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Genesis and profanation of the other world: The interpretation of dreams

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*This paper addresses Nietzsche's reflections on the phenomenon of dreams as a crucial precedent of Freud's *Die Traumdeutung*. The works of Nietzsche and Freud are scrutinized to establish and compare the most relevant aspects of their understanding of dreams. The philosophical impact of both accounts is assessed in terms of the transvaluation of religious and metaphysical values, which reveals three epistemological shifts: the replacement of Metaphysics by History/Genealogy (Nietzsche) and by Metapsychology (Freud), and the expansion of rationality beyond the limits of consciousness (Nietzsche and Freud). Both authors are shown to consider dreams as figurative expressions of a postponed desire – or, more specifically, as the imaginary fulfillment (compensation) and the evocation/awakening of desire. As captured by the phrase “Memento libidines”, dreams are portrayed in both accounts as the guardians of sleep and desire. Finally, and in contrast with Assoun, a new interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is proposed, as an interpretation of the prophet's dreams reveals the presence of individual desire within the Nietzschean understanding of the phenomenon.*

Keywords: criticism of religion, Freud, interpretation of dreams, Nietzsche, transvaluation of values

Extended summary

This paper addresses Nietzsche's reflections on the phenomenon of dreams as a crucial precedent of Freud's *Die Traumdeutung*. The connections between both authors allow us to look back at Nietzsche's writings on the topic from a psychoanalytical perspective.

The first part of the paper scrutinizes the works of Nietzsche and Freud to establish the rationale and objectives of their respective interpretations of dreams. The philosophical impact of both accounts is assessed in terms of the transvaluation of religious and metaphysical values. In line with the authors, such an analysis reveals three epistemological shifts: the replacement of Metaphysics by History/Genealogy (Nietzsche) and by Metapsychology (Freud), and the expansion of rationality beyond the limits of consciousness (Nietzsche and Freud). A contrast with the views of

¹Translated by Peter Shaio

Descartes, a leading figure in the philosophy of consciousness, suggests that such an interest in dreaming – a crucial part of daily life – relates to human symbolic issues much in the same way as the critique of political economy relates to socioeconomic structure.

The second part looks more closely at how each author framed the interpretation of dreams. Five aspects stand out in Nietzsche's work. His pioneering theory (i) values and secularizes dreams, (ii) relates them to primitive thought, (iii) addresses some of their specific operations and their efficiency during wake, (iv) characterizes them as imaginary compensations of unsatisfied desires, and (v) yields convincing interpretations of narrated dreams in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. This perspective resonates through Freud's *Traumdeutung*, in which dreams (or rather, their verbalization) are conceived as meaningful constructions of the dreamer with ontogenetic and phylogenetic implications. Much like Nietzsche, Freud describes dreams as compensations for missing nourishment during the day and as the locus of truths that consciousness withholds. In this sense, both thinkers attribute dreamers with full authorship and responsibility over their dream-telling. According to Freud, such a responsibility also extends to the unconscious motivation of human actions during wake. Building on this conceptual convergence, this paper sets forth a Freudian interpretation of Nietzschean *Amor fati*: Freud regards destiny as the fulfillment of desire.

Concerning the impact of the interpretation of dreams on the notion of rationality, both authors proclaim an expansion of consciousness. The alleged predominance of the Id (reminiscent of what, in Nietzschean terms, might be ironically called the “*Roi Moi*”) is weakened by the acknowledgment of urges or instincts. Although both authors found shared inspiration in Schopenhauer, the impact of dreams on memory was portrayed as detrimental for Nietzsche but as beneficial for Freud. This section concludes by highlighting the authors' shared conception of dreams as a window into individual history extending beyond the self. Freud considers that this threshold could be neither only temporal nor past-bound.

The third part discusses the consequences of prioritizing (unconscious) desire over (conscious) will. In light of its status as an art of wakefulness, the interpretation of dreams is characterized as a key precursor to cultural and ideological criticism. In both accounts, dreams are the prototype of mythical fears and the key to true awakening – namely, a release from metaphysical illusions, fears and misery, superfluous elements, the tyranny of modern vigil, and self-deception. In this vein, Nietzsche proposes the paradox of learning how to wake up from dreams: waking up to desire, in desire.

For Freud, dreams are not merely deceptive entities. He suggests that the possible meanings of dreams include the (disguised) fulfillment of (repressed) unconscious desires. While imaginary, such a fulfillment is an anticipated experience which may prompt action or inaction. It follows that dreams are not merely compensations for lost or unfulfilled desires, but also a reminder of long-postponed yearnings. In *Die Traumdeutung*, dreams are the guardians of sleep and desire. In parallel with Nietzsche's ‘awakening to desire’, a possible epigram is set forth for a Freudian formulation of the universal semantics of dreams ‘*Memento libidines*’: ‘remember your desire’,

'remember you desire'. This paraphrasis of *'Memento mori'* is also reminiscent of the uncanny analogy between sleep and death, and portrays dreams as testimonies of our transience.

The fourth and final part profits from a discussion by Paul-Laurent Assoun (1984) to further develop the comparison between Nietzsche's and Freud's interpretation of dreams and to propose a novel reading of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* from a Freudian viewpoint. Assoun considers that while Freud sets forth a tight, systematic relationship between dreams and individual desire, such a connection is missing in Nietzsche, for whom dreams would be but manifestations of the collective unconscious. However, this paper demonstrates that Nietzsche analyses the individuality of desire expressed in dreaming. Individual desire and the impact of personal history on oneiric symbolization are brought to the fore in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The clearest evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Zarathustra's dreams and their analysis within the book. Specifically, this paper analyses Nietzsche's interpretation of his own character's dreams from a psychoanalytical perspective, thus contributing to the debates around a controversial, polysemic book. Note that the prophet relies on dreams to anticipate a seemingly unspeakable truth: Eternal Return. Where Nietzsche spoke of a *Wahrlicher* (truth-teller), the reader of Freud might deem Zarathustra a *Wahrträumer* (truth-dreamer).

On the assumption that dreams constitute a *via regia* to capture some of Zarathustra's teachings, this paper concludes that the prophet's story pertains to a realm intermediate between wake and sleep. If, as Borges maintains, *Zarathustra* can be read as a sacred book, then it can also be interpreted as a psychoanalytical record: as a dream told jointly by the analyst and the analysed 'subject' – that is, as a 'psychoanalytical' intervention on culture. *Zarathustra* addresses the progressive emancipation from the most basic internal ties; it is a narrative of relief from suffering, redemption and self-improvement. Zarathustra is the spokesperson of what consciousness withholds, the representative of a reason which exceeds words and propositions. The interpreter of dreams – also the first to be analysed – is here to announce the death of God and its encouraging (though terrible) consequence: the superman. In the light of the Eternal Return, the superman implies a dissolution of punishment, or vindictive thought, as he accepts repressed desires instead of denying them. This ideal seems reminiscent of Freud's conception of the goals of psychoanalysis.

In accordance with Nietzsche and Freud, failure to interpret dreams leads to narratives bound to madness. Similarly, a strictly rational and fully conscious conception of reality cannot escape from the traps we set for ourselves. Only that other voice aiming at transvaluation through the vantage point of desire can properly frame reality and deliver us from madness while giving us hope and future.

In my case, too, the originality of many of the new ideas employed by me in the interpretation of dreams and in psychoanalysis has evaporated in this way I am ignorant of the source of only one of these ideas. It was no less than the key to my view of dreams and helped me to solve their riddles, so far as it has been possible to solve them hitherto.

Freud (1923a, p. 259)

The modern interpretation of dreams as a model of the critique of religion

The interpretation of dreams brings together Nietzsche and Freud in the critique of religiosity that makes its way through metaphysics as an attempt to write the history/genealogy of the unconscious and its alienated expressions. Until the mid-19th century, scientific thinking was deaf to the fact that, as far as we know, we are the only animals who tell each other their dreams and interpret them. Until then a disparaged or feared phenomenon, the issue of the dream is perhaps the touchstone of the filiation between Nietzsche and Freud as two critics of religion, metaphysics and the philosophy of consciousness, and because of this, two psychologists with transvaluating intent. We will endeavour to prove that there is no risk of exaggerating in stating that this interest in one of the nuclei of practical life (we sleep and dream during more than one-fourth of our lives!) is to human symbolic issues what addressing the critique of political economy is to socio-economic structure. The influence of Nietzsche in Freud's life and work is demonstrated (Assoun, 1984; Gasser, 1997; Lehrer, 1995; Drivet, 2015). Freud had read Nietzsche since being a young student in the *Leseverein* (a society of readers to which Freud belonged). Freud admired him as a psychologist, and came to recognize Nietzsche as "the first psychoanalyst" (in an interview with Georg Viereck in 1926). Freud, in fact, cited Nietzsche at every key-change moment of psychoanalytical theory (e.g. in correspondence with Fliess; in the key chapter of the *Traumdeutung*; in "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement", 1914; in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920; in *The Ego and the Id*, 1923b, etc.). Josef Paneth and Lou Salomé knew them both and certainly discussed Nietzsche with Freud (Paneth since 1884, Lou Salomé since 1912). Regarding the particular expression of "transvaluation", cf. Freud (1901b), "Über den Traum". In this text Freud confirms the sameness of the process described by him as "displacement" and the operation that Nietzsche calls "inversion of values".

However, Nietzsche (1844–1900) was 12 years older than Freud (1856–1939) and they never actually met each other. Nietzsche died when Freud had just published *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), but the first had succumbed to dementia ten years earlier. Nietzsche understood himself as a psychologist, 'the first psychologist', and believed himself to be dealing with psychological problems: modernity, religion, the ascetic Ideal, the genealogy of morality, guilt, resentment. Freud re-elaborated many of these issues in his own way, without renouncing Nietzsche's legacy, which at times became intolerable.

