The Attachment of Demonstrators to Institutional Politics: Comparing LGBTIQ Pride Marches in Argentina and Chile

NICOLÁS M. SOMMA
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile

FEDERICO M. ROSSI
CONICET - Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Argentina

SOFÍA DONOSO
Universidad Mayor, Chile

Focusing on LGBTIQ demonstrations in Argentina and Chile, we study protesters’ attachment to institutional politics, defined as their emotional and attitudinal connection with the political system. We show that Argentine LGBTIQ demonstrators are on average more attached to institutional politics than Chilean ones. This can be explained neither by differences between Argentines and Chileans in general, nor by demonstrators’ individual characteristics. Instead, expanding the political process model, we argue that achieving a substantial part of the LGBTIQ agenda in Argentina, and limited success in Chile, contributed to build a stronger attachment to the political system among Argentine LGBTIQ demonstrators than their Chilean counterparts.

Keywords: Argentina, Chile, LGBTIQ movements, protest, protest surveys, social movements.

While existing social movement scholarship has centred on how political and institutional variables shape the rise, timing and fall of protests (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; McAdam, 2010), there is a dearth of scholarly attention on how the political setting shapes the political attitudes of activists (for an exception see Norris, Walgrave, and van Aelst, 2005). Recent literature has addressed this void by conducting surveys with demonstrators, thus beginning to unravel their different political profiles. The work of Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk (2009) and Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, and Walgrave (2014), for example, shows how different mobilisation contexts produce diverse motivational dynamics to participate in
demonstrations. Protest surveys following a shared methodology have also allowed for comparative research that helps us to understand how national political contexts shape the characteristics of protest participants (Stekelenburg et al., 2009).

Expanding on this work, we focus on demonstrators’ attachment to institutional politics (institutional attachment hereinafter). We define institutional attachment as the emotional and attitudinal connection with political parties, politicians and state representative institutions. This includes issues such as perceptions of political efficacy regarding politicians and the vote; trust in political institutions; identification with political parties; and satisfaction with democracy. In this way, we examine how the features of institutional politics are connected to prevalent attitudinal characteristics among protesters who engage in non-institutional politics.

We address two questions. First, how attached to institutional politics are participants in street demonstrations? Second, can the political context – specifically, institutional responsiveness to movements’ demands – help us understand variations in institutional attachment between participants in comparable demonstrations in different countries? By answering these questions, we expand the political process model (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et al., 2001; McAdam, 2010), which has focused on the rise and timing of protest, but says little about how the political context shapes activists’ attitudes. Because our conceptualization of institutional attachment is focused on attitudes towards state representative institutions, we do not consider engagement in political actions (such as voting) or attitudes towards civil society organisations other than parties.

We draw on 365 surveys of participants in the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersexual, and Queer (LGBTIQ) Pride Marches in Argentina (November 2015) and Chile (June 2016), complemented by general population surveys from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Our survey follows an adapted version of the methodology applied in the ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ network (Stekelenburg et al., 2012; Klandermans et al., 2014), a collaborative, international study that surveys people at marches through a standardised sampling procedure (see www.protestsurvey.eu).

Other surveys have been conducted at LGBTIQ Pride Marches in Latin America. The Latin American Center for Sexuality and Human Rights (CLAM) asked participants in LGBTIQ Pride Marches in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico who self-identified as LGBTIQ about issues pertaining to married life, parenthood, discrimination and violence among others (e.g. Jones, Libson, and Hiller, 2006; Barrientos, Díaz, and Muñoz, 2012). However, because they are surveys focused on the daily life of people who define themselves as LGBTIQ, they offer less insight into the relationship between people partaking in Pride Marches and institutional politics in comparison to the survey that this article draws on.

The sexual diversity field – composed of the collective struggles for advancing or opposing the rights of sexual minorities – is a contested terrain in contemporary Latin America (Corrales and Pecheny, 2010; Corrales, 2015). Although public support has grown and legislative outcomes have improved regarding LGBTIQ rights during the last two decades, progress has been uneven across the region. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, and a few local governments in Mexico (amongst others, Mexico City), allow same-sex marriage. In Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, same-sex unions have been legalised. By contrast, same-sex marriage is still banned by the constitutions of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras (Díez, 2015: 3).
There is also great disparity between different sexual minorities. Legislation on gender identity is very recent. Argentina adopted a transgender law in 2012, which allows transgender people to register under the gender and name of their choice and use that identity in the public health system. Similar laws were passed as late as 2015 in Colombia, 2016 in Ecuador, Bolivia and Mexico, and 2018 in Chile. As for the rights of intersex people, few countries have secured their physical integrity and adopted policies that address some of their heartfelt demands such as banning irreversible surgery or treatments on intersex children. So, although we refer to the LGBTIQ movement and LGBTIQ policies in this article, we acknowledge that there has been much less attention to and progress in relation to the concerns of bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (BTIQ) communities.

