The *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* publishes articles and reports in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese. All articles submitted to the *Bulletin* are double-blind reviewed undertaken by a specialist member of the SIEPM-Bureau or an external specialist.

Editorial

The *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* has long been considered authoritative in the field of medieval philosophy, which has also made it a key international publication for the advancement of academic careers, thanks to its system of double-blind peer review for all published articles. Over time, it has become an important journal for the publication of unedited texts, the presentation of new research and the discussion of innovative themes.

For this reason I believe it is necessary and appropriate for us to officially add the BPM to internationally recognised databases such as SCOPUS, the "largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature: scientific journals, books and conference proceedings".

This step will produce a number of benefits. Obviously, the procedure is not simple. In order for a candidacy to be successful, it must meet a series of stringent criteria. Together with Alexander Sterkens (Publishing Manager for Brepols) we have reviewed the criteria with a view to officially presenting our proposal for inclusion in the ranking. We already comply with most of the criteria, and the rest can easily be met with some adjustments. The only delicate aspect is the year of issue. The date of publication is in fact a crucial requirement.

Traditionally, the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* is issued one year behind, e.g. the 2017 issue (59) was published in July 2018. In order to resolve this problem and thus 'synchronise' our journal, we have decided to release two issues within a short time span: the current issue (60) and issue 61 (2019), scheduled to be published in October/November 2019. This would mean doubling our efforts this year, but by 2020 we would once more be publishing one issue a year, with the advantage of being able to be included in important databases.

In 2019 the members of the SIEPM will thus receive, by November and as a one-off event, two hard-copy volumes of the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*.

To this we may add another important new development. Since July, the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* has also been available online at https://www.brepolsonline.net/toc/bpm/2017/59/+. Access naturally requires payment but will be available free of charge in the libraries or institutions with a subscription.

As for the *Rencontres de philosophie médiévale* series, as announced in the editorial of BPM 59 (2017) the series is also open to monographs and critical editions. In addition to the acts of the conferences of Nijmegen (edited by Monica Brinzei and Christopher Schabel), Freiburg, Cluj-Napoca and Porto Alegre, the following books are in preparation:

Riccardo Saccenti, *La normatività della natura. Nodi critici e apporti storiografici su una nozione medievale*

Nadia Bray, Diana Di Segni, Fiorella Retucci and Elisa Rubino (eds.) *Centre and Peripheries in the History of Medieval Culture*

Finally I would like to express my gratitude to all those who have supported this significant editorial effort, first and foremost the members of the Bureau of the SIEPM, my friends and colleagues, who it is always a pleasure to work with, and finally the members of Cetefil in Lecce.

Alessandra Beccarisi (Lecce)

Editor, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*
November 2018

Divine Providence and Free Will in the *De Angelo Perdito* by Gilbert Crispin. An Interpretation in Light of the *Consolation of Philosophy*

Gilbert Crispin (c. 1045-1117) is known mainly for his dialogues *Disputatio iudei et christiani* and, to a lesser extent, *Disputatio christiani cum gentili*.[1] Profoundly and undeniably influenced by Anselm of Canterbury, who was his intimate friend and teacher in Bec, Gilbert has been read through the Anselmian writings with such insistence that even his most original thoughts have seemingly been merged with his teacher's. The most eloquent example of this is an article by Richard W. Southern, published in 1954, where he manages to subtract any merit from Gilbert in Anselm's favour. There, referring to "the strictly philosophical passages" of the *Disputatio iudei*, Southern states that in these texts "there is much more of Anselm than Gilbert, not only in their substance, but even in their wording."[2] This affirmation was more than once restated by Anna Sapir Abulafia, one of the editors of Gilbert's complete works.[3]

It was, perhaps, Armitage Robinson in 1911 who first took up this line of argument. In his lengthy study of the life and work of the abbot of Westminster, he noted that, when Gilbert handles the problem of the necessi-

---

[1] The fame of *Disputatio iudei et christiani* and the relevance of the author in his own time are evidenced both by the amount of complete or partial copies of it that have reached us (totalling 32, out of which 20 were made in the twelfth century), and by their presence in the writings of other thinkers. We find, for example, the anonymous *Dialogus inter christianum et iudaeum de fide catholica* wrongly attributed to William of Champeaux which, just like the *Liber disputationum contra Symonem iudeum* by Peter of Cornwall, closely follows the *Disputatio Iudei*. Moreover, as Berger demonstrated, Alan of Lille and Jacob Ben Reuben used passages of this dialogue in their own works. Cf. D. Berger, "Gilbert Crispin, Alan of Lille, and Jacob Ben Reuben: A Study in the Transmission of Medieval Polemic", in *Speculum* 49.1 (1974), 34-47. It was suggested that the *Disputatio iudei* could have been a source of inspiration for Peter Abelard's *Collationes*. Cf. J. Marenbon and G. Orlandi, "Introduction", in *Peter Abelard. Collationes*, ed. Marenbon and Orlandi (Oxford Medieval Texts), Oxford-New York 2001, xxxix-xl. See the complete list of manuscripts that contains works by Gilbert in A. S. Abulafia and G. R. Evans, "Introduction", in *The Works of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster*, ed. Abulafia and Evans (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 8), London-New York 1986, xi-xx.

[2] R. W. Southern, "St. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster", in *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 3 (1954), 92.

[3] Cf. A. S. Abulafia, "An attempt by Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster, at Rational Argument in the Jewish-Christian Debate", in *Studia Monastica* 26 (1984), 56; Idem, *Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, London-New York 1995, 79.

ty of Incarnation in the *Disputatio iudei* 101-103, he rejects the possibility of humanity being redeemed by another human being or by an angel with an argument very similar to the one laid out by Anselm on the *Cur Deus homo* I.5 (*CDH*). Robinson further notes that both authors, in their respective texts, make a statement on the Devil's jurisdiction on the sinners, but in a different way.[4] Indeed, in the latter part of that passage, Gilbert follows the Augustinian tradition, whereas Anselm departs from it saying that the Devil has not rights over us.[5] Robinson, then, simply suggests that "it may be questioned whether Gilbert would have written the latter part after the publication of [the *CDH*]."[6] This statement allows us to suppose that Robinson had no doubts that at least the first part of this passage was indeed written after the *CDH* and that, hence, unlike the second one, it might have been inspired by Anselm's text. Nevertheless, it is known that Anselm wrote the *CDH* between 1095 and 1098, while there are strong reasons to believe that "the greater part of Disputation existed in this final form […] in March 1093."[7]And even though Gilbert made subsequent corrections, as editors pointed out, there are no reasons to suggest they were made after 1098.[8] In any case, sections 101-103 were not affected by any of them.