It was thus that Freud considered himself to be a pioneer in the terrain of the modern interpretation of dreams. Notwithstanding, on the island of dreams that he would conquer with the systematic approach of the scientist and not bereft of the depth and beauty of a humanist, there were tracks that betrayed the transitory sojourn of a shrewd adventurer – a crucial spectral figure for Freud and for the history of psychoanalysis (Assoun, 1984; Lehrer, 1995; Gasser, 1997, Drivet, 2013)² –

²I will address in this paper an aspect (the interpretation of dreams) of the plural thinking of both Nietzsche and Freud. I do not intend to develop a comparison between the complete works of each of them. For a somewhat more detailed study regarding Freud as a reader of Nietzsche and as one who inquires about the nature of the relationship that psychoanalysis establishes with the author of Zarathustra, whom, of course, he does not limit himself to imitating, see Drivet (2015).

and that led to some of the treasures of interpretation which would be valued and rediscovered by psychoanalysis. We refer here, of course, to Nietzsche. Along with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche was the thinker who most deeply influenced Freud (by the affinity we have already made explicit). In Aphorism 5 of the first part of *Human, All Too Human*, titled ‘Misunderstanding of the dream’ [*Misverständnis des Traumes*].³ Nietzsche (1878, p. 14) affirms:

The man of the ages of barbarous primordial culture believed that in the dream [*Traum*] he was getting to know a *second real world*: here is the origin of all metaphysics. Without the dream [*Traum*] one would have had no occasion to divide the world into two. The dissection into soul and body is also connected with the oldest idea of the dream [*des Traumes*], and also the hypothesis of a pseudo-corporality [*Seelenscheinleib*], thus the origin of all belief in spirits, and probably also of the belief in gods. ‘The dead live on, for they appear to the living in dreams’ [*im Traume*]: that was the conclusion one formerly drew, throughout many millennia.

Schopenhauer (1851, pp. 253–329) had linked reflections on ghosts to the dream – in an essay that would be quoted by Freud (1900, p. 65) – but in Nietzsche the dream is an object of study proper to a psychology more divested of occultist ruminations. Nietzsche links metaphysical illusion to dream experience by means of an ethnological hypothesis (Assoun, 1984). The metaphysical fiction of the other world is introduced by the distance between the dream experience and the experience of wake.⁴ In the interpretation of dreams, the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics finds its anthropological ground. It guides his genealogical perspective. If the dream is the origin of metaphysics, if this psychic phenomenon supports in experience the existence of another world where the dead do live, isn’t the attempt to explain the genesis (of the dream) a direct affront to the roots of religiosity? Would it not even be a *definitive refutation* of religion, just as the historical explanation for the emergence of the idea of God was, for Nietzsche (1881, §95) also that of religion? Nietzsche broached this task, which Freud would expound with scientific rigour.

Against the ideology that in Nietzsche’s name – and via the death of the evidence and the romantic inclination for extreme experiences – takes as equivalents the subject-author of the declaration and the content-topic of the enunciation, and leads to the “re-birth of the idols” (Ahumada, 2001), I propose that rereading these two radical destructors of religious illusions leads to a transvaluation which consummates mourning the divine, still to be concluded, in rationalism begun by Descartes. Religion as a subject that exceeds consciousness, is a subject that requires the approach of the unconscious. The critique of religion depends therefore on the understanding of the unconscious bonds that bind us to the faith.

³Translations of Nietzsche’s works were consulted with the originals available at <http://nietzschesource.org/>. Explanations in German are in quotation marks when deemed necessary.

⁴Assoun (1984) reports that Nietzsche takes from Edward Burnett Tylor the hypothesis that the origin of religion is found in the ‘wrong’ interpretation of the dream.

Focusing awareness on these psychic phenomena implied a valuation and a transvaluation of certain central aspects of the dominant modern philosophical tradition's focus on consciousness. Let us consider an implicit counterpoint.

Nietzsche puts Descartes upside down

In the fourth part of *The Discourse on the Method*, Descartes (1970, p. 17), the traditionally considered initiator of modern philosophy, declared:

...but our reasonings when we are asleep are never so evident or complete as when we are awake ... although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as lively and distinct, if not more so than in our waking moments, reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.

For Cartesian rationalism, the dream is therefore the paradigm of deceit, a weakening of reason, proof of what is imperfect in man; and if God is who guarantees the *clear and distinct* difference between dream and awake thoughts, perhaps dreams are the manifestation of the evil genius, of what is 'demonic' in man (Freud, 1900, p. 59). Faced with the levelling of rationality in consciousness, Nietzsche deals with dreams in *The Birth of Tragedy*. In the fourth section of his early work, he affirms what might be understood as a counterpoint to Descartes:

Though it is certain that of the two halves of life, the waking and the dreaming [*der träumenden Hälfte*], the former appeals to us as by far the more preferred, important, excellent and worthy of being lived, indeed, as that which alone is lived: yet, with reference to that mysterious ground of our being of which we are the phenomenon, I should, paradoxical as it may seem, be inclined to maintain the very opposite estimate of the value of dream [*des Traumes*], that mysterious fundament of our being of which we live the appearance.

(Nietzsche, 1872, p. 38)

It is necessary to acknowledge here the influence of Romanticism (which he would soon after consider to be a captive of the old-fashioned idea of history, and would ultimately understand as a form of 'passive nihilism'⁵),

⁵The word 'nihilism' [*Nihilismus*], which appears only in late works Nietzsche published and is nearly omnipresent in his *Posthumous Fragments* (1875–89), refers to the consequences that are extracted from taking on the death of God, that is, the disappearance of any guarantee with regard to the question of the meaning of life (gnoseological or moral), the devaluation of values existing until now. From this belief, however, different attitudes can be derived. Vattimo (1996) has made a distinction in Nietzsche between passive or imperfect nihilism and active or perfect nihilism. The former perceives the senselessness of life and develops as a reaction a feeling of loss, resignation (the pathos of 'in vain' characterizes the passive nihilist), resentment, revenge, and often needs to fill the vacuum of God with new ideals (Wagner's music, socialism, the liberal doctrine of universal happiness; capital?) (e.g., Nietzsche (1885–89), *Unpublished Notes*, 1887, 9[60], p. 236). The latter is that which, while accepting this lack of grounds and positioned over the abyss, is prepared to create new values, indeed exults in so doing (i.e. Nietzsche (1885–89), *Notebook* 1887–88, 11[149], p. 409), an attitude connected with the open horizon of the child and the *Übermensch* in *Zarathustra*. See also Niemeier (ed.) (2012, pp. 381–384). It is impossible to not record here that passage of *The Future of an Illusion* where Freud (1927, p. 31) specifies that 'religiosity' is defined not by the confession of the insignificance and impotence of man when confronted by the entire universe, but by the reaction of asking for help when faced with this feeling. It is the need of a guarantee, an answer, protection and solace before the crumbling of the narcissistic ideals that characterizes nihilistic pessimism.

not only in Wagner and Schopenhauer, but also in Novalis, Schlegel, Schelling and Hölderlin – known and beloved by Nietzsche from the time of Pforta – who writes in the *Hyperion* (and counter to Fichte): “A God is man when he dreams; a beggar when he thinks about it” [*Ein Gott ist der Mensch, wenn er träumt, ein Bettler, wenn er nachdenkt*]. The birth of tragedy, the dream, the music (the chorus) and the myth, for the young Nietzsche all crowd into the cradle of aesthetics understood as the language of the body, little by little forgotten by the ‘tyranny’ of the concept. It is not by chance that, concomitant to his disparagement of the dream, Descartes (1970, Part Four), should minimize the relevance of corporality, affirming that it is capable of pretending that it has no body at all, and that even if the body did not exist, the soul would not cease to be what it is. This is the nightmare from which Nietzsche wished to awaken modernity, even though later on fragments of his oeuvre would be, paradoxically, something more than an “awake remnant” in the sinister assault on European reason that contested the emancipating illusions of modernity (Lukács, 1959; González Varela, 2010).

The interpretation of dreams as the key to the Nietzschean project

The dream is for Nietzsche, as can be inferred from *The Birth of Tragedy*, the first model of the transvaluation of values.⁶ Apollo is understood as an “interpreter of dreams” [*des traumdeutenden Apollo*] in the fourth chapter (1872, p. 58), but the book begins with a valuation of the dream and defining the interpretation of dreams as the true poetic art. The entire first section is a brief introduction to dream interpretation which draws as much from Lucretius as from Wagner, an art by which means the sensitive man extracts his interpretation of life; the dream is the “symbolic *analogon*” of artistic capacity (Assoun, 1984). As a direct advance on the *Traumdeutung*, the self-proclaimed first psychologist (Nietzsche, 1889a, “Why I am a Destiny”, 6, p. 9) adds as well that in the dream “there is nothing indifferent or unnecessary” (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 37), and that not only agreeable and friendly images play out in him, but also serious, dark, sad things, “all the

⁶The Nietzschean notion *Umwertung aller Werthe*, is the synthesized expression of a theoretical, cultural-political and aesthetic programme of Nietzsche’s late philosophy which has the aim of extracting the ultimate and most radical consequences stemming from the “death of God”, the term understood not only as the Judeo-Christian divinity but also as any concept offering itself as an ultimate and sufficient fundament, guarantee and solace. It is an attempt to destroy critically and genealogically Platonic metaphysics and Christian morality (which have been extended into modernity), appealing to psychology, philosophy and history, all the while valuing what is despised from a perspective that is opposite to the one dominant at present. Notions like ‘truth’, ‘sin’, ‘vice’, ‘egoism’, ‘guilt/debt’, ‘justice’, ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘moral’ – but also ‘democracy’ and ‘equality’ – are analysed as the results of the soothing hypocrisy and morality of decadence (‘rationalisation’ in the psychoanalytical sense), while everything that previously was ‘low’ or ‘unworthy’ like the body, sexuality, nourishment, materiality, this world (given that there would be no other), pass to occupy, with full rights, centre stage. The programme of the transvaluation of all values aims as well, under the concept of the *Übermensch*, to redeem men from the ‘spirit of revenge and resentment’ and the ‘spirit of heaviness’ that sicken man, make him into a parasite and promote his sacrifice, preventing him from assuming the absence of any transcendent meaning (the death of God) as hope-filling knowledge that revitalizes, that empowers and heals. In a paradigmatic way, though germinal, the dream is a model of the ‘inversion’ of the hierarchy of values of conventional morality. To understand the meanings to which *Umwertung* remits in English, it is essential to take into account that the German word *Wert* is also translated as *worth*.

