souvenirs 1755–1842*, ed. Didier Masseur (Paris: Tallandier), Letter X.
48. Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 69. Landes uses mostly studies by Baker, Darnton and Habermas about the genesis of the public sphere in France, starting with the crisis of the patriarchal model of power.
49. See Lesley H. Walker, *A Mother's Love: Crafting Feminine Virtue in Enlightenment France* (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 2008), pp. 69–70.
50. I thus do not share the opinion that 'his sexism is overtly political, not theoretical'. See Nancy J. Hirschmann, *Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 166.
51. Jean Jacques Rousseau, 'Letter to d'Alembert', in Allan Bloom, Charles Butterworth, and Christopher Kelly (eds), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 10 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2004), p. 325.
52. Jean Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', in John T. Scott (ed. and tr.), *The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 189.
53. Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', pp. 188–9.
54. Our translation. Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la République*, vol. I (Paris: Fayard, 1986), p. 307. In 1755, Rousseau had already rejected this: 'But although the government is not the master of the law, it is no small thing to be its guarantor'. Jean Jacques Rousseau, 'Discourse on Political Economy', in Roger D.



- Masters and Christopher Kelly (eds), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 3 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 1992) p. 147.
55. Rousseau 'On the Social Contract', p. 167. Chartier analyses how the eighteenth century marginalised the notion of 'civility' as a relation between inferiors and superiors, to substitute a form of 'polite sociability' for it: see Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 91–6. Rousseau's project responds to this tendency. I agree with Goodman's thesis according to which Rousseau produced 'a masculine polity based on an equality of sameness', inside the debate of the Enlightenment on the status of social distinction, see Dena Goodman, 'Difference: An Enlightenment Concept', in Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (eds), *What's Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 143.
  56. Rousseau 'On the Social Contract', p. 206.
  57. Rousseau 'On the Social Contract', p. 228.
  58. Derrida saw in Rousseau a relation of 'différance' between voice and writing, the latter of which being both the supplement and alteration of the first one: see Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology. Corrected Edition*, tr. Gayatri Ch. Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). I expand this concept by applying it to the relation between sovereignty and government (right and force): the magistrate's action is supposed to be the supplement of the law, fixing it in the specific case, but it is also what replaced it. The same logic is at play in the relation between the sexes, the feminine resistance – modesty – being both the condition of and the threat to the masculine will. Zerilli saw this coherence with Rousseau, whose dream would have been 'a society without female voice, one in which woman remains within her proper function as a sign': Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, p. 39.
  59. Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', p. 213.
  60. Kofman illustrated this mechanism exhaustively: see Sarah Kofman, *Le Respect des femmes. Kant et Rousseau* (Paris: Galilée, 1982). Popiel is thus correct when she says that Rousseau's woman produced autonomous individuals. But this implied their masculinisation. This femininity sustains the genealogy of the modern owner, free of all forms of lordly or corporative tutelage. Popiel, *Rousseau's Daughters*.
  61. Our translation. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, in *Édition du Tricentenaire*, vol. 5 (Genève-Paris: Slatkine-Honoré Champion, 2012), p. 78.
  62. For a deeper inquiry into modesty as a specifically governmental virtue in Rousseau, see Lorenzo Rustighi, *Il Governo della Madre. Percorsi e Alternative del Potere in Rousseau* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2017), esp pp. 262–81, 293–315.
  63. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 243.
  64. See Sarah Hanley, 'Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France', *French Historical Studies* 1 (1989), pp. 4–27. The concept developed by Hanley is based on the history of law and has to do with the way marriage has been subjected to both patriarchal and State control; it must therefore not be confused with Merrick's 'family/kingdom model'. Here I am interested in the coherence between the two domains (symbolic as well as legal) explored by Merrick and Hanley.
  65. Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 86. Both in the *Second Discourse* of 1754 and in his *Political Economy* of 1755, Rousseau claims that it is necessary to overthrow Robert Filmer's doctrine exposed in *Patriarcha* (1688). Filmer's famous thesis was that political authority derives from paternal authority over children.