This article focuses on Argentina and Chile. As we explain below, they provide an interesting setting for comparing activist populations given their broad historical, cultural and socioeconomic similarities. We find that Argentine demonstrators are on average more attached to institutional politics than Chilean ones. We show that this puzzle cannot be explained by the arguments that the general Argentine public, or Argentine protestors in general, are more attached to politics than their Chilean counterparts. We also demonstrate that this is not due to compositional differences among LGBTIQ protestors.

Having discarded these alternative explanations, our answer is rooted in the sexual diversity field – specifically, in the responsiveness of the political system to movement demands. Our main argument is that the achievement of a substantial proportion of the LGBTIQ agenda in Argentina, as well as the considerably smaller success with the same issues in Chile, has created a stronger attachment to the party system and the political elites among Argentine LGBTIQ demonstrators than their Chilean counterparts, who exhibit more frustration with their representatives and political institutions. Our argument expands the political process model because it shows how the political context shapes the attitudes (and not only the protest actions) of activists. Given the nature of our data, though, we cannot propose a causal argument. We recognize that there may be a recursive relationship between institutional responsiveness and activist attachment. Hence, we proceed by first discarding alternative explanations and then reconstructing the LGBTIQ policy histories in Argentina and Chile to show their divergent patterns.

Studying demonstrators’ institutional attachment matters for various reasons. First, it helps to unravel the heterogeneity of demonstrators’ characteristics. This is welcome given the growing body of research showing that comparing those who protest and those who do not by means of general population surveys provides a monolithic view on the former (Schussman and Soule, 2005). Second, research on this topic helps us to understand how demonstrators perceive their imbrication in the institutional political system and their strategies to influence it (Rossi, 2017). Finally, it helps us to understand the prospects of policy reforms to address the LGBTIQ community’s demands. The attitudes and perceptions of demonstrators towards the political system will partly define the construction of alliances between institutional and non-institutional actors when advancing reforms.

The article is structured as follows. We review the literature on the relationship between social movements and institutional politics, emphasising how political systems more responsive to movement demands can increase institutional attachment among demonstrators. We explain our survey methodology and then present the empirical puzzle by comparing Argentine and Chilean demonstrators. After discarding three alternative explanations, we present a narrative of the recent development of the sexual diversity
field in each country. The comparison suggests that the varying levels of progress between countries in enacting the sexual diversity agenda helps to explain the differing institutional attachments of demonstrators. The narratives also show how responsiveness depended on the cohesiveness and timing of social movements, as well as their alliances to parties and state actors.

Institutional Attachment of Social Movement Activists

The literature does not provide a single answer to the question of when, and under what conditions, activists are attached to institutional politics, nor to what explains variations in this respect. Until the 1960s, scholars believed that social movement activists were alienated from the political system and mainstream society (Rule 1988).

The paradigmatic shift of the 1970s and 1980s, driven by the emergence of resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories in the United States, brought a new, more benign view of activists. They came to be viewed as rational individuals employing a variegated tactical repertoire to reach political goals, with collective protest being just one of several legitimate tools, like voting or lobbying (Tilly, 1978). Specifically, the political process model (PPM) introduced the concept of political opportunity structure to emphasise how the political context shapes the constraints on and opportunities for mobilisation (McAdam, 2010). The PPM argues that the more open the political system is to participation, the more likely it is that people will mobilise (Tarrow, 1994: 77–80). While the PPM has advanced our understanding of the rise, timing and fall of protests (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et al., 2001), it says little about how the political context might shape the attitudes of activists towards institutional politics.

The logic of the PPM, however, can fruitfully be used to address our concerns. Expanding the PPM, we contend that political systems responsive to movement demands – i.e., that take such demands into account when addressing policy issues and enacting reforms – promote among activists a sense that their demands are worthwhile. This fosters higher levels of political trust and perceptions of political efficacy, identification with and participation in political parties, and satisfaction with democracy – in a nutshell, higher institutional attachment. Conversely, we assert that political contexts less responsive to movement demands will depress institutional attachment among activists, as they will feel their demands are not a priority in the institutional domain.

That political responsiveness boosts activist institutional attachment is theoretically plausible but far from obvious. It is precisely in more open and responsive democracies that activists often become harsh critics of institutional politics (Norris, 1999). Also, concessions obtained from responsive politicians may foster increased expectations among activists that political systems cannot meet, leading to despair and detachment (Davies, 1962). Finally, for responsiveness to boost attachment, movement leaders must frame policy achievements in ways that affect rank-and-file activist views – a process that, as framing theorists note, is not automatic (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613). In sum, whether policy responsiveness affects activists’ institutional attachment or not remains controversial.

However, what happens in the sexual diversity field cannot be extrapolated to the national political system as a whole or to other types of claims (i.e. redistributive). Scholarship on the LGTBIQ movement has shown that even within the sexual diversity field, efforts to secure legal rights and protections have had mixed results. In the United States, for example, the movement was for years more successful in attaining...
the right for same-sex couples to adopt in various local and state jurisdictions than to marry (Mucciaroni, 2008). Also, as mentioned in the introduction, there has been far more progress in promoting lesbian and gay rights than in satisfying the demands of the transgender and intersex community.