«divine comedy» of life” (Nietzsche, 1872, p. 21). This youthful point of view – which even anticipates the sources quoted by Freud regarding the transvaluating preference of dream thinking for apparently trivial details lacking in meaning,⁷ and that does not suffer from the moral or scientific prejudices that lead Maury, for example, whom Freud reads and quotes in the reconstruction of the state of art (Anzieu, 1987), to silence any dream of coarse or indecent content, attribute to madmen criminal desire and subordinate the processes of thinking in dreams to those of wake – is not merely abandoned. In *Human, All Too Human*, the dream is even the seat of the truth that the conscience silences: “*To Interpret from the dream [Aus dem Traume deuten]*. What one sometimes does not know or feel exactly when awake – whether one has a good or bad conscience regarding a person – the dream [*der Traum*] unequivocally teaches” (Nietzsche, 1879, §76). In *The Gay Science* (“The Consciousness of Appearance”), Nietzsche (1882, §54, p. 143) again expresses that the appearance of dreams, in which all ancient humanness and animality live on, is indispensable in order to not perish, given that it prevents – fatal destiny of Narcissus – our plunge into the abyss of the absence of appearance.

The idea that the dream is the paradigm of the transvaluation of values is recovered in the third part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Nietzsche, 1883–85, pp. 148–52) in a passage that refers to a morning dream [*Morgentraume*] of Zarathustra’s, valuing as humanly good the three things up to then most cursed in the world: *voluptuousness* [Wollust], *thirst for power* [Herrschaft] and *egoism* [Selbstsucht]. The acute Nietzschean nose for psychology averred that a *bad interpretation* of the dream is the key that leads to the other world. Freud was not far from this opinion when he wrote:

In point of fact I believe that a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions, is nothing but *psychology projected into the external world*. The obscure recognition (the endopsychic perception, as it were) of psychical factors and relations in the unconscious is mirrored . . . in the construction of a *supernatural reality*, which is destined to be changed back once more by science into *the psychology of the unconscious*. One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform *metaphysics* into *metapsychology*.

(Freud, 1901a, pp. 257–8)

Religious faith is open to being understood, when not dissolved, by using the tools provided by psychology (and history). Fragment number 12 of *Human, All Too Human*, titled ‘Dream and Culture’ [*Traum und Kultur*] (Nietzsche, 1878, pp. 16–17), provides in summary form a comparison between the mental state of the dreamer and that of the primitive man, on the basis of the hypothesis that the brain function most affected by the dream is memory, which would be *reduced* to a state of imperfection like the one primitive humans may have had during wake. Through the effect of primitive man being ‘inclined to forgetfulness’ which, merely by relaxing

⁷Freud quotes in this regard the works of F.W. Hildebrandt (1875), *Der Traum und seine Verwerthung für's Leben* and L. Strümpell (1875), *Die Natur un Entstehung der Traume*.

memory produces falsehood and the absurd, in sleep and in the dream we recapitulate previous humanity. In this state it is quite difficult to differentiate desire from reality, as Nietzsche supposes occurs in the primitive stages of humankind.

Relaxing memory is not the only characteristic through which the dream is associated (*à la* Schopenhauer) with a sort of madness. Fragment 13 of the same text, ‘Logic of the dream’ [*Logik des Traumes*] (Nietzsche, 1878, pp. 16–19), delves into the reflexive consideration of dream thoughts and anticipates certain Freudian intellections regarding the logic of the unconscious to which the latter first acceded by means of the analysis of the work of the dream. Schopenhauer (1851, pp. 253–329) had explained the genesis of the dream phenomenon affirming that when the deafening effect of daytime impressions ceases, the intellect is able to perceive the internal stimuli that barely manage to have a light influence during the day, and intellect can order them according to space and time and make them obedient to the orders of causality. Nietzsche holds that the dream is the search and representation of the (presumed) causes of the sensations the body triggers, but adds something crucial: delivered over to the dream, the sleeper explains the stimuli *backwards*, in such manner that he *believes* that he experiences first the occasional circumstances and then the stimulus. The phantasy takes on in its production the visual impressions of the day, and operating quickly, deduces from the effect the presumed cause, interpreting a series as something simultaneous and even as an inverted series. Deferred action extends in wake to the ambit of moral life: “the reasons and intents behind habits are invented only when some people start attacking the habits and *asking* for reasons and intents” (Nietzsche, 1882, §29, p. 51). The study of this logic is amplified below, in such a way that prefigures the Freudian comparison between secondary elaboration and the formation of delirious systems. In a posthumous fragment titled ‘*Der Phänomenalismus der «inneren Welt»*’, Nietzsche explains the genesis of the dream: “Our entire dream life is the interpretation of complex feelings with a view to possible causes – and in such way that we are conscious of a condition only when the supposed causal chain associated with it has entered consciousness” (Nietzsche, 1885–89, Spring 1888, 15 [90]). It is a theory of “inner experience” that:

rests upon the fact that a cause for an excitement of the nerve centers is sought and imagined – and that only a cause thus discovered enters consciousness: this cause in no way corresponds to the real cause – it is a groping on the basis of previous “inner experiences,” i.e., of memory. But memory also maintains the habit of the old interpretations, i.e., of erroneous causality – so that the “inner experience” has to contain within it the consequences of all previous false causal fictions.

(Nietzsche, 1885–89, Spring 1888, 15 [90])

All this, which constitutes a prefiguration of the problem of the *Nachträglichkeit* in Freud, and of the psychoanalytical concept of ‘rationalization’, is explained under the hypothesis that present-day man reasons in dreams the way humankind reasoned several millennia ago *during wake*. Nietzsche (1878, §13) states that “The dream [*Traum*] carries us back to the earlier

stages of human culture and affords us a means of understanding it more clearly..." and that "...the dream [*Traum*] is a restorative for the brain, which, during the day, is called upon to meet the many demands for trained thought made upon it by the conditions of a higher civilization". This is the fragment Freud recovers about memory in the central part of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900, pp. 547–8).

While, as Freud documents in the first chapters of the *Traumdeutung*, the interest in dreams had been a constant from the mid-19th century both in scientific research and literature, the scientific understanding of dreams, the beginning of which Freud attributes to Aristotle, had produced but extremely scant results for over a millennium. Freud recognizes the existence of rich observations in the literature on dreams, as well as a wealth of material from observation of the topic, but nothing referring to the essence of dreams or the enigma they pose. Literature and science offered until then acute observations but no conceptual understanding of a phenomenon that was the door to the scientific intellection of the dimension of the unconscious. Not the mere valuation of the dream phenomenon but the ambition to understand it conceptually (which does not manage to be as systematic or detailed as in Freud) is what is noteworthy in Nietzsche. Thus the following observation of Assoun's (1984) is relevant: while Schopenhauer's theory of the dream is placed in the historical note of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Nietzsche is quoted in Chapter VII, the core chapter where the fundamentals of Freud's thesis are to be found. Anzieu (1987, pp. 155–160) eruditely recovers and reconstructs the sources of the Freudian thesis, among which he underlines not so much the intellectualist references as romanticism (following an idea of Henri Ellenberger's), but makes clear that the scientific study of dreams, from 1850, began as a rupture with the literary and mystical exploitation of dreams by romanticism. It is striking that he does not mention Nietzsche as an antecedent for the question about the meaning of the dream (and not only its motivation). Even so, for Freud too, what is archaic lives in dreams. Lecture XIII of the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* is titled 'The Archaic Features and Infantilism of Dreams' (Freud, 1915–16, p. 198). There he explains that the dream harks back to states of our intellectual development we left behind long ago, and that because of this we call their mode of expression archaic or regressive. The dream leads us to a twofold prehistory: individual (infancy) and generic (phylogenetic). Freud refers in this passage to the phylogenetic inheritance which constitutes mnemonic contents: representations that we have in our soul and cannot have learned. The Lamarckian-tinged hypothesis supposes that an ancestor acquired these representations and transmitted them to us. On the other hand, that the dream is comparable to the primitive mentality would be attested by the analogy between the fusion of opposites through dreamwork and the antithetical meaning of primordial words in the most ancient languages (Freud, 1910 and 1915–16). Despite Freud's (following Schopenhauer's line which associated insanity with memory loss) having characterized dreams as a short and inoffensive psychosis and psychoses as a long dream, one might add, however, that it was Freud himself who would note in the dream a state where memory becomes broader and

deeper (hypermenmesic dreams), making evident the active participation of the archaic in dream thinking and etymology. The dream seems to tap the unconscious memory where, precisely because it is unconscious, there are barely more than vestiges of the reality principle of wake. In fact Freud considers that the Id participates robustly in the formation of a dream because: (a) the memory in the dream is broader than in wake; (b) the dreamer often uses linguistic signs whose meaning is unknown to him, which probably come from periods that precede the development of language; (c) dream memory very often reproduces scenes from the dreamer's infancy that have not been forgotten but repressed, and (d):

the dream brings to light contents that could not have proceeded from the mature life or the forgotten infancy of the dreamer. We are forced to consider them part of the *archaic inheritance* that the child brings congenitally to the world, prior to any own experience, influenced by what his ancestors experienced. And then we find the *pendant* of this phylogenetic material in humanity's most ancient sagas and in surviving customs. The dream thus becomes, in respect of ancient history, a not-negligible source.

