

Xenophon's Psychology of *Philotimia*

Rodrigo Illarraga

IN XENOPHON'S *HIERO*, the poet Simonides and the tyrant Hiero discuss the difference between the lives of laymen and rulers.¹ For much of the dialogue (*Hier.* 1–7), they seek to identify how rulers and those who are ruled experience differently joy and sorrow. While Simonides holds the common opinion that rulers have pleasant lives, Hiero points out that this idea is the product of a false impression, and in reality rulers have the worst possible lives.

From the beginning of the dialogue, both characters agree on a simple characterization of the sensations experienced by any individual (1.4). Pleasure and pain are the basic sensations that organize life and can be experienced by the body, the *psykhē*, or both at the same time (1.5). An interesting debate develops from this agreement. For Simonides, what distinguishes the ruler is his easy access to pleasure (1.8). However, Hiero points out that these things that are understood by Simonides as pleasure are

¹ V. Gray, "Xenophon's Hiero and the Meeting of the Wise Man and Tyrant in Greek Literature," *CQ* 36 (1986) 117, has pointed out that "the ideals of the *Hiero* are Xenophon's own and he is using the dialogue as a vehicle for their expression." She holds (123) that *Hiero's* innovative literary form answers Xenophon's intention to present what he understands as a more broad and complete image about tyranny. R. Illarraga, "Note sulla forme della monarchia in Senofonte," *Magazzino di Filosofia* 32 (2018) 50–60, holds that Xenophon does not understand tyranny and monarchy as fixed categories, but as one complex continuum that comprehends a more broad notion of rulers. Therefore, here I will refer to all Xenophon's unipersonal rulers simply as rulers, making no distinction between tyrants (Hiero) or kings (Cyrus, Agesilaus). Cf. D. Morrison, "Tyranie et royauté selon le Socrate de Xénophon," *EPh* 69 (2004) 177–192.

not real pleasure, at least not in an absolute sense. Indeed, a pleasant sensation experienced repeatedly becomes routine, and to reach the same share of pleasure a greater degree of that same sensation is required. The example of meals is especially useful to understand this concept of pleasure: those who eat banquets every day get tired of them, while those who usually eat frugal meals enjoy banquets greatly (1.17–23).²

The dialogue continues with the tyrant showing how he is deprived of different types of pleasures. Luxuries and wealth (2), friendship (3), and love (4) are pleasures that rulers do not find with the same ease as the ruled. But in chapter 7, Simonides reveals to Hiero the most powerful desire, the main reason for an individual to face all the difficulties and displeasures of ruling—*philotimia* (7.3–4):

For indeed it seems to me, Hiero, that in this man differs from other animals—I mean, in this craving for honour. In meat and drink and sleep and sex all creatures alike seem to take pleasure; but love of honour is rooted neither in the brute beasts nor in every human being. But they in whom is implanted a passion for honour and praise, these are they who differ most from the cattle, these are accounted virtuous and not mere human beings. And so, in my opinion, you have good reason for bearing all those burdens that despotism lays on you, in that you are honoured

² This idea can be also found in the *Memorabilia* (e.g. 4.5.9, cf. 1.3.8, 1.3.15, 2.1.30). This notion seems to be similar to though more moderate than that of Antisthenes. See P. Decleva Caizzi, *Antisthenis fragmenta* (Milan 1966); A. Patzer, *Antisthenes der Sokratiker. Das literarische Werk un die Philosophie* (diss. Heidelberg 1970); A. Brancacci, “Episteme and Phronesis in Antisthenes,” *Méthexis* 18 (2005) 7–28, “Sull’etica di Antistene,” in L. Rossetti et al. (eds.), *Socratica 2008. Studies in Ancient Socratic Literatura* (Bari 2010) 89–118, and “Introduzione al pensiero politico di Antistene,” in A. Stavru et al. (eds.), *Socratica III. Studies on Socrates, the Socratics and the Ancient Socratic Literature* (Sankt Augustin 2013) 29–40; C. Mársico, *Los filósofos socráticos. Testimonios y fragmentos. Antistenes, Fedon, Esquines y Simon* (Losada 2014); P. Prince, *Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* (Ann Arbor 2015). For some connections between Xenophon’s and Antisthenes’ thoughts see M. Noussia, “Redefining Use, Expenditure and Exchange of Private Wealth: The Socratic Model, Antisthenes and the Cynics,” *Gaia* 19 (2016) 319–333.

above all other men. For no human joy seems to be more nearly akin to that of heaven, than the gladness which attends upon honours.³

Philotimia appears not only as what separates beasts from humans, but as the most real human impulse: the desire that steers all humans, as social and political beings, towards social acknowledgement. The same notion appears at *Anabasis* 6.1.26, where Xenophon describes his own enjoyment, as a human being (*anthropos*), at being so honoured by his men who want to appoint him sole commander of the Ten Thousand.⁴

The comparison in *Hiero* of those who lack *philotomia* to cattle, given that *philotimia* is the main psychological trait of rulers, takes us to the Proem of *Cyropaedia*. There the rulers are described as herdsmen in charge of their animals: they must take care of them, keep the herd together, and guide them towards the best fields. But Xenophon quickly introduces a distinction. While the cattle follow their herdsmen's directions promptly, ruled human beings "conspire against none sooner than against those whom they see attempting to rule over them" (*Cyr.* 1.1.2). As Tatum has said, "the prologue thus delights us by inverting the roles of ruler and ruled in the human and animal kingdoms: the 'society' of animals is 'faithful' to its 'rulers', the 'herds' of human beings 'disobey' their 'shepherds'."⁵ The emphasis on the ever-rebellious human nature described in this section of *Cyropaedia* raises

³ All translations are from Marchant/Bowersock (Loeb), with modifications.

