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LOST IN TRANSLATION: ABC COOPERATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN HAITI

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BERNABÉ MALACALZA AND ANTONIO RAMALHO*

Abstract

This article investigates cooperation efforts on the part of Argentina, Brazil and Chile (the ABC countries) in Haiti. It addresses two salient puzzles. First, why did ABC countries miss the opportunity to build a stronger strategic approach in Haiti, despite the favourable setting presented by a multinational stabilisation and development initiative? Second, why has their cooperation in Haiti not surmounted typical characteristics of North-South cooperation, such as poor coordination? It is argued that the absence of strategic cooperation between the ABC countries and the reproduction of problems plaguing North-South cooperation derive from a complex mix of factors, including philosophically different models of economic development, historical rivalries and the interaction between the ABC countries and Haitian political actors.

Introduction

Latin American states became important players in the overall effort to stabilise Haiti after the acute political crisis that resulted in the ousting of President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004. In order to prevent a looming humanitarian calamity, in June of that year the United Nations Security Council dispatched the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH's mandate included: assisting and protecting civilians; disarming armed parties; pacifying the country; helping the transitional government by strengthening and reforming institutions (e.g., the police, judiciary and prison system) and buttressing the rule of law; endorsing the political process and organising and monitoring free elections; and promoting human rights (UN 2011). This mission, arguably a challenging one for the UN, was handed over almost entirely to Latin American states, in particular Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.¹

The leadership taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the stabilisation effort in Haiti constitutes an emblematic example of post-Cold War initiatives aimed at promoting global peace and security undertaken under the aegis of the UN. It also reflects a genuine commitment towards strengthening economic integration, democratic rule and security in the Americas. The ABC countries realised how the exposure of their military and civilian personnel to a collective security endeavour allowed them to play a novel role in international affairs by

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making visible and articulating new South-South cooperation strategies. These strategies were also aimed at increasing their room to manoeuvre in the region, undertaking initiatives of their own vintage premised on the link between security and development and reaffirming their commitment to the principles of democracy, multilateralism and poverty reduction. Participation in MINUSTAH could become a building block in forging a united front in a region where assertive Venezuelan diplomacy and United States influence polarised views on matters such as regional security, democracy and trade. It was also a test case for future cooperation initiatives (Tripodi & Villar 2005; Heine & Thompson 2011).

This suitable context notwithstanding, the ABC countries did not seize the opportunity to use joint initiatives in Haiti as a means to strengthen their cooperation in areas including security and cooperation. Seven years after joining MINUSTAH, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have been unable to coherently articulate their international development cooperation programmes in Haiti. Why did the ABC countries miss the opportunity Haiti presented

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them to build closer ties and a stronger strategic stance in the areas of security and cooperation? This article argues that four main factors account for this failure. First, Argentina, Brazil and Chile embrace philosophically different models of economic development and therefore view development aid in different lights. Not

surprisingly, their initiatives diverged both in terms of approach and specific policy content. Second, an underlying competitive spirit among these countries informed by historical rivalries has worked against enhancing and deepening cooperation, even in the face of common challenges. Third, the ABC countries have different sets of interests on the ground. The fourth reason is previewed by Baranyi in the introductory article of this special issue. The inability to strengthen cooperation reflects different levels of commitment to peacebuilding initiatives on the one hand and the inherent problems of implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness on the other.

This article results from a cooperative research effort focused on examining the political processes that guide the formulation and implementation of the ABC countries' efforts towards Haiti. It has benefited from several seminars in which authors tested the findings of their research. This joint effort is partly the result of a project investigating emerging South-South cooperation sponsored by the International Development Research Centre. It summarises the authors' common understanding about the scope, purposes and achievements of these countries' policies with respect to MINUSTAH. Following Levy (2008), this work is presented as a *hypothesis-generating comparative case study*. Through an examination of cooperation efforts in Haiti, it seeks to improve the understanding of the stumbling blocks undermining general efforts to deepen cooperation by selected Latin American countries. This material can later be tested through other methods and studies, (e.g., large N studies) to buttress and refine the understanding of the conditions, both domestically and internationally, favouring regional cooperation in peacebuilding and reconstruction.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section elaborates the antecedents of ABC cooperation and examines the goals and incentives informing these countries' involvement in Haiti against the backdrop of South-South development cooperation models. The second section describes and examines the philosophies informing these countries' cooperation programmes and their concomitant approaches towards Haitian partners. The concluding section discusses some lessons that could be drawn from this experience as a way to contribute to evolving debates concerning South-South development cooperation in a particular regional context.