(Freud, 1940, pp. 165–6)

More elements of the Nietzschean interpretation of dreams that will be recreated and integrated into Freud's perspective

Dreams as imaginary compensations

Let us turn now to Nietzsche's perspective to detect the breadth and profundity of his theory of the dream. Paragraph §119 of *Daybreak*, 'Experience and Invention' is essential for understanding the degree of overlap existing between Nietzsche and Freud's conceptions of the 'psyche'. Nietzsche places between dashes what would be one of the central hypotheses of *Die Traumdeutung* when speaking of the modes of satisfaction of the 'moral' impulses: while hunger does not admit for its satisfaction any *dreamed foods*, "the great majority of our instincts, especially those which are called 'moral', are thus easily satisfied, – if it be permitted to suppose that our *dreams* [*Träume*] serve to some extent as *compensation* for the accidental absence of 'nourishment' during the day" (Nietzsche, 1881, Paragraph §119, p. 136). Dreams are fictions, interpretations of our nervous stimuli, says Nietzsche, which have the function of obtaining by means of imaginings a space where they play out, and a discharge. Every dream lends its language to the instinct that is on duty that night. Nietzsche calls 'poetic reason' [*Dichtende Vernunft*] the reason that on a daily basis translates these stimuli in different modes. This reason has greater freedom of interpretation than the reason in command during wake. No surprise: in the dream the sense of reality does not count nor is there the representation of self-death, that is, some limit. The fragment concludes underlining that there is no substantial difference between wake and dream, that all our moral judgments are not more than images and phantasies that shroud a physiological process unbeknownst to us, and that 'all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary of an

unknown text, one which is perhaps unknowable but yet felt' (1881, p. 137). There are only differences in the degree of freedom in the interpretation process: what happens in dreams could be equivalent to what happens in any human activity. Nowadays it is inevitable to hear an echo of Freud in this.

The unconscious determinations of experience: destiny and responsibility

The anticipation of psychoanalytical ideas about the logic of the unconscious does not end there. Next, Nietzsche explains how the meaning of experiences is determined by the impulse that captures them, which is why experiencing and storytelling are juxtaposed and mutually determinant. An experience by itself can set off quite dissimilar interpretations and attitudes. This 'anti-realist' understanding is aware of the profound unconscious depth of the assignment of meaning, discards direct access to the world via perception (nobody is an Adam in terms of perception), discredits the otherworldly as a necessary cause of the dream phenomenon and anticipates one of Freud's crucial discoveries for 'the birth of psychoanalysis'. Freud arrived at the critique of positivistic realism as soon as he left off believing in 'his neurotic' (see Freud, 1994, p. 284). With the discovery of the efficacy of unconscious phantasies, constitutive of the act of experiencing, the 'theory of seduction' lost its power to explain. The external factors that up to that moment had captured the attention of the doctor lost their exclusiveness and even their priority before the gravitational force that constitutional factors acquired under the gaze of the psychologist. Yet despite the 'biologizing' trends (attentive to endogenic causation) denounced by Laplanche (1998), that change did not transform Freud into someone who would definitively decry the importance of external events (Grubrich-Simitis, 2006, pp. 29–30). At the end of his life he would say that a particular event, which acts as a trauma for a certain constitution, would lack such effect if it were the case of a different constitutional type. Aetiology is composed by both factors, which form the so-called 'complementary series' where the lack of intensity of one of them is compensated by the intensity of the other (Freud, 1939).

We can see to what extent Nietzsche contributes to the emergence of some of Freud's (1900) ideas, despite the latter having explicitly denied recognition to the origins of his inspiration in 1923 (see the epigraph above, Freud, 1923a, p. 259), the year when he incorporated the Nietzschean language to the second topic.⁸ This influence is observed in three lessons that

⁸When in 1923 Freud systematizes the second topic and introduces the concept of the id, he takes it from Georg Groddeck, though he is aware of its true provenance: 'Groddeck himself no doubt followed the example of Nietzsche, who habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and, so to speak, subject to natural law' (Freud, 1923b, p. 22n). As Assoun (1984) has observed: Freud, who claims to not read Nietzsche or who, according to his statements, has barely been able to read a single page before feeling constrained to abandon it, knows the *habitual uses* of a Nietzschean expression. It is plausible to suppose that in the transformation of Freudian theory towards 1920, Nietzsche may have made influential reading. Proof lies in the repeated use of central Nietzschean concepts in psychoanalytical texts, themselves no less relevant: for example, in the notion of the "superman" and the "eternal return of the same" in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and in 'The Ominous'. The Nietzschean origin of these ideas is more evident when we consider that in 1920 Freud rereads and values the thesis Sabina Spielrein (1912) had expressed in 1912 in a brief paper where Nietzsche is mentioned about twenty times. See also Roudinesco (2015, p. 246).

can be extracted from *The Interpretation of Dreams*: the first affirms that the dream has a meaning; something present in Nietzsche, as we saw, in his first book, and especially clear in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, a book where dreams are interpreted with no recourse to magical thinking (but without employing free association, and considering them almost as coherent wholes). Second, the psychoanalyst considers it permissible to transfer from the hypnotic state to wake the efficacy of the unconscious processes of states of mind (just as he will find generalized the accentuated features of the pathology in so-called ‘normal’ life): Nietzsche considered consciousness to be the comment on a felt, more relevant sub-text. Last, and as an extension of this, Freud holds that all events, those of the dream and the apparently absurd and trivial ones of wake, are subject to an unconscious determinism: Nietzsche never tired of rejecting the ingenuous belief in “free will” (Nietzsche, 1879, §50; see also Vartzbed, 2003, pp. 140–143). Yet for all that, nobody denied the idea of responsibility over dreams (Kaufmann, 1974, pp. 181–182).

The first psychologist, as Nietzsche called himself, calls our attention to our own responsibility for the contents of dreams in a paragraph of *The Dawn of Day* (Nietzsche, 1881, §128) titled *Dreaming and Responsibility* [*Der Traum und die Verantwortlichkeit*]. He affirms that nothing belongs more to the individual than his dreams: he decides the plot, the form, the duration and is the actor and spectator. Now if one does not wish to accept responsibility for dreams, Nietzsche deduces, it is because he is aware of terrible dreams that affect pride instead of extolling him: in those something repugnant is announced. Next, and in apparent contradiction, the philosopher denies that we are really responsible for dreams, to the extent that there is no free will except as an illusion of pride and the feeling of power. Freud (1925, p. 133) will repeat the gesture in a brief article aimed precisely at underlining the moral responsibility of the dreamer for his dreams. Such responsibility, as a product of involuntary thought, can be generalized to a set of events in waking life, determined by unconscious desires. The psychoanalyst explains through the analysis of parapraxes the conflict of wills that tears apart the mind, and recommends recognizing oneself in one’s own decisions, even (and especially) the unconscious ones:

Action frequently manages to mask itself as a passive experience. All those of us who can look back on a comparatively long experience of life will probably admit that we should have spared ourselves many disappointments and painful surprises if we had found the courage and determination to interpret small parapraxes experienced in our human contacts as auguries and to make use of them as indications of intentions that were still concealed. As a rule we dare not do so; it would make us feel as though, after a detour through science, we were becoming superstitious again. Nor do all auguries come true, and you will understand from our theories that they do not all need to come true.

(Freud, 1915–16, pp. 57–8)

Freud demonstrates, after compiling numerous instances, that apparent luck or ‘fortune’, ‘chance’ and ‘fate’ are quite often the result of decisions

that the individual makes after turning his back on his own conscience. *Not*-cognizing the opposite of conscious will prevents *re*-cognizing oneself in one's desires, thus leading to experiencing passively the results of one's own actions, as if it were a matter of something that has nothing to do with the praxis of the 'sufferer'.

Far from subscribing to any reactionary or conservative meaning, Freud's is a psychoanalytical mode of interpreting a Nietzschean problem, to wit: *Amor Fati*.⁹ Indeed, this can only remind us of one of Zarathustra's principal lessons, which has the scope of a rebellion against (and reconciliation with) time: to transform any 'it was thus' into 'I willed it so'. The Nietzschean interpretation of dreams is a radical form of the critique of any doctrine of spirits and even of metaphysics, which transvaluates not only the latter's cognitive schemata but also its perennial emotional structure. In the fragment of *Dawn, and the New Day* titled 'Awakening from the Dream' [*Vom Traume erwachen*], Nietzsche (1881, §100, pp. 98–9) affirms that it is a dream, that is, a desire, to believe in the 'moral significance of existence', with which all faith in predestination collapses. In *The Gay Science*, the question of 'Amor Fati' arises, in apparently paradoxical form, against the belief in Fate (and in consequence a ground). In fragment §277, 'Personal Providence', Nietzsche gives value to chance, which occasionally guides our hand, in opposition to the metaphysical trend governed by wanting to prove that, happen what may, the facts will show themselves to be something that 'could not fail us', as something full of profound (pre-established) meaning for us. And he says this right after having devoted the first fragment of Book Four (*Sanctus Januarius*) of *The Gay Science* (§276), to *Amor Fati*: "I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love from now on!" (1882 p. 157). As a preview of the idea of eternal return, he affirms that he dreams that *averting his gaze* should be his only denial. He dreams, as Zarathustra will, of someday being someone who needs only say 'yes'. If freedom is defined in the following paragraph as the power of no longer being ashamed of oneself, we might formulate thus the paragraph we are commenting – the sign of freedom achieved is: no longer having to say 'no'. In other words: to free oneself from the need for negativity. Freud contributes to an emancipatory reading of this idea: *Amor Fati* is not a celebration of the justice of fate or its super-human inevitability; nor is it a way of affirming the secret reason of nature, or conformity in respect of the present political-economic system. Freud sees that only by accepting the past can we change it. In the field of political theory, nothing invalidates the well-known *dictum* that men make history in conditions not of their own choosing. From a psychoanalytical

⁹Carol Diethe (2007, p. 4) and Patrick Wotling (2001, pp. 8–10) begin by defining literally this concept as "Love of Fate or Destiny", "amour du destin". It is a question of an idea opposed to resentment or the spirit of revenge that bids us to reinterpret every resigned 'it was so' (even concerning painful and tragic experiences we thought we 'suffered' passively) into a joyful 'I wished it so'. If we were to formulate this in Freudian terms we could affirm that this idea leads to accepting that 'fate' is nothing but the enactment of an (unconscious) desire. However, in the *Nietzsche Dictionary* (Niemeyer, 2012, pp. 42–44) this idea is linked as strongly to Chance as to internal Necessity (that Freud would call 'unconscious').

perspective, it is a matter of going deeper into the ingenuous idea of the responsibility of the philosophy of consciousness, a consciousness which, more often than is apparent, does not know what it wants, or does not want what it believes.