⁴ Taking into account that *aner* in *Hier.* 7.3 does not appear to imply a moral judgment on gender and its links with *philotimia*, but instead serves to establish a hierarchy of human dignity: beasts, humans that resembles beasts, and virtuous humans. See F. W. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonticum* I (Leipzig 1801) 237, s.v. ¶4. A reading that understands this sentence as a consideration on gender would need to consider that in Xenophon's perspective "as *anthropoi*, women may also worry about their honour, not merely in the reductive sense of chastity but with regard to their own standing in the eyes of their communities": B. Keim, "Honour and the Art of Xenophontic Leadership," *Histos* Suppl. 5 (2016) 130.

⁵ J. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton 1989) 60.

questions about the real possibility of *Hiero's* “beastly” non-ambition—do cattle-like humans, i.e. humans without *philotimia*, without the desire for honour, really exist? We will address this question later.

Honour makes its appearance in the *Hiero* as one of the pleasures that an individual can experience. But, unlike the more commonly recognized desires for pleasures (such as desire for food, drink, sex, etc.), *philotimia* is the hallmark of the exceptional nature of a few individuals. It is the love or desire for honour, and honour is understood as including the idea of approval or praise: the *philotimoi* crave recognition, which always needs a third party to acknowledge their achievements. In keeping with the previous categorization, it is clear that this is a pleasure of the *psyche* related to interpersonal experiences.

Philotimia is not the desire for any *hedone*, but a pleasure close to the divine. Alexiou notes that this ranking helps to explain why the *philotimos* is superior to the *philokerdes* (*Oec.* 14.10) and why *philotimia* is associated with *kalokagathia* since it does not appeal to those who yield most readily to gifts (*Mem.* 2.3.16–17).⁶ Still, this does not explain why *philotimia* is divine. Is this a warning Xenophon is giving, related to an insatiable “desire for god-like rule,” as Smith Pangle suggests for Cyrus?⁷ On the contrary, Xenophon’s praise for *philotimia* is not ironic. The first step to understanding this relationship with the divine lies in another compound term with the transitive verb-stem *philein*: *philanthropia*, a trait directly associated with *philotimia* (*Cyr.* 1.2.1), which is also a feature of the gods (*Mem.* 4.3.6).⁸ As we shall see, *philotimia* depends on philanthropic behaviour in order to truly unfold.

⁶ E. Alexiou, “Competitive Values in Isocrates and Xenophon: Aspects of Philotimia,” *Trends in Classics* 10 (2018) 126. Cf. F. Bevilacqua, “Kalokagathia e kaloi kagathoi nelle opere socratiche di Senofonte (Memorabili, Economico, Simposio),” *Magazzino di filosofia* 32 (2018) 1–50.

⁷ L. Smith Pangle, “Xenophon on the Psychology of Supreme Political Ambition,” *American Political Science Review* 111 (2017) 318.

⁸ Cf. V. Azoulay, “Xénophon et le modèle divin de l’autorité,” *CEA* 45 (2008) 151–183.

The dignity and quality of *philotimia* explains why anyone would face pain and sorrow in order to achieve honour. This characterization of *philotimia* offers a psychological explanation, complementary to the dialogue between Socrates and Aristippus in *Mem.* 2.1.1–17.⁹ There, the two philosophers debate on how rulers should be educated. Socrates insists that those who rule should be able to put aside their desires for somatic pleasures (sleep, sex, drink, and food) to put their society first. Aristippus agrees with this characterization, but Cyrenaic hedonism¹⁰ forces a strong conclusion: since the good ruler must postpone any kind of bodily pleasure, Aristippus states that to dedicate oneself to ruling would be pure foolishness.¹¹ In these paragraphs of the *Memorabilia*, the Socratic justification for the task of the ruler seems to rest on the importance of the community over the individual. *Philotimia* as an elementary desire of those who want to rule allows an explanation that, without contradicting the community's interest, helps us understand why any individual would be willing to abandon all types of pleasure vindicated by the Cyrenaic posture. *Philotimia*, understood as an impulse towards a supreme psychological pleasure, explains all kinds of sacrifices, and it therefore works as a challenge to Aristippus' somatic hedonism.¹²

⁹ On the debate between Aristippus and Socrates see K. Urstad, "Aristippus and Freedom in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*," *Praxis* 2 (2008) 41–55; D. Johnson, "Aristippus at the Crossroads: The Politics of Pleasure in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*," *Polis* 26 (2009) 204–222; R. Illarraga, "Enkrátēia y gobierno. El gobernante insensato de Aristipo y su aparición en *Ciropeidia*," *Méthexis* 30 (2018) 1–30.