  66. Rousseau, 'Discourse on Political Economy', p. 201.
  67. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 590.
  68. For Okin, Rousseau 'uses the sentimental family in order to define women's nature in such a way as to render them incapable of any role outside the domestic sphere': Susan Moller Okin, 'Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (1981), pp. 65–88, here p. 76.
  69. I believe that when Fraisse talks about the 'two governments', theorised in a definitive manner by Rousseau, this duality must be taken literally: it is about two different ways of governing, but implies the permanence of a similar issue, that of the government as such. See Geneviève Fraisse, *Les Deux gouvernements: la famille et la cité* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), pp. 16–17.
  70. See Else Wiestad, 'Empowerment Inside Patriarchy: Rousseau and the Masculine Construction of Femininity', in Lynda Lange (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Rousseau*, pp. 169–86, here p. 170. Wiestad noted that this construction of the feminine power is part of 'two parallel and gender divided power structures that are built into one another and into the same neopatriarchal system of domination'. While she is right to see 'a dual and complementary power structure implying not only polarity, but also asymmetry' (p. 173), Wiestad did not consider the new state-home mirror.
  71. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 48.
  72. Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', p. 191.



73. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 39.
74. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 39.
75. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', pp. 49–50.
76. For Runte this is the goal of Rousseau's irony. See Roseann Runte, 'The Paradox of Virtue: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and La Reine Fantastique', *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 23 (1994), pp. 47–54.
77. Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', p. 235.
78. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 50.
79. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 50.
80. Hanley worked on the falsification of the Salic law as well as on the forms of implementation and resistance that surrounded it – starting with the quarrel between Christine de Pizan and Jean de Montreuil until the codification of the doctrine about 'the king's one body'. See Sarah Hanley, 'Identity Politics and Rulership in France: Female Political Place and the Fraudulent Salic Law in Christine de Pizan and Jean de Montreuil', in Michael Wolfe (ed.), *Changing Identities in Early Modern France* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 78–94; Sarah Hanley, 'Configuring the Authority of Queens in the French Monarchy, 1600s–1840s', *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 2 (2006), pp. 453–64. Cosandey highlighted the theoretical and legal difficulties that accompanied the imposition of the Salic law, as well as the contradictions that arose during the regencies that, since the end of the fifteenth century, were feminine: see Fanny Cosandey, *La Reine de France. Symbole et pouvoir, XVe-XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), pp. 28–54.
81. Rousseau, 'Discourse on Political Economy', p. 141.
82. See Michel Senellart, *Machiavélisme et raison d'État, XIIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 1989).
83. Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', p. 218; Saccarelli, 'The Machiavellian Rousseau', p. 483.
84. For Zipes, with the fairy tale 'women writers . . . sought to subvert the male code and replace it with a more liberal one favorable to the predilections of educated women, who wanted more power to determine their lives': Jack Zipes, *Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion: The Classical Genre for Children and the Process of Civilization* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 32.
85. Rousseau, 'Discourse on Political Economy', p. 142.
86. See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
87. Maza emphasised that during the second half of the eighteenth century jurisprudence established an analogy between the social contract and the marital contract as 'a freely chosen and revokable mutual pact', even though the masculine authority was not questioned. See Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs*, p. 268.
88. See Rudy Le Menthéour, 'La Vertu du moindre effort. La morale sensitive de Rousseau', in Blaise Bachofen, Bruno Bernardi, André Charrak and Florent Guénard (eds), *Philosophie de Rousseau* (Paris: Garnier, 2014), pp. 69–83.
89. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 545.