Dream, childhood and primitive thinking

Once we abandon the illusion of the rationality of the world, of absolute and inevitable justice, of guaranteed meaningfulness under apparent confusion, the dream collapses as a divine message, even though it is maintained as a ‘mysterious’ message. Nor will it be anymore an absurd creature. The dream is the royal way for understanding primitive thinking, myths and religions, but also artistic experience and, Freud would add, extending the understanding of belief in the “omnipotence of thoughts”, infantile and neurotic thinking. The connections between dream and myth had been perceived by Rank (1961),¹⁰ an admiring reader of Nietzsche, in two texts that were part of the Appendix to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, ‘Dream and Poetry’ and ‘Dreams and Myths’, which were included as part of a plan of Freud’s to convert his book into a less personal work (in Marinelli and Mayer, 2011, pp. 232–291).¹¹ Along these lines, in the Postscript to the Schreber case, Freud (1911a, pp. 74–76) shows certain links between the symbolization of delirium and the symbols of myths and religions. Thus, he explains that myths are to humanity what dreams (and deliriums) are to individuals. Both phenomena show unconscious regularities in symbolization that lead to surprising parallels.

From the study of dreams and delirium, Freud deduces that humankind’s mythopoetic powers have not lapsed, and that the same occurs with the formative powers of religion: “We have said: ‘In the dream and in neurosis we find the child, with the properties of his way of thinking and his emotional life’. We can complement: ‘We will also find the *savage, primitive* man, just as he shows himself in the light of archaeology and ethnology” (1911a, p. 81). We are now able to remember that, rigorously, what presents as an apparent ‘complement’ is not something that Freud added at that time: the parallel with the primitive and the savage was something Nietzsche had already drawn, and Freud had quoted him in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, over a decade previously. What was new in Freud lay in comparing the dream with the thinking of the infancy of ontogenesis, not phylogenesis.

¹⁰The manifestation of the intimate relationship between dream and myth – not only regarding the content but also the form and motor forces of this and many other, more particularly pathological, psyche structures – entirely justifies the interpretation of the myth as a dream of the masses of the people...’ (Rank, 1961, p. 9).

¹¹It may be convenient to say that Rank saw in Nietzsche the “direct ancestor of psychoanalysis” (in Marinelli and Mayer, 2011, p. 236). Rank even states that Nietzsche’s thought is “The most important antecedent of a psychoanalytic dream doctrine”, though he tempered his thesis by calling him a predecessor who remains “still at an intuitive level” (2011, p. 250). Rank recalls that in *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche had recognized the dream as a source of art, and he did not deprive himself of leading the article entitled ‘The Dream and the Myth’ with a fragment of a paragraph of *Human, All Too Human*. Rank reproached Freud for the silence on this debt with fine and furious irony at the time of his final fight in 1926. In April of that year Rank visited him for the last time, taking Nietzsche’s complete works as a gift. Freud gave way to be made “the cross” (Roudinesco and Plon, 1998, p. 920).

Beyond the precise details of the chronology of ideas, what is of interest here is whether religiosity, animism and in consequence the entire metaphysics of theological features can remit to a ‘bad interpretation of the dream’. A reflexive genesis of dream thinking has the value of a profound and innovative critique of metaphysics. It is significant that in note 70 to *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Spanish translator Sánchez Pascual should say that Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72) defined religion as a “dream of the human spirit” (in Nietzsche, 1887, p. 214n): the dream is in this quote the archetype of human creation, as much as its alienation. Aristotle was the first to analyse dreams as objects of psychology and who did not believe that they were the products of the inspiration of the gods. Even more: for him, as Freud recognizes (1900, pp. 1-2), dreams had a demonic nature because nature was demonic. Roudinesco (2015, p. 237) documents that as a member of the tradition of the ‘Dark Enlightenment’, Freud allowed himself to be bewitched by the ‘daemonic’ (the primacy of the passions over reason, the occult and the ominous) only to in turn conjure it by invoking the ideal of science. “And it is in this dialectic between the dark and the light where one can situate Freud as the heir of Nietzsche because his project supposes a will to transform romanticism into a science.” (Roudinesco, 2015, p. 237) Under a format guided by scientific aspirations that translate Metaphysics into Meta-psychology and erode the religious need to appeal to a transcendent world in order to explain this world, *The Interpretation of Dreams* could thus be considered, not so much because of its intentions as because of its conclusions – and if we may be allowed the tone of a manifesto quite foreign to Freud (though frequently Nietzsche’s) – Freud’s ‘*Antichrist*’. In this book Freud conducts a painstaking analysis of dreams and delivers a metapsychological reflection about the unconscious which transforms into something that can be disregarded, any reference to the divine when explaining the genesis of dreams and the other world. Freud refers to the relation between the dream material and the text which expresses it in terms of a “total ‘*transvaluation of all psychic values*’” (Freud, 1900, p. 329), an allusion to the *leitmotif* of the Nietzschean attack against Christianity. Once this hypothesis is accepted, Yerushalmi’s conclusion is no surprise (1996, p. 66); reading *Moses and Monotheism*, he notes the continuity of Freud’s secularizing enterprise: “In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud observed that he had treated dreams ‘like a sacred text’ (*wie eine heiligen Text*). What would be more natural for him than treating the sacred text like a dream?”

Dream and illusion: The dream as a model of delusion and the dream as the *aeda* (ἁοιδός) of desire

Dream and ideology

If Freud finds a science it is because he finds a language (its rules, its conditions of possibility). The dream is the language of desire, not of will. Dream-thinking is for Freud the model of primitive thinking and the key to understanding the genesis of myths and the entire peculiar language of the

unconscious: “The state of sleep is able to re-establish the likeness of mental life as it was before the recognition of reality [*Realität*], because a prerequisite of sleep is a deliberate rejection of it” (Freud, 1911b, p. 218n). Through the study of the dream Freud is able to discern the unconscious mechanisms which, even as they explain dream formation, make it possible to discern symptom-formations, the means through which the neuroses and psychoses, but also the mental life of the child, claim our interest.

But we want to go beyond purely psychological interest. How does the interpretation of dreams relate to the critique of ideology and the critique of religion? Why do we believe that the interpretation of the dreams of Nietzsche and Freud leads to an overcoming of religious superstition? Could dream have an emancipatory value? Freud insists on the interminable task of revelation. There is an ambiguity to being awake, for it can remit both to *not sleeping* and to ‘*revealing*’.¹² Uncovering is the job of the critique of ideology and the interpretation of dreams, even when behind one revelation one might only find another: both critical procedures have as their object to reveal what was (until then) disagreeable or shameful, to express what was silenced by the dominant resistances. If anything, the dream as the ‘guardian of sleep’ is frequently associated instead with the result of repression and denial and the ideological tutelage that, like religion, can fulfil the function of ‘opium of the people’. Walter Benjamin, for example, an interested reader of Freud, establishes a memorable analogy between sleeping and alienation on the one hand, and between awakening and awareness of the conditions of oppression, on the other (cf. Drivet, 2010). This is not an entirely unjustified interpretation of Freud’s work. Like a radicalization of what was learnt in interpreting dreams, Freud traces the mechanisms of their ‘doing’ extended into wakefulness, just as Nietzsche had counselled. Yet Freud himself had noticed them with admiration in the hypnotic experiences he had witnessed at the Salpêtrière. Sometimes, the conscious will that has been the mere executor of the unconscious imperative is satisfied to argue convoluted arguments in order to demonstrate, always *ex post facto*, the diminished sovereignty of the ego. Several years later, in the “rat-man” case, Freud (1909, pp. 210–11) differentiates *awake thinking* (*rationalizations*, from *effective reality* motivated unconsciously by sexual desires). It follows that, unconstrained by unconscious nooks and crannies, it is possible to *dream while awake*: a state similar to the hypnosis that rules obedience to the leader of masses, and analogous to ideology. That is why Freud compares in that case history obsessive thinking (stuck at the repetition of a symptom) with dream thinking (stuck at hallucinatory satisfaction). In both a disfiguration similar to the desire itself is experienced. For many reasons that are not limited to clinical analysis, dreams deserve our maximum attention: “When you reject something that is disagreeable to you, what you are doing is repeating the mechanism of constructing dreams rather than understanding it and surmounting it” (Freud, 1915–16, pp. 144–5). If you replace ‘dream-work’ with ‘ideology’, the association between psychoanalysis and the critique of culture

¹²In the translation of this text (originally written in Spanish) it was not possible to keep the wordplay with the verb *desvelar*.

readily becomes apparent. It is inevitable to recall that the critical theory of the Frankfurt School made a fruitful use of this analogy which, in turn, we want to complement.

Dreaming can be the analogue of religion and ideology (or these of dreaming) from the point of view of the critique of ideology (which would find in the *Interpretation of Dreams* a methodological and epistemological model) because both the dream, like religion and ideology, express themselves by using unified representations, with relative coherence, in a message whose apparent sense is quite distant from its true meaning (*Bedeutung*)¹³; understood ingenuously, they allude to a sort of withdrawal from the world, a kind of capitulation in the face of the weariness of the day, which we note in the need to sleep. 'I am dead tired' is what the exhausted person says when he prepares to rest. In one of the finest paragraphs devoted to the experience of sleep, Freud (1915–16, p. 87) writes:

I put myself to sleep by withdrawing from the external world and keeping its stimuli away from me. I also go to sleep when I am fatigued by it. So when I go to sleep I say to the external world: 'Leave me in peace: I want to go to sleep.' On the contrary, children say: 'I'm not going to sleep yet; I'm not tired, and I want to have some more experiences.' The biological purpose of sleep seems therefore to be rehabilitation, and its psychological characteristic suspense of interest in the world. Our relation to the world, into which we have come so unwillingly, seems to involve our not being able to tolerate it uninterruptedly. Thus from time to time we withdraw into the premundane state, into existence in the womb. At any rate, we arrange conditions for ourselves very like what they were then: warm, dark and free from stimuli. Some of us roll ourselves up into a tight package and, so as to sleep take up a posture much as it was in the womb. The world, it seems, does not possess even those of us who are adults completely, but only up to two thirds; one third of us is still quite unborn. Every time we wake in the morning it is like a new birth. Indeed, in speaking of our state after sleep we say that we feel as though we were newly born. (In saying this, incidentally, we are making what is probably a very false assumption about the general sensations of a new-born child, who seems likely, on the contrary, to be feeling very uncomfortable.) We speak, too, of being born as 'first seeing the light of day.'¹⁴

Sleep is the state wherein I have removed my interest from the external world: that is why sleep is in part death; transitory rest which remits, by ominous analogy, to eternal rest.¹⁵ Sleep and death are imagined as

¹³All these phenomena, understood psychoanalytically as 'secondary elaborations', take from the elements of the dream, the fragments of reality and the enigmas of the world the subject faces, their appearance of absurdity and incoherence, effecting a partial or total re-composition by means of selection, addition, the establishment of causal links, etc.