¹⁰ For an introduction to Cyrenaic ethics see C. Mársico, *Los filósofos socráticos. Testimonios y fragmentos I* (Losada 2013); U. Zilioli, *The Cyrenaics* (Oxford/New York 2014); V. Tsouna, "Cyrenaics and Epicureans on Pleasure and the Good Life: The Original Debate and its Later Revivals," in S. Weisser et al. (eds.), *Strategies of Polemics in Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Leiden/Boston 2016) 113–149.

¹¹ See Illarraga, *Méthexis* 30 (2018) 1–30, for Aristippus' political thought here and its relation to Xenophon.

¹² R. Sevieri, "The Imperfect Hiero: Xenophon's Hiero as the (Self-)

The characterization of honour as a pleasure of the *psykhē* and *philotimia* as a psychological impulse is made directly in the basic description of one of Xenophon's most important heroes: Cyrus. To explain the resounding and exceptional success of Cyrus, Xenophon describes the nature of the Persian prince starting from three impulses that dominate his *psykhē*: *philanthropia*, *philomatheia*, and *philotimia*.¹³ Something similar can be said of the other great monarchical role model in Xenophon's works, Agesilaus II. The Spartan king is celebrated for his virtuous *psykhē* (*Ages.* 3.1), and it is indicated that *philotimia* was a constitutive part of his *physis* (10.4).¹⁴ The notion that one's nature has direct consequences in the world of politics and that, in particular, a ruler's nature is one of the essential determinants of his political career, is stated in *Cyropaedia*'s proem (1.1.2–3).¹⁵ This first chapter of *Cyropaedia* works as a miniature theoretical manual, where Xenophon presents—using Cyrus as an excuse—the basic elements of his political philosophy. Precisely there, it

Taming of a Tyrant,” in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and his World* (Stuttgart 2004) 277–289, and, later and more profoundly, L. Takakji, “Xenophon the Literary Critic: The Poetics and Politics of Praise in Hiero,” *GRBS* 57 (2017) 49–73, esp. 55 ff., have remarked on the connections between epinician poetry and the *Hiero*. According to Takakji, Xenophon's focus on wealth (and the pleasures associated with it) works as criticism of the wealth motif in the epinician genre (traditional victory odes). This is not incompatible with understanding these references to wealth, but also other somatic pleasures, and also functions as an intertextual reference to Aristippus: Xenophon is reviewing negatively an image of pleasure and a definition of happiness that appear in different genres and thinkers.

¹³ *Cyr.* 1.2.1, wonderfully analyzed in N. Sandridge, *Loving Humanity, Learning, and Being Honored. The Foundations of Leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus* (Washington 2012), esp. Introduction.

¹⁴ E. Manes, *L'Agesilao di Senofonte. Tra commiato ed encomio* (Milan 1992) 171. On Agesilaus' representation in Xenophon see N. Humble “The *Agesilaos* and the Genre of Encomium,” in A. Powell et al., *Xenophon and Sparta* (Swansea forthcoming).

¹⁵ Cf. F. Bevilacqua, “Seduzione e potere nella *Ciropeia* e nell'*Economico* di Senofonte,” in F. Benedetti et al., *Studi di filologia e tradizione greca* (Naples 2003) 138.

is indicated that one's *physis* is one of the aspects that (together with education and origin) must be investigated in order to understand why the Persian prince distinguishes himself from other men in regard to political success. Moreover, Xenophon's Socrates has a similar idea. In *Memorabilia* 3.1.6 Socrates states that *physis* is one of the reasons why a *strategos* may have certain exceptional abilities.

In *Hiero* 7.3 the expression "lover of praise" works as a synonym of *philotimia* (cf. *Ages.* 10.4).¹⁶ This expression, ἐπαίνου ἔρωσ, is also used in *Cyropaedia* 1.5.12, in Cyrus' first speech to the *homotimoi*, the ruling class of Persia and its military elite. Cyrus has been chosen as commander of the expedition to support the Mede allies, ruled by Cyrus' maternal uncle Cyaxares.¹⁷ In Persia, Cyrus and the *homotimoi* received the same education, including physical preparation for hunting and war and moral training centered on self-control (*enkrateia*), moderation (*sophrosune*), and justice.¹⁸ Cyrus' speech aims to encourage his troops at the start of the military campaign, and to do so, he describes the valuable traits he shares with his soldiers. He points out the *philotimia* of the *homotimoi*, and describes it as a psychological trait, the most beautiful and useful for war (1.5.12). The reason for its importance lies in the main attribute of those who love recognition: they are willing to undertake any type of effort and danger in order to be appreciated. As Tamiolaki has noticed, Cyrus appeals to "the issue of long-lasting pleasure ... in an effort to persuade them to pursue virtue and toil."¹⁹ This long-lasting pleasure, a stable pleasure, is the pleasure of being honoured.

