

# Contratiempo: *Contract Archaeology or a Trench in the Battle for the Dead*

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
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## ***Contratiempo: Contract Archaeology or a Trench in the Battle for the Dead***

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**Abstract** Why is it that, in the present context of territorial intervention of capital, contract archaeology (CA) is so efficient in terms of the market? In order to approach an answer to this question, the deep complicities between, on the one side, the theoretical-methodological assumptions technologically reconverted by CA and, on the other, the hegemonic ontological and epistemic assumptions mobilized by the narratives of development are anatomized. After featuring the fundamentals of the specific post-disciplinary form of CA, its totalitarian vocation implied in its opposition to the unheard dissident voices is exposed. In the context of the border, CA can be either seen as an efficient professional expansion (from the hegemonic viewpoint) or as a trench in the battle for the dead.

**Keywords** Epistemic assumptions · Epistemology of archaeology · Discipline · Post-discipline

### **Introduction**

In the times I was an undergraduate student, the very possibility of archaeology having commercial success, mercantile efficacy, was too unlikely even to be thought about. Thus, only the older among the readers may share with me a kind of surprise. It is still mystifying that the national state regulates cautionary professional interventions on some objects from, and knowledge on, a past previous to itself, while at the same time it neglects its duties of protection of the rights of those that dwell in those same lands. Moreover, it is usually the case that the dwellers are descendants of the objects of which scheme of care archaeology derives as a liberal profession with a successful mercantile performance. My own first reaction to surprise was to address the logic of the

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procedures of impact studies with so high and strict quality standards as to be sure that the precautionary principle of impact assessment would be precisely and confidently applied. The context of the capitalist border, nonetheless, very rapidly showed itself not only quite flexible, but also even demanding depressed quality standards (Haber 1999). Mega-mining projects regarding which I was called to intervene were based on such a huge imbalance of power that in those contexts of practice it ended being stupid to independently support an ethical principle. As everybody knows, and I eventually came to know, nobody hires a stupid. And this is the end of my story of personal involvement on that side. So gigantic is the disproportion of power between mega-mining corporations and national and provincial states that the latter ended up, and still are, advocates of corporate interests. Local people, at their turn, ranged between discomfort, negotiation, and resistance. I myself stayed with teaching, trying to inculcate in students a firm adherence to the quality standards that the logic of impact assessment required (but the market refused). But eventually even the logic was confronted, when my student Daniela Fernández, herself an inhabitant of a town heavily impacted by a mega-mine and soon to be intervened by another one even bigger, taught to me about the principle of life: she questioned the meaning of taking part in a procedure of impact assessment of the very project that risked her and hers family life. *To intervene by way of precaution on the effects of a project on the archaeological heritage is nonsensical if the lives of the heirs of that heritage are compromised by that same project.* Daniela's statement was a certainty simple and deep. But if we think about it, it has not simple but deep consequences. On the first place, she introduces the value of local life as preeminent to the values of truth, development, and utility. Accordingly, she sets her home of enunciation in her dwelling place instead of the academy. At the same time, she builds her interests with the local movement for life and against toxic mining, a movement I also support.

Much has been said on technical and methodological issues of archaeological intervention in impact assessment studies within investment and development projects. Much has been debated on ethical considerations and the necessary management guidelines. Theoretical work on the reasons for the alliance between capital, state and archaeology, instead, has been comparatively neglected. The WAC Inter-Congress on Contract Archaeology held in Brazil in 2013 focused on that, and as soon as it was announced in the WAC mailing list received a fierce resistance from many colleagues. I not only congratulate Adriana Dias and Cristóbal Gnecco for convening a forum that aims taking theoretical work to those corners of our practice that have remained neglected by thought, but I also think that some theory has to be done about the resistance to theory of an important part of the disciplinary collective. CA has so sheepishly evolved into a technology that archaeologists resist being something else than instruments. In order to counteract, at least in a tiny fraction, such a decisive farewell to thought, I would propose a setback or counter-time—from the Spanish language word *contratiempo*, meaning problem or setback, and made from the terms *contra* (against) and *tiempo* (time). A setback or *contratiempo* is like an obstacle, thus I would propose thinking of it as an obstacle to the instrumentalization. But a setback or *contratiempo* is also a counter-time, a time other, one that has some other shape and passes in some other way. I would like this chapter to contribute in the twofold meaning of the setback or *contratiempo*. In the following pages I'll scrutinize both the epistemic aspects that constitute archaeology as knowledge available for intervention, and the