That is the reason why Southern belabours a quite fragile argumentation in order to support his thesis that these topics, which Gilbert had dealt with

---

[4] Cf. J.A. Robinson, *Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster: A Study of the Abbey under Norman Rule* (Notes and Documents relating to Westminster Abbey 3), Cambridge 1911, 64.

[5] Cf. Gilbertus Crispinus, *Disputatio iudei* 101-103, ed. A.S. Abulafia and G.R. Evans, in *The Works of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster* (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 8), London-New York 1986, 34.10-35.10; Anselmus Cantuariensis, *CDH* I.5 and 7, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Opera omnia 2), Rome 1940, 52 and 55-59. See too page 53, where Schmitt himself includes Gilbert's dialogue in the *apparatus fontium* of the fifth chapter.

[6] Robinson, *Gilbert Crispin*, 64.

[7] Abulafia, "Introduction", xxviii. See also pages xxxi-xxxiii where other works related to the *Disputatio iudei* are dated. The most decisive evidence for this might be the existence of three manuscripts where Gilbert's dedication letter refers to Anselm as an abbot. Robinson was familiar with one of these manuscripts, the London, British Library, Add. Ms. 8166. However, when confronted with this evidence, he suggests there has been some confusion. He goes on to propose that the compiler of the codex, having access to various literary remains of Gilbert, and driven to form them into a single collection, possibly misrepresented an early draft as a piece of finished work. Cf. Robinson, *Gilbert Crispin*, 54 and 82.

[8] Bernhard Blumenkranz, the first editor of *Disputatio iudei*, suggested the year 1096 as *terminus ante quem*, whereas R. Zwi Werblowsky traced it to 1094-95. Cf. B. Blumenkranz, "Praefatio", in *Gisleberti Crispini Disputatio iudei et christiani*, ed. Blumenkranz (Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia 3), Utrecht 1956, 12; R.Z. Werblowsky, "Crispin's Disputation", in *Journal of Jewish Studies* 11 (1970), 77. For the *Disputatio iudei* recensions, cf. Abulafia and Evans, *The Works of Gilbert Crispin*, 2-6.

before Anselm, could not have been his own idea but must, in fact, be borrowed from Anselm. He maintains this position solely on the basis that he finds it inconceivable that Anselm could have borrowed them from Gilbert.[9] His conviction, which underlies many of the works that other scholars would write afterwards, is that Anselm's "intellectual resources were incomparably richer than those of Gilbert."[10] This was the conception of the hermeneutical narrative that Bernd Goebel—I believe quite correctly—called the "obsolete interpretation."[11] To a greater or lesser extent, the authors that follow this line have not seen in Gilbert anything more than a thinker of the monastic milieu, a smart one at that, but limited in his theological formation.[12]

I believe that this skewed reading of Gilbert has not only contributed to dismissing the value of his other works and his philosophical disposition, but that the prejudice it stems from was translated into the *apparatus fontium* of at least one of his works, the *De angelo perdito* (*DAP*). In effect, we find in that text two long passages in which Gilbert does not follow Anselm, but, rather, proposes an original argument, inspired partly by Boethius, a source that is ignored completely by the apparatus of said passages. The first one consists of sections 49-56, in which Gilbert deals with the tension between free will and divine providence; the second, sections 64-74, where

---

[9] SOUTHERN, "St. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin", 91: "It is one thing to believe that Anselm borrowed a quotation from Canon Law or extracted an opinion […]; it is quite another to believe that he borrowed a central point in his doctrine of the Redemption from Gilbert Crispin." To leave no doubt, further, the author adds *ibid.* 98: "Gilbert's work cannot of course compare in power or importance with the *Cur Deus Homo* […]."

[10] SOUTHERN, "St. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin", 93. David Whidden has argued against Southern's article in his dissertation; cf. D. WHIDDEN, "The *Proslogion*, Gilbert Crispin, and the *Cur Deus homo*: Anselm's Student and the Problems of the Incarnation", presented in *Reading Anselm, Context and Criticism*, Boston College, 27-30 July, 2015, yet unpublished. Cf. URL= http://www.academia.edu/14476066/The_Proslogion_Gilbert_Crispin_and_the_ Cur_Deus_homo_Anselm_s_Student_and_the_Problems_of_the_Incarnation.

[11] See B. GOEBEL, "Vernunft und Autorität in den Religionsgesprächen Gilbert Crispins", in *Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie* 11 (2012), 38-68. Goebel does not only point out the hermeneutical misjudgements of this tradition, but also offers his own interpretation both of the *Disputatio iudei* and the *Disputatio gentili,* showing us a much less subordinate Gilbert to the Anselmian *forma mentis*.

[12] SOUTHERN, "St. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin", 98: "[…] one has the feeling that Gilbert would gladly have remained on the humbler level of Biblical exegesis and not ventured on the heights of speculation." In order to counteract the tenor of such statement, Gillian Evans— editor of Gilbert's complete works with Abulafia—points out in G. R. EVANS, "Appendix: Gilbert Crispin", in *Anselm and a New Generation*, Oxford 1980, 207 that: "As an early English theologian [Gilbert] would win few marks for pioneering spirit […] His achievement was modest, but his works have a solidity and a finish which give them some claim to respect."

the author develops some theological and mathematical considerations on the unity.

In the present article I will focus on the first passage and will leave the assessment of the second for a forthcoming work. Taking his exposition, I will intend to show how Gilbert draws on the argumentative scheme of the fifth book of the *Consolatio philosophiae* but uses this source in a manner that is both personally and philosophically relevant to his work. That responds, in turn, to my principle aim, which is to provide further evidence that the philosophical production of the fourth Abbot of Westminster is not a rehashed summary of Anselm's—who in any case is his principal interlocutor—but has scholarly worth in its own right. In fact, as Whidden has already shown, Gilbert was also an interlocutor for Anselm himself.[13] In this sense, and in order to be consistent with their respective dates, the works that Anselm elaborated after those of Gilbert which are included in the *apparatus fontium* of both the *DAP* as well as his remaining works, must be read as related to the same circle of thought, but not as sources.