For Xenophon, *philotimia* is a desire that, to be fulfilled, has a concrete and specific definition: in order to be praised it is

¹⁶ B. Due, *The Cyropaedia. Xenophon's Aims and Methods* (Aahrus 1989) 218.

¹⁷ Cf. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction* 15 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. W. E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (Albany 1977) 45–46; Due, *The Cyropaedia* 150–151; H. Lu, *Xenophon's Theory of Moral Education* (Newcastle upon Tyne 2015) 63 ff.

¹⁹ M. Tamiolaki, "Emotion and Persuasion in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*," *Phoenix* 70 (2016) 58–59.

necessary to take action. What must be done? Is any kind of effort or danger equally worthy of the ambition to be appreciated and honoured by others? After listening to Simonides point out the importance of *philotimia* for rulers, Hiero insists on explaining exactly what kind of honour the true *philotimos* aspires to (*Hier.* 7.5). Not all honour is the same: there is such a thing as false, distorted honour, produced by fear of suffering (7.7). False honour includes acts and performances that have the appearance and gestures of honour, but are bestowed without true recognition.²⁰ Intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion result in distorted, corrupt honour. However, there is a way to achieve true honour (7.9):

For whenever men feel that some person is competent to be their benefactor, and come to regard him as the fountain of blessings, so that henceforward his praise is ever on their lips, every one of them looks on him as his peculiar blessing, they make way for him spontaneously and rise from their seats, through love and not through fear, crown him for his generosity and beneficence, and bring him freewill offerings, these same men in my opinion, honour that person truly by such services, and he who is accounted worthy of them is honoured in very deed.

True honour is recognition freely given after performing admirable deeds.²¹ It is the external result of true internal admiration: the gestures of recognition or praise are the last stage of a process that began with respect, devotion, and gratitude. There is true honour and false honour, and this contrast allows us to distinguish between true *philotimia* (desiring true honour) and false *philotimia* (coveting any kind of honour, whether true or false). Given that, as Xenophon insists, true *philotimia* is the

²⁰ Cf. J. Luccioni, *Xénophon. Hiéron* (Paris 1947) 77.

²¹ A similar idea is at *Cyr.* 1.6.21, where Cyrus says that people obey someone “who they assume is better informed about everything that is useful than they themselves are.” For the *Hipparchikos* see O. Stoll, “For the Glory of Athens: Xenophon’s *Hipparchikos* <Logos>, a Technical Treatise and Instruction Manual on Ideal Leadership,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 43 (2012), esp. 254–255.

product of difficult and sustained work, we should think that those who are moved by false *philotimia* would prefer the simplest path to false honour, easily obtainable through intimidation or violence. This adds a new level of complexity to Whitehead's traditional division between good *philotimia* focused on the interest of the community and bad *philotimia* as the interest of the individual.²² In fact, Xenophon's *philotimia*²³ appears as the core of another type of morality, where, as Danzig has said, "self-interest is compatible with benefiting others."²⁴ Xenophon's *philotimia* is philanthropic *because* it is selfish.²⁵

The prospect of transforming false *philotimia* to actual *philotimia* may explain Simonides' comparison of humans without *philotimia* to cattle. At the beginning of the *Hiero*, Hiero himself is an example of false *philotimia*. He only rules because he has imposed terror on his city, and he is himself terrified and afraid of his people's vengeance. He is, in fact, the living image of Ischomachus' Tantalus in *Oeconomicus*, always frightened of dying (*Oec.* 21.21). But the dialogue works therapeutically²⁶ and Hiero admits his suffering and intends to heed Simonides' advice.

This brings us back to our previous question—do cattle-like humans, i.e. humans without *philotimia*, without the desire for honour, really exist? Is Hiero's poet contradicting *Cyropaedia*'s proem or is he just creating a fictional scheme?

²² D. Whitehead, "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit. φιλοτιμία in Democratic Athens," *ClMed* 34 (1983) 55–74, and *The Demes of Attica* (Princeton 1986) 234–252.

²³ Henceforth, *philotimia* will always mean "true *philotimia*" unless stated otherwise.

²⁴ G. Danzig, "The Best of The Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-Interest and the 'Ironic' Reading of *Cyropaedia*," in F. Hobden et al., *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry* (Leiden 2012) 538.

²⁵ Xenophon's innovation, in terms of Whitehead's division, is that *idia* and *demosia philotimia* are merged into one.

²⁶ For this approach see E. Biondi, "La peur du tyran dans le Hiéron de Xénophon: un cas de psychanalyse qui ne dit pas son nom," in S. Coin-Longeray et al. (eds.), *Peurs antiques* (Saint-Etienne 2015) 163–172.