epistemic assumptions of the broader political and cultural context that rules interventions in border territories, in order to show how both set of assumptions are not just compatible but also they require one another. I hope to be able to show the epistemic complicities on the basis of which epistemic and political alliances are possible, even beyond previous commitments to ethics, science, and professionalism. I would also like to convey the idea of the counter-hegemonic sense of border theory, such as that being made in movements for life and against toxic mining, which I find echoed in the proposed un-disciplined archaeology (Haber 2012).

## Disciplinary Epistemic Assumptions

Archaeological discipline aims to know the past through its material remains. Whatever specific definitions of knowledge, past, and materiality, are chosen, something has to be said about a past time on the basis of some kind of observation of things. Presumably, these things were originated in a past time, and this past is what archaeological discipline talks about. Starting from such a pedestrian understanding of the archaeological discipline, it seems convenient to scrutinize how is it that the different terms thus included in the description are mutually related.

Archaeological discipline codifies a series of interrelated transformations: from past to present time, from facticity to discourse, from perception to writing, and from the other to ego. Disciplinary codification admits only some specific modes of relation between past and present, thing and discourse, perception and writing, and other and ego. Relationships between those terms that are different to the disciplined ones are considered as imperfect knowledge, or illicit ways of dealing with archaeological things. This is such because the discipline already attributes to the world certain values regarding matter, perception, time and the other, previously to the perception of facts. So, it is not very surprising to find those values in the world. Such value attribution constrains the territory for further ethical and political debate.

The archaeological object (that is, as it is understood by the archaeological discipline) was a thing. Its thingness was translated into facticity through the attribution of archaeological values to the thing. That attribution happens when the thing is named by the disciplinary language; in that point it ceases to be a mere thing and it is transformed into a case within a category of facts. That category of facts has a name, so it can be said and written. The first attribution is of the value of muteness: the archaeological object is neither a piece of writing nor of (contemporaneous) speech; archaeology obtains specificity and independence from history and ethnography as neighbor disciplines. Such difference within the neighborhood defines the archaeological object as the erasure of linguistic communication. The ethnographer communicates with her object-people through some kind of linguistic communication, either direct or mediated. The historian communicates with the object-people through a linguistic communication inscribed in writing. People (usually but not always with words) say something to ethnographers and historians. That is not the case with archaeologists, whose objects say nothing to them. Material objects don't talk. Even while some archaeologists say they read archaeological remains (for instance, Hodder 1989), such a tenet is understood as a metaphor, that is, as an extension to archaeological objects of the kind of relationship usual within non-verbal communication, verbal language, or written texts.

Material remains are thus considered as analogous to text, and they can be read *as if they were* texts, that is, a metaphoric extension of the meaning that material objects *actually or literally* lack.

The essential lack of language is to be transformed into linguistic discourse. Whatever the archaeologist says about her object, it is about a non-saying thing. What the archaeologist says, whatever the meaning of the thing, it is not said by the thing (given its muteness), but by the archaeologist on the basis of what the archaeologist sees. The relationship between the mute but visible object and the talking and seeing archaeologist only can have one shape: the archaeologist perceives the exterior of the thing and talks and writes about the thing. The thing cannot return even a word to the archaeologist that says a word about it. Whatever the kind of relationship between people in the past and its objects, these remain in the archaeologist's present bounded by their material—that is, non-linguistic—capacity. Communication with people in the archaeological past is thus excluded; relationship with them is featured as a particular one-directional archaeological way. Meaning attributed to objects, sites, contexts, and so on, depends on the inter-subjective disciplinary consensus. Whether this thing is a flake, a house or a ritual deposit, is to be attributed to the object through the implicit acceptance that this thing is a case within this name category. Disciplinary linguistic naming of mute objects attributes values which the objects lack since their natural muteness; and such attribution of values is transposed to people in the archaeological past, the makers and users of flakes, dwellers of houses, and devotees participants of ritual deposits (Haber and Scribano 1993).