While in the United States the PPM emphasised how social movements can take advantage of political openings, scholars in Latin America often addressed instead how movements distance themselves from the state. During the struggles to regain democracy in the 1980s, they examined the ways in which ‘new’ social movements redefined democracy and the political by bringing issues of identity, ethnicity and citizenship into the political agenda (Escobar and Álvarez, 1992). Yet this literature often neglected social movements’ relationship with the institutional sphere and downplayed the capacity of the state and political parties for enabling social change (Rice, 2012). Furthermore, it overlooked the fact that rather than distancing themselves from the state, Latin American social movements frequently aim to gain access and proximity to the formal institutions of governance (Davis, 1999; Rossi, 2017).

In sum, extant scholarly debates have no universal answer to the question of when activists are detached from political institutions. In some contexts, depending on the nature of the state and other political institutions, activists might seek to distance themselves from the institutional terrain, and in others, engage with it as much as possible. We will explore these issues in the LGBTIQ Pride Marches in Argentina and Chile.

Why LGBTIQ Movements in Argentina and Chile?

We compare Argentina and Chile for two reasons. First, by comparing two neighbouring countries that share many socioeconomic, cultural and historical characteristics, any country differences between the activist populations are less likely due to these factors. Second, despite these similarities, Argentina and Chile present an interesting contrast in the ways institutional politics addressed social movement demands. In general, Argentine movements have established a closer relationship to parties and state agencies than their Chilean counterparts, promoting greater responsiveness to movement demands (Donoso and von Bülow, 2017; Rossi, 2017).

As we show below, in the sexual diversity field this resulted in a greater advancement of the goals of the LGBTIQ movement in Argentina than in Chile. This is in line with Corrales (2017: 52), who argues that the cross-national variation in LGBTIQ rights in Latin America is based on the existence of a movement that pushes for the achievement of the LGBTIQ agenda and the openness of the national institutional context. If greater political responsiveness boosts activist attachment to institutional politics, as we argue, we should see Argentine activists more attached than Chilean ones. The comparison of Argentina and Chile thus provides an ideal setting for exploring our argument.

Data and Methods

Drawing on surveys in several European countries, the ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (CCC) network developed a specific methodology for conducting surveys with participants in protest demonstrations. The objective is
to survey a given number of demonstrators (usually between 150 and 250 per event) following a selection procedure in which each demonstrator has a similar probability of being approached by the survey team.

Each protest has a team of supervisors called ‘pointers’, each of whom oversees a team of pollsters. Typically, four to six pointers are used for a protest, each of whom has a team of approximately five pollsters. Upon arriving at the protest event, the survey team makes a rough estimate of the protest participants and defines a criterion for selecting ‘rows’ and individuals within each row to ensure similar chances of contact for each. They then communicate that criterion to the pointers, who use it to select potential respondents and inform their pollsters about which demonstrators they should address.

The questionnaire includes information on various topics related to the protest – how participants were informed and recruited, whether they came together with other people (and who), what motivated them to protest, their knowledge and perception of the convening organisations, political and ideological attitudes, previous history of activism, and sociodemographic information.

CCC surveys go beyond the very basic characterisation of demonstrators that is common in general population surveys, which ask whether the respondent protested in the past or not. CCC surveys allow studying central aspects of the mobilisation process that are simply not recorded in general population surveys. And by applying the survey at the time of the protest, more reliable information is obtained since answers are less affected by memory bias.

To adapt this methodology to the Chilean and Argentine context, using recommendations given by the team that implemented the surveys in Mexico and Central America, we deviated from the original European model in an important respect. We applied the original CCC questionnaire in a face-to-face fashion. In Europe, respondents were asked to fill in the questionnaire at home and send it back by post. This change was made due to the low response rate that the Latin American survey teams anticipated would be obtained if using mail. However, following the CCC methodology, we used the same survey questionnaire and selected demonstrations that are ‘functional equivalents’. We picked demonstrations taking place in two capital cities – Buenos Aires and Santiago – and that referred to the same issue: LGBTIQ rights.

Because the CCC questionnaire does not record information regarding non-binary gender self-identification, we cannot study the rich multiplicity of identities that compose the LGBTIQ movement. Surveys by Barrientos et al. (2012) and Jones et al. (2006) were specifically developed for the LGTBIQ movement and introduced an analysis of these multiple identities.

Table 1 summarises the main features of our surveys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Chile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>7 November 2015</td>
<td>25 June 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Name</strong></td>
<td>Marcha del Orgullo LGBTIQ</td>
<td>Marcha por la Diversidad Sexual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
<td>149</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CCC surveys in Argentina and Chile.
The Attachment of Demonstrators to Institutional Politics

Figure 1. Institutional Attachment among Argentine and Chilean Participants in LGBTIQ Demonstrations

Source: CCC surveys in Argentina and Chile.