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The Antecedents of ABC Cooperation

The antecedents of an ABC pact go back to 1915, when Brazil endorsed talks to curb an incipient arms race in the region. In the 1940s presidents Juan Domingo Perón of Argentina, Getulio Vargas of Brazil and Carlos Ibañez del Campo of Chile sought to promote closer ties among their states that underscored common challenges and threats. For both opportunities, embryonic movements seeking closer cooperation among the ABC countries failed against the backdrop of mutual distrust and rivalry over pre-eminence (Dalponte & Marinkeff 2009; Hirst 2010).

Prospects for furthering coordination on foreign policy among the ABC countries improved within the context of the third wave of democratisation that swept the region in the late 1980s (Dalponte & Marinkeff 2009, Hirst 2010, Feldmann & Montes 2010). This trend deepened as the ABC countries mounted a common security stance to counterbalance the aggressive agenda advanced by the U.S. following the 11 September 2001 attacks (Lengyel *et al* 2010; Diamint 2007). These efforts were the result of work of an epistemic community comprised of civilian personnel and military officers working in the defence ministries who realised that cooperation was pivotal to further their position in several areas deemed critical such as Haiti. The creation of the so-called 2x9 mechanism, under which ministers of defence and foreign affairs of nine Latin American countries with troops in Haiti (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) met regularly to discuss security and development cooperation matters, was also pivotal to buttress the ABC stance. The collaboration of defence and foreign affairs ministries is an excellent antecedent to regional consensus building (Diamint 2007:5) and may have contributed to enhancing regional capacity to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Llenderrozas 2007). Unfortunately, these meetings have not been institutionalised and remain *ad hoc* initiatives.² Coordination among ABC in dealing with G-8 donor countries also helped to strengthen common positions.

MINUSTAH and the ABC countries' goals

Brazil agreed to take a leading position within MINUSTAH as a political platform to enhance its status as a regional power with global ambitions. Other reasons inform the Brazilian decision to accept a prominent role in the efforts to rebuild Haiti:

- The conviction of governments and the political establishment that a regional solution would be more effective to tackle Haiti's predicament;
- The opposition of the U.S. authorities to a possible Chilean leadership, a retaliatory measure for Chile's reluctance to endorse a U.S.- sponsored Security Council resolution to intervene militarily in Iraq;
- The desire to abide by its own discourse concerning its readiness to take responsibilities in the international realm;
- A formal request on the part of France, the U.S. and Canada, which were overstretched due to their troop commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq and thus felt unable to lead an operation;
- A formal request by the Haitian authorities;
- MINUSTAH matched perfectly well Brazil's commitment towards South-South cooperation, one of its foreign policy priorities, and would contribute to enhancing the country's prestige.

As Brazil's former Foreign Relations Minister stated:

Brazil was right about sending troops and assuming the military command of MINUSTAH because, in the first place, it was a mission decided by the UNSC, the only organ with the legitimacy to determine the presence of foreign troops in a sovereign country (Amorim 2007).

For Chile, Haiti was a golden opportunity to make a gesture of political and strategic rapprochement with the U.S. following the Iraq impasse. This would be the first participation by the Chilean Armed Forces in large-scale UN peacekeeping operations. Two main factors informed Chile's commitment to participating in MINUSTAH: relevant participation in Haiti seemed an excellent opportunity to show the international stature of President Lagos's leadership; and Chile's economy showed signs of strong recovery after the meagre results of the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was not a question of simply having the resources, but also of underscoring its conviction that international solidarity is an ethical and political imperative that should materialise in concrete terms in regional initiatives. Chile's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Foxley, stated this vision candidly:

Chile had the intention to help Haiti not only for humanitarian reasons, but in order to increase its international prestige as well. Prestige yields good dividends by boosting leadership, something that may translate into more investment, which is beneficial to the country (cited in Feldmann & Montes 2010: 17).

The quick commitment of Brazil and especially Chile elicited suspicion in the Argentine government about those countries' aspirations of enlarging their regional influence. Soon after the articulation of the Multinational Interim Force in Haiti under an American aegis, an overcommitted US with demanding missions in Iraq and Afghanistan decided to outsource stabilisation efforts in Haiti. This paved the way for a rapid channelling of initiatives through the UN. This favoured Argentina's long-standing preference for multilateral endeavours to handle crisis situations. In addition, the American 'retreat' and the shift to multilateralism fed the perception of Argentina's foreign policy circles that a window of opportunity was emerging for Latin American countries to play a bolder role in crisis episodes within the region (Lengyel 2006).³

The multidimensional involvement of the ABC countries

MINUSTAH represents an example of the so-called third-generation peacekeeping operations, characterised by challenging goals and a complex mandates. These operations may be deployed without the consent of warring parties and seek to provide assistance and protection to civilians, force hostile groups to abandon violence, and collaborate on state creation and/or reconstruction (Talentino 2005; Doyle & Sambanis 2006: 10-12; Baranyi 2008). In the case of MINUSTAH, its specific goals included creating a secure and stable

environment, guaranteeing respect for human rights and supporting the political process in Haiti. Against the backdrop of widespread violence and a dysfunctional, weak state incapable of providing basic public goods, the UN mission was mandated to help Haiti bring about political stability and boost its economy.