(Knowledge on/The people of) the past depends on the disciplinary value attribution to mute matter. Whatever the relation between people and flakes, the disciplinary archaeological language already decides that those things are flakes and that that people was flake maker/user. Once it has been decided that the world of things is mute, and that any communication with things is impossible but only an external visual perception, a wide road toward the unilateral attribution of values is opened. Such attribution is neither casual nor random but depends on the backing and language of the disciplinary collective that gives names to things.

These decisions weren't invented anew by archaeology. A long historiographical tradition provided the basics that were afterwards adopted and adapted by archaeology. In his fundamental historiographical work from the fifth century BCE Herodotus coupled together the different operations that were later consolidated within the western epistemological tradition. Herodotus coupled a common Greek classification of peoples together with a classification of sources of historic knowledge. The Greeks classified peoples according to their possession or lack of a true language (being Greek language the one considered by Greek people the true one) (Santiago 1998). Greeks and Barbarians (that is, non-Greek-speaking peoples) were classified at either sides of a cultural/linguistic difference regarding the writer (in the commented case, Herodotus himself). The sources of knowledge were classified according to a range of closeness/distance to truth, from visual witnesses of the facts (close to truth) to second hand legends and traditional knowledge (close to falseness). Sources of knowledge on the past were linguistically communicated to Herodotus, either as oral or written text. Herodotus himself was not an eyewitness of past facts, but he knew them already put down into words in his sources (documents). Any kind of people could put facts into words, even people that fought at both sides of the Peloponnesian Wars between Greeks and

Persians. But only the eye witnessing of facts by Greek-speakers had the opportunity to be communicated to the historian as a high-ranked knowledge close to truth. Collective memory, traditional knowledge, and barbarian knowledge were classified in the lowest ranks of the hierarchy of knowledge, even if this knowledge was about those same barbarians. Cultural othering was thus coupled together to the idea that the facts are knowable through an external observation then put into words in the historian's language. The cultural/linguistic other had no opportunity for wording, not even for returning the gaze. These decisions were later consolidated in the western historiographical tradition, within the enduring framework of the history discipline—as the expert knowledge of the past (Garrahan 1946; Gottschalk 1950; Shafer 1974). The ontological understandings of knowledge and the past were correspondingly naturalized.

Eye-witnessing and matter-touching were to become the major vehicles for a rational approach to truth within Western world. The “Incredulity of Thomas” artistic theme was to appear since the fifth and sixth centuries CE in Italy and later popularized during Baroque times, depicting the Apostle Thomas putting his fingers into Jesus' wounds at his side. The episode is narrated in John's Gospel (John 20:24–29) as follows:

24 But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came.

25 The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the LORD. But he said unto them, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.

26 And after 8 days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you.

27 Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side: and be not faithless, but believing.

28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My LORD and my God.

29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen Me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.

The biblical text, where faith (believe without seeing) is preferred to skepticism (need to see and touch for oneself in order to accept the fact), reproduces the former ranking of sources of knowledge, although the hierarchy here is inverted in favor of faith. It is interesting, though, the focus on touching—and not just seeing—that is placed on Thomas, for it brings to the fore the intimate relation between the preference of sight as the organ for perception of the facts and the understanding of facts in terms of matter—thus the need to touch. It is also interesting that Thomas would be considered as the patron for Justice (and the critical search of justice) within Western tradition, and not of Skepticism (as the rejection of Faith).