The Puzzle: Why Are Argentine Demonstrators more Attached to Institutional Politics than Chilean Ones?

Our survey shows a puzzling contrast: participants in the Argentine LGBTIQ demonstration are systematically more attached to institutional politics than their Chilean counterparts. As Figure 1 shows, this happens across several indicators of institutional attachment. For instance, on a 1–5 scale, on average Chilean demonstrators agree more than their Argentine counterparts that ‘many politicians make promises but then do nothing about them’ (4.55 vs 3.57 respectively) and that ‘voting is useless; parties always do what they want’ (3.51 vs 2.66), with both differences being significant at the 0.001 level. Likewise, Chilean demonstrators put much less trust than Argentines in the national government (2.03 vs 2.95 respectively) and political parties (1.56 vs 2.67, both differences significant at the 0.001 level), and slightly less in local governments (2.28 vs 2.47).

Additionally, Figure 1 shows that about 26 percent of Argentine demonstrators are members of political parties while only 6 percent of Chilean demonstrators are. And while 63 percent of Argentines feel ‘somewhat close’ or ‘very close’ to a given political party, only 28 percent of Chileans feel so (chi-square significant at the 0.001 level in both cases). Moving to perceptions of the political regime, on a 0 to 10-point scale of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country, Argentine demonstrators score 6.07 on average while Chilean demonstrators only score 3.14 (difference significant at the 0.001 level). Finally, while 78 percent of Argentine demonstrators reported having voted in the last national election, only 48 percent of Chilean demonstrators did so (not shown in Figure 1; these figures are only partially comparable because turnout is mandatory only in Argentina, though not punished if not fulfilled).

In sum, across several indicators mapping feelings and attitudes towards the main elements of the institutional political system, Argentine demonstrators clearly seem to be more attached than Chilean demonstrators. Such differences are not only statistically but also substantively significant.

How can we explain this contrast? Our answer emphasizes the differing responsiveness of political systems and institutional actors to movement demands, but before presenting it at length, we will consider three alternative explanations of this empirical puzzle.

A first alternative explanation lies in ‘compositional differences’ – differences in average individual characteristics in the country samples. For instance, Argentines may score higher than Chileans on individual attributes associated with higher institutional attachment, and this may account for the puzzle. In considering this possibility, we carried out multivariate regression models with each indicator of institutional attachment as the dependent variable. Independent variables were age, educational level and gender (male, female and no answer), as well as a country dummy variable in which Argentina has a value of 1 and Chile equals 0. We chose age, education and gender because previous research shows that in Latin America, these factors usually shape institutional attachment (Booth and Seligson, 2009: 113–116). If after controlling for these factors, the country variable remains significant, then country differences in attachment cannot be (at least fully) attributed to compositional differences: even if Chileans and Argentines on average scored equally in these variables, there would persist differences that must be attributed to other factors.

Table 2 presents the results. It shows the coefficient, standard error and significance level of the country dummy variable in models having different institutional attachment indicators as dependent variables, while controlling by gender, age and education. Results mirror the bivariate ones presented in Figure 1: excepting trust in the local government, in every case Argentines show significantly higher levels of institutional attachment than Chileans. Thus, the puzzle cannot be attributed to compositional differences.

A second alternative explanation posits that Argentines in general are more attached to institutional politics than Chileans in general. If the general adult populations in both countries differ on average in that respect, the differences we found among demonstrators might merely reflect this fact. If this were the case, when comparing the adult populations in both countries, we should find that Argentines are more attached than Chileans, and that the magnitude of the difference is similar to that found between demonstrators. In considering this possibility, we used LAPOP surveys of both countries (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/), which represent the adult population. We combined the
Table 2. Regression Coefficients of Country (Argentina = 1, Chile = 0) in Institutional Attachment Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of model</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Country coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinal logistic</td>
<td>Many politicians make promises but then do nothing about them</td>
<td>−2.085</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voting is useless; parties always do what they want</td>
<td>−1.346</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>1.518</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in local government</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
<td>2.008</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary logistic</td>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>1.658</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinal logistic</td>
<td>Closeness with political party</td>
<td>1.594</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>2.992</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aAll models control for age, gender, and educational level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Source: CCC surveys in Argentina and Chile.

2010, 2012 and 2014 waves to obtain a robust picture less affected by contingent factors. We considered trust in political institutions, party membership and identification, and satisfaction with democracy (LAPOP does not have indicators of political efficacy comparable to those of the CCC survey).

A third alternative explanation posits that the answer to the puzzle lies in differences in the social movement sector (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) as a whole. If this were the case, the differences in institutional attachment among LGBTIQ demonstrators should emerge when comparing demonstrators in general in both countries. For testing this possibility, we also use LAPOP. Specifically, we compare all those who reported having participated in a demonstration or public protest in the last twelve months, disregarding the issue.