¹⁴Freud again says something similar 25 years later: "The ego gives evidence of its original derivation from the id by occasionally ceasing its functions and allowing a reversion to an earlier state of things. This is logically brought about by its breaking off its relations with the external world and withdrawing its cathexes from the sense organs. We are justified in saying that there arises at birth an instinct to return to the intra-uterine life that has been abandoned – an instinct to sleep. Sleep is a return of this kind to the womb" (Freud, 1940, p. 165).

¹⁵It would not be exaggerated to affirm that children resist sleep when they begin to forge their identity and notice that in sleep they will be alone (that is, without their parents, defenseless) and even lose their own selves, as if rehearsing for death. That is why sleep is the first teacher of death, the first to remind us, insistently, that we are mortal.

attempts to return to the womb, experiences where all displeasure has been dissolved. The dream, like the ideology, invites one to withdraw attention to the world, to the 'effective reality'. If dreams are to individuals what myths are to humanity, it is understood why the demystifying interpretation of dreams can be prolonged as a de-theologization of the Christian message. Overcoming the obscurantist hermeneutics of dreams leads to the understanding of the psychic mechanisms that encourage the development of unconscious formations, whether parapraxes, dreams, myths, religions or delusional systems. In other words, the Nietzschean interpretation and the Freudian interpretation of dreams are invaluable contributions to enrich the critique of ideology that has its beginning in the critique of religion. The critique of religion shows that there are no transcendent origins of the idea of God. This is a human projection, and Freud pinpoints the precise determinations of that projection: the parental imago.

The complicated mental activity implied in the search for satisfaction via dreaming and awake thought represents *a flight from the satisfaction of desires* experience demands. After all, thinking is for Freud nothing but a substitute for hallucinatory desire. Because of this, dreaming is also the key to understanding the alienation of delirious systems. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1913, pp. 94–5) compares the secondary elaboration of the dream with the delirium or self-deception of any vision of the world (including that of philosophical systems) that subordinates the interpretation of facts to the rigid premises of a complex. According to what is said there, dreaming can extend into wake in a way consistent with myth, religion or a delirious system. Indeed, religious and mythical features and icons manifest in a paranoid system like Schreber's, hounded by an omniscient being who condensed paternal with scientific authority: power and knowledge. And does not Schreber show the exaggeration of the Christian fantasy of the omniscient and omnipotent god? Kinship between Christian dogma (with a God who does not lose sight of thoughts or omissions) and paranoid delirium had been noted by Nietzsche, who also did not fail to note the filiation of delirium with the dream. The 'ugliest of men' (from *Zarathustra*), the assassin of the omniscient God, could have been the anonymous author of the fragment of *The Dawn of Day*, 'The Donor's Modesty', where the individual hounded by the impertinent eye asks himself:

... Well, are we never to have the right of remaining alone with ourselves? Are we always to be watched, guarded, surrounded by leading strings and gifts? If there is always someone round about us, the best part of courage and kindness will ever remain impossible of attainment in this world. Are we not tempted to fly to hell before this continual obtrusiveness of heaven, this inevitable supernatural neighbour? Never mind, it was only a dream [*Traum*]; let us wake up!

(Nietzsche, 1881, pp. 330–1)

The absolute witness must dissolve upon waking. And it is being awake while 'superior men' sleep that distinguishes from them Zarathustra, the harbinger of the superman (Nietzsche, 1883–85, IV, 'The Sign'). Nietzsche proposes the following paradox of the dream [*Traum*]: we must learn ... to

wake up.¹⁶ In the dream we find both the prototype of all mythical terror as the key to true awakening, an awakening from metaphysical or comforting illusions, from fears and miseries, from this day, from the superfluous, from false well-being, from the small chains of stupor of modern wake and from self-deceptions. The Christian religion, which does not allow even thoughts to escape its control, thus becomes the first ‘total institution’ with global pretensions which reduces to nought the space of intimacy and aloneness, of the free spirit that stands apart from the mass. But the prisoner of that nightmare is above all the prisoner of a bad interpretation of that nightmare.

The emancipatory potential of dream

Let us recapitulate to proceed: in Nietzsche we thus find not just the first theory that (i) values and desacralizes dreams; (ii) places them in relation to primitive thinking; (iii) lucidly describes their specific logic,¹⁷ demonstrates their efficacy in wake and (iv) understands them as compensations for unsatisfied desires, but also (v) we have in Zarathustra more than one example of a convincing interpretation of the dream text that does not need to appeal to mysticism to dynamite the foundations of metaphysics. While Nietzsche does not make a methodical use of free association, neither does he go much further than the analysis of dream as a unit of meaning, there is nothing the *Traumdeutung* more resembles.

It is necessary to note that the dream, in Nietzsche or Freud either,¹⁸ does not have a unilaterally suspicious, deceitful, distracting meaning. Being as it is in Nietzsche the archetype of art, the dream is the door to imagining an ‘other-world’ where the satisfaction of desires is not forbidden. It is interesting to remember that Borges (1974, p. 483) in the prologue to *Artifices* (1944) notes that the misadventures of *Funes, the Memorious* – condemned, because of his incapacity to forget or refrain from the exact repetition of what was – is “a long metaphor of insomnia”. It would not be wrong to conclude from that metaphor that the dream would not be possible in a world always the same as itself, and that a world with no dreams would not escape surfeit or reiteration. The connection with Borges is tighter when we note that Borges himself (1974, p. 389) is who remembers, now in the *History of Eternity*, that “*Not sleeping* (I read in Robert Burton’s ancient treatise) is a heavy cross for melancholics, and we know that Nietzsche suffered this cross and was driven to seek salvation in the bitterness of chloral hydrate.” If the ‘bad’ interpretation of the dream leads to a belief in spirits and the other transcendent world of religions (including the

¹⁶And it is already clear in *The Gay Science*, (Nietzsche, 1882, p. 175): “*Dreaming*, Either one does not dream, or does so interestingly. One should learn to spend one’s waking life in the same way: not at all, or interestingly.”

¹⁷Assoun (1984) recalls that in *The Traveler and his Shadow* Nietzsche compares the dream with a literary narration, and there we find the threefold character that Freud assigns to the dream: associativity, symbolism and figuration.

¹⁸An attempt has already been made to show (Drivet, 2013), counter to Bloch’s (2004) critical interpretation, that in Freud’s work the dream is not reduced to the sphere of pathology or anamnesis (like a conservative tendency directed only to the past).

philosophical ones) where uncastigated evil is punished and the good that was not rewarded in life is compensated, then the ‘good’ interpretation leads to the world of art, the world beyond the spirit of heaviness and conformism of the morality of the herd. In the light of the Nietzschean and Freudian interpretation of dreams, false religious redemption can be reinterpreted as a promise of aesthetic redemption that need not appeal to a metaphysical instance.

In *The Gay Science*, §59, Nietzsche (1882, p. 70) compares artists like himself to the ‘sleepwalkers of the day’. The spirit and the *force of dreams* compel them to ascend by the most dangerous paths. The dream is, from this point of view, the goad for the highest aesthetic experience, the most intense, possibly the most honest. It is in the sphere of the dream where a potentiality shows itself as a splendid temptation (Nietzsche, 1882, §288). Stated in Freudian terms, the dream is at the same time the guardian of sleep and that of desire. Freud (1900, p. 612) recognizes in unconscious processes, from which the dream comes, an essential function in artistic creation:

We are probably inclined greatly to over-estimate the conscious character of intellectual and artistic production as well. Accounts given us by some of the most highly productive men, such as Goethe and Helmholtz, show rather that what is essential and new in their creations came to them without premeditation and as an almost ready-made whole.

Desire is in dreams, yet one does not dream what one wants: in an indisputable way, at least under the favours of Morpheus, it is desire that makes the decision. Any dream presents to the ego, with the help of the unconscious, a demand: satisfy an instinct if it comes from the id; solve a conflict, cancel a debt, establish a purpose if it comes from the remaining preconscious activity of waking life; satisfy a moral demand if it comes from the superego. But because the ego is accustomed to retaining firmly the desire to sleep, it feels this demand and endeavours to eliminate it. It manages to cancel it by means of an act of apparent acquiescence: a *fulfilment of desire*, inoffensive under these circumstances: “This replacement of the demand by the fulfilment of a wish remains the previous essential function of the dream-work” (Freud, 1940, p. 169). And if the dream can be many things, Freud says (1915–16, p. 223) “...there is one that it always is: the (disguised) fulfilment of an unconscious (repressed) wish”. Imaginary fulfilment but ultimately the anticipated experience of a ‘fulfilment’ – at the service of quietude or action, conformism or revolt. The dream is not only the ‘guardian of sleep’, as Schneider (2010) affirms about Freud to mark the distance Bion will take from Freud. It is not mere compensation or needy recompense for what was taken from us or we were made to give up, a substitute beyond criticism, completing the interpretations of the world and rationalizing domination; it is also the *transitory memory and awakening* of desire, so many times delayed; the atmosphere where desire breathes and revitalizes itself. Freud would not have made a mistake nor incurred in contradictions with his theory had he thought to formulate the universal semantics of the

dream with the paraphrase: *'Memento libidines'*. Dreaming is thus the *material* (i.e. immanent) condition of possibility of art, and of all the forms of that other possible world that with the force of desire impugns the deprivations of this world.