The core of Simonides' approach is, precisely, to correct false *philotimia* to true *philotimia*. Mentioning humans without ambition is only a rhetorical device instrumental to this task. Strictly speaking, there is no human without ambition, but its mention serves to dilute the weight of false *philotimia*, and also to elevate *philotimia* in dignity. But, even more, Simonides' invention of this type of non-ambitious human being is key for not imbuing fear into Hiero's virtuous reconversion—as set out in *Cyropaedia*, the cruel truth is that almost every political rule is doomed to failure because of human ambition (*Cyr.* 1.1.1–2).

The association between *philotimia* and hard work²⁷ (especially when it comes to other people) also occurs in other works of Xenophon. In the *Hipparchikos* he presents a proposal for the reform of the Athenian cavalry, and one of the matters that especially interests him is what has been called “military psychology.”²⁸ For this reason, *philotimia* plays a fundamental role as a necessary impulse for the proper development of a military force (*Hipp.* 1.21, 1.26, 2.2, 7.3, 9.6).²⁹ *Philotimia* is in fact the most important feature for intermediate officials (*dekadarkhoi*) since it guarantees the pursuit of beautiful actions (2.2),³⁰ and it is also the psychological trait that leads to continuous practice and training, and makes soldiers useful for the city (1.21).³¹ In the *Cyropaedia*, the connection between *philotimia* and effort appears already in the adolescence of Cyrus, in his time at the Mede court.³² There, the ambition for recognition is exemplified

²⁷ Cf. S. Johnstone, “Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style,” *CP* 89 (1994) 219–240.

²⁸ H. R. Breitenbach, *Historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons* (Freiburg 1950) 87.

²⁹ See B. Keim, “Xenophon's *Hipparchikos* and the Athenian Embrace of Citizen *philotimia*,” *Polis* 35 (2018) 495–522.

³⁰ Keim, *Polis* 35 (2018) 507.

³¹ For Xenophon's utilitarianism see E. Occhipinti, “Philia and Utilitarianism in Plato and Xenophon,” *Sileno* 42 (2016) 91–110.

³² R. Illarraga, “Los modos de la Corte. La Formacion Meda de Ciro en *Ciropedia*,” *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 73 (2017), esp. 1620.

by Xenophon as the Persian prince's drive to train tirelessly in the art of horsemanship (*Cyr.* 1.3.3), a technique nonexistent in his homeland. Cyrus does not rest until he becomes the best horseman and is recognized as such by all (1.3.3, 15). As the *Cyropaedia* progresses, the positive results of these actions caused by *philotimia* are noted: Cyrus' training is the first step for the foundation of a Persian cavalry corps (4.3.4), one of the military reforms that will allow the victory against Assyria and the formation of the Persian Empire.³³ *Philotimia* acts as the drive to achieve personal goals, but this individual accomplishment has communitarian implications: honours given for being good at something are modest in comparison with the honours for doing great things for all society. This is a good example of Xenophon's original thought on traditional views on public and private spheres that some scholars have noted.³⁴ While a more conventional outlook would understand individual public service as an altruistic, selfless offering—virtue as subordinating the private sphere to the public sphere—Xenophon's *philotimia* reconfigures this interaction. One's honest societal commitment could also be a way to obtain certain things only available in the public sphere that are nevertheless valuable in the private or intimate sphere (see 200 above).

The necessary link between *philotimia* and external recognition highlights the importance of competition: for a *philotimos*, the only way to be better is to be better than others in the eyes of others. In *Hipparkhikos* 1.25–26, the desire for honour is satisfied with beautiful weapons and a well-trained body (cf. *Lac.* 7.3), but also with the institution of competitions and awards for those in the cavalry corps who are more capable. Therefore, *philotimia* and *philonikia*—the desire of victory—appear as intimately related desires.³⁵ It is not the only joint occurrence of these two

³³ P. Christesen, "Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Military Reform in Sparta," *JHS* 126 (2006) 49.

³⁴ Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction* 60. Cf. *Mem.* 4.1.2.

³⁵ For *philonikia* in Xenophon see C. Tuplin, "Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia*," in A. Powell et al., *The Shadow of Sparta* (London 1994) 155; N.

psychological traits. At the end of the *Oeconomicus* (21.10) Ischomachus identifies the good leader—one with a royal character³⁶—as one who can encourage subordinates' *philonikia* and *philotimia*. These two ambitions, properly oriented, are essential for all work and success. This link (without the word *philotimia*, but with concepts related to the acquisition of honours) also appears in the *Constitution of the Spartans*. There, Xenophon explains how Lycurgus established the Three Hundred as a means to channel the ambitions of the young, using competition as a way to classify the highest honour: to be part of the elite body of the best few hundred Spartan warriors (*Lac.* 4.2–5).³⁷ Thus, *philonikia*, the individual desire to excel over others, is openly encouraged in the service of society. The same goes for *Cyropaedia*, where *philonikia*, if carefully managed, can be used for the good of the whole army (*Cyr.* 3.3.3, 7.1.18; cf. *Mem.* 2.6.5, 3.4.3).