Table 3 summarises the ensuing results. It compares the level of institutional attachment in both countries among the general population, the population of demonstrators (on any issue) and the LGBTIQ demonstrators we surveyed. For each indicator of attachment (presented in the rows), the table shows the ratio that results from dividing the Argentine figure into the Chilean figure. Thus, ratios over 1 indicate that Argentines are comparatively more attached, while ratios below 1 indicate the opposite.

The last column on the right in Table 3 shows what we already know: Argentine LGBTIQ demonstrators are much more attached than Chilean ones, and accordingly all ratios are over 1. But this is not the case when comparing the general country populations (alternative explanation #2): four ratios are below 1 and only two are over 1. Indeed, Chileans in general seem to trust more in the three institutions considered, and be more satisfied about democracy, than Argentines in general. Thus, the differences among LGBTIQ demonstrators do not mirror the differences found in the general population.

Moving to alternative explanation #3, the central column shows that Argentine protestors in general tend to be more attached than their Chilean counterparts (all ratios are above 1 except for trust in local governments). But the ratios of LGBTIQ demonstrators are always higher (and often considerably higher) than those of general protestors. Thus, while part of the puzzle may be explained by national differences among protestors, there is clearly more in play.
Table 3. Country Ratios of Institutional Attachment in Three Different Populations (Higher Ratios Denote Higher Attachment of Argentines Relative to Chileans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>General population</th>
<th>Demonstrators last year (any issue)</th>
<th>LGBTIQ demonstrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Congress/nat. Govt.</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local government</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: LAPOP. bSource: CCC surveys in Argentina and Chile. cX Argentina / X Chile. LAPOP: question refers to Congress; CCC: question refers to national government. dX Argentina / X Chile. ePercent Argentina/percent Chile. LAPOP asks about attendance to meetings of political parties and political movements. CCC asks about membership in political parties. fPercent Argentina/percent Chile. LAPOP: ratio of percent satisfied + percent very satisfied with the way democracy works in (country). CCC: ratio of means in 0–10 satisfaction scale. gPercent Argentina/percent Chile. LAPOP asks about sympathy towards a political party (yes/no). In CCC, we consider in each country the percentage who feel ‘somewhat’ or ‘very close’ to a political party.

Alternatively, if we read Table 3 at the row level from left to right, we find that with just one exception, the ratios increase sequentially. That is, the attachment gap is larger for demonstrators in general than for the population at large, and for LGBTIQ demonstrators than for demonstrators in general. This suggests that there is something specific to the sexual diversity field that deepens the attachment gaps. Next, we turn to this point.

The Uneven Progress of LGTBIQ Movements in Argentina and Chile

The alternative explanations examined are insufficient to explain why Argentine LGTBIQ demonstrators are more attached to institutional politics than their Chilean counterparts. Expanding the logic of the political process model, we argue that part of the answer lies in the differing responsiveness of national political systems to the demands of LGTBIQ movements. By addressing many such demands early on and to a fuller extent, the Argentine political system and its main players contributed to foster a sense of attachment among activists that is missing in Chile, where the advance of the sexual diversity agenda was much slower and faced significant obstacles. Below we develop this claim, first looking at Argentina in historical perspective and then Chile.

Argentina: A Successful Movement with a Long History and Responsive Political System

In 2010 Argentina became the first Latin American country, and one of fewer than a dozen countries in the world, to legalise same-sex marriage, including full rights for adoption, inheritance and health access. Two key factors explain this achievement. One is related to the characteristics of the issue and the actor protesting. The other one
is the configuration of the national political context – specifically, the strength of allies of vis-à-vis antagonists to the LGBTIQ agenda of claims.

The history of the LGBTIQ quest for recognition in Argentina is longer than in most other countries in Latin America, including Chile. Argentina has the region’s oldest LGBTIQ movement. It can be traced back to 1967 and to the organisation Nuestro Mundo (Our World), founded by Communist Party youth members expelled from the party due to their homosexuality (Díez, 2015: 76–77). There have been two waves in the history of the LGBTIQ movement in Argentina (Encarnación, 2011). In these two waves, the LGBTIQ movement was transformed from a revolutionary liberation movement to a more moderate actor, which resembles an advocacy group.

During the first wave, between the 1960s and 1970s, the Frente de Liberación Homosexual (Homosexual Liberation Front, FLH) was created (Corrales and Pecheny, 2010: 10). The FLH was intensively persecuted during Isabel Perón’s government in 1975, and hundreds of FLH members disappeared during the 1976–1983 military authoritarian regime (Díez, 2015: 78–79). The second wave started after re-democratisation in the 1980s and has focused on ‘the integration of gays into the community by presenting gays and lesbians as equal to everyone else’ (Encarnación, 2011: 106). Influenced by the human rights movement and Michel Foucault’s ideas, in 1984 the Comunidad Homosexual Argentina (Homosexual Argentine Community, CHA), the main contemporary organisation of the Argentine LGBTIQ movement, was founded. In the 1990s, the CHA received growing international financing due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, turning gay street activism into an advocacy NGO (Díez, 2013: 218). Legal advocacy and activism framed as a human rights issue has been the strategy since the 1980s, with the idea that heteronormativity needs to be questioned by guaranteeing for others the same human rights as heterosexuals (Díez, 2013: 222; 2015: 80).