The dream as a Trojan horse?

The dream is not just the object of psychology because of its mechanisms but because it is a mode of transmission of the truth, truth that largely outstrips the rationalist (conscious) notion of this concept. For Zarathustra, to see someone sleep is to know him, and it is the dream [*Traum*] that must uncover what the friend does during wake (1883–85, I, 'The Friend'). Zarathustra uses the dream [*Traum*] to announce the great Noontide (1883–85, IV, 'Noontide'): the dream has, as we have already seen, the function of foretelling a truth that apparently cannot be said. As to Freud, if with *The Interpretation of Dreams* he declared himself to be closer to the occult sciences than to medical science and the philosophy of consciousness, what would he say years later after having what he termed a 'prophetic dream' in which he dreamt the death of Martin, his firstborn son, on the day he was lightly wounded on the front? This experience would become one more reason for Freud (1922 and 1941) to consider reports about telepathy – as can be imagined, today also the truth onto which dreams open shakes the foundations of the small beliefs of a reason that clings to the (present-day) conquests of scientific positivism.

The desacralization of the dream is built over the *immanent* question about its *immanent* meaning. We use here the concept of 'immanent' as opposed to 'transcendent' or 'metaphysical'. Immanent interpretation is a materialistic interpretation. In a broad sense, to be materialistic is to believe that God is dead. Thus, interpretation or analysis is a new transvaluation: "I shall describe the process which transforms the latent into the manifest content of dreams as the *'dream-work'*. The counterpart to this activity – one which brings about a transformation in the opposite direction – is already known to us as the *work of analysis*" (Freud, 1901b, p. 640). Assoun (1984) affirms that in Freud there is a systematic and close link between individual desire and the dream which is lacking in Nietzsche, who sees in any case a participation in the generic unconscious. Even so, the presence of individual desire and of the weight of biography in symbolization seems to be implicitly present in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. If Nietzsche is the first 'psychologist' (even the first psychoanalyst),¹⁹ the prophet of the superman and eternal return is, in the *avant la lettre* pre-history of psychoanalysis, the first analysand. Before the prophecy of the pessimistic seer (Nietzsche, 1883–85, II, The Soothsayer, XLI) Zarathustra becomes sad and tires; he ceases to eat and sleep and remains mute. At last he falls into a deep sleep. Awakening in anguish, he tells this dream, and the disciple he loved the most interprets it the way psychoanalysis would, shortly afterwards. From the beginning, the dream [*Traum*] is understood by the disciple

¹⁹In this regard, see Drivet (2016).

playing analyst as an enigma. It begins with the idea that it is holding imprisoned a meaning which must be liberated, and that this meaning concerns the dreamer's history. The elements of the *mise en scène* for the eye of consciousness are resignified in the voice of the third party. It is the dreamer, declares the interpreter, who appears represented as a wind that tears off the doors of death and its guardians, like laughter and vital figures that surge from the coffin that bursts. We are before an interpretation understood as an explanation or interpretation, in the strict sense that Freud attributes to the concept of *Deutung*, which is less surprising if we remember that previously Nietzsche had defined Apollo as *des traumdeutenden Apollo*. Notwithstanding, the (*symbolic*) interpretative method is still not fully *analytical* (*en détail*, not *en masse*), as it will be for Freud (1900, p. 103) at least in the first edition of his book. In their *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, Laplanche and Pontalis (1998, p. 201) explain that the interpretation found in the nucleus of Freudian doctrine and technique is the "making evident the latent meaning of material". For Freud, "the *Deutung* of a dream consists in ascertaining its *Bedeutung* or meaning" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1998, p. 490). This is not about an art in itself: in Freud interpretation is integrated with the dynamics of the cure; its use is subject to the technical rules that govern the entire treatment. In the excerpt of interest here, interpretation will be liberating for Zarathustra. And if Freud recognizes that secondary elaboration constitutes for the dreaming subject a first interpretation destined to offer a measure of coherence to the elements that are the product of the dream-work, Nietzsche (1875–82, p. 315) in a manuscript written in Sorrento during Spring-Summer of 1877 (22 [62]), does not ignore that "We do not think only inside the dream [*Traum*], but the dream itself is the result of a thought." Zarathustra's is a dream of anguish in which he dreams of his enemies, those who in reality he has already vanquished. Like the dreams about examinations Freud would describe (1900, pp. 271–4), the prophet's dream seems to want to say: "Do not fear tomorrow. Look at the anxiety you experienced before your enemies, and afterwards nothing bad happened to you." And just as Zarathustra came back to himself from his dream, they should awaken from their selves and return *to* Zarathustra, the disciple interprets. After the interpretation Zarathustra is immobile "...like one returning from a long foreign sojourn" (Nietzsche, 1883–85, *The Soothsayer*, p. 110). And does that not happen every time we awaken from a deep dream, as if we returned from that remote "inner foreign domain" that Freud calls the unconscious? Do we not feel that everything that was familiar has become strange?²⁰

²⁰Regarding *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Assoun (1984) insists on underlining the differences between Nietzsche and Freud. He devotes 15 valuable pages to the dream in his book, and after laying bare very important parallels between Nietzsche and Freud with regard to this, he concentrates on the regressive character of images in Freud, in contrast with the aesthetic valuation these receive in Nietzsche. Yet he appears to forget that the requirement of figurativeness as a regression to images has for Freud a subtle expressive function: given that one cannot regress to a prior mode of figuration abandoning verbal language, regression, seen from the viewpoint of the dream interpreter, is an astute and refined mode of saying the unsayable.

The dream transvaluates because it places life in play from the point of view of some repressed desire, and there lies its effect of immediate disorientation. Transvaluation relativizes certainties (beginning with the undoubted certainty that the ego is in command during wake) on which we support ourselves in everyday life; and makes the familiar ominous.²¹ Yet if the dream terrifies it is because it impels toward a truth that we find unbearable: In *The stillest Hour*, Nietzsche (1883–85, II, p. 116) speaks of the terror of he who falls asleep, because the ground fails where dreams begin [*Dieses sage ich euch zum Gleichniss. Gestern, zur stillsten Stunde, wich mir der Boden: der Traum begann*]. At that still hour there is something which, voiceless, speaks to Zarathustra and leads him to his truth, to face his fears, anger, pride and shame: his deepest desires and fears, even against all the prophet's resistances.

The dream-imbued meeting told in *The Vision and the Enigma* (Nietzsche, 1883–85, III, p. 124) depicts the spirit of gravity as “half-dwarf, half-mole” (*ibid.*, p. 124); Zarathustra speaks with this figure. It is a dream scene: as in dreams, at a certain moment the dwarf disappears and Zarathustra sees before him a shepherd, suffocating because a black serpent had slithered down his throat while he was sleeping. After the fruitless effort to wrest the snake from the shepherd's throat, Zarathustra shouts to the agonizing man to bite it, which ends the suffering. We will not discuss each of the elements of the dream. What is interesting, before anything, is that faced with this experience Zarathustra asks that the enigma, the vision, the (sleeping or waking) dream be interpreted for him. Later in the same work we will learn casually that it was Zarathustra himself who was the shepherd whom he himself helped, thus laying bare a further example of dream coding. The dream appears once again as a special sort of text, amenable to interpretation, and in *Zarathustra*, as will later be the case for Freud, the manifest dream is capable of clearly differentiating itself from latent dream thoughts.

As we have seen, in *Zarathustra* a number of accounts of dreams can be found, and similarities of the analyses of these with the work of

²¹This check to the mastery of the ego can be read in *The Gay Science*, §22, *L'ordre du jour pour le roi* [the order of the day for the king] Nietzsche (1882) tells a dream where he is awakened by the tolling bells of the tower clock, which at first he integrates into the dream but then awakens him with their insistence. Nietzsche interprets that the ‘god of the dream’ was mocking the too formal and princely manner of organizing the dreamer's day. It is interesting that in a posthumous annotation about this aphorism, Nietzsche wrote, “*Travailler pour le roi Moi*”, making it even clearer that the King (*Roi*) of the dream is the Ego (*Moi*). Equally, to explain the disruption of logic the dream produces in thinking governed by consciousness, Nietzsche turns to the dreamer who hears the tolling of bells, Freud (1915–16, p. 93) tells in the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* a dream of his own, to show the influence of external stimuli on the production of the dream, and resorts to the stimulus of some tolling bells: “I woke up one morning in a mountain resort in the Tyrol, knowing I had had a dream that the Pope was dead. I could not explain the dream to myself; but later on my wife asked me if I had heard the fearful noise made by the pealing of bells towards morning which had broken out from all the churches and chapels. No, I had heard nothing, my sleep is more resistant than hers; but thanks to her information I understood my dream.” Psychoanalysis says nothing about the specific composition that the dream-work constructed from the stimulus, or about the motivations that led to such a result, something more striking if we remember that slightly after this he notes that, “Dreams do not simply reproduce the stimulus; they work it over, they make allusions to it, they include it in some context, they replace it by something else (1915–16, p. 95). Freud knows perfectly well that the dream does not *reflect* external or internal stimuli but formulates with them a *representation*, an *interpretation*. Hatred for the Catholic Church is undoubtedly counted as an inevitable motivation that finds expression in a dream having oedipal resonances.

psychoanalysis, yet it is not so farfetched to state that the entire work is composed in an intermediate zone, in that 'in-between' where wake and the command of the laws of dreams mingle in masterly style, dominating both dimensions. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, this profound waking dream of Nietzsche's, is then the spokesman for what the voice of consciousness keeps silent, the representative of a reason that does not reduce to the propositional or the verbal, one that explores in the interstices of the body and announces its longings. The return of the remote past dreams propitiates, causes some rejection to the consciousness because returning also promises a liberation not reached by leaving animality behind/underneath, but by revaluing the anti-Pauline 'inner animal'. *Zarathustra* can be read (such was Borges's conjecture) like a sacred book but also, and not *despite* but precisely *because* of this, as a psychoanalytical case history: like a dream told by the analyst and by the analysand, a poetical self-analysis; a self-reflexive poem and myth that in some measure operate via the unconscious path. It is the experience of progressive emancipation from even the most archaic inner bonds, the chronicle of emergence from suffering, of redemption and going beyond your own self. Before the hard truth (one's own), there is flight (from oneself and in itself), resistance, pain and then liberation, freshness, aurora. *Zarathustra*, the dream-interpreter and first analysand, comes to announce the death of God and consequence, filled with hope (and not less terribly): superman [*Übermensch*]. This inaugurates, under the auspices of the 'Eternal Return', a dimension that resolves the vengeful intent of thought, concealed under the form of 'punishment', because it is capable of recognizing and accepting instead of denying and acting out the repressed. *Zarathustra* is defined by Nietzsche (1883–85, IV, 'On the Higher Man', p. 406) as a *Wahlacher*: he who laughs truth. But he does not only *laugh* and *dance* truth (as we read in this work) but also, and this we can state and understand only after the *Traumdeutung*, he is who, as each of us does, *dreams* truth (we can say that he is a *Wahrträumer*) but interpreting it as nobody has until this moment.