Furthermore, the *Cyropaedia* also remarks on the close association between *philotimia* and *philonikia*. Cyrus himself, who is said to be the most ambitious (*philotimotatos*), is also described as *philonikos* (*Cyr.* 1.4.15, 8.2.14). Additionally, *philotimia* and *philonikia* appear jointly as the reasons to conduct games and competitions before the war. *Philonikia* is the impulse that motivates the games that precede the invasion of Armenia (2.1.22), but also generates jealousy among the nobles who participate in the competitions described at the end of *Cyropaedia* (8.2.26). One can explain these two possible antithetical outcomes of *philonikia* if we review its relationship to *philotimia*. Is victory by itself a final goal or only the means for something more? For Xenophon, a ruler must pursue victory and success for the sake of the well-being of the

Humble, *Xenophon's View of Sparta* (diss. McMaster 1997) 219; V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir* (Paris 2004) 143.

³⁶ For this expression in Socratic works see L. Edmunds, "Socrates and the 'Royal Art' (βασιλική τέχνη)," *Teoria Politica* 5 (2015) 77–99. Cf. J. Luccioni, *Xénophon et le Socratisme* (Paris 1953) 144–146.

³⁷ On this see C. Mársico, R. Illarraga, and P. Marzocca, *Jenofonte/Pseudo-Jenofonte, La constitucion de los lacedemonios, Hieron, La constitucion de los atenienses* (Buenos Aires 2017) 122–123.

ruled and for the admiration that comes from it (1.6.1 ff., esp. 8, 10, 21).³⁸ Thus, *philonikia* does not appear as an independent psychological trait, but as one dependent on a desire for admiration and honours. If in fact *philotimia* and *philonikia* are linked not as equals but instead in a hierarchical, dependent way, that would explain why *philonikia* could become a negative. There are two possibilities: *philonikia* has lost *philotimia* as leading trait and has another one as reference, e.g. *philokerdeia*, which would make the final goal of victory mere profit; or *philonikia* is driven by false *philotimia*, which would corrupt the desire for victory (e.g. not over enemies but over friends and colleagues).

How does *philotimia* work in the games before the war against Armenia? In *Cyropaedia* 3.3 ff. Cyrus has managed to subdue the rebellious Armenian king and has also defeated the Chaldeans. He even manages to make Armenia and Chaldea allies of Persia and Media against Assyria. But the campaign pauses and the army rests before continuing the war. At this moment, Cyrus

observed that, because they were so eager to excel in those exercises in which they compete against each other, many of the soldiers were even jealous of one another; for this reason also he wished to lead them into the enemy's country as soon as possible. For he knew that common dangers make comrades kindly disposed toward one another, and that in the midst of such dangers there is no jealousy of those who wear decorations on their armour or of those who are striving for glory; on the contrary, soldiers praise and love their fellows even more, because they recognize in them co-workers for the common good. (3.3.10)

The situation is especially interesting. *Philotimia*, already described as a psychological virtue of the Persian soldiers, here presents a negative aspect that must be addressed. Indeed, *philotimia* requires others as enablers (someone to beat, someone to be better than, etc.) in the eyes of a third party (someone to see and value those actions). Instead of denying this intrinsic property, Cyrus embraces it. His ability lies in redirecting the

³⁸ See V. Gray, *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes. Reading the Reflections* (Oxford 2011) 265–267, against the ironic reading of this passage in C. Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince. Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia* (Berkeley 2001) 164–178.

philotimia towards a proper target. And so, enemies play this role so that the soldiers' *philotimia* will unfold properly: defeating the adversaries brings honour and recognition by commanders, comrades, and society as a whole. At the same time, the imminence of danger (the fear of suffering future damage) dissolves any type of quarrel that might exist between the members of a community, and in this situation the *philotimia* (trying to achieve honour by defeating enemies, making new strategies, doing courageous deeds, etc.) becomes valuable again for everyone (cf. *Lac.* 4.5, *Cyr.* 1.2.12).

Xenophon's account sets out what happens when there are no external adversaries. Without enemies, the only means of acquiring what is desired by *philotimia* are fellow soldiers. Competition not only breaks the bonds of friendship between comrades, but also stirs up jealousy. Cyrus responds to this with two complementary measures. The most obvious one is to quickly restart the war with the objective of facing a common enemy (*Cyr.* 3.3.12). The second strategy shows another aspect of the good development of *philotimia*: the importance of a hierarchy that clearly establishes that not all recognitions have the same weight—instead, that they are dependent on who gives them. Cyrus summons the entire army in perfect order, and fully armed, and reiterates the entire chain of command, explaining in detail which officers are in charge of which army sections (3.3.11). This reaffirmation of a vertical structure allows him to easily organise prizes, punishments, and rewards, as well as honours and recognitions. The initial, uncontrolled *philotimia* is a form of what I have described as false *philotimia*: the soldiers seek to obtain recognition without any restrictions through acts that are harmful to their society (or in this case the army). Cyrus' intervention manages to reconvert this impulse, retrieving its original, useful configuration.