Crucially, the LGTBIQ movement built a strong relationship with the party system and with allies inside and outside the state. During the struggle against the military regime, important ties were formed. A strong and well-organised human rights movement emerged in the late 1970s and successfully established a human rights agenda during the transition process. This was crucial for the LGBTIQ movement (Pousadela, 2013). Since the 1980s, it has been closely connected to the human rights movement, as well as the women’s movement and some small left-wing parties (Partido Obrero [Workers Party], Movimiento al Socialismo [Movement towards Socialism], Partido Humanista [Humanist Party], and the Socialist Party mainly) (Díez, 2015: 82–83). The construction of this relationship continued in the post-transition period, with increased dialogue between the LGBTIQ movement, the women’s movement and the Socialists (Corrales and Pecheny, 2010: 23–24). In brief, then, the transition to democracy in Argentina produced a party system that was not detached from social movements or, significantly, human rights claims. From the very beginning of the transition to democracy, coordination among state and social actors was decisive and a common practice in Argentina.

The responsiveness of the political system was also a result of the capacity of the LGBTIQ movement to use certain historical junctures tactically. The 1994 terrorist attack on a Jewish association headquarters in Buenos Aires, in particular, provoked strong general condemnation of discrimination of any kind. This was translated into the first constitution of the city of Buenos Aires, drafted in 1996. The LGBTIQ movement profited from this political opportunity to introduce the first constitutional clause on anti-sexual orientation discrimination in all Latin America (Díez, 2015: 114).
The legalisation of civil union in 2001 in Buenos Aires was the result of the combination of two key conditions: a well-crafted alliance with the leftist government of Aníbal Ibarra (a former member of the youth Communists) and the impact of the 2001 crisis (the major regime crisis of Argentina since the return to democracy) on the political elites, which forced parties to be more responsive to societal claims to avoid suffering massive protests (Díez, 2015: 122).

This situation was repeated during the national legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2010. The successful advocacy campaign was managed from the Socialist office inside Congress and received the strong support of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Díez, 2015: 147–148). The support of strong institutional allies from inside the state was crucial to achieving same-sex marriage in Argentina despite strong veto players. Abiding cooperation with institutional allies, parties and other movements helps to explain the positive evaluation of participation, voting and parties by LGBTIQ activists reported in Figure 1.

Finally, while the Catholic Church and other religious groups are the main players vetoing the expansion of LGBTIQ rights in many Latin American countries, in Argentina there are no confessional parties of any religious group with parliamentarian representation (Corrales, 2015: 54). This does not mean that there are no links between religious groups and the party system, but these are individually based. This explains why the Catholic Church was taken by surprise by the approval of same-sex marriage legislation. Lacking strong ties to political parties, the bishop of Buenos Aires, Jorge Bergoglio (nowadays Pope Francis), was unable to coordinate rapid, effective resistance. In brief, the conservative bloc was not sufficiently organised to oppose same-sex marriage legislation in Argentina (Díez, 2015: 147). This political configuration also helps to explain, two years after same-sex marriage, another important advance: the adoption of a transgender law.

The movement’s agenda was not realised by fighting against the institutional system, but rather through a strategy of protracted colonisation of the state so that strong intra-state members could advocate for LGBTIQ rights. The comparatively high percentage of party affiliates who participated in the Buenos Aires protest (Figure 1) illustrates how embedded the movement is in the party system. The achievement of the LGBTIQ agenda is an important factor for understanding the high institutional attachment among LGBTIQ activists in Argentina.

**Chile: A Fragmented Movement with Few Achievements and a Political System with Low Responsiveness**

The Chilean political system has been much more sluggish than Argentina’s in advancing the sexual diversity agenda. While, as noted above, some Argentine provinces passed their first laws protecting sexual minorities in the 1990s, a comparable law in Chile was not approved until 2012. A gender identity law was approved in 2018, six years later than in Argentina. Similarly, Chile only approved a civil union bill in 2015, which some provinces of Argentina had already done in 2003. Chilean legislative advances not only came late but are also incomplete. As of early 2019, same-sex marriage and the adoption of children by homosexual couples – both of which have existed in Argentina since 2010 – have not been approved in Chile and are unlikely to be in the near future.

Uneven progress in the sexual diversity agenda in Argentina and Chile is consistent with the differences in the subjective states of the demonstrators we surveyed. We asked
them how they feel when thinking ‘about the rights of sexual minorities’, followed by different emotions and an answer scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = a lot. Results appear in Figure 2. Given the obstacles to institutional recognition in Chile, it makes sense that Chilean demonstrators feel angrier than Argentines (3.27 vs. 2.73) as well as more frustrated (2.99 vs. 2.27) about the rights of sexual minorities (differences significant at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels respectively).