Archaeological discipline extends such ontology from the cultural others (even enemies) to the archaic past, that is, the past that cannot be mediated through language. The whole operation of unidirectional gaze and wording bounded within a linguistic/cultural Western intimacy ends being ruled by the archaeological methodological operations. The archaeologist understands thingness as mute material facticity and then she writes down the words that make it communicable/interpretable/explainable in her

same terms, given that was archaeological language that formerly attributed them with meaning. While transformed to fact the thing is attributed with the value of being unable to return neither the gaze nor the word. Moreover, as close as we are now to the thing, we can notice that the thing, even before being perceived or named, is already attributed of its lack of relation: the thing is the mere thing as if it could be without its constitutive relationships, even the relations it held with the perceiver. That is why archaeology pre-understands the thing as lacking not only linguistic but also any other semiotic capacity. At least this is valid from an ontological and epistemological viewpoint, because archaeology ends “interpreting” non-linguistic meanings of things, as for example, practical meanings. Nevertheless, for the moment it should be stressed the paramount importance that the repression of the meaning of things has within archaeology. Things are excised from the relations within whom they are. The relations within whom the things are are separated from the things.

History—what it is said to have happened—is a textual representation of history—what happened. Textuality represents facticity; this being already codified through cultural intimacy with the historian implies that both the historian and the author of the document (the original textualizer of facticity) share (or assume to share) certain understandings regarding time, knowledge and matter. Cultural otherness (other ontologies different to the historian’s one) is excluded from the documents or is considered as disposable (in this regard it is worthy to read the decolonial sense of oral history, Rivera 2010). Epistemic violence is codified in the historical method of the hierarchy of sources, given that it excludes the potential otherness constitutive of other disregarded sources, and altogether other epistemes, as lacking truth and constituted in falseness (Trouillot 1995).

Archaeological discipline also textualizes facticity but within its own methodology: it is the archaeologist who writes down about facts (field reports, records, schemes, forms, papers, and so on) instead of “discovering” texts already written by someone else in documentary repositories. Archaeological textualization is made within the intimacy of the social disciplinary collective and the disciplinary language. Disciplinary language introduces an epistemic violence before methodology. Once the thing is considered an archaeological object a whole set of possible relations with that thing is attributed (included) and a different whole set of possible relations of that thing is excised (excluded). As I explained above, this implies a previous ontological violence of excision of things from their relations of being. Every attribution of meaning or interpretation occurs after an original repression of meaning.

When archaeology studies material remains, it implicitly disregards both non-remaining matter and immaterial remains. That is, the possibility of something being a category such as “material remains” implies erasing the other two possibilities. Both erasures are differently considered within archaeological discipline. The first erasure, matter not remaining till present times, may be considered as an external critic of sources; within archaeological discipline it works under the heading of site formation processes and taphonomy. The second erasure—the immaterial remains—may be considered as part of an internal critique, although not well attended yet within archaeological discipline but by it being excluded from the disciplinary framework. As the relationships to the thing were formerly excluded from the fact, descent and memory as sources of knowledge are excluded from the disciplinary framework that defines its object and method. Descent from and memory of archaeological objects



cannot happen to oneself in the capacity of disciplined subject. Descent and memory aren't relationships that can be seen from the outside, but are internally constitutive of subjectivity. Only occasionally a coherent consideration of internal critique, as in certain cases of indigenous archaeology, is able to break down the restrictive boundaries of the discipline. Much more often the strategy of disciplinary objectification has been reluctant to internal critique; in such situations indigenous archaeologies have been subjected to disciplinary language, or they have been reduced to making up the disciplinary frameworks in order to conserve them unquestioned (Gnecco and Ayala 2011).

Western time is knitted within the fabric of archaeological discipline as it is within historiography. It can almost be said that the West is, mainly, a theory of history. Western time has a lineal shape. A straight line goes from the past to the present. With an origin point and a magnitude, Western time is a vector line. Since the onset of Abrahamic religions, time is originated in God's act of creation and is oriented towards dead's resurrection. While different origin points have replicated the original one, the shape of time remains virtually the same. West European Renaissance colonialism was oriented towards the salvation of the souls; nineteenth century north European colonialisms were oriented towards civilization (Thomas 1994); and since mid-twentieth century time colonialism is oriented towards development (Escobar 1999). Also, origin points have changed from Creation to Big Bang, and their replications (Christ birth, the discovery of the Americas, national independence, and so on) signaled particular origins for specific collectives. Vector time admit localizing each person, people and nation according to their magnitude alongside a line in a sequence from the origin to the orientation. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spaniards (even more if Christians, male and proprietors) were closer than Andeans to the salvation of their souls, i.e., they had greater magnitude. Nineteenth-century Englishmen were closer to civilization than gauchos. Twentieth-century US was closer to development than Argentina. Vector time also implies that history is spatially distributed, in the sense that, on time, history moves accordingly to the progression alongside the vector. Thus, each point in the vector line tends to move in direction to increasing magnitude. It is expected that an Andean moves in direction to Christianity, a gaucho towards civilization, Argentina towards US-shape development and capitalism. Common interpretative categories in archaeological discipline (complexity, political differentiation, domestication, and so on) are coined in the same vector shape, and when the past is interpreted accordingly to these categories Western ontology of vector time becomes naturalized. One of the main tasks of archaeological discipline seems to be the expansion of the West(ern ontology) over times and peoples that are beyond its boundaries.