Regarding the *DAP* and its Sources

The *DAP* belongs to a group of writings composed during the years immediately after the meeting Gilbert held with Anselm in Westminster during the winter of 1092-1093; a meeting which, it would seem, formed the basis for our author's later production. It has reached us in a single manuscript, the London, British Library, Add. Ms. 8166, ff. 18v-22v.[14] Anna Sapir Abulafia and Gillian Evans published the critical edition of this work in 1986.[15]

Written in the form of a dialogue between the figures of *Interrogatio* and *Responsio*, the book begins by closely following the thematic content, first, of the *De casu diaboli* (*DCD*) and then, to a lesser extent, the other two works Anselm had conceived as a triad along with it, the *De veritate* and the *De libertate arbitrii*. Some passages recall the *CDH*, a text that, at best,

---

[13] Whidden's thesis is that some theoretical changes in Anselm, which can be observed in the *CDH* and in the *De conceptu virginali* regarding the *Proslogion*, are explained by his reading of Gilbert's *Disputatio iudei*. Cf. WHIDDEN, "The *Proslogion*". It is worth noting that Whidden has presented this research in a colloquium and, as such, is part of a further-reaching work which the author is yet to publish.

[14] Cf. EVANS, "Introduction", xxxiii and xxxv. According to Robinson, Boston of Bury, a librarian in the monastery of Saint Edmund, recorded in the fifteenth century a copy of the *DAP* in the library at Brinkburn. This one is currently missing. Cf. ROBINSON, *Gilbert Crispin*, 53.

[15] GILBERTUS CRISPINUS, *De angelo perdito*, ed. A. S. ABULAFIA and G. R. EVANS, in *The Works of Gilbert Crispin*, 103-15.

was written at the same time as the *DAP*, but not before. Due to all of this, the *DAP* has been seen as a partial interpretation or even a sort of tribute to Anselm's *DCD*,[16] where some passages seem to be deliberate simplifications of the Archbishop's arguments, to which Gilbert's text, according to Evans, is "obviously" indebted, "point for point, and topic for topic."[17] This could be the reason for which there is no work consecrated entirely or partially to the *DAP*, and those that do dedicate some lines to it within the framework of some other topic, generally related to Anselm, are but a handful.[18] However, it was Evans herself who, in a work prior to the critical edition, held that in the *DAP* Gilbert had "not simply repeated Anselm" but that he had "produced a treatise which stands on its own merits."[19]

In fact, if the *DAP* "begins" with Anselm's line of thinking, then the reader can only deduce that this is because the rest of the work does not follow that same line. From the 82 total sections, the similarities to the Anselmian production are evident in sections 1-48, in which the problems handled are: being and remaining in truth/happiness; the Devil's perseverance on good; free will, reason and will; the Devil's sin and his punishment; the reward for the good angels and, finally, the tension between free will and grace relating to the meaning of *posse*. But even within them, Gilbert's solutions do not always follow those of his teacher, just as it happens in sections 101-103 of the *Disputatio iudei* I have already mentioned.[20]

---

[16] D. T. Rakus, *Towards an Anselmian Theodicy*, Ph.D thesis, University of Toronto, Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada, 1997, 121: "In *De angelo perdito*, might have written as a tribute to Anselm or as a partial interpretation of *De casu diaboli* […]."

[17] Evans, "Introduction", xxxiv: "Point for point, and topic for topic, Gilbert's treatise of the fall of Satan is more obviously indebted to Anselm than any of his other works." We can find an echo of this interpretation in A. J. Novikoff, "Anselm, Dialogue, and the Rise of Scholastic Disputation", in *Speculum* 86.2 (2011), 411.

[18] Excepting the brief mention found in D.A. Wells, "Religious Disputation Literature and Theology of *Willehalm*: an Aspect of Wolfram's Education", in *Wolfram's* Willehalm*: Fifteen Essays*, ed. M.H. Jones and T. McFarland, New York 2002, 155, the remaining scientific works which—as far as I am aware—take into account the *DAP* are included in the bibliography used in this paper.

[19] Evans, "Appendix", 201.

[20] For example, Gilbert holds a conception of the dynamism of the soul that strays from the Anselmian one, to the extent that the emphasis is on reason rather than will. In a few words, according to Gilbert, the Devil was able to persevere and not to persevere because, thanks to free will, he was able to use and not to use reason. Since he estimated he could be equal to God, he did not want to persevere in the truth, thus, he "concessam potentiam utendi ratione non uoluit seruare." Cf. Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 11-21, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 105.1-13 and 106.5-8. Gilbert seems to have made an attempt to provide a rational framework to the famous "non [voluit] nisi quia voluit" with which Anselm finished his *De casu diaboli*. Cf.

That said, once the tension between grace and free will has been resolved (sections 32-48), Gilbert turns to another, nonetheless related, tension: that between free will and divine providence. From that moment on, Gilbert's work strays not only from the *DCD*, but from Anselm himself. Nevertheless, a close inspection of the *apparatus fontium* of sections 49-56 reveals that Anselm is the only author mentioned among the sources.

The first reference to Anselm's work in the *DAP*'s apparatus is a passage of the *DCD* in which Anselm, just as Gilbert does in his own text, points out that the question of foreknowledge is not new and, therefore, had already been handled by other thinkers before himself. However, the passage is not about a doctrinal topic, but rather a meta-doctrinal resource, a rhetorical one in any case. Moreover, the words chosen by each author are not similar at all:

Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De Casu diaboli* XXI, ed. F. S. Schmitt 1, 266.25-27	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 49, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 110.26-27.
Sed reminiscor nunc illius famosissimae quaestionis de praescientia divina et libero arbitrio. Quamvis enim tanta auctoritate asseratur […]	Magna dixere magni doctores de hac magna questione

Among the Christian sources, one of those *auctoritates* was doubtlessly Augustine. In fact, it is Augustine's lead that Anselm follows in handling the problem, maybe not as much in *DCD* XXI (where he barely develops the subject), but mainly in the *De concordia*, which is the second work considered within the *apparatus fontium* of the *DAP*'s passage.[21] But what Gilbert develops differs enough from both Augustine's and Anselm's thought. At most, some parallels could be established with the arguments in the *De concordia*, where we even find an example similar to the one Gilbert proposes in his own exposition: that of someone who writes.[22] Nevertheless, this work has been discarded by Evans herself as a reference for the elaboration of the *DAP* due to its later composition date (1107-1108). In any case, as Evans affirms, the contents of the *De concordia* are an expansion of the *De liber-*

Anselmus Cantuariensis, *DCD* XXVII, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Opera omnia 1), Edinburgh 1946, 275.24-31. In addition to the *apparatus fontium* of *DAP*, to check the correspondence of these themes with Anselm's works, Evans, "Appendix", 202-04, can be consulted.

[21] According to the *apparatus fontium*, the passage is Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia* I.2, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Opera omnia 2), 249. To which extent Anselm's arguments follow or distance they from Augustine's is a question not fit to be handled here.