MINUSTAH represents an example of the so-called third-generation peacekeeping operations, characterised by challenging goals and a complex mandates.

This included: creating a safe and secure environment and curbing scores of non-state armed groups;⁴ helping civilians afflicted by war, disease and displacement; and promoting political dialogue with the aim of organising democratic elections, developing infrastructure and buttressing the rule of law (Shamsie & Thompson 2006).

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The challenging goals set by MINUSTAH represented a major opportunity for the ABC countries. In addition to accumulating experience in major diplomatic forums, their participation in MINUSTAH became a valuable opportunity to assess their approach to overseas assistance. The ABC countries have openly expressed their commitment to promoting South-South cooperation as a major element informing their foreign policies. They therefore saw Haiti as a valuable opportunity to assess their practices in the realm of bilateral cooperation (Lengyel 2006).

ABC cooperation programmes: strengths and weaknesses

The ABC countries complemented their multilateral efforts with several bilateral initiatives. Brazil invested over \$2.75 billion in technical cooperation with Haiti in 2010, 46% more than in 2009. Between 2005 and 2010 these initiatives accounted for roughly \$7 billion, mainly in aid for development and public health. In 2010 it sponsored 17 projects in seven areas: agriculture, food security and nutrition (eight); health (three); justice and security (two); and infrastructure, professional qualification, culture and sports, each with one. Brazil's experience in Angola has shown the importance of linking reconstruction efforts to long-term development goals, particularly in the field of infrastructure (Farani 2011).

In Haiti, Brazil better articulated its efforts on the ground. Haiti alone accounted for over 13% of Brazilian spending on technical cooperation between 2005 and 2010, the fourth highest budget behind Mozambique (15.78%), East Timor (15.16%) and Guinea Bissau (14.43%). But the programmes for Haiti include huge infrastructure projects, such as the hydroelectric dam project, Artibonite 4 C, in Plateau Central, estimated to cost \$190 million. Brazil also contributed \$220 million to humanitarian assistance after the Haitian earthquake (Farani 2011).

Argentina's cooperation initiatives present smaller figures and a broader scope. They cover areas such as education, institution building, security, health infrastructure, food security and housing. Argentina's flagship programme is Pro Huerta, which provides technical assistance with the aim of improving the capacity of small farmers and communities to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of fresh organic vegetables. It involves the participation of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture and has been implemented in schools, orphanages, training centres, farmers' associations, women's associations, professional centres, parishes and congregations of various religious denominations (Malacalza 2010).

Chile, for its part, has undertaken programmes in areas including education, child support, the environment, technology, public security and health. The training of the newly formed Haitian National Police has been an important component of Chile's contribution to MINUSTAH. Two other important projects include a programme for food security, which benefits approximately 1,000 Haitians and education for kindergartens (Piracés 2009).

In short, as Table 1 illustrates, beyond their specific roles in MINUSTAH the ABC countries' bilateral cooperation schemes do not reflect a concerted, well-planned strategy with coordinated medium- or long-term goals. Their bilateral contributions in the fields of food security and education, just to mention two relevant areas, have not produced an integrated, trilateral rural development initiative. Rather than providing the tools for fostering statebuilding, community self-sufficiency, private and public initiatives and, more broadly, sustainable development, the ABC countries' cooperation programmes lack a clear focus, are neither fully consistent nor particularly resourceful, and appear to generate – with some exceptions – limited spillovers. The disparity of resources allocated to and results obtained by MINUSTAH in comparison to bilateral schemes, moreover, demonstrates that ABC countries' contribution is stronger in the realm of peacekeeping than in peacebuilding. These

Table 1: ABC Development Cooperation Programmes in Haiti (2005-2011)