No other discipline is best suited than archaeology for allocating each people, even the most distant and archaic, within the already casted shape of Western time. While Western theory of history is not constrained to archaeological discipline, its particular coupling together with the epistemology of the gaze and the anthropology of othering, makes archaeology a body of knowledge particularly useful for naturalizing and universalizing Western ontology; and this is of paramount importance in contexts, as the present one, of colonial border expansion.

Such a systemic usefulness has nothing to do with ethical decisions, although fundamental decisions regarding practice are included and concealed. What is usually considered as dependent on individual ethical decisions in contexts of practice is

already over-determined by epistemic decisions already taken during disciplinary processes. Two of such processes can be described. An ontogenetic disciplining occurs during years of institutionalized exposure and conversion to the disciplinary language, epistemology and ontology. A phylogenetic disciplining occurs as the discipline develops and adopts its own language, becomes institutionalized and, in the case of archaeological discipline, it becomes the hegemonic means for dealing with the ancestors of defeated peoples and their colonized descendants. Both disciplining processes are mature enough when disciplinary language is adopted as if it was one's own language, and when disciplinary frameworks are safe from the internal critique of decent and memory. In fact, it is usually the case that descent and memory, in other words, the relational meaning of the thing, are repressed. Once disciplined, a whole range of methods and theories appear and multiply; nonetheless, beyond such variability the disciplinary framework remains safe and solid.

Epistemic violence is already codified within the disciplinary framework. Once the subject is disciplined, and the discipline becomes the authorized means for dealing with a particular region of reality (ancestors of the defeated, archaeological heritage, and so on) within the limits of the framework there is no real choice but to reproduce epistemic violence. In such a context, ethical evaluations of practice, even assuming that the individuals involved have the best of the decolonial intentions, at the best may adopt the appearance of a decolonial practice—what is known as politically correct practice. Notwithstanding its appearance, such practices reproduce the same epistemic framework that codifies violence on other knowledges. That is the reason why a decolonial consideration of archaeology should evaluate the epistemic and ontological assumptions informing languages (as the disciplinary one) that give meaning to the world, making it available to the expansion of colonial relations.

At this point I have to acknowledge the virtual non-existence of such a landscape in its pure form, albeit I hope that presenting a simplified set of relations proves to be useful for the sake of the argument. Both the premises on the working of the world and the axiology of archaeological discipline have undergone great transformations during the last decades, and this should be further developed in order to put some flesh in such a skeletal landscape presented thus far.

## Post-Discipline

Capitalism entered a new expansive stage since the last 20 years. Territories formerly neglected for capital investment are being considered now. New exploitation and/or processing technologies are focused on resources previously unexploited. Aspects of reality formerly ignored by the market economy are developed into new goods. Late capitalist market has expanded into every corner of the planet, every side of the world and, every fragment of knowledge, tradition or curiosity. Even Western expansion itself has been developed into a capitalist good, capturing otherness, exoticism, tradition, outbacks, adventures and frontiers. Ruins, history, past time, and every sign of the difference to the capitalist world are a privileged target for market development. Rural and urban development projects remove sediments containing remains from the past in almost every spot of the post-colonial world. Reconstructions of past lives made by disciplinary archaeology are transformed into attractions for growing publics always