[22] Cf. Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia* I.5, ed. Schmitt, 255.4-6. Curiously, this example is not recorded in the *apparatus fontium*.

tate arbitrii and, therefore, were already part of Anselm's teachings that Gilbert received in Bec.[23] Thus, Evans implicitly repeats Southern's procedure, which we could summarize as: "Anselm wrote it afterwards but thought about it first." In contrast, I am convinced that Gilbert's cultural heritage is not necessary constrained to the Anselmian doctrine. As a matter of fact, a significant lexical particularity can offer an insight into both Gilbert's detour from the Anselmian handling of this problem, and into his proximity to Boethius, doubtlessly another one of those *magni doctores*.

Dealing with this problem, Augustine, Anselm and Boethius oscillated between the usage of the terms *providere*, *praevidere* and *praescire* and their corresponding substantivized forms. In Augustine's and Anselm's texts, the use of *praescire* prevails, whereas in Boethius's *Consolatio* the alternation between these three voices is more even. However, in the *Consolatio*, Boethius explicitly states that there is not *praescientia* but *scientia* in God and that, therefore, the term *providentia* should be preferred to *preavidentia* due to the connotation of its respective prefixes.[24] In the *DCD*, Anselm also notes that *praescientia* is not the proper term to refer to God's knowledge, and he also proposes *scientia* in its stead. Nonetheless, he does not use *providentia* at any time. In other words, Anselm only removed the prefix *prae-* but remained within the semantic field of *scire*.[25]

This lexical issue is relevant, given that Gilbert only uses *providentia/providere*. Moreover, as we will see next, his whole argumentation depends entirely on the contrast between *videre* and *providere*.

So, if we look at the most relevant texts, we find:[26]

---

[23] Cf. Evans, "Appendix", 201; Eadem, "Introduction", in *The Works of Gilbert Crispin*, xxxiv. Within the sections that handle the topic, the *apparatus fontium* also refers to Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De Libertate arbitrii* XII, ed. Schmitt (Opera omnia 1), 224. However, I find the reference too indirect to be considered here.

[24] Boethius, A. M. T. Severinus, *De consolatione philosophiae* V.6.16-17, ed. C. Moreschini, Munich-Leipzig 2000, 157.64-68: "Itaque si praesentiam pensare velis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis. Unde non praevidentia sed providentia potius dicitur […]."

[25] Anselmus Cantuariensis, *DCD* XXI, ed. Schmitt, 267.7-9: "Praescientia dei non proprie dicitur praescientia. Cui enim semper omnia sunt praesentia, non habet futurorum praescientiam, sed praesentium scientiam."

[26] For obvious reasons, I have taken into account the nouns as well as their relative verb forms, and have excluded the appearances of these terms in titles, subtitles and critical apparatus. I have also omitted the appearances of the terms *praenotio/praenoscere* given that only Boethius uses them (a total of 11 times) in *Consolatio* and Augustine a single one in *De libero arbitrio* III. The editions consulted for each are Augustinus Hipponensis, *De libero arbitrio*,

		Providere/ Providentia	*Praevidere/* Praevidentia	*Praescrire/* Praescientia
Augustine	*De Libero Arbitrio* III	3	10	67
	De Civitate Dei V	6	-	52
Anselm	*De Concordia*	3	6	70
	De Casu Diaboli XXI	-	-	23
Boethius	*De Consolatione Philosophiae* V	29	3	22
	Commentarium in Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias Pars Posterior III,9	6	-	-
Gilbert	*De Angelo Perdito* 49-56	15	-	-

Even though Gilbert does not explain the reason for his choice, it distances him from Augustine's and Anselm's treatment while placing himself implicitly under Boethius tutelage.

Exposition and Development of Sections 49-56 in Light of *Consolatio* V

As John Marenbon has suggested, in *Consolatio* V.3.4-6, Boethius lays down the problem he will resolve in the last stretch of his work as follows:[27] (1) First, he holds that if God foresees all things (*cuncta*) infallibly, everything His providence knows will necessarily happen. (2) Then, he observes that the "all" includes human deliberations and volitions and, therefore, the problem concerns especially freedom of choice. (3) In a third moment, the character *Boethius* explains that "if" these volitions are capable of (*detorqueri valent*) taking a different orientation than foreseen, these cannot be known. And, if so, even if God is infallible, that is, even if his belief is always true,

---

ed. W. M. Green (CCSL 29), Turnhout 1970; Idem, *De civitate Dei* V.I, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Stuttgart 1993; Anselmus Cantuariensis, *DCD* and *De concordia* ed. Schmitt; Boethius, A. M. T. Severinus, *Commentarium in librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias pars posterior*, ed. C. Meiser, Leipzig 1880; Idem, *De consolatione philosophiae*, ed. Moreschini; Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito*, ed. Abulafia and Evans.

[27] As regards Boethius's analysis, I follow J. Marenbon, "Divine Prescience and Contingency in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*", in *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 68.1 (2013), 9-21, at 12. I am aware of the volume of work on the topic not considered here, however my purpose is not to analyse Boethius, but rather Gilbert Crispin.

he would never have knowledge but a mere "uncertain opinion." (4) But this is not so. *Boethius* immediately discards that possibility: affirming that God has opinion instead knowledge is wicked. Thus, as Marenbon has rightly noted, "Given that God does have knowledge, and not just opinion, of everything, […] all events must be fixed, in order for them to be proper objects of knowledge."[28]

Even if this proposition may be found *in nuce* in Augustine,[29] through the figure of *Interrogatio*, Gilbert seems to echo the problem from the text of the *Consolatio*. Indeed, at the start of his argument, he uses a structure and terminology much closer to those of the character Boethius. In any case, the focus is undeniably his own:[30]

Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.4-6, ed. Moreschini, 140.5-141.15.	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 50, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 110.29-111.3.
Nam *si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest*, evenire *necesse est quod Providentia futurum esse* praeviderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia voluntatesque praenoscit, *nulla erit arbitrii libertas*; neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quaelibet exsistere poterit voluntas, nisi quam nescia *falli providentia divina* praesenserit. Nam si *aliorsum* quam provisa sunt detorqueri valent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia, sed opinio potius incerta; quod de deo credere nefas iudico.	*Si prouidentia Dei non fallitur*, *liberum arbitrium nichil operatur*. Quamuis enim res quedam fiunt ex necessitate, quedam ex uoluntate, uitari *nullo modo potest futurum esse* uel non esse, seu ex uoluntate seu ex necessitate, quod Dei prouidentia prouidet futurum esse, uel non esse. Quid vero mea interest utrum fiat ex uoluntate an ex necessitate? *Necesse est* ut fiat seu ex uoluntate seu ex necessitate *quod Deus* prouidet *futurum esse. Alioquin falleretur providentia Dei.*

Gilbert's proposal starts with the intervention of *Interrogatio*, which unifies the first two moments of Boethius' exposition, maintaining, at the same time, the conditional form of the first: (1) "If God's providence makes no mistakes," then free will is necessarily nullified. (2) Then, he explains that, even when some events are produced by the will—or, have their efficient

---

[28] Marenbon, "Divine Prescience", 12.