Area	Project	Country	Budget (\$)
Agriculture & food security	Programme for fresh food self-sufficiency	Argentina supported by Spain, Canada & International Fund for Agricultural Development	8,230,000
	Rural development of the north	Chile	257,004
	Transfer of technology for the production of cashew nuts	Brazil	194,440
	Management and reconstruction of the vegetable surface of the Mapou Basin	Brazil (\$293,090) Spain (\$351,200)	644,290
	Promotion of durable production of legumes in the Kenscoff region	Brazil	221,650
	Centre for validating agricultural technologies and for promoting rural development in Fond des Nègres, Nippes	Brazil	5,300,000
	Improving the systematic production of rice, beans, corn & cassava in Nippes and Petit Goave	Brazil	1,200,000
	Promoting the sustainable production of vegetables in the Kenscoff region	Brazil	250,000
	Strengthening family agriculture and food security	Brazil	340,000
	Construction of small containers to store rain water	Brazil	290,000
	Strategic programme of technical cooperation in agriculture and food security	Brazil	4,000,000
Education	Centre for Professional Training (mechanics, electricity, software and cloth)	Brazil	4,000,000
	Education project for kindergartens	Chile	215,294
	Kenscoff Farmers' Cooperative (Afe Nèg Kombit)	Chile	6,560
	Reinforcement of the school 'Rebública de Chile'	Chile	16,118
	Association for the Development of Cite Soleil	Chile	4,000
Health	Medical assistance by América Solidaria (Centre CAFOJ)	Chile, América Solidaria	100,000
	Reinforcement of the Haitian programme of immunisation	Brazil (\$801,750) Canada (\$1,497,583)	2,213,586
	Technical assistance in animal health and sanitation inspections	Argentina	10,400

Area	Project
Justice	Fight against women
Public finance	Technical and financial
	Quarantine expenses
Energy	Hydroelectric (Arb)
Infrastructure	Reparation of roads
Security	Honorary Red Cross
	Rehabilitation
	Collaboration with consular arm
	Strengthening National
	Training by the

* Sourced from data

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Area	Project	Country	Budget (\$)
Justice	Fighting violence against women in Haiti	Brazil	296,861
Public finance	Technical cooperation in planning and public finance	Argentina	290,000
	Quantification of public expenditure on children	Argentina, Unicef	3,000
Energy	Hydroelectric dam project (Arbonite 4 C) in Plateau Central	Brazil	190,000,000
Infra-structure	Repair of roads and avenues in Port-au-Prince	Brazil	1,500,000
Security	Honour and respect for Bel Air: Reduction of armed violence and urban rehabilitation in the neighbourhood	Brazil, Viva Rio, Canada & Norway	3,600,000
	Collection of urban solid waste to consolidate the process of reduction of armed violence in Carrefour	Brazil – IBSA Fund (India, Brazil & South Africa)	1, 532,416
	Strengthening of the Haitian National Police	Brazil	520,000
	Training of the Haitian National Police by the School of Chilean Carabineros	Chile	758,987

* Sourced from data supplied by the foreign affairs ministries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

countries have indeed been able to help maintain public order and provide immediate relief in terms of social needs, addressing short-term expectations. However, the connection between these initial efforts and an articulated long-term development strategy are far from clear. As a result, their purported goal of helping to address and remedy on a permanent basis the predicament of the Haitian population seems not to have been achieved.

Even though the ABC countries share a technical assistance approach based on official exchanges, some of the obstacles that impede their joint ownership of the ABC programmes in line with the Paris Declaration are: a lack of institutional capacities to support coherent, long-term programmes; inter-ministerial disputes (such as that between Argentina's foreign and social development ministries over the coordination of Pro Huerta initiatives) and frequent changes of officials responsible for cooperation (with three-monthly rotations).

The ABC countries' political engagement in MINUSTAH involved the creation of the 2x9 mechanism with the aim of institutionalising the discussion of common policies and other concerns. Some authors argue that the 2x9 mechanism has contributed to enhancing coordination among ABC countries by stressing that the collaboration of defence and foreign affairs ministries is an excellent antecedent to regional consensus-building (Diamint 2007: 5). Others recognise that joint participation in such activities has enhanced regional capacity to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Llenderozas 2007). To sum up, the evolution of their respective bilateral initiatives indicates that the ABC countries seem not to have

been able to take full advantage of the 2x9 mechanism, whose consultation meetings have thus far been characterised by informality, intermittence, lack of predictability and ineffectiveness. After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the newly created Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has also become involved in Haiti, further blurring the role of ABC countries in the Haitian emergency (Heine & Thompson 2011).

The literature on humanitarian assistance and development aid establishes that inefficiencies and duplication are common features when it comes to executing initiatives on the ground (Barnett & Weiss 2008; Kent 1987). This brief overview of the ABC countries' initiatives in Haiti offers yet another example of this pattern. Despite their efforts within the 2x9 mechanism and UNASUR, ABC countries have had a hard time coordinating their actions at the political and diplomatic levels. Coordination on the ground has been particularly difficult. Whether UNASUR will contribute to strengthening the coordination of ABC countries' initiatives on the ground remains an open question.