ready for the consumption of these goods. Diversity is universally celebrated, and for sure it is also converted into touristic good. Territories locally managed by generations of indigenous peoples, peasants, rural dwellers, and urban workers, are being intervened by capital. Capital is now much more flexible, fluid, overabundant and thirsty of earning revenues, and crowds of brokers are mobilized worldwide in search of developable investment opportunities. Armies of developers are in charge of opening up of such opportunities, making academic, traditional, indigenous, and so on, knowledge available for the creation of new goods. National states invest public funds for building the infrastructure needed for the operations of capital investment: roads, waterways, seaports, mountain passes, bridges, are being built all over the postcolonial world in order to release the extracted primary products: minerals, fuels, agricultural products, any other sort of good that may flow from the territories to industrialized centers. The project for the Integration of the Regional South American Infrastructure (IIRSA in Spanish <[www.iirsa.org](http://www.iirsa.org)>) is an example of international frameworks agreed upon by national states. These mobilize public funds and intervene in whatever local territory is located within the reach of the project. The trans-national agreements as the one considered are an echo of the synchronized reform of mining legislations in tens of national states throughout South America and Africa during the 1990s, lobbied by the International Mining & Minerals Association (Machado 2011). Besides the global scale of capital and the regional multilateral scale of state policies, each one of these projects intervenes territorially in specific localities. It is in these locally managed territories that capital, state, and local dwellers meet each other. It is not surprising that archaeology can be found in these postcolonial entanglements of diverse aims and interests from capital, life and knowledge. Capital, state and social movements struggle for their own regimes of care of those territories. Territorial entanglements imply struggles of knowledge in contexts of hegemony and subalternity. Archaeology is not a neutral observatory of these entanglements, given that archaeology is already the discipline within the hegemonic knowledge that is in charge of dealing with the territorialized remains of the subalterns' ancestors. And it is usually called to intervene in battlefields already epistemically structured. Archaeological discipline has undergone deep transformations in order to be able to address values other than truth. Such additional values (as social justice, market, capital revenues, and so on) operated a technological reconversion of an academic/scientific discipline formerly oriented towards the sole search of true knowledge. Some of the names of the technological reconversions of post-disciplinary archaeology are cultural resource management, indigenous archaeology, forensic archaeology, and archaeological tourism. Particular pieces of legislation (mainly heritage and indigenous legislation) modulate the specifics of archaeological interventions in territorial entanglements. The usual means for regulating the relationships with materials (things) and peoples is the professional ethical assessment of the intervention. The ethics of the consequences of the archaeological territorial interventions has within post-discipline a place equivalent to that which epistemology formerly had within disciplinary contexts. Protocols are defined in order to formalize the contexts for intervention; stakeholders are listened in order to identify their diverse positions regarding the archaeological record; indigenous claims to remains are modulated by state law and bureaucracy. Heritage legislation (as international and multilateral conventions) includes both disciplinary definitions of the archaeological remains and disciplinary regimes of care of them. The same can be said of the post-disciplinary

interventions in territorial entanglements. Post-discipline recapitulates former disciplinary assumptions regarding remains, that is, the constitutive territorialized relations between specific peoples and agents/things. That is why, even considering the usual importance of the ethical assessment of the eventual consequences of interventions, and also assuming the best of the intentions of the professionals involved, archaeological post-disciplinary interventions are already structurally laden.

The ontological assumptions that are carried in the disciplinary frameworks are consistent with the western hegemonic ontology of time, matter and knowledge. This ontology is based on a hegemonic epistemic status. Because of this, more than a set of statements on reality, it is the epistemic platform, the principle of reality that aligns the past, the present and the future within hegemonic discourse. Given that it is about the time in which actors act, it is unnecessary to presume them acting cynically. Such time, Western vector time, already has an origin and a magnitude. So, the one who lives in that time lives with both that same origin and that same orientation, and also acts in the world with the same activism implied in the transposition of time into space. Subaltern regimes of care have little room to negotiate and almost none for moving out from subalternity. Other times are not even perceived (as such) by the hegemonic gaze. Sometimes they are conflated as archaic fossilized samples, inert remains of the other, folklore that stimulates the chromatics of difference.