[29] Augustine sets out the issue in Augustinus Hipponensis, *De libero arbitrio* III.ii.4.14, ed. Green, 276.1-5 as follows: "Quae cum ita sint ineffabiliter me mouet quomodo fieri possit ut et deus praescius sit omnium futurorum et nos nulla necessitate peccemus. Quisquis enim dixerit aliter euenire aliquid posse quam deus ante praesciuit, praescientiam dei destruere insanissima impietate molitur." Augustine also discusses freedom of choice and divine foreknowledge in another important place, *De civitate Dei* V, but the starting point there is the Pagan doctrine (especially Stoic) of fate.

[30] Critical edition uses full-stops or semi-colons in some indirect questions (cf. e.g. Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 24 and 66, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 107.3-5 and 113.11-12). To highlight the interrogative nature of the sentence headed by the adverb '*Quid*', I changed the original semi-colon for a question mark.

cause therein, which is essentially the same—("quamuis res quedam fiunt ex uoluntate"), it is unavoidable not only that what God's providence foresees will happen, but also that will not happen ("futurum esse uel non esse"). In the Boethian mode, events are not capable of turning out differently from how they are known by God's providence, which, even if not explicitly affirmed, implies that God's providence in infallible. Although Gilbert does not use the term "contingent", his concern undoubtedly lies with the problem of future contingents.[31] Thus, being future unavoidable, (3) *Interrogatio* concludes there is no sense in wondering ("Quid vero mea interest?") about its causes. In other words, even though every event is either necessary or voluntary, the distinction remains irrelevant, because (4) what effectively will happen—which is, in the end, what matters, and that is why the alternative *non esse* does not appear—is necessary since it is foreseen by God. The reference to Boethius is clear: Gilbert resorts to a construction which, in addition to completing the proposal of *Interrogatio*, confirms, almost in the same terms, the apodosis of the conditional with which Boethius started his:

Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.4, ed. Moreschini, 140.6-8.	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 50, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.1-3.
evenire *necesse est quod* Providentia *futurum esse* prae*viderit*	*necesse est* ut fiat seu ex uoluntate seu ex necessitate *quod* Deus pro*uidet futurum esse*

(5) In order to conclude and reinforce his exposition, *Interrogatio* adds a restrictive clause that seems to take up the last stretch of *Boethius'* presentation: Were it not necessary (*alioquin*), God's providence would make a mistake. Nevertheless, due to (2), we know it does not.

The layout of this problem, however, does not conclude until the intervention of *Responsio*:

> Constat quia prouidentia Dei prouidet quicquid futurum est, et futurum est quicquid prouidentia Dei prouidet. Constat quia que futura sunt, quedam ex necessitatem quedam ex uoluntate, futura sunt et tamen, sicut dicis, ex necessitate fit nec uitari potest, futura uel esse uel non esse, que prouidentia Dei prouidet futura esse, uel non esse.[32]

This figure, then, starts pointing out two premises which, separately, do not generate any problems: (6.1) no future event may escape providence. There

---

[31] Strictly, the problem of future contingents—which is of a logical and grammatical nature—refers to that raised by Aristotle in *Peri hermeneias* III.9, and differs from the problem posed by the divine foreknowledge—which is of a gnoseological nature. Both, however, are closely related. In fact, as we will see, Gilbert connects them in such a way that some theoretical aspects of the first are the basis to solve the second.

[32] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 51-52, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.7-13.

is a strict correspondence between everything that (*quidquid*) will happen and everything that (*quidquid*) God's providence foresees—wherein the quantifier reminds us of the "all" (*cuncta*) in the first sentence of *Boethius*'s proposal. Nonetheless, that future events are unavoidable or necessary insofar as they are foreseen by God does not say anything with regards to their efficient cause and, therefore, *Responsio* adds that (6.2) there are different kinds of future events: those that will happen by necessity and those that will happen by will. (7) Finally, he signals the misunderstanding of *Interrogatio*, which consists of confounding two kinds of necessity, assigning the necessity that supposes the knowledge God has of the future— which comprises not only the events that will happen, but also those that will not—to the cause of the events. Ultimately, what *Responsio* is saying is that the question regarding the cause of future events does matter, since (6.1) and (6.2) are different instances. However, in order to take *Interrogatio* out of its mistake, it is not sufficient to point out the difference between the two, it is also necessary to make them compatible.

Thus, what Gilbert has to demonstrate through *Responsio* is that although not every event is produced by necessity, this is not incompatible with the fact that, at the same time, everything that will happen is necessary as far as the providence's foresight cannot be avoided. In order to achieve this, he provides an example:

> Video, inquam, te scribere. Si concedis, concludam, ergo necesse est te scribere, et te id concedere opportet, quamuis non est necesse te scribere quia non scribis ex necessitate.[33]

It is noticeable that *Responsio* uses the term "necessity" even to denote a voluntary act such as writing: "non scribis ex necessitate." Gilbert's intention is not as much to bring forth the value of the will or free will, but to specify the sense in which "necessity" should be understood. So, *Responsio* begins by formulating a sentence that could appear contradictory: "necesse est te scribere […] quamuis non est necesse te scribere." He aims to show that the present is voluntary, that is, contingent in one regard and necessary in another: it is contingent because one does not write by necessity, it is necessary because it is happening. Therefore, if he concedes he is writing (*si concedis*), he also should concede (*concedere opportet*) this (*id*): that it is necessary that he is in fact writing.

The first part of Gilbert's argument, then, develops in the logical and grammatical field of the problem of future contingents.[34] His proposal

---

[33] GILBERTUS CRISPINUS, *DAP* 53, ed. ABULAFIA and EVANS, 111.14-17.