Obstacles to Cooperative Efforts

The ABC countries have explicitly regarded their respective participation in MINUSTAH as a crucial element of their foreign policies because it galvanises their power regionally, enhances their international prestige and provides opportunities to calibrate cooperation efforts abroad. This joint mission opens up opportunities for them to strengthen foreign policy coordination in the light of relevant developments in the Americas. In spite of these factors and their purported commitment to building common ground, cooperation has remained shallow. This is particularly perplexing because the challenging and at times hostile environment in Haiti represents an ideal context to deepen cooperation. The gap between concrete cooperation on the ground and their diplomatic discourses, however, evidences the limits of ABC countries' joint efforts.

Different models of development and their impact on foreign policy orientations

The link between development and foreign policy orientations is not straightforward. Causality is not unidirectional: sometimes domestic development considerations strongly permeate perspectives on international affairs, influencing national options for alliance building, decisions in international forums and involvement in international conflicts. Moreover, commitments made at the international level shape the boundaries or time frame of domestic development policies. In countries whose states present important functional and ideological cleavages, the preferences of bureaucratic agencies working in the field of development are not always paid due attention by public officials in the foreign affairs departments (Haynes *et al* 2010: 86-110).

These caveats notwithstanding, the consolidation of alternative economic development models has hampered cooperation among the ABC countries in Haiti. Motivated by domestic factors, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile have embraced different domestic economic development paths. As discussed below, these paths have also influenced their views on international assistance, and more specifically their strategies in Haiti.

Brazil under Lula's government

After World War II Brazil developed through an import substitution industrialisation model predicated on the idea that the state should play a central role in the economy. The state regulated economic activities, taxed imports and provided subsidies and investment in a

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range of industrial sectors deemed strategic for the development of productive autonomy. The emphasis relied on a flexible foreign policy seeking greater projection of the country internationally (Soares de Lima & Hirst 2006:23)

As Brazil gradually liberalised its economy since the 1980s its foreign policy also shifted towards accommodation with neoliberal norms. Under President Lula's government (2002-2010) Brazil resumed its autonomy-focused strategy with strong global aspirations. It revived some of its traditional objectives: the construction of an international order based on rules and institutions rather than on power politics; the talent to serve as a consensus-builder, fixing the country's image of a peaceful and constructive member of the international society; and the attempt to avoid confrontation with other countries, leaving all doors open (Valler Filho 2007; Sweig 2010). Nonetheless, it also innovated. For example, it denounced the unfairness inherent in the international order and offered technical cooperation to less developed countries all over the world, a move that informed Brazil's decision to engage in MINUSTAH. After all, Haiti symbolises better than any other country the huge inequalities observed in the Western Hemisphere. Because Brazil had previously announced its preparedness to assume greater responsibilities on the international stage, but failed to materialise this promise in different occasions, it was difficult to avoid engaging in Haiti.

By defending a more just international order ruled by more representative global institutions, Brazil affirms an economic and political standpoint that conceives insecurity and underdevelopment as being inextricably linked to injustice and unrest, both at the domestic and international level (Hirst 2010; Valler Filho 2007; Soares de Lima 2005; Hurrell 2007). The Brazilian position expresses itself in a number of concerted actions it has carried out with other emerging countries. These include India, Brazil and South Africa (2003) and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) forums of 2009; the commercial G-20 (2003); the financial G-20 (2009); and several regional and global summits. Brazil called for a global fund against poverty (2004), adopted ambitious positions regarding environmental conservation at Copenhagen 13 with the creation of the Bali Roadmap (2007), and at the Copenhagen 15 Conference of the Parties (2009).⁵ These initiatives reflect the views of Brazil and other BRICs countries that global institutions are unrepresentative of some key political players. They also reflect the hope that global governance reform, particularly within UN, will open the way for repositioning Brazil in a new world order

A number of initiatives in areas including transportation, power generation and distribution, and the promotion of regional integration in South America complement the efforts to improve the country's position on the world stage by reducing inequalities and promoting socioeconomic development. In this context MINUSTAH represents for Brazil an opportunity to develop joint projects that may promote regional integration and enhance its prestige. Assuming a leading role in shaping a prosperous and stable region capable of addressing its own problems is thus a priority (Soares de Lima 2005; Valler Filho 2007).