It sometimes happens that territorialized social movements against development/knowledge dispute the archaeological interventions guided by ethically and politically minded principles and protocols. The archaeologists involved in such entanglements unexpectedly see themselves politically and epistemically aligned with capital and the state and against territorialized localities. Such a situation usually move archaeologists to reinforce hegemonic positions within Western episteme, but it may also be an opportunity for acknowledging the perversity and persuasiveness of disciplinary assumptions that constitute the ethical and political subjectivity of (disciplined) subjects beyond their own ethical and political decisions in life.

Vector time recapitulates previous Western theories of history. Development is the orientation of the current hegemonic time. Vector time is one and the same with archaeological time; that is the reason for the complicity between archaeology and development. When post-disciplinary archaeology intervenes in the study of the effects of a particular development and/or investment project, archaeology assumes a particular ontology of time, matter and knowledge already casted in its own disciplinary framework. Lineal time implicit in the archaeological report is the same lineal time implied in the inevitability of capitalist expansion (in the form of that particular development). Other times codified in other knowledges are excluded from the evaluation of the project. Ethical evaluation of the correct practice can only decide within the margins left by the protocolization (modulation) of the expansion of Western ontology beyond its boundaries. Post-disciplinary archaeology is included in schemes that modulate capitalist expansion, in the sense that capitalism is never contested nor questioned, as if it were a metaphysical fatal destiny instead of a socio-historical phenomenon. The project of territorial intervention is guided by a bureaucratized procedure that translates it into an actual possibility. Territorial intervention by capital never takes in mind local territorial agency. Financial brokers assess territorial interventions of capital in terms of equations of cost, income, risk, and term. Archaeological heritage is quite difficult to be anticipated or quantitatively defined without



archaeology. The role of post-disciplinary archaeological interventions is to translate the archaeological heritage uncertainties of an investment project in monetary value equivalence; mainly qualitative, invisible and unpredictable entities are thus made available for their inclusion in financial equations that are needed to assess the (capital) viability of the project. Even if archaeological intervention increases costs and terms, it is the only way of managing risk reduction regarding something so uncertain as archaeological things.

## Contratiempo

In order to end this already long text I would like to ask the reader to think in the possibility of a counter-time, a counter hegemonic time which I have written for in previous opportunities in relation to un-disciplined archaeology (Haber 2012). Here I'll only emphasize local territorial agencies in the capitalist frontier entanglements as places for theory. These are the territories signaled in the border dynamics for knowledge extraction. How to go through the territory in low-investment survey, what vegetables are useful for what, local traditions, archaeological sites, how to take care of the territory, are some of the knowledges that are extracted and made available in market developments fostered by capital investment projects. Our sciences have looked for informants, ethnographical and ethnoarchaeological data, local support (goods, permits, and labor force), in short, local knowledges have been and are used but rarely have been considered as knowledge on their own right. But in fact, it is on these knowledges that the counter-hegemonic resistances to territorial interventions are based. Local territories aren't managed nor dwelled in isolation from the hegemonic episteme, but they develop diverse modalities of relation with it. To inhabit the border is always to inhabit an epistemic duplicity, to talk two languages, to think with two hearts. Territorial collectives wanting to confront with epistemic hegemony always have a huge theoretical task to accomplish: to think the hegemony against the grain and to de-link their language. They have a great advantage, too. They acknowledge their living place as their place for enunciation and theory, and they theoretically mobilize themselves in defense of life. Guided by a principle of hope and ready to struggle for their dead, they have to read against-the-grain the academic discourses that were mobilized for intervening their territories.

Those are the places for de-colonial theorizing, and it is in conversation with those border places that archaeology turns un-disciplined. To un-discipline archaeology is to insubordinate itself from its disciplinary assumptions, those that I have anatomized in the first part of this text. Archaeology is usually present in border territories, and it usually is right in the centre of the battlefield. Nobody can be neutral in the battlefield. Once there, one may be either hired in the service of capital and assess the effects on heritage of the investment project and translate those effects in a value equivalence ready to be included in a financial equation, or one may develop solidarity with local territorial agencies ready to fight for their dead. One may inhabit the hegemonic time and enjoy the little or big market success, or inhabit a trench line, a counter-time.

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