Why did Chile’s sexual diversity agenda fall behind Argentina’s? Part of the answer stems from the weakness of the Chilean LGTBIQ movement. To begin with, LGTBIQ people suffered severe police harassment during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–1990), and hostility persisted in the 1990s, after democratic restoration. Furthermore, since its beginnings in the early 1990s, a deep, persistent division has weakened the Chilean LGBTIQ movement. One side of the divide is illustrated by Rolando Jiménez – a former Communist militant turned prominent gay activist and founder of the Movimiento de Liberación Homosexual (Movement of Homosexual Liberation, MOVILH), the first LGBTIQ organisation in Chile, dating from 1991. Jiménez was often accused of being a male chauvinist and discriminating against lesbians, transvestites, effeminate men and people with AIDS (Robles, 2008; Díez, 2015). He was finally expelled from MOVILH and in 1999 created another organisation, also called MOVILH although with a slightly different underlying name (Movimiento de Liberación e Integración Homosexual [Movement of Homosexual Liberation and Integration]).

On the other side of the division stands a host of groups representing lesbians, transgendered people and transvestites, which coalesced in 1998 into the Movimiento Unificado de Minorías Sexuales (Unified Movement of Sexual Minorities, MUMS). MUMS focused on establishing public policies on AIDS rather than on policy change and challenging the state. During the 1990s, MUMS members helped in the design and administration of HIV/AIDS prevention programmes, received international funding, and gave input for the first AIDS law in 2001 (Robles, 2008).
In addition, in 2011 the Fundación Iguales (Equals Foundation) was created. Iguales is led by members of the Chilean social elite and has adopted a less confrontational approach than MOVILH. Iguales declared its intention to push for an anti-discrimination law and civil unions rather than for the more resisted goal of same-sex marriage. Given its more resonant approach, Iguales quickly received the support of a host of leftist and centrist politicians (including some of the most liberal Christian Democratic legislators), as well as artists, intellectuals and journalists.

A fragmented LGBTIQ movement met a hostile environment, where homosexuality was illegal until 1999. Also, labour code allows firing employees for the 'good of the company’. Both things have contributed to keeping homosexuals in the closet (King, 2013: 189).

The overall fragmentation of the LGBTIQ movement worked against its ability to gain stable allies and create strong networks for policy change (Díez, 2015). Movement ties to allied politicians also proved weak and unstable, at least before the creation of the Fundación Iguales in 2011. The links forged with leftist legislators, which led to the legalisation of homosexuality in 1999, were not further developed thereafter (Díez, 2015: 203). In fact, while the left showed greater openness to the movement than the right, its homophobic old guard prevented wholesale endorsement (Robles, 2008).

In combination with a weak social movement, Chile’s powerful conservative bloc helps account for the relative stagnation of the sexual diversity agenda. It is composed of three political parties that routinely opposed LGBTIQ legislation for years: the Christian Democratic Party (DC), National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). The DC was a member of the Concertación, the centre-left coalition in power between 1990 and 2010. While it is a centrist party that shares some views with the left regarding the role of the state and social policy orientation, it has strong links to the Catholic Church and a more conservative view of LGBTIQ rights.

In turn, the RN and especially the UDI – the two partners of the centre-right Alianza coalition which has controlled roughly half of Congress since 1990 – are motivated by conservative ideology, are linked to conservative interest groups, and represent conservative electoral bases. Thus, DC, RN and UDI legislators had little electoral or ideological motivation to support progressive LGBTIQ legislation. Given their predominance in Congress, this powerful bloc routinely delayed or obstructed progressive LGBTIQ legislation with various tactics over the years. Finally, since democratic restoration, some wings of the Catholic Church have also shaped the sexual diversity field through an expanding network of educational institutions, foundations and informal networks at the elite level, especially through Opus Dei and the Legionarios de Cristo (Christ Legionsaries) (Díez, 2015).

The existence of a strong conservative bloc helps explain why Chile delayed until 1999 to legalise homosexuality. The congressional debate started in 1995 on the initiative of leftist legislators of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy, PPD). Yet RN, UDI and DC deputies successfully opposed it. They argued that homosexuality was immoral and unnatural and that it could be the first move in a path leading to same-sex marriage (Díez, 2015: 200). In the end, the legalisation of homosexuality in 1999 did not result from the ideological liberalisation of conservative politicians, but from Chile’s attempt to secure a free trade agreement with the European Union, which required that Chile show itself to the world as a tolerant country (Díez, 2015: 202).
Chile also had to wait until 2012 to have its first anti-discrimination law. This bill, which included protection to LGBTIQ among other social categories, was introduced in Congress in 2004. Yet, DC and UDI legislators, as well as conservative civil society and evangelical organisations, launched a campaign to exclude LGBTIQ categories from the proposal. The discussion froze after 2007 for lack of support from DC senators – who noted pressure from religious groups. In 2011, during the centre-right government of Sebastián Piñera, the murder of a gay teenager by a neo-Nazi group in a Santiago park contributed to overcoming conservative resistance in Congress. The assassination shocked the public to a point that few legislators could oppose the bill without risking losing support from their constituents. After seven years of debate in Congress, the bill was finally approved by mid-2012 (Díez, 2015: 232–234).