Brazil has adhered to the Paris Declaration and formally stressed its intention to strengthen the local ownership of development projects, particularly rural development. It also avoids imposing conditionalities and relating its projects to Brazilian investments or trade. The Brazilian government operates its foreign policy pragmatically, but it also points to a 'horizon of idealism': it wants to project abroad the commitment shown domestically with promoting social justice, reducing poverty, improving democracy, strengthening sustainable development and respecting human rights (Patriota 2011). However, the cooperation offered by the Brazilian government in Haiti and elsewhere is clearly demand-driven and focused on the sectors where government organs have developed the capacity to offer short-term results: agriculture and health. It also involves the private sector in promoting professional formation for the industrial sector.

Chile under 'The Concertación' governments

Chilean involvement in Haiti represents part of a major diplomatic offensive to reinsert the country in international circles. Following years of international isolation stemming from the repudiation that the military dictatorship (1973-1989) created internationally, the coalition that would govern the country for the next 20 years (1990-2010)⁶ wholeheartedly promoted an active participation in international affairs. This policy has continued under the administration of President Sebastian Piñera (2011-). Chile's thesis is that globalisation generates risks and poses questions, but also opens up great opportunities that may bring benefits to the country (Feldmann & Montes 2010).

Against this backdrop Chile has adopted a proactive role in the discussion and resolution of diverse international topics, having embarked on visible diplomatic campaigns. Chile successfully applied twice to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (1996-7, 2003-4) and four times of the UN Economic and Social Council, and has had continuous participation in the UN Commission on Human Rights. It successfully promoted the candidacy of Juan Somavía to become Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (1999) and that of José Miguel Insulza of Secretary-General of the *Organisation of American States* (2005), who was later re-elected. Chile also fostered bilateral free trade agreements and promoted its participation in economic associations, in particular the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while promoting its market-driven economic model (Wehner 2009).

Chile has thus adopted a foreign policy with liberal overtones that mimics that of the industrialised democracies of the OECD. The Chilean Foreign Ministry portrays the country's foreign policy as being based on permanent principles and programmatic objectives. These include: multilateralism; respect for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states; respect for international law; the commitment to peaceful resolution of controversies; and the promotion of human rights. Chile has been one of the active promoters of the *human security* concept, endorsed by like-minded governments (including Canada, Norway, and Sweden) and summarised in the concept of 'responsibility to protect'. Its bilateral cooperation in Haiti relies heavily on this principle in every field – economic, security and environment. Chile proposes a global approach to overcome underdevelopment through the encouragement of free trade, modernisation of the state and programmes to overcome poverty and inequality (Alvear 2004). As a result, Chilean involvement in Haiti serves its professed foreign policy goals as it shoulders multilateral efforts to promote peace and regional stability and international solidarity (Feldmann & Montes 2010; Wilhelmy & Durán 2003). It also helps to mitigate a degree of international isolation, as shown in the above statement by its former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Foxley.

Chile's cooperation efforts in Haiti have been influenced by the *Weltanschauung* described above, asserting market-oriented economic and social policies (Castiglioni 2005). It thus fosters a development model that removes the state's role as an engine for economic development and promotes an *assistentialist* ethos in the social sphere. In the absence of a strategy directed by one single actor in Haiti, Chilean cooperation schemes seem to lack coherence and focus, particularly if one takes into consideration Haitian political culture, which is rooted in the idea that everything comes from the central government.

Argentina under Kirchner's governments

Following the collapse of its economy in 2001, Argentina gradually overcame the crisis through two main factors: a commodity boom and the devaluation of the peso. With the election of

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Nestor Kirchner in April 2003 Argentina abandoned the path of unconditional alignment with the U.S. and sought a more autonomous stance. It prioritised economic growth, rapprochement with neighbouring countries (particularly, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) and a diversification of the country's international engagements, including bilateral agreements on energy and agriculture cooperation with Venezuela (Follietti 2005; Malacalza 2010).

In his first years in office Nestor Kirchner focused on economics. The priority was to control the domestic social emergency and overcome the severe liquidity problems that the 2001 default on the external public debt generated with the international financial institutions. When economic growth resumed Argentina sought greater international visibility. In the region this included Argentina's leadership in the creation of UNASUR and its important role in MINUSTAH. At the multilateral level, for example, Argentina joined the push in the G-20 to cap global food prices, an initiative that was consistent with its support for food security in Haiti (Lengyel 2010).

Two main elements mark Argentina's approach to international cooperation: first, the concern with domestic development combined with the rejection of any 'one size fits all' solution and the promotion of locally grounded initiatives to properly attend the recipient's development needs; second, the conviction that recipient countries have to be fully involved in the design and implementation of programmes. Argentina's approach to cooperation can be fairly summed up as largely demand-driven and *ad hoc*. Accordingly, the needs identified in partner countries and in capacities available at home orient Argentinean interventions (Follietti 2005; Malacalza 2010; Lengyel 2006).