The importance of a hierarchical criterion for the competition and, therefore, for access to honours, thus propelling the virtuous development of *philotimia*, is one of the *Hipparkhikos*' motifs

(*Hipp.* 1.23–25, 9.3).³⁹ That *philotimia* without a criterion is false *philotimia*—and therefore a corrupt type with negative consequences—allows us to explain the negative characterization of Alcibiades and Critias as *philotimotatoi* (*Mem.* 1.2.12).⁴⁰ This is a strange pejorative use of a *philotimos* superlative:⁴¹ as we have seen, Xenophon uses the word another five times and always does so with positive connotations while highlighting its utility for all society (*Mem.* 3.1.10, 3.5.3; *Cyr.* 1.2.1; *Ages.* 10.4; *Hipp.* 2.2).⁴²

At the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon devotes himself to defending Socrates from the accusations made against him,⁴³ and in 1.2.12 ff. he faces what must have been one of the most compromising circumstances for his contemporaries: his relationship with Critias and Alcibiades. Xenophon's narrative is very clear: Critias and Alcibiades did plenty of damage to Athens, and the cause was their nature. They were the most ambitious of the Athenians, which led them to seek fame at all costs and to desire without restraint to be part of all political decisions (1.2.14). Xenophon's portrait of the two characters and their psychological predisposition is, in light of what I have argued, clear: we are facing false *philotimia*, the kind that does not care about performing good deeds, but simply being performatively honoured, without any consideration for the reasons or motivations for the recognition.

What is the reason for this corrupt *philotimia*? It is possible to suggest three causes in the absence of a hierarchical criteria. The

³⁹ Keim, *Polis* 35 (2018) 515.

⁴⁰ See D. Gribble, *Alcibiades and Athens. A Study in Literary Presentation* (Oxford 1999) 223.

⁴¹ Like Alexiou, *Trends in Classics* 10 (2018) 123, I cannot see any apologetic dimension. The interpretation of M. Tamiolaki, "Athenian Leaders in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*," *Histos* Suppl. 5 (2016) 8–9, though interesting, fails to notice that in Xenophon sometimes *philotimia* is a negative quality.

⁴² Alexiou, *Trends in Classics* 10 (2018) 122.

⁴³ Cf. M. Bandini and L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon, Mémoires* (Paris 2000) ccxxxix.

first speculative reason, not explicit, may be found in the Socratics' criticisms of Athenian democracy and society.⁴⁴ For instance, Antisthenes, who is seen as one of Xenophon's influences, states that democracy is marked by the absence of any criteria. In Antisthenic philosophy, Athenian democracy is a political system that does not take into account that, to make informed decisions, some degree of technical knowledge is needed. If anyone can occupy any political office, a false horizontality is established wherein the most disadvantaged sectors are harmed by those who actually have the expertise to reach a position of power.⁴⁵ The only negative use of the superlative of *philotimos* in Xenophon's works occurs precisely in a democratic dramatic context, while the other five concern monarchical or military structures: clearly hierarchical settings. It would not be strange to think that, for Xenophon, Athenian society as it existed in the time of Alcibiades and Critias favoured the appearance, development, and excessive stardom of unusual characters marked by false *philotimia*.

A second reason for the development of false *philotimia* linked to the absence of hierarchy or criteria may be in Alcibiades' and Critias' contempt for Socrates as a teacher and as a role-model (*Mem.* 1.2.14 ff.). Their rejection of the Socratic type of life—to the extreme of preferring death over Socrates' life (1.2.16)—even though his virtue was well-known, is a sign of their inability to accept a stable criterion beyond their own ambition.

Finally, there is a third reason: their refusal to recognize the hierarchy that *sophrosune* should lead, ruling all virtues related to behaviour (*Mem.* 1.2.15, 17).⁴⁶ To illustrate its importance,

⁴⁴ For the Socratics' criticism of democracy and their Laconism see P. Cartledge, "The Socratics' Sparta and Rousseau's," in S. Hodkinson et al. (eds.), *Sparta: New Perspectives* (Swansea 2009 [1999]) 311–337.

⁴⁵ See G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* II (Naples 1990) 166–167 (V A 72, 73, 68).

⁴⁶ On *sophrosune* in Xenophon see G. J. de Vries, "Σοφροσύνη en grec classique," *Mnemosyne* 11 (1943) 81–101; H. North, *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca 1966) 128, 130–131; Due, *The Cyropaedia*

Xenophon states that those who have great abilities but lack *sophrosune* are most inclined to do wrong and commit injustice (4.3.1). In this sense, only with the cultivation of *sophrosune* can we conceive of the good development of *philotimia*, i.e. of true *philotimia*, the one that drives people towards doing good deeds.