90. Our translation. Joseph de Maistre, *Étude sur la souveraineté* (1794).
91. Concerning the *Hausväterliteratur* between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Otto Brunner, *Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria*, tr. Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); Joel F. Harrington, 'Hausvater and Landesvater: Paternalism and Marriage Reform in Sixteenth-Century Germany', *Central European History* 25 (1992), pp. 52–75. This genre is also present in the rest of Europe, especially in England, Italy and in Spain. See Elliot Kendall, *Lordship and Literature: John Gower and the Politics of the Great Household* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), pp. 9–27; Daniela Frigo, *Il padre di famiglia. Governo della casa e governo civile nella tradizione dell'economica tra Cinque e Seicento* (Roma: Bulzoni, 1985); Michel Foucault, 'La gouvernementalité', in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits II. 1954–1988* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 635–57; Marie-Laure Acquier, 'La prose d'idées espagnole et le paradigme de l'économie domestique, ou l'économie dans la littérature (XVI<sup>e</sup>-XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles)', *Cahiers de Narratologie* 18 (2010), Digital Object Identifier: 10.4000/narratologie.6063. We find here a 'growing continuity', or at least a strong relation, between the Lord's *dominium* and the government of the kingdom, that was dismissed by the Cameralists, and later by the Physiocrats.
92. See Gray, *Productive Men, Reproductive Women*, pp. 89–119. Gray highlights the importance of this tradition in the transformation of the old household into the modern family. Under the Ancien Régime, in particular, the distinction was made between home and household, and relatives and family, where the first one did not involve blood relationship and the second one did not entail living together. The modern family combines these two aspects, by privatising the home and reducing the number of family members. See Stéphanie Minvielle, *La Famille en France à l'époque moderne – XVI<sup>e</sup>-XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Armand

- Colin, 2010), pp. 143–5. Concerning the coherence between the reproductive role of women and that of men in the genesis of the capitalist accumulation, see Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch. Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation* (New York: Autonomedia, 2009).
93. Judith Still, *Feminine Economies: Thinking Against the Market in the Enlightenment and the Late Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 95–134.
  94. Nancy Armstrong, 'The Rise of the Domestic Woman', in Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse (eds), *The Ideology of Conduct: Essays on Literature and the History of Sexuality* (New York: Methuen, 1987), pp. 96–141, here p. 113.
  95. Rousseau wrote, 'the true mother of a family is hardly less of a recluse in her home than a nun in her cloister', Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 566.
  96. Jean Jacques Rousseau, 'Fragments of *Émile*', in Christopher Kelly and Allan Bloom (eds), *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 13 (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2010), p. 680.
  97. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 51.
  98. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 51.
  99. Our translation. Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits III. 1976–197* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 642.
  100. Rousseau does in fact share the populationist worry of the time. See Steinbrügge, *The Moral Sex*, p. 25–8; Michel Senellart, 'La population comme signe de bon gouvernement', in André Charrak and Jean Salem (eds), *Rousseau et la philosophie* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2000), pp. 189–212. On the relation between maternity and population for Rousseau, see Carol Blum, *Strength in Numbers: Population, Reproduction, and Power in Eighteenth-Century France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 113–51.
  101. As Hunt Botting has shown, if Rousseau was ever close to feminist thought, it was in the 1740s, during his collaboration with Mme Dupin. The reasons that led him to change his position are still to be clarified. See Eileen Hunt Botting, 'The Early Rousseau's Egalitarian Feminism: a Philosophical Convergence with Madame Dupin and *The Critique of the Spirit of the Laws*', *History of European Ideas*, (2014), pp. 732–744, Digital Object Identifier: 10.1080/01916599.2017.1314154.
  102. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 47.
  103. Whimsical is described as a hysterical and vaporous woman, one of the great common grounds of the Enlightenment. Sterility and pregnancy are both often associated with vapours, explained by an imbalance of the matrix or of the animal spirits. See Sabine Arnaud, *L'Invention de l'hystérie au temps des Lumières (1670–1820)* (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2014).
  104. See Barbara Duden, *L'Invention du fœtus : le corps féminin comme lieu public* (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1996); Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 40.
  105. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 41.
  106. Rousseau, *Emile*, pp. 539–40.
  107. Rousseau, 'Queen Whimsical', p. 43.
  108. Joan Wallach Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', *The American Historical Review* 91 (1986), pp. 1053–75, here p. 1074.
  109. See Myriam Maître, 'Les Précieuses, de la guerre des sexes aux querelles du Parnasse: jalons d'une polémique empêchée', *Littératures classiques* 59 (2006), pp. 251–63.