Argentina's recent involvement in Haiti epitomises this rationale. When the food crisis hit in 2008, Argentina spotted an opportunity to respond to a major Haitian need by demonstrating its expertise in the promotion of small-scale agriculture and other grassroots responses to a major economic crisis. Argentina quickly offered to extend its own Pro Huerta programme to Haiti, to promote household agriculture and local food security in particularly vulnerable areas of the country. Argentina's initiative was seen as a compelling way to link Haiti's needs and Argentina's expertise in agriculture.

Table 2 summarises the arguments presented in this section regarding the developmental models and their impact on the foreign policies of the ABC countries.

Table 2: ABC Development Models, Global Approaches and Foreign Policy Goals

	Domestic development model	Global approach	Main foreign policy goal	Haiti is an opportunity to...
Brazil	Developmentalist, industrial, agri-food	Power-seeking and normative	Global player as rule-maker	Denounce the unfairness inherent in the international order and gain prestige
Argentina	State-led, agri-food	Pragmatic, with some normative focus	Leadership as regional player	Reject 'one size fits all' solution and promote locally-grounded initiatives
Chile	Market-driven, natural resources	Pragmatic, free trade agreements	Global player as rule-taker	Promote the human security concept and the responsibility to protect

The ABC countries and the quest for pre-eminence

In addition to discrepancies stemming from diverse philosophical views on economic development and foreign assistance, unfulfilled expectations concerning cooperation among ABC countries also result from historical rivalries. A particularly salient issue concerns their competition for pre-eminence in regional affairs. Brazil, Argentina and Chile have been categorised in the academic literature as intermediate states, 'would-be great powers' and middle powers. This characterisation captures these countries' emerging status and emphasises their regional predominance and their role as regional peacemakers. In the case of Brazil, it also underscores its global ambitions (Hurrell 2007, Soares de Lima & Hirst 2006).⁷

While ABC countries share a status as regional powers, there are salient differences in their size, capabilities, and scopes (Pazo 2005). With a population of approximately 200 million people, a robust, modern industrial sector and sizable human capital, Brazil is considered the South America's *hegemon* (Buzan & Weaver 2004). Brazil aims at projecting its image beyond the region on a global level and at increasing its visibility and impact in international relations and its role as a global actor. In this sense Brazil is perceived as a global player and projects its global identity as a voice for the developing world in crucial international debates (John de Sousa 2008; Sweig 2010). With a much smaller population (40 million), but significant human and technical capabilities, Argentina has less of an influence in regional affairs, let alone globally. Although transformed into a major economic powerhouse in the region, Chile is a small country (17 million inhabitants) that simply lacks the human and technical resources of its much larger neighbours.

Border frictions have also influenced – and soured – their relations. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, competition hinges on pre-eminence in the region. Although smaller, Argentina has competed fiercely with Brazil: its strategy consisted in counterbalancing and constraining Brazil's actions as much as possible by refusing to grant it the necessary acceptance and legitimacy. Chile holds no regional ambition and clearly has no desire to compete with Brazil; on the contrary, it has acted as a traditional as a loyal ally (Sweig 2010). Chile's supportive attitude with Brazil serves the purpose of keeping in check Argentina, with which it has a complex, competitive relationship characterised by cyclical periods of friction and distension (Buzan & Weaver 2004).

These undercurrents and tensions have come to fore, although furtively, working against closer cooperation in the Haitian case. Argentina perceives MINUSTAH as a process that serves Brazil as a platform to project power in world affairs, particularly within the UN system, although this is not expressed in official discourse. It also is worried about Chile's growing stature and influence in the region, although this is mitigated by a marked improvement in bilateral relations. Chile's participation in ABC coordination efforts is pivotal because its presence and stance help to improve relations between Brazil and Argentina.

Conclusion

This article has examined the attempts undertaken by the ABC countries to deepen and enhance their cooperation in foreign policy. It has suggested that the 2004 Haitian crisis constituted a propitious opportunity to advance substantively the convergence of their external diplomatic agendas. Its main contention has been that Haiti presented a golden opportunity to deepen cooperation among the ABC countries, but that they did not seize it. Three main factors account for this failure. First, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile embrace philosophically different models of economic development and therefore view development through different lenses. As Table 2 shows, Brazil's development cooperation approach is