However, there is a version of dreams in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* which retains much more romanticism than Freud admits. In the mentioned work, dreams are experiences of ecstasy, with torrential, prophetic and overwhelming features. Freud does not exclude this possibility, but concentrates on dreams as enigmatic messages, less devastating than disturbing, less grandiloquent, and less judgemental and univocal than polyphonic. Nietzsche and Freud share the view that the dream is the vehicle of a truth that our conscience repels. But between life and death as absolute terms, between truth and lies (in an extramoral sense), beyond good and evil, between the summit and the most abject plains, there is a multiplicity of nuances over which Freud does not preach. The dream cherishes a truth: but it is not necessarily a universal truth, a teaching for another: not even *a* truth or one message. Even more: it may not be a truth historically or psychologically necessary for self-improvement. As a kind of Trojan horse, the dream can be the vehicle of a truth unpleasant and irreconcilable with reason and life: a traumatic truth that struggles for its symbolization. As Freud once wrote, the sad can also be true. It may be a terrifying truth that reveals and denounces reality

masked by a comforting illusion. And does not precisely this Primo Levi teach at the end of *The truce?* In the last chapter, entitled ‘Awakening’, he narrates a repeated dream that haunts him. A nightmare that is a dream within a dream, and that inspires the poem with which the book begins: he is at the table with his family, or in the green countryside, or in any warm and relaxed environment, far from any pain. And yet he experiences a subtle and deep anguish, the sensation of a coming threat. Then the whole appearance melts around him. Everything becomes chaos. He knows that this means he has returned to the Lager, and that nothing outside the Lager was true. The rest was a dream, he says. The inner dream is finished, and in the outer dream a voice is heard, brief, and said in a low voice. It is the order of dawn in Auschwitz: to get up. Unlike Zarathustra’s teaching, the certainty that the Lager will never abandon us is a form of the eternal return of the uncanny. There is probably no way to integrate Auschwitz into the love of fate. But perhaps it is also inaccurate in this case to define the dream as the vehicle of a ‘truth’ that brings the death of the dreamer, as a kind of suicidal gift. Since we can also infer ambiguity in this type of dream, at least sometimes, it is necessary to recognize in the dream, together with the return of the traumatic (together with the death wish), the insistence of the attempts to elaborate its nucleus (still) not symbolized.

Dreams are a kind of text that enables numerous readings. After the works of Nietzsche and Freud, the sacred interpretation of them was deactivated. These small and ephemeral intrapsychic works of art offer different ways to decode them. The dream can offer a counter-world with which to confront this (our) world (and tend to transform it), or in which to stay to flee from reality. And the dream is also a first attempt of *working-through* our existential dramas, it is memory of the desire and of the silenced truths. Nietzsche and Freud seem to say that if we place our trust in the dream without interpreting it, we remain captives of a delirious story. But if we place our trust in reality seen ingenuously, without sufficient awareness of the effects of morality or of the unconscious phantasies mediating our experience, we do not either emerge from the trap of our ideas, those that we incessantly impose on ourselves. Only interpretation willing to transvaluate maintains a regard for effective reality that liberates us from delirium without wresting from us our longing and hope, the horizon of going beyond ourselves, the future.

Translations of summary

Genèse et profanation de l'autre monde : l'interprétation des rêves. Cet article propose présenter la pensée de Friedrich Nietzsche sur le phénomène des rêves comme une antécédente incontournable de *Die Traumdeutung*. On va explorer les œuvres de Nietzsche et de Sigmund Freud pour établir et comparer les aspects les plus importants de leurs conceptions sur les rêves. On va réfléchir sur l'impact philosophique de l'interprétation des rêves formulée par ces auteurs en termes d'une transvaluation sécularisée des valeurs religieux et métaphysiques qu'on présente divisé en trois niveau: le remplacement de la Métaphysique par l'Histoire (Nietzsche), une traduction de la Métaphysique en Métapsychologie (Freud), et l'extension de la rationalité au-delà des limites étroites de la conscience (Nietzsche et Freud). On peut constater que, en tant qu'expression figurée d'un désir différé, le rêve est, selon ces deux auteurs, en même temps le paradigme de la satisfaction imaginaire (compensatoire) et le souvenir/l'excitation du désir. Avec l'expression "*Memento libidines*" on affirme que le rêve est le gardien de sommeil et du désir.

Finalment, et contrairement à la version d'Assoun, l'article propose une nouvelle interprétation d'*Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra* qui met en relief, à partir de l'analyse des rêves de Zarathoustra, la présence du désir individuel dans la conception nietzschéenne du rêve.

Genesis und Profanierung der Anderen Welt: Die Traumdeutung. Dieser Beitrag untersucht Nietzsches Überlegungen zum Phänomen der Träume als maßgeblichen Vorläufer von Freuds *Traumdeutung*. Nietzsches und Freuds Schriften werden untersucht, um die relevantesten Aspekte ihres jeweiligen Verständnisses der Träume herauszuarbeiten und miteinander zu vergleichen. Die philosophischen Implikationen beider Konzeptualisierungen werden mit Blick auf die Umwertung religiöser und metaphysischer Werte untersucht. Dabei werden drei epistemologische Veränderungen erkennbar: Die Ersetzung der Metaphysik durch die Geschichte (Nietzsche) und durch die Metapsychologie (Freud) sowie die Erweiterung der Rationalität über die Grenzen des Bewusstseins hinaus (Nietzsche und Freud). Der Autor zeigt, dass beide Autoren die Träume als bildlichen Ausdruck eines aufgeschobenen Wunsches verstehen, genauer: als imaginäre Erfüllung (Kompensation) und als Evokation/Hervorrufen des Wunsches. Sowohl bei Nietzsche als auch bei Freud werden Träume als Wächter des Schlafes und des Wunsches verstanden. Abschließend präsentiert der Autor eine von P. Assoun abweichende neue Interpretation von *Also sprach Zarathustra*, da die Deutung der Träume innerhalb des nietzschianischen Verständnisses des Phänomens des Propheten individuelle Wunschaktivität zutage treten lässt.

Genesi e profanazione dell'altro mondo: l'interpretazione dei sogni. Questo articolo si incentra sulle riflessioni di Nietzsche sul fenomeno dei sogni, come precedente fondamentale della Traumdeutung di Freud. Si esaminano le opere di Nietzsche e di Freud per stabilire e confrontare gli aspetti di maggior rilievo della loro concettualizzazione del sogno. Si valuta l'impatto filosofico di entrambe le prospettive teoriche in termini di trasposizione dei valori religiosi e metafisici, che rivela tre trasformazioni epistemologiche: la sostituzione della metafisica con la storia (Nietzsche) e con la metapsicologia (Freud) e l'estensione della razionalità oltre i limiti della coscienza (Nietzsche and Freud). Si mostra come entrambi gli autori ritenessero il sogno l'espressione figurativa del desiderio differito – o, più specificamente, la realizzazione immaginaria (compensazione) e l'evocazione/risveglio del desiderio. Come si può cogliere dall'espressione *Memento libidines*, entrambe le concettualizzazioni rappresentano il sogno come il guardiano del sonno e del desiderio. Si propone infine, e in contrasto con Assoun, una nuova interpretazione di *Così parlò Zarathustra*, come interpretazione dei sogni del profeta, che rivela la presenza del desiderio individuale nel contesto della visione nietzschiana di questo fenomeno.

Génesis y profanación del otro mundo: La interpretación de los sueños. Este trabajo presenta el pensamiento de Friedrich Nietzsche sobre el fenómeno de los sueños como un antecedente ineludible de *Die Traumdeutung*. Se exploran con exhaustividad las obras de Nietzsche y Sigmund Freud para establecer y comparar los puntos centrales de sus respectivas concepciones del sueño. Se reflexiona sobre el impacto filosófico de la interpretación de los sueños forjada por ambos en términos de una transvaloración secularizadora de los valores religiosos y metafísicos que deslindamos en tres niveles: el reemplazo de la Metafísica por la Historia (Nietzsche), una traducción de la Metafísica en Metapsicología (Freud), y la ampliación de la racionalidad más allá de los estrechos límites de la conciencia (Nietzsche y Freud). Se demuestra que, en tanto expresión figurada de un deseo postergado, el sueño es para ambos tanto el paradigma de la satisfacción imaginaria (compensatoria) como del recuerdo/despertar del deseo. Expresándolo con la fórmula "*Memento libidines*", se afirma que si el sueño es el guardián del dormir, también lo es del deseo. Por último, y contra la versión de Assoun, el artículo propone una novedosa interpretación de *Así habló Zarathustra* que pone de relieve, a partir del análisis de los sueños de Zarathustra, la presencia del deseo individual en la concepción nietzschiana del sueño.

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