[34] See n. 31. As Toivo Holopainen demonstrated, appealing to a distinction between two

doubtlessly refers to the premise of the necessity of the present, proposed by Aristotle in *Peri hermeneias* 19a23 and reflected in the passage of *Consolatio* V.6.29, where Boethius, after having established the difference between simple and conditioned necessity, exemplifies the second by saying that "nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere voluntate gradientem, quamvis eum tum cum graditur incedere necessarium sit."[35] Paraphrasing Boethius, as per Gilbert's example, we could say that "no necessity compels a man to leave a trace of ink on the parchment who is writing voluntarily, even though it is a necessary thing that he leave a trace of ink on the parchment at the point at which he writes."[36] This shows that events like writing or taking a step are said to be necessary not in and of themselves, but rather because of the relationship they hold to a condition which, in these cases, is their condition of happening in the present.[37]

On the other hand, the example "video te scribere" is not accidental at all. The verb *video* refers to the sense of sight which has primarily a gnoseological value (to be aware, to know, to understand, etc. in the active voice). Therefore, the proposition "I see that you write" is equivalent to "I know that

---

kinds of necessity was the way in which many 11th-century theologians usually tried to resolve the problem of future contingents. Cf. T.J. HOLOPAINEN, "Future Contingents in the Eleventh Century", in *Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila*, ed. V. HIRVONEN, T.J. HOLOPAINEN and M. TUOMINEN (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 141), Leiden 2006, 103. In this sense, Gilbert's approach is no exception. Nonetheless, Holopainen's thesis is that even though Anselm of Besate, Peter Damian and especially Anselm of Canterbury—who are the theologians whose texts he analysed—knew that problem through Boethius, his major source of influence to conceptualize necessity was Augustine's *De civitate Dei* V.8-11. Showing to what extent Gilbert converges or diverges from those authors is a desired but strenuous task. I will just mention some meaningful points in regard to Anselm when appropriate.

[35] ARISTOTELES, *De Interpretatione,* trans. BOETHII 19a23, ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO (Aristoteles Latinus 2.1-2), Brügge-Paris 1965, 17.3-4: "Igitur esse quod est quando est, et non esse quod non est quando non est, necesse est"; BOETHIUS, *Consolatio* V.6.29, ed. MORESCHINI, 159.107-109. Having in mind the ninth chapter of *Peri hermeneias*, Anselm distinguishes between two types of necessity—*necessitas praecedens* and *necessitas sequens*—and even uses an example similar to Gilbert's, of someone who is speaking. Cf. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *CDH* II.17, ed. SCHMITT, 125.8-11 (see n. 40 and n. 41). However, it suits him to explain neither providence nor prescience, but the tension between the necessity of the Passion and Christ's voluntary death. In the specific context of the problem of divine *praescientia*, Anselm's analysis implicitly takes up those types of necessity in ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *De concordia* I.2-3, ed. SCHMITT, 247-52.

[36] The paraphrase follows Joel Relihan's translation of the *Consolatio*. Cf. BOETHIUS, *Consolation of Philosophy*, trad. J.C. RELIHAN, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2001, 148.

[37] Cf. J. MARENBON, *Le temps, l'éternité et la prescience de Boèce à Thomas d'Aquin* (Conférences Pierre Abélard), Paris 2003, 39.

you write," if and when the action seen is actually happening. In addition *video* is the same verb contained in the word that Gilbert chose to refer to divine "knowledge" of the future, *providentia*. So, even though the first part of his argument consists of logical and grammatical distinctions about necessity, the example holds, at the same time, the gnoseological nature of the problem, that is to say, how God's "foresight" is compatible with free will.

Having said that, note that the example denotes the conditioned necessity not only of the present as present, but the necessity of the relationship between the present and the knowledge or sight one might have of it, which is nothing but the first example Boethius proposes regarding conditioned necessity: "si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est. Quod enim quisque novit, id esse aliter ac notum est nequit."[38] *Responsio* develops this relationship in the following section, starting with a central distinction, also regarding necessity:

> Videamus igitur qua in parte necessitas ista se habebat, utrum in rebus an in rerum connexionibus. Aliud est enim si te uideo scribere, necesse est consequi te scribere, quod non facis ex necessitate sed lib[e]ri arbitrii potestate; et aliud est 'necesse est te scribere', hoc est, 'siue uelis siue nolis necesse est te scribere'.[39]

According to this, one is the necessity of the conclusion or, as *Responsio* calls it, the necessity within "the connections between the facts": "si te uideo scribere, necesse est consequi te scribere"; the other, the necessity "in the facts" themselves, that is, an external causal efficiency: "siue uelis siue nolis, necesse est te scribere." This second type of necessity refers to the facts that, as *Responsio* will let us know in its final sentence about this problem, simply happen (*sunt*).[40] What matters, however, are those facts that *fiunt ex voluntate*. Gilbert had already established, in his own way, that the present facts are necessary in so far as they happen, but that, even so, the fact itself, taking writing for example, is given *liberi arbitrii potestate*. Now he adds that, in the connection between two facts (a present event and the sight one has of it), a kind of necessity exists that is subordinated to the condition of the protasis

---

[38] BOETHIUS, *Consolatio* V.6.27-28, ed. MORESCHINI, 158.102-159.104.

[39] GILBERTUS CRISPINUS, *DAP* 54, ed. ABULAFIA and EVANS, 111.18-22.

[40] See p. 25. Gilbert's *necessitas in rebus* is equivalent to Anselm's *necessitas praecedens*. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *CDH* II.17, ed. SCHMITT, 125.9-10: "Praecedens et efficiens necessitas est, cum dicitur caelum volvi, quia necesse est ut volvatur." In turn, both conceptualisations are comparable to the *necessitas simplex* proposed by Boethius in *Consolatio* V.6.28-29, as well as to that *necessitas* "quae non est in nostra potestate", mentioned by Augustine. Cf. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De civitate Dei* V.10, ed. DOMBART and KALB, 208.12-16.

being true. For that reason, it is expressed by a material conditional.[41] But this necessity *in rerum connexionibus* does not imply a metaphysical need in any way, that is, a causal necessity that is efficient *in rebus* themselves.

In the sections already analysed, *Responsio* makes use of not one, but two conditionals to express two different connections between the same two facts: seeing someone writing and that someone writes. In their conjunction, there is a similarity to the example Boethius provides in *Consolatio* V.3.10, which he proposes regarding the necessary correlation between the present and true belief about that present:

1. If we admit a present event, then, the belief that the event is effective-ly happening is necessarily true or, in other words, is necessary to conclude that the event is effectively happening.

Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.10, ed. Moreschi-ni, 142.31-32.	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 54, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.19-20
Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere coniectat veram esse necesse est	si te video scribere, necesse est consequi te scribere

And inversely,

2. If we admit that a belief about a present event is true, it is necessary that that present be such as that belief conceives it.

Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.10, ed. Moreschi-ni, 142.33-34.	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 53, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.14-15
si de quopiam vera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est.	Video, inquam, te scribere. Si condecis, con-cludam, ergo necesse est te scribere

These two conditionals work in the *Consolatio* to disregard the solution pro-vided by *quidam* according to which "Neque enim necesse esse contingere quae providentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt provideri."[42] This is a

---

[41] This type of necessity could be comparable to the Anselmian *necessitas sequens*. An-selmus Cantuariensis, *CDH* II.17, ed. Schmitt, 125.10-11: "vero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris. Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse, ut dum loqueris non loquaris […]." Simo Knuuttila noticed, however, that the expla-natory example has the "Because *x* is, *x* is" form (te loqui, *quia* loqueris). In this sense, it is a "temporal" necessity, which is confirmed by the conjunction chosen in the following sentence "dum loqueris". Knuuttila also pointed out that the "If *x* is, *x* is" form would only later be used by Anselm in *De concordia* I.2. Cf. S. Knuuttila, "Anselm on Modality", in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, ed. B. Davies and B. Leftow, Cambridge 2004, 123, 130 and n. 43. In contrast to this last form, it should be noted that the necessity *in rerum connexionibus* propo-sed by Gilbert connects two facts, so it must be formulated with two variables "If *x* is, *y* is."

[42] Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.9, ed. Moreschini, 141.22-24.

false solution since it, as *Boethius* states, does not eliminate the necessity, but rather inverts it. In order to eliminate it, one must comprehend that, even when a *communis* necessity exists in both conditionals, the cause of the truth of each of them comes *ex altera parte*.[43] Thus, both Boethius and Gilbert maintain that neither a true belief about the present is an efficient cause of that present, nor is that present the efficient cause of that true belief. The common necessity, that is, the necessity in the connection between them, is bidirectional, but the truth of each of them depends on the facts, which are necessary inasmuch as they are happening regardless of their efficient causes.

After having established these distinctions, Gilbert, through *Responsio*, advances to his conclusion. The first step is to make explicit the consequence of what is said above: that the sight of the present events, even if it is true, in other words, even if it is knowledge, is neither the efficient cause of those events, nor the cause that they happen in a certain fashion. In his words: "Nec meum uidere dat tibi ullam necessitatem scribendi, uel non scribendi, seu bene scribendi, seu male scribendi."[44] Once again, one of the premises of the *Consolatio* appears: "Num enim quae praesentia cernis, aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus? Minime."[45] With this affirmation, *Responsio* demonstrates that at least one event exists which, even though it is necessary because it is happening and its necessity in its connection to another fact (the external sight) is of a conditioned nature, it is itself voluntary and, as such, it is contingent according to its efficient cause. Thus, there is not always a necessity in the facts, and free will stands. It remains to be explained, however, how this is not incompatible with the fact that everything (*quicquid*) that will actually happen is necessary, as far as what God's providence foresees cannot be avoided.

Thanks to an admirable textual economy, the statement that the sight or knowledge one may have of an event does not determine the cause of that event allows Crispin to focus on the gnoseological field, that is, on the aspect of the problem specifically related to knowledge. So, the next section begins explaining that "Videre uero hominis falli potest, et ideo aliquando non est

---

[43] Boethius, *Consolatio* V.3.13, ed. Moreschini, 142.38-40: "Ita cum causa veritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas."

[44] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 55, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.23-24.

[45] Boethius, *Consolatio* V.6.19, ed. Moreschini, 157.73-74. A similar formulation of the same principle had already been made in Idem, *Ibid*. V.4.20, ed. cit., 148.57-59. However, in that instance of the argumentation, it served to prove the existence of contingent futures, since a contingent present, before being produced, was a contingent future.

ita in re sicut estimamus non uidere."[46] Contrary to what it may seem in a first reading, this affirmation does not aim to open up a reflection on the fallibility of the senses. Its purpose is to point out the difference between human and divine sight which "falli non potest," as *Responsio* adds immediately afterwards.[47] At the same time, this distinction ratifies explicitly the protasis of the conditional of section 50, "Si prouidentia Dei non fallitur." Nonetheless, further discussion of the *Consolatio* is needed before advancing to the solution of *Responsio*.

In order to resolve the problem, Boethius introduces what Marenbon calls the "Modes of Cognition Principle."[48] In V.4.23, *Philosophia* makes explicit the assumption of the thesis she is arguing against: one must admit only as knowledge those judgements that conform to reality, since "quae incerti sunt exitus, ea quasi certa providentur, opinionis id esse caliginem, non scientiae veritatem." In place of this "Likeness Criterion," Boethius proposes his own thesis: "omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem."[49] It should be noted that it appears with slight variations in two opportunities, just before and immediately after his exposition about the modes of knowledge, developed between V.4.26 - V.5.12. As Marenbon has proven, far from being a mere gnoseological *excursus*, exchanging the "likeness criterion"—which is based on the nature of that what is known—for the relativization of knowledge—which is based on the nature of he who knows it—is the core of the Boethian solution.[50] Precisely, by doing so, Boethius is able to explain that, because God is completely simple, he exists and knows in eternity and thus his way of knowing differs from ours. Given that eternity is a permanent present, God's knowledge is analogous to our knowledge of the present: necessary in so far as it is happening. But that does not imply that the event is—in Gilbert's terms—produced "by" necessity, because the nature of the object of knowledge in itself does not change. In the case of future events, this nature is that of being uncertain and open. Consequently, God makes no mistake in knowing not only that an event which itself is uncertain will actually happen but also that it will have such and such a result.[51]

---

[46] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 56, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.27-28.

[47] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 56, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.29-30.

[48] Cf. Marenbon, "Divine Prescience", 14.

[49] Boethius, *Consolatio* V.4.25, ed. Moreschini, 149.73-75. Cf. Idem, *Ibid*. V.6.1, ed. cit., 155.1-2.

[50] Cf. Marenbon, "Divine Prescience", 16-19.

[51] Cf. Marenbon, "Divine Prescience", 16-19.

Let us return, then, to the *DAP*. In section 56, the last which deals with the matter in hand, *Responsio* sketches the difference between these modes of cognition and entirely omits any reference to eternity. This could be the reason why his solution may seem abrupt and even confounding. However, once again, Boethius' elaborate development finds itself condensed in a few words: "sed uidere Dei quantum ad diuinum contuitum, prouidere Dei quantum ad humanum intuitum attinet, falli non potest."[52] This implies that the cognitive act of seeing for God can only be called foreseeing from our point of view. Therefore, even when Gilbert does not mention the topic of eternity-temporality, he assumes it in some way; otherwise, it would not make sense to relativize the mode of referring to the divine cognitive act (*videre/providere*) precisely according to the nature of the one conceiving that same act (*ad diuinum contuitum/ad humanum intuitum*). This also explains why he used the example of a present action to explain a problem about events that will happen and, with that, also accounts for his reticence to using the prefix *prae-*.