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developmental and industrialist, has evident South-South cooperation overtones and strives to transform the country into a global player. With more modest goals – and means – Argentina is strongly influenced by agro-industrialist activities. Chile embraces a highly pragmatic model that conceives development cooperation as being driven by the private sector. Second, there is an underlying competitive spirit derived from historical rivalries that works against stronger cooperation, even in the face of common challenges. Given its size and power, Brazil strives to lead in South America. While Argentina attempts to counterbalance Brazilian pre-eminence, Chile bandwagons, knowing it is too weak to counter Brazil. Argentina and Chile, meanwhile, compete for influence and prestige behind Brazil. Third, different views regarding development strategies inform different preferences regarding statebuilding efforts and shape their real commitment towards honouring the Paris Declaration. Fourth, each of the three countries pursues different interests derived from its own ideological preferences as well as domestic pressures that constrain its room for manoeuvre and become a difficult stumbling block for joint initiatives. Brazil seeks a global status by denouncing the unfairness of the international order and gaining more prestige through industrial infrastructure and agricultural development projects. Argentina is trying to consolidate its state-led and agro-food development domestic model and seeks to expand in Haiti its conviction that locally grounded initiatives are better and more adaptable than 'one size fits all' solutions as the Pro Huerta programme tries to demonstrate. Much to the dismay of many, the ABC countries have found it problematic to substantively advance joint cooperation efforts given the different levels of their adherence to the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. In sum, ABC cooperation is clearly demand-driven and focused on the sectors where governmental organs have implemented successful policies with short-term results. Since volatility of engagement (not only in aid volumes, but also in diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, the ABC countries must improve aid predictability and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination to improve the cooperation efforts.

Beyond lost opportunities, however, the corollary of this pattern is that their individual efforts have fallen short of helping to improve the living conditions of the Haitian population on a large scale. Following Galtung's (1969) concept of positive peace, while there has been an improvement in the general security conditions in the country, more lasting changes are too few and far between to achieve a transformation of the economic, political and social conditions

ABC countries have done little to avoid contributing to creating a fragile, artificial peace in the country.

that fuel war or, in the Haitian case, that generate the state fragility. ABC countries have done little to avoid contributing to creating a fragile, artificial peace in the country. Their programmes, crafted in many cases with little planning, if any, have been as much influenced

by domestic preferences and capabilities as by the needs of the target population; they have not been able to advance meaningful peacebuilding efforts that can substantively alter the chances of a better future for the Haitian population.

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Endnotes

¹ Latin American countries contribute with 60% of UN troops deployed in Haiti. Countries contributing military personnel (7,039 in all) are: Argentina (558, including a field hospital), Bolivia (208), Brazil (2,200), Canada (10), Chile (499), Croatia (3), Ecuador (67), France (2), Guatemala (118), Jordan (728), Nepal (1,075), Paraguay (31), Peru (209), the Philippines (157), Sri Lanka (959), United States (4), and Uruguay (1,135) (UN 2011).

² Interview by the authors with María Inés Ruz, former advisor to the Chilean Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2010, Santiago de Chile

³ Two key domestic factors also informed Argentina's decision to participate in MINUSTAH: 1) it would secure U.S. support in international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, at a time when the country was in the middle of the harsh post-default debt negotiations with international financial agencies and private bond-holders; and 2) it was highly functional to the government's goal of identifying a new role and mission for Argentina's armed forces and improving civil-military relations at a time when the Kirchner administration was making a strong drive to further democratise its forces.

⁴ Violent groups include paramilitary groups with links to Haiti's economic elite and with ties to the dissolved army, renegade members of the armed forces and police, armed gangs and criminal syndicates smuggling drugs, arms and other illegal merchandise, and common criminals (ICG 2009).

⁵ Brazil's South-South cooperation since 2002 shows impressive results. It opened 35 embassies mainly in Asia and Africa, 30 of which have been reciprocated. Between 2003 and 2008 its foreign trade with particular regions has grown: 249% with South American countries, 316% with Africa, 329% with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and 370% with Arab countries. This contrasts with the bilateral trade with traditional partners, such as the U.S., which roughly doubled from \$26.2 billion to \$53.05 billion in the same period (Itamaraty 2010).

⁶ The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) elected four consecutive presidents: Patricio Aylwin (1990-1993), Eduardo Frei (1994-1999), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).

⁷ Different attributes have been ascribed to intermediate states and middle powers. According to Nolte, 'it makes sense not to act on the assumption of only one global power hierarchy, but rather to presuppose a parallel and superposed system of global, regional and, in some cases, sub-regional power hierarchies, which are in a permanent process of interaction' (2007: 9). The status of middle or regional power is a social category that depends on the perceptions of 'others' on the corresponding power hierarchy perceived by other states (*ibid.*).

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Abstract

Given the less-than-despite the past all-review of the Unit before the January the catastrophic di policy and practice Paris Declaration undertaken by the l and Development. in a country challe and conflict, Haiti effective developm

Introduction

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