Likewise, the conservative bloc delayed the approval of a civil union bill. Initially introduced in 2003 by a centre-left party, the PPD, its discussion was postponed until Socialist President Michelle Bachelet’s first mandate (2006–2010), only to be opposed by the DC (Díez, 2015: 221–223). After becoming president, Sebastián Piñera proposed a common law agreement (the Acuerdo de Vida en Pareja [Life Couple Agreement]). The project received the support of some RN liberals but created rifts with the more conservative UDI and was frozen in Congress until 2011, when Iguales took up its banner (Díez, 2015: 235). Again, the bill was strongly opposed by religious organisations and the UDI, yet this time they were unable to block it.

Conclusion

In the last three decades, the political process model (PPM) explored how political context affects the rise, timing and fall of protests (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 2010). The PPM, however, paid little attention to the ways in which such context shapes the institutional attachment of activists. We follow the logic of the PPM to make sense of an empirical puzzle revealed by our surveys of participants in LGTBIQ demonstrations in two similar Latin American countries: why do Argentine demonstrators systematically show higher levels of attachment to institutional politics than their Chilean counterparts? That is, why do Argentine demonstrators have more political trust and more favourable perceptions of political efficacy, show higher rates of party membership and party identification, vote more, and feel more satisfied with democracy than their Chilean counterparts?

We propose that an important factor for understanding these differences lies in the responsiveness of the political system to LGBTIQ movements’ demands. In Argentina, laws protecting sexual minorities have existed since the mid-1990s (in Chile, only since 2012), and civil union bills date from the early 2000s (in Chile, from 2015). In 2010, Argentina legalised same-sex marriages nationwide and allowed adoption by homosexual couples, neither of which has happened in Chile by early 2019 – and it seems will not happen for some time yet. Argentina adopted a gender identity law in 2012, six years before Chile did.

Our comparison of the sexual diversity fields in both countries shows that differences in responsiveness can be traced to the timing and cohesiveness of LGBTIQ organisations and to the alliances they created with political actors. Argentine movements emerged earlier (in the 1970s) and managed to deal with internal divisions more successfully than their Chilean counterparts. By framing their claims as a human rights issue, they built strong relationships with other social movements, leftist parties and state actors,
thereby defeating conservative actors who opposed the sexual diversity agenda. Conversely, Chilean LGBTIQ organisations emerged later (in the early 1990s), suffered from strong internal divisions from the outset, and had feeble ties with political parties and other movements. They also faced a more cohesive social and political conservative bloc that successfully opposed the sexual diversity agenda. By taking into account these contrasting sexual diversity fields, we can understand why Chilean activists feel more frustrated and detached from institutional politics than their Argentine counterparts.

We do not claim that this is the only solution to the puzzle. Yet we explored, and found insufficient, three alternative explanations. Differences in institutional attachment do not result from compositional differences between the samples of demonstrators surveyed. They result neither from differential attachment between the general populations of both countries, nor from the national populations of demonstrators. Future research, however, should examine the likely recursive relationships between policy responsiveness and attachment. For instance, stronger institutional attachment in the early stages of a movement’s development could provide among activists the self-confidence needed to establish cooperative relationships with institutional actors and therefore bring about responsiveness.

This focused comparison of Argentina and Chile opens new questions. Some are substantive: can the differences between each country’s LGBTIQ demonstrators be observed in other policy fields? If so, can they also be traced to differences in the responsiveness of political systems, or are other factors in play instead? Other questions are theoretical: to what extent can the PPM be expanded beyond the classical questions about the timing and intensity of protest mobilisation? Is it useful for explaining cross-national differences in other social and political attitudes of demonstrators beyond attachment? Finally, because our survey results are snapshots taken at one point in time, we cannot assert that the country differences we found will remain stable in the future. However, our attachment indicators tap general attitudes towards the political system and its main actors which go beyond the political contingency and capture relatively stable national configurations, as shown by comparative research on political culture (Inglehart, 1988). Future research should tackle this issue empirically with additional surveys.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by CONICYT (Chile) through a FONDECYT Regular grant (1160308) and the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES) (CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009). We thank Cristián Ayala, Magdalena Browne, Isidora González Ríos, María Inclán, Sebastián Mauro, Damián Paikin, Mario Pecheny, the fieldwork teams at the CEAP-UBA (Argentina) and DESUC-PUC (Chile), and three reviewers and the editors of BLAR.

References