Now *Responsio* is ready to set out his conclusion: no matter whether we call it sight, from the divine perspective, or foresight, from the human point of view, it is a cognitive act in which God

> falli non potest, et ideo quicquid Deus prouidet futurum est, nulloque modo prouidentia inmutat quam rebus quas condidit dedit naturam. His ut sint ex necessitate, illius ut fiant ex uoluntate.[53]

The fact that, in contrast to human beings, God "cannot" make a mistake is, once again, a premise on which Gilbert does not need to elaborate because it is not relevant to his proposal, and because, additionally, he had already declared how *posse* should be understood with regards to God.[54] The problem is not the fallibility of knowledge, either human or divine, but how to account for future events whose efficient causes are voluntary are, in turn, unavoidable.

The answer is then that, regardless of how we call the cognitive act of God, He knows future events with the same necessity as we know the present.[55] And given that our knowledge/sight of the present only imposes necessity in the connection between the facts, but not in the facts themselves, neither does His knowledge/sight—"prior" only *ad humanum intuitum*—

---

[52] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 56, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.28-30.

[53] Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 56, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.29-32.

[54] Cf. Gilbertus Crispinus, *DAP* 43-47, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 109.29-110.16.

[55] At this juncture, it is important to remember that in *DCD*, Anselm does not contemplate this gnoseological analogy. Anselmus Cantuariensis, *DCD* XXI, ed. Schmitt, 267.9-10: "[…] alia sit ratio de praescientia futurae quam de praesentis rei scientia […]."

change the nature of those events, of which some *fiunt* by will, others, simply *sunt* by that necessity Boethius calls "simplex."[56] Once again, a certain correspondence can be observed with a passage in the final stretch of the Boethian text:

Boethius, *Consolatio* V.6.20-22, ed. Moreschini, 157.74-158.85.	Gilbertus Crispinus, *De angelo perdito* 56, ed. Abulafia and Evans, 111.27-32.
Atqui si est divini humanique praesentis digna collatio, uti vos vestro hoc temporario praesenti quaedam videtis, ita ille omnia suo cernit aeterno. Quare haec divina praenotio *naturam rerum proprietatemque non mutat* taliaque apud se praesentia spectat qualia in tempore olim *futura* provenient. Nec rerum iudicia confundit unoque suae mentis intuitu tam necessarie quam non necessarie ventura dinoscit, sicuti vos cum pariter ambulare in terra hominem et oriri in caelo solem videtis, quamquam simul utrumque conspectum tamen discernitis et *hoc voluntarium illud esse necessarium* iudicatis.	Videre uero hominis falli potest, et ideo aliquando non est ita in re sicut estimamus non uidere; sed uidere Dei quantum ad diuinum contuitum, prouidere Dei quantum ad humanum intuitum attinet, falli non potest, et ideo quicquid Deus prouidet *futurum* est, *nulloque modo* prouidentia *inmutat quam rebus* quas condidit dedit *naturam. His ut sint ex necessitate, illius ut fiant ex uoluntate*.

Conclusions

This article has sought to give a more accurate profile of Gilbert's thought, demonstrating that his brief reflection regarding the tension between divine providence and free will is more indebted to Boethius than Anselm, whom Gilbert does not follow uncritically as it was usually believed. In effect, in spite of the lack of strict literal parallelisms and the introduction of his own terminology (such as the distinction between "necessitas in rebus" and "necessitas in rerum connexionibus"; or the more subtle distinction between "diuinum contuitum" and "humanum intuitum"), sections 49-56 of the *DAP* can be read in light of the fifth book of the *Consolatio*. Gilbert's handling is his own because his commitment to the Boethian matrix is not made explicit through the direct quotation of passages but, rather, in the way he approaches and, especially, resolves the problem, synthetizing the stages of Boethius' arguments. Yet, the editors of Gilbert's work insist on the so-called "obsolete interpretation" and see the omnipresent influence of Anselm throughout. However, this position starts to dissolve when the dating of his respective works is taken into account, along with its doctrinal contents and terminological preferences. Two considerations stem from this.

---

[56] Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio* V.6.27, ed. Moreschini, 158.100-102.

In the first place, despite the considerable difference in the treatment of the problem between Gilbert's texts and those Anselm wrote before composing the *DAP*—which Gilbert had surely read—the editors preferred to refer to a text conceived more than ten years later, such as the *De concordia*. Stuck to their prejudice that Gilbert had followed Anselm "point for point," they were incapable of considering other possible sources for that particular passage. The resulting product provides a meagre *apparatus fontium* with which to approach Gilbert. Perhaps to try and right that wrong, Evans proposed in her introduction to the *DAP*—coincidentally after mentioning this problem—that everything Gilbert wrote, he had, in any case, already learned in Bec.[57] But, even without questioning the extent to which Gilbert gained the lion's share of his education in Bec, it is unwise to underestimate the six years he spent in Canterbury, where he was chaplain to the famous Lanfranc and whose library kept some copies of the *Consolatio*.[58] In fact, the noticeable absence of this text in the *apparatus fontium* is partly what motivated the writing of this paper.

Secondly, the dialectical approach of Gilbert, although concise and, at times, abstruse, shows that not only did he venture "on the heights of speculation" (unlike Southern's belief)[59] but also under the guidance of Boethius, the greatest source of the Twelfth-Century Renaissance. This is by no means a secondary consideration, as it allows us to include Gilbert in a certain tradition whose authors can be understood as waypoints on the itinerary towards Chenu's *aetas boeciana*, even whilst they do not form part of it in the strictest sense.[60]

Natalia G. Jakubecki

University of Buenos Aires - CONICET[61]
natalia.jakubecki@filo.uba.ar

---

[57] See n. 23.

[58] Cf. R. J. James, *The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover: Catalogues of the Libraries of Christ Church Priory and St. Augustine's Abbey at Canterbury and of St. Martin's Priory at Dover*, Cambridge, 1903, xxxiii. On the other hand, the oldest catalogues we have of the libraries at Bec and Westminster come from dates later than Gilbert's lifespan, so it is very difficult to establish a reliable *corpus fontium*. For a list of the pertinent catalogues, cf. Abulafia and Evans, *The Works of Gilbert Crispin*, 7, n. 8 and n. 9.

[59] See n. 12.

[60] Cf. M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Études de Philosophie médiévale 45), Paris 1957, c. 6, 142-58.

Abstract: This article focuses on the sections 49-56 of the *De angelo perdito* by Gilbert Crispin, where he intended to solve the problem between free will and divine Providence. It aims to show how Gilbert draws on the argumentative scheme of the fifth book of the *Consolatio philosophiae*, and uses this source in a personal manner. On that basis, its purpose is both to highlight the lack of references to Boethius in the *apparatus fontium* of the critical edition and to provide further evidence that the philosophical production of the fourth Abbot of Westminster is not a rehashed summary of Anselm's, as it was usually believed.

Keywords: Gilbert Crispin, Severinus Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, Providence, Free Will, Necessity.

TABLE DES MATIÈRES