To dwell on this last point: we have mentioned that the good development of *philotimia* is directly related, at a socio-political level, to the recognition of some type of order or hierarchy that permits the establishment of different types of recognition or honours to aim for. The trigger on the psychological level is *sophrosune*. The conversation between Tigranes and Cyrus about *sophrosune* highlights the usefulness of this virtue for being aware of one's own place. Cyrus has defeated the Armenian, former vassal of the Medes, who had rebelled, aspiring to greater freedom. His son Tigranes, showing his education—given by a teacher often identified with Socrates (*Cyr.* 3.3.38)⁴⁷—argues with Cyrus to save his father's life (3.3.14–40). An important section of this deals with the *sophrosune* of the Armenian (and his lack of it) (16–21), since that is the cause of his rebellion. *Aphrosune* explains why a man would try, for example, to defeat someone who is obviously superior. In the case of the Armenian, it explains why he rebels against Cyrus. An open and clear defeat is needed to be the tool to impose the recovery of moderation: when the *aphron* is surpassed in all aspects in an explicit and direct way, he understands his place and, therefore, recovers his *sophrosune* (19). A similar notion appears at the end of the *Oeconomicus*, where the possession of *sophrosune* distinguishes those

197; D. Morrison, "Remarques sur la psychologie morale de Xénophon," in M. Narcy et al. (eds.), *Xénophon et Socrate* (Paris 2008) 11–28; and F. Bevilacqua, *Memorabili di Senofonte* (Turin 2010) 53, 144 ff.

⁴⁷ Xenophon writes of an unnamed "sophist," but this word does not have the same derogatory meaning that it has, for example, in Plato. See W. Nestle, "Xenophon und die Sophistik," *Philologus* 94 (1940) 31–50; C. J. Clasen, "Xenophons Darstellung der Sophistik und der Sophisten," *Hermes* 112 (1984) 154–167; F. Villar, "The Uses of *sophistés* in Xenophon," in C. Mársico et al. (eds.), *Xenophon Philosopher: Ethics and Argumentation* (Bern forthcoming).

who know how to rule from those who do not (*Oec.* 21.12).⁴⁸ There, moderation plays a key role, since it is the virtue that allows a leader to rule over willing subjects. Without *sophrosune* every ruler is a despotic ruler, and to rule over unwilling subjects is a living hell (21.12).⁴⁹ Moderation, therefore, involves being able to acknowledge one's own abilities and those of others, and acting in accord with that. This fits Xenophon's Socrates' maxim, that *sophrosune* equals *sophia*, and this means knowing what is good and beautiful and pursuing it, as well as knowing what is bad and ugly and avoiding it (*Mem.* 3.9.4).

With *sophrosune*—the virtue that teaches one to identify and to respect one's proper social role—*philotimia* becomes the desire for real praise that can only come from doing good deeds. This resembles the words of Simonides, who maintains that there is a virtuous feedback between actual hard work and *sophrosune* (*Hier.* 9.8). As mentioned above, together with *sophrosune*, *philotimia* is always true *philotimia*. Although it is not explicit, we can think that this is exemplified in the case of the soldiers who recovered their moderation thanks to the reinforcement of the chain of command. At the beginning of the hostilities, they stop competing with each other and deploy *philotimia* fully in the war against a real enemy. It is also striking that Xenophon's archetypal *philotimotatos par excellence*, Cyrus, complements his natural desire for admiration with an intense training in *sophrosune*, learned as a child in Persia (*Cyr.* 1.2.8–9) and later exercised throughout his adult life (6.1.47).

While false *philotimia* can only have negative consequences in the long term, true *philotimia* is the drive for good communal actions, as only they can garner true approval. This potential can be displayed in any social or political position. For example, *philotimia* is the cause of soldiers exercising and improving their skills, which results in benefits to their cities (*Hipp.* 1.21, cf. 25).

⁴⁸ See S. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus. A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford 1994) 344.

⁴⁹ See R. Buxton, "Xenophon on Leadership: Commanders as Friends," in M. Flower (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon* (London/New York 2017) 331–332.

But, undoubtedly, *philotimia* unleashes its full magnitude and unfolds in broader endeavors when possessed and embraced by a ruler with *sophrosune*. That appears to be Xenophon's ideal development of the desire for honours, illustrated by the advice of Simonides and also by the recommendations of Cambyses the elder to Cyrus (*Cyr.* 1.6.7 ff.), and finally, those of Cyrus to his children (8.7.7 ff.): it is necessary to provide a true good life to the ruled, in order to be honoured by them and to rule happily. Gray has rightly pointed out that "the motive for the leader to foster this *eudaimonia* to followers is the pursuit of his own *eudaimonia* because he must use them for success."⁵⁰ But this mechanism applies to every human being, because, if we trust Socrates' judgement, there is nothing more virtuous for any individual than to be useful to society (*Mem.* 4.1.1–2). As we have seen, the main drive for pursuing good and beneficial actions is the ambition to be acknowledged by others. Of course, leaders and rulers are in a better position to do great deeds and also to be honoured by their fellows and subordinates. But with *philotimia* everyone, of any political or social status, can enjoy real admiration and true honours.⁵¹

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Bar Ilan University /
National Scientific and Technical
Research Council (CONICET)
rodrigoilllarraga@filo.uba.ar

⁵⁰ V. Gray, "Xenophon's *eudaimonia*," in F. de Luise et al., *Studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the Ancient Socratic Literature* (Sankt Augustin 2013) 63. Cf. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces* 100.

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